The New Human Resources Management

of the United Nations

A Study of the Reform Process

between 1985 and 2005

Dissertation

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“My vision is of an independent international civil service which will once again be known for its high standards of ethics, fairness, transparency and accountability, as well as its culture of continuous learning, high performance and managerial excellence.”

(Quote of the SG, in: Investing in the United Nations for a stronger organization worldwide, A/60/692: para. 26)
Acknowledgements

I like to thank the many friends and colleagues who assisted me with their advice and provided me with their support and encouragement during the years I devoted to this research project.

I like in particular to extend my gratitude to my friend Dr. Bob Yaffee, Senior Research/Statistical Consultant of the Statistics and Social Science Group, ITS/ACS, New York University, USA. Bob conducted the testing of the data collected by me through individual interviews and offered his advice and assistance in the analysis of the data.

I am also grateful to Dr. Michael Wolf who is teaching at the Verwaltungsfachhochschule Koblenz, Germany. Michael provided me with his personal advice as a friend and experienced researcher and gave me feedback on the layout of this study on administrative reform.

My special thanks go to Thomas Kamps for his time and his assistance in the editing of the many versions and the final draft. Thomas’ critic and assistance was of great value as he could provide his expertise as a former member of the UN Department of Human Resources Management.

I also like to express my appreciation to those colleagues in the UN system, who directed my special attention to issues of concern through their comments and questions.

I could not have accomplished this work without the continuous support of my husband, Ray, and the encouragement given by my parents.
Preface

This study contains the findings of independent research of UN human resources management reforms between 1985 and 2005. The conclusions and interpretations of data collected during the course of this study are a reflection of my analysis of primary and secondary literature, of UN official statistics and of observations and results obtained from the pilot study I conducted in 2002. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

The decision to this research project is the result of my personal interest in questions of the internal management of the United Nations. By turning this interest into the topic of scientific research, I extended my curiosity about the current administrative reforms into a personal development goal.

In December 2001, I obtained the preliminary clearance from the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources of the UN. The topic was then registered at the Freie Universität Berlin as doctoral thesis in April 2002, and I was fortunate to find in Prof. Dr. Albrecht and Prof. Dr. Hüfner two doctoral advisors, who are both experienced and familiar with the UN and its repeated reform efforts.

I expect this study to be a constructive contribution to the ongoing UN reform process and hope it will motivate other students of various scientific disciplines to further research the internal management of the UN.

I like to note that the exclusive use of the male form in this research paper is applied solely for reasons of simplicity and has no significance in terms of the actual gender representation at the UN Secretariat. The use of only one pronoun (the male version) is justified as it agrees with standards in research literature.

Anna Botham-Edighoffer

Geneva, August 2006
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Abbreviations

ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACPAQ Advisory Committee on Post Adjustment Questions
CCISUA Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations (includes staff unions of UNESCO, UNICEF & UNIDO)
CPC Committee for Programme and Coordination
DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DGACM Department of General Assembly and Conference Management
DM Department of Management
DPI Department of Public Information
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSG Deputy Secretary-General
e-PAS electronic Performance Appraisal System (see also PAS)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FICSA Federation of International Civil Servants’ Associations (includes staff of all the common-system organizations, incl. UNOG)
Fifth Committee Administrative and Budgetary Committee
FS Field Service
GA General Assembly
GERWUN Group on Equal Rights for Women at the United Nations
GS General Service
G-to-P General Service to Professional Service (examination)
HR human resources
HRMIS Human Resources Management Information System
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICSAB International Civil Service Advisory Board
ICSC International Civil Service Commission
ICJ International Court of Justice
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO International Labour Organization
IMIS Integrated Management Information System
IMO International Maritime Organization
INTERORG Interorganizational bodies
ITC International Trade Centre
ITU International Telecommunication Union
JIU Joint Inspection Unit
KIMRS Key Item Management Reporting System
MBO Management by objective
OCSS Office of Central Support Services
OD Organization Development
ODS Official Document System
OHRLDC Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Land-locked Developing and Small Island Developing States
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<td>OHRM</td>
<td>Office of Human Resources Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPPBA</td>
<td>Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts</td>
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<td>OSRGCAC</td>
<td>Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAS</td>
<td>Performance Appraisal System (see also e-PAS)</td>
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<td>PER</td>
<td>Performance Evaluation Report (system)</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Performance Management</td>
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<td>ref.</td>
<td>reference</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>Sixth Committee</td>
<td>Legal Committee</td>
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<td>SSS</td>
<td>Staff Selection System</td>
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<td>UN(O)</td>
<td>United Nations (Organization)</td>
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<td>UNAT</td>
<td>United Nations Administrative Tribunal</td>
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<td>UNCHS</td>
<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFIP</td>
<td>United Nations Fund for International Partnerships</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>(Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
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<td>UNMOVIC</td>
<td>United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission</td>
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<td>UNOG</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Geneva</td>
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<td>UNOIP</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme</td>
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<td>UNON</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Nairobi</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOV</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Vienna</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories</td>
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<td>UNU</td>
<td>United Nations University</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPU</td>
<td>Universal Postal Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WIPO</td>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The reform of the United Nations (UN) is not a topic that was put on the agenda of Member States recently, but has been a subject of discussion in the General Assembly (GA) since the early days of the UN’s existence.\(^1\) By its fifth year of existence, and not yet settled into its headquarters in New York, the UN was already subjected by its legislators to a first general review of its personnel management system.\(^2\)

Many efforts to reform the UN followed over the years and the organization has since undergone numerous changes of its structures and policies.\(^3\) Some of these changes were managed re-organizations and formally approved modifications to procedures, others originated from operational requirements due to the expansion of mandates. These earlier changes must also be seen against the growing membership of the UN and global developments.

Founded in 1945 by 50 nations, the membership of the UN had more than doubled by 1961 and had grown to a total of 159 Member States by 1984 (United Nations (Ed.) 1985: A.3). By 2002, the UN membership reached 191 members and in June 2006 the UN grew with the admission of Montenegro to 192 members (www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm; http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html; United Nations (Ed.) 2004: 297-302; and GA/10479).

Two major developments brought about an increased interest in UN reforms in the 1980s: (1) the reform movements of the public sector in many Member States of the UN since the

\(^1\) Reforms of international organizations as a necessity to improve the functioning and effectiveness were already a point of discussion during the time of existence of the League of Nations (Volger (Hrsg.) 2000: 430). Even though the UN was subject of numerous reviews since its early days of existence with a first review of the UN salary, allowance and leave system in 1949, we can place the start of the reform movement into the 1980s, leading ultimately to the current comprehensive reform programme in 1997.

\(^2\) The first international civil servants moved into the Secretariat Building at the East River in New York on 21 August 1950.

\(^3\) The term \textit{organization} is in the context of this study used in reference to the main organization of the UN with its six principal organs and various offices worldwide.
early 1980s, and (2) conflicting expectations about the role of the UN among the grown membership of the organization with its majority of developing and less developed countries.

In the earlier years of the UN, Member States had basically agreed on structural changes and concentrated on revisions of policies and regulations, including those concerning the human resources (HR) management of the UN. Since the 1980s Member States have focused on a more efficient use of resources and the effective execution of programmes. As in so many national public sector reforms, the reform of the UN became a code word for change in order to improve its internal management, to modify its structures and to make more efficient use of its resources.

The UN administration, which had grown into a large bureaucracy over the years as a result of decisions of its members, was now criticised by these same Member States for its wasteful operations, duplications, lack of controls, lax management and excessive administrative cost, in particular its high expenditures for staff and staff-related cost. Since many Member States had introduced national reforms of their own public sectors in an attempt to improve services to their citizens with less bureaucratic hurdles and at lower costs, they also wanted to see similar reforms to be introduced in the UN.

In addition, many large UN contributors, foremost the United States of America (USA), looked for ways to limit the expenditures and to make better use of funds given to the organization. While they had introduced national reforms to restrict public spending at home, these Member States were now looking for savings in other areas of their spending.

While the international community prepared for the 40th anniversary of the UN, the call for UN reforms became an accepted subject that would stay on the agenda of the organization in the coming years.

The expansion of the UN system had been mirrored by changes to the organization of the Secretariat. In the area of development and social affairs, the GA established in March

---

4 The UN system was especially between the 1950s and 1970s expanded into a system of regional UN Offices, subsidiary bodies (to the GA or the Security Council) and Commissions (under the direction of the Economic and Social Council), in addition to the creation of UN Programmes, Funds and Special Agencies.
1978 the Department of Technical Co-operation for Development. This department was later and in conjunction with structural reforms merged with the Department of International Economic and Social Affairs as recommended by the Group of high-level experts (also called the Group of 18; A/41/49). Other organizational changes followed, so, for instance, the establishment of the new Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992 “to provide executive direction, management and logistical support to United Nations peacekeeping operations worldwide” (United Nations (Ed.) 1998a: 27).

Modifications to the structure of the Secretariat, as well as changes of procedures and regulations were proposed and approved by Member States to make the organization more effective and more responsive in view of its new mandates. Some of the structural changes to the Secretariat were later revised, in some instances even reversed only to re-establish previous structures, which may suggest that such actions were taken without a long-term vision of the future role of the UN and for political reasons. On the other hand, we must accept that changes were approved at a time when future developments were unknown and consequences of such decisions could not have been foreseen by the legislators.

Despite these changes to the organization, the basic hierarchical structures of the UN bureaucracy were maintained throughout the years. The UN Secretariat is today structured in virtually the identical scheme to the day of its foundation. There are departments (in some instances also called offices) headed by politically appointed Under-Secretaries-General who report directly to the Secretary-General (SG). At the next lower levels are offices of specific services under the management of Assistant Secretaries-General and these devolve further into Divisions, Sections and Units at succeeding lower levels.

Member States did not change these administrative bureaucratic structures, nor did they assign greater administrative authorities to the SG through a possible amendment of the UN Charter. The Secretariat developed meanwhile from a mainly headquarters-driven

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5 An exception was the proposal of the Soviet Union during the review of the activities and organization of the Secretariat in 1961 to introduce a troika of leadership. For further details see chapter 1.8.1 on the historic overview of former organizational change proposals. For a the full text of the Charter see United Nations (1980): Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (DPI/511, 2-80)
organization into a network of field offices each with a limited delegation of authority for the management of their financial and human resources.

Today more than two thirds of UN (Secretariat) international civil servants work in field offices worldwide. These changes to operational requirements also brought about changes to the funding of UN activities. Over 50 per cent of field operations are now financed through voluntary contributions and less than 50 per cent within the regular budget (A/55/253).

Despite several reviews of the UN HR management system and those apparent changes in view of increased field operations, changes of the Secretariat’s HR management were made within existing basic hierarchal structures. At last, a group of experts (the Group of 18) concluded in 1986 that “personnel policy and management in the United Nations has suffered as a result of the considerable political and other pressures that have influenced the selection of staff” and recommended that the personnel management needed to be improved and the staff rules and regulations needed to be revised (A/41/49: 20). This review of the Group of 18 was the beginning of continuous efforts to reform the UN HR management that prolonged for over 20 years.

The reform programme of 1997 is a renewed attempt to improve the UN HR management system. While this reform programme is to some degree based on earlier proposals with respect to the management of the UN international civil service, it is different in that it is embedded in a comprehensive reform that extends to various other management aspects of the Secretariat.

Many other UN entities including the Specialized Agencies have introduced similar reforms, some of which were designed independently; others were introduced in consultations with the SG to ensure coherence with his comprehensive reform programme. Two elements of this HR management reform make cooperation among the various UN

---

6 This study of the UN HR management reform concentrates mainly on reform measures proposed with respect to the administrative body of the UN, the Secretariat with a particular emphasis to those proposed between 1985 and 2005, especially the most recent reforms introduced by the SG since 1997. For a detailed overview of the UN system, including the UN Secretariat, see http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html and Annex I.
entities a particularly important requirement, firstly, the requirement to increase the mobility of staff and, secondly, the goal to motivate and support continuous learning within the UN.\textsuperscript{8}

The aspects of the UN HR management reform are perhaps the least publicly observed part of this comprehensive UN reform programme. The results of internal management changes are often not easily detectable by outsiders, as the complex system of management structures and internal regulations are sometimes difficult to comprehend.

For those who are the main recipients of UN assistance, much depends, however, on the quality of the internal management, e.g. the effective delivery of aid at the most efficient use of the often restricted financial funds. The effectiveness and efficiency of such programmes relies to a large degree on the numbers of personnel the organization can devote these operations and their skills and qualifications. The founders wrote, consequently, into the Charter of the UN that the qualification of UN civil servants shall be the “paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service” so the organization could secure “the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity” of the UN civil service (UN Charter Article 101).

In accordance with the UN Charter, Articles 97, 100 and 101, the SG is responsible for the UN HR management. Member States have frequently attempted to influence administrative decisions or at occasions even interfered with the authority of the SG for the internal management. Former Secretaries-General have objected with greater or less success to such actions by Member States. The current reform programme addresses this issue by proposing the strengthening of the SG’s role as Chief Administrative Officer.

Any discussion of past and current UN reforms must take into consideration the owners of the UN. It is often ignored that the UN serves ultimately not governments, but the ‘peoples’ according to the Preamble of the UN Charter. Especially, the reform of the HR management of the UN must bear in mind that changes are not just about improving

\textsuperscript{7} Examples of reforms of UN entities are the ongoing reform of the management system of UNDP and reforms introduced by FAO.

\textsuperscript{8} The term \textit{mobility} refers to the condition for all UN civil servants to move frequently to a new position and/or duty station. In view of staff training and continuous learning, the ambition is to make greater use of UN training facilities, such as the UN System Staff College in Turin.
internal management practices and changing the conditions of the international civil service, but are supposed to improve services to the global citizens who are the ultimate shareholders of the organization.

1.2 The Need to Act

As Carnevale states: “The problems facing public administration in general, and human resources administration in particular, are essentially political, not managerial” (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 251). In the case of the UN, it appears that the organization is facing both political as well as managerial obstacles with respect to its HR management reform efforts.

Reforms of past years, including those that were introduced in 1985 have not brought about the changes and improvements the Member States expected. Hopes and aspirations among UN administrators and the staff at large for reforms remain today as valid as they were in the mid 1980s.

When reviewing the state of the existing UN HR management of the Secretariat in 1997, the need for further reforms became evident. The HR management of the UN Secretariat was found to be too labour-intensive, time-consuming, and showed a number of flaws such as a lack of systematic staff training, of HR planning and of a career development programme (A/51/950).

Statistics documented many of the specific reform requirements. Recruitments and appointments were found to take on average one year or longer (A/49/845: para. 126). At the same time, high rates of resignations, especially among the younger and highly qualified Professionals, were apparent. Statistics also revealed that the average UN civil servant in the Secretariat was 49 years old, which would eventually lead to increased

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9 A survey conducted in 1985 showed that 80% of staff members were supporting a reform of the UN Secretariat (Beigbeder 1987: 22). The pilot study conducted in connection with my research in 2002 confirmed the high agreement among staff with the need for reform of the UN, in particular with its HR management system. These results were again validated by a survey conducted by UNOG Staff in 2005, whereby 48% of respondents think the ongoing reforms and restructuring of the UN are positive (UNOG Staff 2005).
numbers of retirements and a future higher demand to recruit at a faster pace more personnel.\textsuperscript{10}

In addition, high levels of resentment, frustration and a certain degree of mistrust among UN employees towards the leadership and management were apparent.\textsuperscript{11} The detection of such a negative organizational climate gave cause to also initiate a change of the organizational culture in the UN Secretariat as part of the reforms. It was rightly recognized by the ‘designers’ of this 1997 reform that the need for reforms must go beyond formal and structural changes of the HR management system, since the organization was in need of fundamental changes, including those of attitudes and behaviours, and required the reaffirmation of its (lost) values.

There is general agreement among all main actors of the UN about the need for further reforms.\textsuperscript{12} Not all actors agree, however, on the same reasons for these reforms and on the kind of reforms they would like to see being implemented. Member States expect from reforms an improved management of financial and HR resources, the more effective utilization of the organization’s resources and an efficient execution of programmes. Inevitably, these expectations are to various degrees influenced by individual governments’ different national and political interests.

Earlier studies by Müller (1992) and Dicke (1994) show that developing countries give priorities to measures expected to improve the organization’s ability to provide technical and economic assistance. Countries in need of international assistance emphasize the

\textsuperscript{10} Expectations were that about 4,500 employees would retire from the UN civil service between 1997 and 2007, on average 400 per year (A/51/950: para. 230; Highlights No.18, October 2000: 2).

\textsuperscript{11} Indicators for the existence of a harmful climate were also detected by the Staff Poll of 1985 and a survey, carried out by the UNOG Coordinating Committee of the Staff Union of 1995 (Beigbeder 1987: 22; UNOG Staff 1995). The Integrity Survey by Deloitte Consulting confirms that a low level of trust towards management remains also in 2004 an issue (Deloitte Consulting 2004).

\textsuperscript{12} Main actors are, in accordance with organization theories and management theories, those with a particular interest in the organization, also referred to as the stakeholders of the organization. In the context of this study, these are UN Member States, members of the UN administration and the staff of the UN Secretariat at large, including their staff representatives (UN Staff Union). The terms UN administration and UN administrators refers accordingly to the SG and senior managers, who are foremost responsible for the execution of the UN HR management and its reform. See also chapter 1.7.3.
importance of more support and better, more effective programme administration. The majority of the industrialized countries, on the other hand, expect a more efficient use of the resources of the organization, e.g. through better coordination of programmes, more controls over the organization’s spending and changes of UN management processes. The USA as the largest contributor to the UN budget remains a strong force in the demand for administrative reforms and is, as a consequence, criticised for its repeated attempt to dominate the UN also in conjunction with the reform process.

The fundamental need for reforms is rooted in the increasing demands on the UN against the limited financial resources at its disposal to meet those demands. A de-facto zero-growth budget over the past years requires that resources be utilized in the most cost-efficient way. Reforms often entail, however, additional investments. Where extra funding for such investments is not available, resources must be re-deployed to finance reform programmes, otherwise such reforms must be deferred.

The comprehensive reform programme introduced by SG Kofi Annan in 1997 includes questions on the organization’s internal management, administrative structures, financial planning and budgetary processes, but also addresses issues of the leadership by Member States and possible changes with respect to the UN’s legislative organs and subsidiary bodies. Such proposals address, for instance, new working methods for the GA, the reform of the Security Council, and other improvements in view of the UN’s mandates in the areas of economic and social affairs (e.g. better governance and Global Compact).13

As these comprehensive reforms are extended to other UN entities of the UN system in order to better coordinate policies and programmes, this reform initiative has a greater potential to be successful then earlier, single efforts. The strong interest in the successful implementation of these reforms at all levels of the organization creates an additional higher potential for success.

Hence, it could be expected that the proposed reforms would enjoy the wide support among all stakeholders of the organization. Expectations towards a successful reform process
remain in particular strong among the staff of the UN Secretariat, as they look forward to a reformed, fairer and more transparent HR management system and to better conditions, including enhanced career opportunities.

Nonetheless, managers and UN civil servants at the lower levels of the Secretariat bureaucracy hold different views about the ‘desired’ final outcome of this reform, as my research could substantiate. In addition, individual expectations are also influenced by experiences with earlier reforms. Organizational change often creates uncertainties and anxiety among employees, e.g. with respect to their job security and future career opportunities. As a result, UN civil servants may act reluctantly, resist or even boycott reform efforts as certain changes are introduced.

In view of these obstacles resulting from the different expectations among the stakeholders, the SG and his senior management team, who are ultimately responsible for the implementation of administrative reforms, must act as mediators (among legislators) and pursue a strategy to gain and retain the support, trust and cooperation of Member States and the staff (including managers) during the reform process. Consequently, the development of UN reforms and their implementation is a complicated balancing act of promoting a reform programme that is manageable, agreeable to all stakeholders and supported by them.

While the quest for UN reforms including changes of the UN HR management methods has a long history, Member States have pressed especially since the mid 1980s for real improvements to the UN’s internal management practices. The organization must now demonstrate its ability for reforms, in particular since similar reforms are pursued or have already been completed in other organizations and in a number of national public administrations.

If the UN administrative leadership can present specific results and measurable improvements of its internal management practices, Member States who are still critical of the reform progress may become more supportive of it. The UN needs the continued

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13 Report A/51/950 details these areas of desired changes and improvements in paras. 97-216, reflecting on questions of the SG’s new approaches to policy formulation. Member States pledged to support the proposed reforms in their Millennium Declaration A/RES/55/2 (see hereto also A/56/326).
support of Member States not only in financial terms. If these reforms are to be successful, the organization will need the common approval of the proposed administrative reforms.

It would be naïve, however, to expect that a successful reforms will be sufficient to change politically motivated decisions in the legislative organs of the UN or to ensure that Member States fulfil their financial obligations to the organization on time. This reform is, nonetheless, an opportunity for UN administrators to win and secure the support and trust of a larger number of Member States; this may in turn lead to their stronger support of other proposed organizational changes.

1.3 The Need to Research

In order to understand what needs to be done to improve the UN’s HR management, those in charge of reforms rely not only on practical experience, but must also be able to call upon knowledge gained from scientific research in the design and actual implementation of reforms. Independent research can, furthermore, contribute valuable information to this reform process, if the UN chooses to introduce reform measures that have already been tested in other organizations.

The systematic evaluation of reform measures would be important in order to establish from the start whether the new instruments are as effective as expected. Unfortunately, the UN often failed to monitor the impact of changes. As a result, corrective actions were delayed by several years or one system replaced another without reaching the results intended.14

The lack of systematic analysis of former change programmes of the UN is regrettable, also in view of the current reform. UN reformers and legislators could have utilized such knowledge gained from former reform efforts in the design of current reform strategies. The ongoing reform process is likewise implemented without sufficient monitoring and

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14 Examples are the actual prolonging of the recruitment and appointment process as a result of the introduction of the Vacancy Management and Staff Redeployment system in December 1986 and the failed Performance Evaluation Reporting system in use until the late 1990s, which was then replaced by the Performance Appraisal System (see hereto also the subject Case Study below).
evaluation mechanisms, although frequent surveys have been conducted to gather data from the staff on such questions as work/life issues, harassment and integrity.\textsuperscript{15}

From the review of these surveys and of reform progress reports issued by the SG, it is not evident if and how the administration has methodically and continuously studied the impact of reform measures.\textsuperscript{16} Certainly, no objective assessment has been done on the impact of management and supervisory training in conjunction with these HR management reforms.

Surveys taken between 2000 and 2004, e.g. the survey on staff mobility and on job satisfaction, concentrated on recording the current perceptions of international civil servants, but could not assess whether reforms had created any changes in attitudes over time or other improvements that would result from actual reform actions. Plans to monitor the implementation of HR management reforms were announced by the administration, but results of such internal reviews, if collected, have not been published.

Research by impartial researchers could also detect causes for such undesired phenomena as the high numbers of resignations among highly qualified and young Professionals.\textsuperscript{17} Of particular interest in connection with this reform should be the state of the organizational climate and a study on the feasibility to change the organizational culture of the UN over time. Research on the UN’s organizational culture will be of particular importance, since there will be no successful reform without a positive change of its culture.

This reform process also offers an opportunity to scholars to study the UN in times of change, which can provide useful insights in reform processes of international organizations and their internal management, in general. As Dijkzeul (1997) states, there is no “research

\textsuperscript{15} A number of respondents to my pilot study (see chapter 4.4), among them several staff representatives, regretted likewise that the UN administration had not established a system that would be suitable to analyse methodically the impact of this current reform programme.

\textsuperscript{16} The study on the impact of the human resources management reform (A/59/253) by the Office of Internal Oversight Services is the only more scientifically organized study of reforms.
tradition” for the internal management of international organizations, nor have scientific disciplines such as the studies of international relations, public and business administration, paid particular attention to the internal functioning of international organizations (Dijkzeul 1997: 14). Dijkzeul gives no conclusive reasons for this observed lack of interest among the majority of scholars, but he states that the “lack of attention to international organizations and management theory has been noted repeatedly” in the 1980s and that “the neglect of organization theory…leads to an oversimplified view of international organizations” (Dijkzeul 1997: 14 and 17).

The many studies of the UN examine specific policy areas, e.g. the UN peacekeeping or development programmes, as well as former reform programmes of the UN, but do not attempt to construct a theoretical model of international organizations and international management. The general conclusions of such research do usually not go beyond presenting descriptive summaries of the ‘nature’ of international organizations.

Scholars and practitioners agree, nevertheless, that the UN (and other international organizations) cannot simply be compared with national public administrations and its internal management has distinct characteristics that may not be found in national organizations. The logical consequence that must follow is the need to develop a specific theory of international organizations and their management.

In agreement with Dijkzeul, much could be gained from more systematic research of international organizations by representatives of disciplines such as business administration, public administration and international relations. The management of international organizations

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17 There is, for instance, a high, but unconfirmed probability that a number of outside factors may cause these large numbers of resignations among young Professionals. Changes of attitudes and career aspirations of younger UN staff members compared with former generations of UN civil servants might be reasons for these observed phenomena. As for system-immanent reasons, like the lack of spousal employment, dissatisfaction of career opportunities and dissatisfaction with the UN’s remuneration system, see report of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) on ‘Young Professionals in selected Organizations of the United Nations System’ (JIU/REP/2000/7); and responses to the Fifth Committee by Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources, Rafiah Salim, December 1998: 5; also A/55/253: Annex IX).

18 See hereto also Pitt/Weiss (Eds.) (1986) and Beigbeder (1988), who provide useful collections of their own research and that of other scholars. Such empirical studies of selected areas of the UN management and the UN bureaucracy, partially mixed with hypothetical assessments by single authors, open a number of questions that could be further explored through scientific methods.
organizations offers a broad field for this much needed research and the development of a theory of international organizations could make an important contribution to a better understanding of the internal mechanics of the UN and many, other international organizations. Such research could, furthermore, lead to a better understanding and development of more effective management strategies for practitioners, especially at times of re-organizations.\textsuperscript{19}

1.4 Objectives

The objective of this study is to examine proposed and implemented reforms of the UN HR management system. This study reviews the reform process beginning from 1985, but puts a definite emphasis on those reforms that are part of the new HR management in connection with the comprehensive reform programme of 1997. My review ends with the accomplishments up to and including 2005.

HR management is a central management function and as such it determines how effectively and efficiently the UN can implement and manage its many programmes. The qualifications of UN staff and managers are key to the overall performance of the organization. Qualification, skills and experience (or organizational memory) do not, however, ensure high performance. Performance is linked to motivation and self-determination. Leadership and the management culture are determining factors for the productivity and quality of work performed in an organization. Just as good management can increase productivity through the selection of the right person for the job and by motivating employees to better performance, so can poor management negatively influence the climate and, consequently, the efficiency (productivity) of an organization.

The UN Secretariat with operations worldwide and with a body of staff from many different nations, with different cultural and social backgrounds, faces unique challenges to its HR management that are not present in many other multi-national co-operations or in regional organizations, such as the European Union and the Association of South-East Asian

\textsuperscript{19} Such research could, for instance, identify management tools that would build on the ideal image of the international civil servant, offer practical applications and analyse the specific management issues of international organizations with a multinational work force. There is, furthermore, no sufficient empirical knowledge on the many external influences and cultural
Nations. This analysis of the new UN HR management takes this distinct international character of the UN’s management into account.

As reforms are implemented, the ultimate aim would be to determine whether those reforms improve the conditions of service of UN civil servants and whether the reform goal to introduce modern management practices to make the UN more efficient and more effective UN is realistic under the given conditions.

This study offers an assessment of the ongoing reform process directed at the HR management in the UN Secretariat, which represents one of its very central management functions. Rather than coming to a conclusive and final judgement of this reform in progress, the objective of my research is to document and examine the proposed reforms during the implementation process and the state of reform implementation.

The pilot study (conducted in 2002) contributes findings on the perceptions of a small sample group of UN civil servants at all levels of the organization with respect to this ongoing reform process. As this pilot study provides valuable indicators on the problems perceived by respondents with respect to the implementation, it is anticipated that these results will proof useful to UN administrators and other individuals concerned with UN reform by providing pointers for further analyses of this reform programme.
This study is based on a number of hypotheses, which are outlined in table 1 below.

Table 1: Hypotheses

1. The success of reforms is related to the fulfilment of the various actors’ responsibilities in accordance with their functions in this reform process. While the central responsibility for the design, planning and implementation of reform measures is with the SG (and his senior management team), the success of reforms also depends on the legislative and financial actions of Member States and the participation of the staff at large throughout the planning and implementation and the accord among all actors on the reform goals and required actions.
2. The more reform progresses successfully (measured on real improvements), the more confidence in the reform programme and trust between actors in their honest efforts to reform the UN will emerge. This trust-building process will support the development of an organizational culture of cooperation and greater transparency.
3. Reforming the HR management system, including the decentralization of HR management functions, is not automatically generating a more efficient and effective management, but must go hand-in-hand with the three common rules for good HR management: trust, communication and participation.
4. Predicaments of the HR management were not exclusively resulting from the then-existing (central) structures. Real improvements in the UN HR management will require a (new) calibre of managers who can operate in a changed framework of adaptable policies and structures that are the expressed overall UN management culture of a progressive, fair and exceptional employer.
5. The useful application of new technologies positively relates to the efficiency of the new HR management; the attitudes and behaviours of managers towards their staff and managers’ awareness of modern HR management relates, alternatively, to the effectiveness of the new UN HR management.

The two central questions guiding this study are:

a. What needs to be done to change the organizational climate and culture in support of the overall reform of the UN?

b. What are the issues that concern staff members in this HR management progress of the UN Secretariat?
1.5 Structure

Chapter 1 is an introduction to the topic of reform by providing background information on the question of UN reform. It outlines the research methods used in the evaluation of the UN HR management reform and lays the groundwork for the discussion of the new HR management of the UN by providing definitions and introducing the terminology used in the context of reform. In particular, the introduction of the main actors in the UN Secretariat and the overview of former reform initiatives present the basis for the following development of scenarios of this reform programme that guide this study of UN HR management reform.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background and in a snapshot the realities of the UN international civil service. Before discussing the applicable principles of the international civil service, selected organization theories and models of change and organizational success are introduced from which this reform of the UN HR management can draw. The examination of the realities of the international civil service is a critical discourse on the ideals and the praxis of the international civil service, including a discussion of the role of Member States as bearers of the principles and guarantors of the independence of the international civil service. This chapter contains further statistical data on the composition of the UN Secretariat and provides an overview of the policies ruling the HR management system as well as the complex system of monitoring and controls.

Chapter 3 presents the UN HR reform programme of SG Kofi Annan initiated in 1997 developed from reforms demanded by Member States since 1985. The components of this new HR management model are discussed in light of earlier reform efforts. Progress and success of the 10 building blocks are determined based on the actual implementation and application of the respective reform measures and against management theories, empirical research and practical experiences with reforms of other organizations, where applicable.

Chapter 4 contains the assessment of the new HR management, which includes the quantitative and qualitative analysis of this ongoing reform. It further includes a case study
on the UN Performance Appraisal System (PAS) the UN Secretariat, which illustrates some of the challenges of this UN reform.

The pilot study, conducted in connection with this research that surveyed UN staff at various levels and in offices ranging from the UN headquarters in New York to main offices in Geneva and Vienna, provides additional, valuable indicators of perceptions among the staff towards this reform programme.

Chapter 5 presents an outlook, and a summary of future challenges. This chapter also refers to the need for reforms of the UN Staff Union as the main staff representing body. It further discusses some areas that would need to be further researched. In concluding this study, I present a vision of the future UN arguing that a necessary degree of central UN HR management is important since the organization must establish a more systematic HR planning and career development system and would need to guarantee equal employment conditions.

1.6 Research Methods and Intricacies

This study of the UN reform uses various methodological approaches. Selected organization theories were used as much as such theories were suitable to explain existing structures and internal mechanisms of the UN. In addition, models of organizational change served some aspects of this analysis of the UN HR management.

The primary sources of information to assess the progress and success of the implementation of reforms were UN official records. Since 1985 over fifteen official reports have been issued on administrative reforms. Those relevant to the reform of the HR management were included in the assessment of reform efforts between 1985 and up to 1996. As secondary sources in the review of HR management reforms 1985 – 1996 publications of scholars and authorities familiar with the UN management system were

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20 Selected organization theories are for instance Max Weber’s bureaucracy analysis, the Human Relations Approach, the Human Resources Approach and relevant aspects of the new Institutional Economics.
Key documents relating to the UN HR management reform introduced in 1997 are the SG’s report A/51/950 (Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform), by which he proposed his comprehensive reform programme; report A/55/253, which outlined the implementation of the HR management reform programme; report A/57/387 (Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change); and report A/60/692 (Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide).

In addition, reforms are steered by the review of the peace operations (A/55/305) and the Millennium Declaration (A/56/326) including the 2005 World Summit Outcome resolution (A/RES/60/1). Of further importance are progress reports published by the SG (e.g. A/53/414, A/53/748, A/55/270, A/55/399 and A/59/263) and the annual reports of the SG on the work of the Organization.

In order to verify the timeliness of the implementation of reforms measures, numerous GA resolutions were reviewed against reform progress reports. In addition, numerous briefs, newsletters and other information published on the question of UN reforms and on the specific issue of UN HR management reform, including publications at the UN Intranet and the UN Website were used as references in this study.

To substantiate information from official sources of the UN, I reviewed reports, statements and surveys of independent entities, such as the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), OIOS, as well as material published by the UN Staff Union and other groups representing UN civil servants, such as the Group on Equal Rights for Women (GERWUN).

Empirical data collected in the course of a pilot study were analysed to obtain indicators on the perception of the staff at the various levels of the UN Secretariat and their acceptance of proposed reform measures. In addition to the methods used for the analysis of the data collected as described in the respective Annex hereto, the quantitative and qualitative

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21 Mr. Yves Beigbeder worked in administrative and consultative positions with FAO, WHO and UNITAR. Mr. Maurice Bertrand was a member of the UN Joint Inspection Unit for about eighteen years.
methods used in this analysis are mainly derived from Babbie (1990) and (1998) and Judd, Smith and Kidder (1991).

This study utilized further findings on particular issues concerning UN reform and internal management questions of international organizations by a variety of independent researchers such as Dicke (1994), (1998), Hüfner (1994) and Cox/Jacobson (1973).

Observational data and informal talks with UN personnel contributed to the selection of some of the reform measures emphasized in this study. It should be further noted that this study gained additional insights through information provided by representatives of the UN Administration and the UN Staff Union not readily available through official records or other formal sources.

The quantitative analysis compares stated reform goals with the actual implementation over time. After taking count of the implemented measures, establishing the time frame within which reforms were introduced and the implementation was completed, the timely execution of these reform measures was rated on a dual scale by comparing the announced deadline, with the published date of completion and the factual date of implementation.

An attempt to conduct an independent qualitative analysis of the specific changes and single reform measures was found to be unfeasible as too many relevant factors were missing or unknown to come to a reliable assessment. Only if more detailed data would be accessible could an objective and convincing evaluation determine whether or not single reforms or the combination of reform measures had indeed produced positive changes towards measurable improvements of the UN HR management. To conduct such an evaluation would have required the collection of data and information through an independent survey to capture the status before and after the initiation of reforms. Instead the success of selected measures was established on the basis of reports issued by

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22 The first comprehensive progress report in connection with the millennium commitment will be due in 2006 (A/56/326: para. 305).
23 Informal talks, independent from the pilot study on UN HR management reform, were held between 1998 and 2003 with UN personnel of almost all levels at UN Offices in New York, Geneva, Bonn, Nairobi and Vienna, as well as with staff in field missions (UNAMA and UNTSO).
independent bodies such as the OIOS and the JIU and proposed reform measures were reviewed against results of similar reform actions in other organizations where appropriate.

While conducting my analysis, I was confronted with three major difficulties: (1) access to and availability of official information on the latest status of reform efforts, (2) the question of accuracy and (3) the validity of information.

The most recent information with respect to the implementation of HR management reforms is accessible through UN official records. As progress reports, including statements by the SG and his senior managers, present a general outline of the reform progress and remain a view from ‘above’, such information does not allow for a more detailed analysis of the status of reform measures. In order to obtain a fuller spectrum of information, it is necessary to refer to protocols of debates in the respective legislative organs and subsidiary bodies, internal briefing notes, the findings of independent bodies and statements of groups representing the interests of the staff.

Specific problems of the implementation of single measures, e.g. issues of resistance among actors and information concerning the internal decision-making processes, often remain inaccessible to independent researchers. The information on which such research is based remains, consequently, selective and incomplete and may hamper an accurate assessment.

Examples for the lack of accuracy are statements about the implementation of specific measures. The administration reported, for instance, in 2000 about the HR Management Information System as a tool to facilitate the HR planning process (United Nations (Ed.) 2000). The report gave the impression as if the system was established, while it was neither fully running at the time as a component of the overall Information Management Information System nor was it available to managers throughout the UN Secretariat.

Another example was the announcement concerning the introduction of the electronic Performance Appraisal System (e-PAS). The administration stated in reports published in 2003 that e-PAS was operational throughout the UN Secretariat. In fact, the system was not introduced in many field offices by the end of 2003. Such inaccuracies could eventually lead to false judgements on the reform progress. Where disagreements between official reports and the actual status of reform actions were detected, clarifications were
obtained directly from the UN administration or the Staff Union. Where discrepancies could not be resolved, e.g. with respect to differing statistical data, they were stated with references to the respective sources.  

1.7 Definitions in the Context of UN Reform

1.7.1 The Topic of Reform

Before entering into the discussion of UN reform and the new HR management, it is necessary to define the terminology and to comment on the concepts on which this reform is built. Beginning with the topic of reform, it should be noted that the term ‘reform’ was in the past context of UN reforms often applied to changes of the system that comprised more or less partial modifications rather than an overall process of organizational change.

In the context of this study, reform is seen as a complex process of renewal and wide-ranging changes of the organization with the objective of bringing about improvements and to remove faults. Reform may entail aspects of downsizing, restructuring and re-engineering, but goes beyond single modifications of various aspects, such as changes of policies, procedures and structures. It constitutes a transformation of an organization that entails a variety of change actions and is ultimately directed at improvements of the organizational culture. As such it is best described as a process of organizational development.

Strictly following this definition of reform, the reform programme of 1997 is different from earlier UN reform attempts that were a collection of separate change programmes. The 1997 reform programme pursues short-, medium and long-term objectives and includes changes in many different areas of the UN Secretariat. Although planned, prepared and carried out by the respective actors within the organization, they are part of a larger

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24 When reviewing statistical data of the UN published in annual reports and for various purposes, a repetitive problem observed is that statistics are frequently inconsistent, incomplete and not available for specific occupational groups or in the format desired; such observations have also been reported by internal and legislative bodies (see for example A/56/956: 2; also A/RES/56/127).

25 The organizational development approach perceives organizational change as a process of participation and acceptance that involves employees and the leadership of an organization. For a comprehensive and critical overview see Schreyögg 2000: 503-528.
programme of renewal of the UN that includes the Secretariat and its HR management as a central component of the internal management of the organization. Moreover, this reform is the continuation, and to some part, the resumption of reforms that have been demanded by legislators since the mid 1980s.

Each reform process can be divided into six stages: (1) a reform initiative, (2) a process that is in management theories usually referred to as ‘unfreezing’ and requires the involvement of all stakeholders (in the case of the UN: Member States, managers and staff), (3) a system analysis to assess the present condition, (4) a reform formulation, design and planning which is consequently followed by the actual (5) implementation and requires (6) controls, monitoring and evaluation of the reform implementation to ensure that the realization of the reform programme is as expected and fulfils its purpose. Eventually, reform measures have to be reformulated, renegotiated or they have to be redesigned.\(^\text{26}\)

Organizations change usually over time responding to their environment by adjusting their internal processes and policies to internal and external factors, independently from existing and fully formulated reform plans or management strategies (Bea/Göbel 1999: 418-420). However, any un-structured organizational changes, including spontaneous adjustments of the structures and management practices as a reaction to acute problems, or modifications of selected areas in the management of an organization are in the context of this study not considered reforms. These are, in accordance with Bea and Göbel, simply adjustments of an existing system either to increase productivity or to address other problems of organizational dysfunctions, like the lack of internal (effective) communication or poor quality standards.

Just as reforms of public sector administrations became a familiar topic on the agenda in many national governments during the 1980s, so did the UN reform debate develop from single management aspects and areas of operation to wider-ranging reforms that would

\(^\text{26}\) These six stages of organizational reform were derived from the model of re-organization formulated by Ulrich and Fluri (Ulrich/Fluri 1995: 211).
involve fundamental changes of the ways the UN manages its financial resources and its personnel.27

More recent UN reform discussions can, consequently, be divided in three fields:

a. The political reform debate about the need to amend the UN Charter and to modify individual legislative bodies, such as the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) including the voting system in the GA;

b. The structural/conceptual reform debate concerning new efforts of international assistance, more coordination, better cooperation and the general effectiveness of the UN (see for instance Agenda for Development 1992 and Agenda for Peace 1992); and

c. Reforms of the internal management, e.g. those related to the management of UN financial and human resources.

While the demand for reforms was mainly introduced by the USA, other Member States, among them the main contributors including the Soviet Union, agreed.28 The experience of the majority of industrialized countries and a number of developing countries of the British Commonwealth with reforms of their own public services may have reinforced these

27 The USA as the largest contributor to the UN budget remains the strongest force demanding reforms. Frederickson (1999) places, likewise, the start of the repositioning of US public services in the mid-1980s. He not only points to the increased “congressional micromanagement” by the US government since 1978 (Civil Service Reform Act), but also agrees with Light (1999) in his analysis of the downsizing and outsourcing of public services as illusions resulting in “significant further illusions of merit, illusions of accountability, and illusions of capacity” (Frederickson 1999: 703). These observations about US reforms are significant, since similar issues are brought forward in connection with UN reforms. The UN administration has repeatedly complaint about the micromanagement of the GA. Similar to US reforms, the UN has voted to outsource its commercial operations in the 1980s and mid-1990s, expecting to lower administrative costs and increasing income to the organization. Outsourcing is also an issue of the latest reform report issued in March 2006.

28 The top seven contributors to the UN paying 72% of the UN regular budget are: USA (22%), Japan (18 %), Germany (10%), France (7%), Italy (5%), the UK (5%) and Russia (3%) (http://www.un.org/News/facts/setting.htm, downloaded on 23 July 2001)
Member States’ views of the UN administration as a bloated bureaucracy, ill-equipped to fulfil its mission.29

The central reform goal (improvements of efficiency and effectiveness) is “to make the world organization … more responsive” (A/42/234: 4). In the context of critical notations of the inefficiency of the UN and in view of limited funding of UN operations, which are further restraint by the failure of Member States to pay their contributions to the regular budget on time, the implementation of visible reforms becomes increasingly an issue of survival and a tool of legitimisation of the UN. Hitherto many Member States, including the USA, continue to delay payments of their annual contributions or threaten to withhold them as a tool to re-enforce the implementation of reforms and for other (political) reasons.30

The purpose of UN reforms differs among industrialized and developing Member States as is discussed in more detail in chapter 1.7.4. Nevertheless, they all seem to share the common concern to defend their national interests and to reach for greater influence and higher returns from their UN membership.

Proposed HR management reforms as a vital part of the comprehensive administrative reform programme can be analysed from various aspects:

a. As part of ideological changes that are directed at the organizational culture;

b. As part of a reform strategy to create a more flexible, decentralized management;

c. As a function to improve the internal management through modernization and simplifications; and

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29 National reforms were introduced in Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Finland, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and USA (Maguire (Ed.) 1996; Beigbeder 1987: 159-160). Among the Commonwealth members were Ghana, Jamaica, Malta, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zimbabwe (Kaul 1996).

30 Hindell states for instances: “America only supports the UN when it agrees with it. … For example, Washington encourages reform of the Secretariat – although not so much for the good of the UN as for saving money and promoting its own influence” (Hindell 1992: 32). Beigbeder also suggests that the quest for reform to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN may be used by governments to realize their political goals or to justify the withholding of contributions in violation of the principles of the UN Charter, rather than to foster a thorough management reform of the UN (Beigbeder 1997: 5-9; also Unser 1997: 344-357). To the positions of other western Member States and the Soviet Union see Beigbeder 1987: 16-20.
d. As part of structural reforms ranging from re-organizations of the Secretariat to establishing new entities and bodies to enforce the new HR management system.

After the failed and incomplete attempts of continuous reforms since 1985, it has become increasingly important for the UN to demonstrate its ability to reform itself and to implement modern management methods. The current reform is influenced by a variety of modern management theories and reform models of private sector and public sector organizations, including those of the *New Public Management*.

The implementation of proposed reforms depend on five factors: (1) leadership; (2) dialogue; (3) trust; (4) agreement and (5) time.

The realization of reforms depends at the outset on the (political) leadership, e.g. the support and clear guidelines offered by Member States. The progress of HR management reforms since 1997 demonstrates that the (administrative) internal leadership of SG Annan and his senior management (reform) team were able to develop and implement a number of important HR management reforms within given authorities.

Before reforms can be implemented, a process of dialogue among the various actors has to take place to exchange views with respect to the goals and expectations. Communication and participation is important to define common reform objectives and to design specific measures. New technologies have certainly contributed to better communication and more information about the reform process. They have also opened up new possibilities for an ongoing dialogue between the staff and the internal leadership.

The building of trust among various groups of actors in the ongoing reform process is a critical factor during the entire reform process. The re-appointment of SG Annan for a second term was certainly an expression of trust by Member States in his ability to implement the desired reforms among other things. The state of trust from UN employees towards the leadership of Member States as well as towards the administrative leadership remains rather questionable and the specific reasons would have to be further studied.

There is basic agreement among all actors on the need of reforms, although objectives of reforms vary within and among the various groups of actors. Disagreements among
Member States on the kind of reforms could become one of the biggest hindrances in the reform progress.

Time is an essential factor in the design, introduction and implementation of reforms. On one hand, sufficient time has to be devoted in the planning of reforms to ensure the agreement of all parties involved. Continuous changes and repetitive modifications over extended periods can, conversely, result in frustration among actors and a loss of trust in the leadership. It is, therefore, important to promptly implement agreed reforms and to monitor the process to ensure the proper application of such measures over time.

As research in the context of this study shows, politicians, administrators and scholars alike all refer to UN reform as a tool to introduce improvements, as if the only logical equation is ‘reform equals improvement’. The history of earlier UN reform efforts showed, however, that not every change would automatically ensure the desired results. Empirical research of organized changes in other organizations of the private and public sector illustrated similar unexpected outcomes.  

So can isolated changes have negative influences on the performance and morale of staff and even decrease the actual efficiency and effectiveness of organizational actions. If not built on wide agreement through the participation of employees and negotiations with union representatives, they can lead to inner or actual resignations of staff. Possible negative effects of the decentralizing of HR management functions could be unfair treatment of UN employees by managers and higher expenditures for training of managers (JIU/REP/2000/6).

The reform of the UN after 1985 can be divided into three phases. The first phase (1985-1990) initiated by the appointment of a group of high-level experts (the Group of 18) “fell considerably short” not only with respect to the HR management aspects of this reform.

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31 So does Hickok (1998) argue, that “the most prominent effects of downsizing” are “in relation to culture change, not in relation to saved cost or short-term productivity gains.” See also for public sector reforms the examples given by Knott/Miller (1987) referring to reforms of the US public administration as failures since they could not accomplish their main goals, which was the creation of a neutral administration (Knott/Miller 1987: 274).
The second phase (1991-1996) focussed mainly on the economic and social fields of operation and the area of peacekeeping, but left also a number of HR management reforms unfinished. The third phase of UN reform began in 1997 with the introduction of SG Kofi Annan’s comprehensive reform programme that includes HR management reforms some of which originate from proposals of the Group of 18. This latest reform programme can be further divided in phase I (1997 – 2001), which was partitioned in track 1 (March – June 1997) and track 2 (July 1997 – Dec. 2001), and in phase II (2002 – 2006).

1.7.2 Vision, Mission, Strategy

“There is widespread agreement in the performance management literature that organizations should have a vision, mission and strategy” (Williams 2000: 33). A vision, mission and strategy are of equal relevance with respect to the planned reform process of the UN.

Unfortunately, not all actors in the UN may be fully aware of the vision, mission and the different strategies applied by the leadership (Member States and administrators) in view of the many UN mandates. In some instances, staff members may not even share the vision of senior management with respect to proposed reforms. Considering the numerous actors within the UN, a variety of perceptions about the organization’s vision, mission and reform strategy may exist depending on the level and personal involvement of those actors and their access to information. For the assessment of UN HR management reforms, it is indispensable to understand the reform vision, mission and strategy.

**Vision:** The overall vision of the UN is manifested in the preamble of the Charter of the UN, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights”, and “to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”.

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32 Inner resignation means that employees stay with a company, but are not willing to contribute more than the absolute minimum on performance as a result of their frustration and lack of motivation. Management theories see various reasons for this to occur and address the problem with strategies to motivate employees, like incentives and non-monetary instruments.

33 Statement by Margaret Joan Anstee (Müller 1992 (Vol. I): ii). Ms. Anstee was the SG’s Special Co-ordinator for the Implementation of Reforms Arising From the Group of 18 Report.

34 Vision is defined as the long-term aim of an organization (Williams 2000: 34-35).
In the context of UN HR management reform, the vision expressed by the UN administration is the creation of “a simplified structure that avoids duplication and achieves greater impact; empowered and responsible staff and managers; a leaner and more efficient United Nations Secretariat; and an organization that fosters management excellence and is accountable for achieving results determined by the Member States” (A/51/950: par. 224).

This overall vision is broken down in six areas of reform activities, each with their own vision statement:

a. The vision of organizational change is elucidated as the commitment of the SG “to creating an organizational culture that is responsive and results-oriented, that rewards creativity and innovation and promotes continuous learning, high performance and managerial excellence” (A/53/414: par. 5).

b. The vision to plan for the future in terms of HR management foresees “an organization which has developed the necessary tools for making informed decisions about its resources requirements and workforce, in order to meet its changing needs” (A/53/414: para. 14).

c. In view of the new recruitment and placement policies of the UN, the vision is the development of an “organization that has the right person in the right place at the right time, and can recruit and place staff through a system that is fair, timely, simple, cost-effective and transparent, while empowering managers to deliver programmes and fulfil General Assembly mandates” (A/53/414: para. 20).

d. The vision statement in connection with staff administration is to evolve an organization “which manages its human resources on a global basis through simpler, faster and automated administrative processes and, by delegating, to the maximum extent possible, the authority, responsibility and accountability for the day-to-day management of human resources to the line managers.”

e. The vision of staff development, performance management and career support is a “more focused, responsive, result-oriented Organization that builds and maintains a

35 A/53/414: para. 25. Line managers are usually appointed within the UN Secretariat at P-5 or D-1 levels and above.
highly competent, multi-skilled, versatile and independent international civil service. An Organization capable of effectively fulfilling its present and future mandates and, at the same time, meeting the development needs and career aspirations of individual staff members. An organizational culture that fosters high performance, managerial excellence, continuous learning and mutual trust and respect” (A/53/414: para. 31).

f. In view of the conditions of service, the vision statement is: “A strong and independent international civil service with conditions of service unique to a United Nations ethos, including a streamlined and competitive compensation package that addresses the needs of a global civil service and fosters greater operational and administrative flexibility” (A/53/414: para. 48).

The latest reform report A/60/692 outlines a number of additional, new visions of the SG with respect to the continued reform process as from 2006 onwards.

Mission: The mission of an organization is derived from its legitimacy, its purpose and principles. “The mission should describe the organization’s current purpose in terms of what the organization will do over the near term” (Bounds/Yorks/Adams/Ranney 1994: 218). The definition found by Campbell and Yeung stands for “an organization’s character, identity and reason for existence” (Campbell/Yeung 1991: 145).

In the case of the UN, the purposes and principles are outlined in chapter I of the Charter such as the goals to maintain international peace and security, to guarantee the existence of independent nations and their right of self-determination and to pursue social and economic sustainable development and to fulfil the many other tasks as mandated by the legislators and contained in the mission statements of the GA as well as the tasks given to the organization by the SG. One purpose of the UN reform is the renewal of the existing HR management into a new (more flexible) HR management.

Strategy: The strategy of an organization is defined as the combination of methods and measures to accomplish the pre-determined goals. “The MEANS by which organizations meet, or seek to meet, OBJECTIVES. There can be a strategy for each product or service, and an overall strategy for the organization” (Thompson 1990: x). A strategy could be a
clearly defined plan with specifically defined procedures and rules or a general code of conduct with vaguely formulated goals.

Strategies applied by the UN can be analysed on two levels. The overall organizational strategy and the strategies applied for each organizational goal are determined by decisions of the GA and other legislative bodies of the UN. The SG in his role as Chief Administrator and executive head of the UN has the right and responsibility “to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 99 of the UN Charter). Such submissions of the SG could constitute proposals to alter certain organizational strategies.

Based on the overall strategy of the UN, the SG is ultimately responsible to formulate his management and reform strategy. These strategies may be in turn influenced by decisions of Member States concerning the internal management.

While the UN’s change strategies were earlier directed at an expansion of the system and its mandates, the reform strategy since the 1980s is mainly concerned with the consolidation and coordination of actions. UN HR management reform strategies are to establish a new management culture in support of the new HR management, to ensure the involvement and cooperation of managers, and to improve the communication between administrators, legislators and the staff at large.

Key elements of this strategy are “conditions of service that are progressive and competitive”, “clearly defined core organizational values and competencies”, a changed role of the Office of Human Resource Management (OHRM) and to foster “an atmosphere of mutual trust between staff and managers, to name the most noteworthy” (A/53/414: para. 9).

1.7.3 The Actors in the Reform Process

This study distinguishes between external and internal actors (see table 2). The group of external actors is further divided into those belonging to the public sector that includes representatives of national governments, political groups and individual politicians that may participate in the reform discussion and representatives of the private sector, such as private businesses, foundations not financed by governments, research institutions and individuals
of the private sphere that might contribute to the reform of the UN (e.g. independent consultants and experts not part of any political groups or governments). The group of internal actors is divided into those belonging to the internal management of the UN Secretariat and those counted as the general category of personnel.

Table 2: Actors in the context of UN reforms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXTERNAL</th>
<th>INTERNAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC SECTOR</td>
<td>PRIVATE SECTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Governments</td>
<td>Businesses and corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National ministries and political parties</td>
<td>National unions, labour organizations and business organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Representatives and other members of the delegation voting on behalf of their governments in the GA, its subsidiary committees and other legislative organs</td>
<td>Foundations and organizations with a particular interest in the UN; independent, not-for-profit organizations with private sponsorship (others than NGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental/not-for-profit organizations and other institutions associated with political parties and specific agenda on international affairs</td>
<td>Institutions with an interest in international relations and research; press and media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals of the political or public arena who contribute to the reform process</td>
<td>Independent individuals who donate funds or contribute otherwise to the UN (e.g. celebrities); consultants and experts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INDEPENDENT AND INTER-AGENCY BODIES**

Subsidiary bodies of the GA with an advisory role (JIU) or decision-making power (ICSC) on UN management issues and OIOS as independent agency within the UN Secretariat

Table 2 shows also a third category of UN actors. These are the independent and inter-agencies bodies, the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). These bodies were
established by Member States and are distinct from the external and internal actors. Their members are independent experts, appointed by the GA for a pre-determined period of time.\textsuperscript{36}

Although these institutions are not part of the UN administration, they maintain offices within UN facilities and their salaries and operational expenses are included in the provisions of the regular budget of the UN. UN civil servants are appointed to assist in the work of these entities and to perform administrative tasks. These independent entities are managed by specific provisions and their statutes are approved by the GA.

Although not every group of actors listed in the above table directly participates in the discussion or formulation of organizational reforms related to the UN HR management, they may indirectly influence the reform process at various degrees.

The main actors in the context of reforms are the governments of Member States, represented by their Permanent Representatives in the GA and subsidiary bodies, the UN administration, represented by the SG, the Deputy Secretary-General and senior managers, and the UN staff at large, represented by the Staff Union and other groups with a particular interest in staff-related issues (e.g. GERWUN). These main actors can be divided in the group of shareholders and/or stakeholders in accordance with organization theories (Bea/Göbel 1999: 391-392; Schreyögg 2000: 316).

Shareholders are all those actors with distinct property rights in an organization by means of their investments (shares) and powers of decision-making over the organizations activities (Bea/Göbel 1999: 391-392). The ultimate UN shareholders are the citizens of Member States.\textsuperscript{37} The investments of Member States are their contributions to the regular budget and special funds and they exercise their decision-making powers through their votes within the legislative bodies of the UN.

\textsuperscript{36} OIOS is somewhat an exception to this generalization, as the head of OIOS is appointed for a single five-year term by the SG (A/RES/48/218 B).
In the context of the *Property Rights Approach*, Member States have as owners of the UN the right to utilise the organization and the right to change the organization’s substance, e.g. by changing its structure and size (Bea/Göbel 1999: 130).

Decisions and contributions of Member States determine, accordingly, the range of operations of the UN and shape the development and implementation of reforms. By approving the budget and the staffing table of the UN Secretariat, Member States make decisions about the administration’s capacities to introduce reform measures. The schedules of consultations within the GA and the subsidiaries committees and the approvals of proposed reform measures influence the progress of these reforms.

**Stakeholders** are those individuals or groups who have a particular interest in the organization and are affected by the organization’s actions (Ulrich/Fluri 1995: 77-79). The term stakeholder is, consequently, far more general and includes a large number of possible actors within an organization as well as in the organization’s environment. By definition, Member States and their citizens belong, consequently, to both groups. Other stakeholders of concern to this analysis of HR management reform are the members of the UN administration and the staff at large, in addition to the independent and inter-agency bodies, the JIU, ICSC and OIOS.

Among the internal actors only few have active decision-making power with respect to the internal management of the UN and the implementation of reforms. In accordance with the UN Charter, such authorities are given to the SG as the Chief Administrative Officer, who can further delegate these authorities to other UN officials.

Those stakeholders with no active formal decision-making power can, nevertheless, influence the internal reform process through their participation in the development and implementation of reforms or by providing or withholding information to those who have

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37 Member States are those states with full membership of the UN in accordance with Article 4 of the UN Charter. Member States are represented in the UN system by their Permanent Representatives and other delegates of their Permanent Missions to the UN who act on instructions and orders from their governments. Ideally, these governments are elected freely and democratically by the citizens of Member States to represent the interests of the majority of their citizens in the legislative organs of the UN. Citizens constitute as taxpayers ultimately the actual financiers and, therefore, shareholders of the UN.
the legislative or administrative decision-making power. Of all stakeholders, Member States are subjected to the most complex issues of limited and/or incomplete information.

Among those that might not have direct decision-making powers, but a strong potential of influencing the reform process are certainly the JIU and the OIOS. Through their studies and reports on reform issues, they can influence decisions of Member States, as well as those of the SG.

The ICSC, among the three independent bodies has a specific mandate that mainly concerns HR management issues within the Common System. It has further the authority to make decisions with respect to HR management aspects, for instance in connection with job classification standards (as per Article 13 of the ICSC Statute) and the classification of duty stations (as per Article 11).

1.7.4 Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Context of UN Reform

Efficiency and effectiveness are probably the two topics appearing most frequently in the context of past and current discussions of UN reform. To build a common ground for the examination of the HR management reform, the following three questions will be answered:

a. What are the common scientific definitions of efficiency and effectiveness of international organizations?

b. How do UN actors (Member States and administrators) define the efficiency and effectiveness of UN?

c. What are the specific criteria of an effective and efficient UN HR management?

In brief, findings are that there is no single scientific definition. Depending on different approaches and academic disciplines, there are numerous definitions with respect to the

\[38\] Art. 10 of the Statute reads: “The Commission shall make recommendations to the General Assembly on (a) the broad principles for the determination of the conditions of service of the staff; (b) the scales of salaries and post adjustments for staff in the Professional and higher categories; (c) allowances and benefits of staff which are determined by the General Assembly” and the “(d) staff assessment.” ICSC may also make recommendations on standards of recruitment, the establishment of rosters, issues related to the career development and staff training, and the evaluation of staff as determined by Art. 14 (ICSC/1/Rev.1: 3).
efficiency and/or effectiveness of organizations. There is also no common agreement among Member States and UN administrators. In addition, definitions given by scholars and practitioners, as well as statements by Member States and UN administrators, do not always clearly differentiate between efficiency and effectiveness. With respect to the possible contribution of the UN HR management reform, the goal is to improve the recruitment and promotion process, simplify rules and procedures, establish new mechanisms, such as HR planning and a systematic career development programme, that will make HR management less time consuming and less costly.

**Scientific definitions:**

The most common definition of efficiency (“to do things right“, Ulrich/Fluri 1995: 133) in theories of social science and in organization theories, describes it as function to operate and accomplish organizational goals in the most rational, cost-effective manner (as defined by the stakeholders), to be measured as input-output relation, whereby the output is determined by the organization’s productivity or successful performance in view of specific goals (Schreyögg 2000: 49; Staehle 1999: 444; Dicke/Hüfner (Hrsg.) 1987: 32).

In accordance with the strategic constituencies approach, an organization is, therefore, considered efficient if it meets the demands and expectations of those members from whom it receives its resources (Staehle 1999: 447). Dicke defines efficiency (“in very general terms”) as the relationship between vested (allocated) resources and the projected or desired purpose (Dicke 1994: 40). Inputs (money, personnel etc.) are compared with (expected) outputs (services and products) and measured in terms of quantity or quality or a combination of both (Williams 2000: 55-58).

In accordance with the definition of Pareto, a project is efficient “if it will make either everyone better off or at least no one worse off than he would have been without the project” (Knott/Miller 1987: 211). For Max Weber, efficiency is “the achievement of the optimum result with the least expenditure of resources, not the achievement of a result regardless of its quality, with the absolute minimum of expenditure” (Weber 1964: 161). Weber’s thesis of the bureaucracy as the most efficient instrument to coordinate and control complex organizational actions and later models of specialization and separation into simple processes by Fayol or Taylor are, however, debated by representatives of the Human
Resources Approach in that extreme specialization and hierarchical structures lead to frustrations, lethargy and ineffectiveness of organizations (Schreyögg 2000: 32, 53).

Effectiveness (“to do the right things“, Ulrich/Fluri 1995: 133) is defined by Dicke as the level of goal attainment, expressed as ratio of the actual result (‘Ist-Leistung’) and the (however defined) expected or prescribed result (‘Soll-Leistung’) (Dicke 1994: 40). Bea and Göbel define effectiveness similarly as the level of goal attainment, e.g. how ‘well’ goals are realized (Bea and Göbel 1999: 14).

Williams sets effectiveness (goal attainment) in the context of performance, as one of three dimensions of organizational performance, namely effectiveness, efficiency and changeability (Williams 2000: 64-66).

These definitions of efficiency and effectiveness indicate that the common understanding, however differently expressed by scholars of different disciplines and schools, is built on the rational use of resources (efficiency) and the level of goal attainment (effectiveness). While it may be easy to measure or determine the economic (rational) use of resources and the level of goal attainment in some organizations, this appears more difficult in service organizations in particular if they are exposed to various influences, as is the case with the UN. In the end, the final judgement of the efficiency and effectiveness of an organization is in the hands of its stakeholders (in the case of the UN, including the recipients of the its many services).

Perceptions and priorities of Member States:

The examination of UN official records shows a diverse interpretation of the terms ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ by representatives of Member States. Their statements refer

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39 Considering the complexity of activities of the UN and its input-output relations, including the multi-layered influences and decision-making processes characteristic for all international organizations, mathematical methods and existing empirical methods fail to assess the efficiency and/or effectiveness satisfactorily (Dicke/Hüfner (Hrsg.) 1987: 11-28; see hereto also Staehle 1999: 437-452, 456-458). It is, nevertheless, considered possible by the author to evaluate the UN HR management reform programme. The basic assumption in this context would then be that the reform programme is considered efficient if it is implemented within a time frame that is equivalent to similar actions of other organizations and at similar costs. This would require a comparative analysis. The effectiveness of this reform programme can further be determined based on its final outcome, e.g. by examining whether it accomplished its set target to reduce recruitment periods, complemented by surveys of users.
to efficiency and effectiveness, displaying a de-facto lack of clarity in the use of terminology, but also the apparent presumption of a common definition and understanding among all actors (Dicke 1994: 20).

Member States also often propose actions to improve the efficiency and/or effectiveness that contradict each other. On one hand, it is the expansion and growth to create a more efficient organization and greater effectiveness of programmes; on the other hand, these improvements are to be accomplished through the streamlining of organizational structures and a zero-growth budget. As Dicke further determines, various groups of Member States display different priorities and concepts in their arguments for improving the efficiency of the UN here and its effectiveness there (Dicke 1994: 196, 227-228). As he then concludes, such different positions may be a result of these Member States as potential donors or recipients of UN assistance.

The majority of industrialized countries wish to obtain a higher level of efficiency through better management practices, recommending a zero-growth budget or minimal increases only in areas their political leaders determine important. As the main contributors to the organization (and major ‘donor countries’), their goal is to restrict expenditures through consolidation and better coordination, in particular in the area of general administration. In contrast, those countries that are in the majority recipients of international aid emphasize the importance of securing the effective administration of programmes and the efficient use of funds, but broadly oppose budget reductions. Their major interests are to increase UN activities, arguing that more, not less money is needed to make the UN more effective and that any reductions of personnel and financial resources could jeopardize the success of development and peacekeeping operations.

Moreover, changing national and political interests of Member States may well explain some of their contradictory views displayed with regard to efficiency and effectiveness. As Beigbeder observes, Member States occasionally employ the issue of efficiency and effectiveness to distract from their actual political agenda, rather than to successfully pursue
the reform of the UN. In other instances, it may appear more advantageous to politicians to blame failures and missed opportunities on the ‘mismanagement’ of the UN administration, rather than to acknowledge that insufficient funding of UN operations or other deficiencies resulting from Member States’ actions were the reasons why those operations were not as effective as desired.

The different emphasis on efficiency on the part of the donor countries and on effectiveness on the part of the major recipients of international aid among UN Member States (as described by Dicke) are the expression of their conflicting interests and create a potential for additional conflict that also has some bearing on negotiations and decisions with respect to UN reforms.

To the role of Member States in connection with the effectiveness of the UN, Beigbeder states: “The effectiveness of a UN organization in fulfilling its task depends on the quality of its leadership, of its personnel at all levels, of its operational machinery and of its internal administrative functions. It also depends on the political will of member states to use the organizations in order to promote, not only their own national interests, but mainly international cooperation directed towards developing countries. In turn, the confidence of member states will enhance the morale and effectiveness of the staff, whose skills and devotion are indispensable” (Beigbeder 1987: 7-8).

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40 Beigbeder 1997: 8-9. Beigbeder refers, for instance, to the aim of the USA to lower their contribution assessment to the regular budget from the previous 25% to 22% and the withholding of contributions by Member States to re-enforce reforms. He further perceives the objections by the Soviet Union to a permanent UN civil service a tactic to serve the Soviet Union’s interest of seconding their civil servants to the UN. For further background information on political motivations of Member States see also Müller 1992 Vol. I: 12, 79-80 and Dicke 1994: 195-228.
Efficiency and effectiveness in the context of reform – interpretations by the administration:

A review of UN official records did not produce a clearly formulated, official definition of either efficiency or effectiveness by the UN administration. References to efficiency programmes and statements in connection with reforms that promise improvements of the effectiveness and/or efficiency of the UN are the only indications of official interpretations by the administration.

Efficiency is used in reference to the economic use of resources by stressing improvements of the administration and management and savings through a ‘better’ use of resources. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is mentioned in connection with improvements of the UN’s ability to cope with growing mandates and to accomplish the UN’s objectives. These observations apply to the discussion of reforms in general, as well as to references made in the context of HR management reforms, e.g. to improve the efficiency of staff selection and recruitment processes and ‘good management’ practices (A/51/950; A/59/263).

The general understanding at the most senior level of the administration appears hence to be in agreement with most scientific definitions and reflects the principles of the UN Charter. We can, however, not presume that in the absence of a clearly defined, official definition of efficiency and effectiveness, UN civil servants throughout the organization share a common

41 The definitions provided by the JIU in 1978 was the only clear attempt that could be identified to provide a ‘UN specific’ definition of either term. Efficiency is thereby defined as “the extent to which implementation of the activity produces the greatest product at a given cost or a specified level of production at the lowest cost”. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is defined as “a measure of the relative degree to which it is successful in achieving its objectives” (JIU/REP/78/5: 8, 19-20; see hereto also Dicke/Hüfner (Hrsg.) 1987: 29-43). Since the JIU is, however, an independent body and not part of the UN Secretariat administration, its definitions cannot necessarily be perceived as official perceptions or interpretations on senior management. A comprehensive discussion of the question on adequate methodologies to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of international organizations can be found in Dicke/Hüfner (Hrsg.) (1987) and in Dicke (1994).

42 The Charter refers to certain goals and improvements that require in themselves a certain degree of goal attainment and good (effective) management and leadership. Such stated goals are for instance to establish higher standards of living and to create better conditions of economic and social progress (Art. 55). With respect to the HR management, Article 101 demands the application of highest standards of efficiency (among other qualifications) as one of the paramount considerations in the employment of staff. Article 101 is the only reference within the framework of the UN Charter referring to the topic of efficiency (Dicke 1994: 95).
understanding. It must be, therefore, assumed that unlimited varieties of perceptions about the organizational and individual efficiency and/or effectiveness exist.

These different perceptions, e.g. of efficient performance and an effective work programme, could greatly differ among UN civil servants as a result of personal views, circumstances and standards applied in various UN offices. Accomplishments reached under difficult conditions in the field could be considered as most efficiently executed in the opinion of those responsible, while they may be judged on the basis of criteria applied by Member States and independent analysts as less efficiently managed projects. It is also possible that single projects may be successfully implemented and at the least possible cost to the organization, but may not be effective in the opinion of recipients or Member States.

In view of the overall organizational efficiency and effectiveness, the UN reform proposal of 1997 calls on Member States to support the organization, provide the organization with the necessary funds (e.g. through their timely payment of contributions) and to strengthen the role of the SG. So is organizational effectiveness to be gained through the provision of clear guidelines, by setting agreed priorities and by giving the SG “the necessary tools to accomplish mandates objectives most effectively”. The SG further encourages Member States in connection with his proposed reform programme to strengthen the effectiveness of the UN by using the organization as forum and instrument of cooperation, to “bridge the very real differences in interest and power” (A/51/950: 10).

In order to improve the efficiency of the organization, the reform programme contains proposals to change organizational structures through a systematic re-organization of the UN Secretariat that will inter alia improve the internal decision-making process. Ongoing financial problems since the early 80s and the complex administrative system of the UN require that cost savings are identified and appropriate management strategies are developed to address the issues of increased spending for administration and non-programme costs.

Reform strategies are described in general terms such as ‘streamlining’, ‘simplifying’, ‘harmonizing’ and ‘improving the coordination and cooperation’, but are not followed up by reports that would identify detailed savings resulting from specific reform activities. Admittedly, it would be difficult for the administration to strictly connect possible savings
to specific reform measures, as many and perhaps unknown factors may influence the outcome of reform actions. It will be, likewise, challenging to assess whether reforms to this date have directly contributed to improved performance at the overall organizational or the individual level. Both analyses would require a detailed knowledge of the situation before reforms have been implemented in order to attribute the outcomes of reforms to either savings or/and performance ratings. To my knowledge, the organization is lacking data and sources that would allow such a systematic assessment.

Specific improvements of the effectiveness of the HR management are to be achieved through a number of changes that are oriented on results in the respective HR management areas, ranging from HR planning to new conditions of service (A/55/253: 3).

Improvements of the efficiency of the HR management alternatively concentrate on enhancements of HR management performance or, in other words, on maximizing its ‘outputs’. Such higher efficiency of the UN HR management system is related to procedures and processes that will eventually speed up the recruitment and improve the selection process etc.

Downsizing and cost savings through staff reductions are not explicitly mentioned as measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency in connection with reforms. To the contrary, the SG has, at several occasions, clearly rejected the suggestion that reforms would include the reduction of posts. The first series of reform proposals contained, nonetheless, the elimination of 1,000 posts in the name of greater efficiency. The reference to the demand of Member States for a “more efficient use of resources” indicates that further cuts of the staffing table may have to be expected (A/55/253: para. 11(b)).

Insofar, the overwriting reform goal of the UN is not much different from those of many national public and private sector organizations by taking into consideration that the UN will have to do in future ‘more with less’. Improvements of the performance at the individual as well as organizational level will, consequently, become increasingly

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43 Therefore, the organization has to “retain and motivate staff of the highest calibre at all levels, who can be moved rapidly and are able to function effectively under various circumstances” (A/55/253: 4).
important, which makes the reform of the HR management a crucial factor in the overall reform of the UN.

1.7.5 Organizational Culture – Organizational Climate

There is a close link between organizational change and the culture and climate of an organization. When reforming an organization, the existing organizational culture must be taken into account and a climate of trust should be established that supports the planned changes. On the other hand, organizational changes are often specifically introduced in order to improve the organizational culture and/or climate (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 121).

There are numerous definitions of organizational culture and organizational climate proposed by different scholars, of which a few are introduced below.

The term organizational culture derives from ethnology and is mainly used in theories of organizational development. An organization’s culture may be defined as “the pattern of basic assumptions that a given group has invented, discovered, or developed in learning to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, and that have worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Pierce/Newstrom (Eds.) 1990: 85).

Brown’s definition is similar: “Organizational culture refers to the pattern of beliefs, values, and learned ways of coping with experience that have developed during the course of an organization’s history, and which tend to be manifested in its material arrangements and in the behaviours of its members” (Williams 2000: 40 referring to Brown 1995).

Ott calls it “the fabric of the core” of an organization and “an interactive blend of change-resisting (or enhancing) beliefs, socially constructed realities, values, professional traditions, norms, ways of thinking about and doing things, and language or jargon that is shared by members of an organization” (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 116-120).

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Organizational development is perceived as a process of dialogue in support of organizational learning among managers and employees with the goal to develop capabilities of cooperation among all members of an organization and consensus about changes of organizational procedures and regulations, where required (Ulrich/Fluri 1995: 206-207).
In general, organizational culture is a complex system of expressed attitudes, resulting in certain patterns of behaviour and norms applied by the members of an organization towards the external environment (e.g. clients), similarly to societal cultures. It is the ‘inner-self’ or combined self-image of (all members of) an organization.

**Organizational climate** is defined as “a summary perception of the organization’s work environment” (Joyce/Slocum 1984: 721). Tagiuri calls it “the internal environment of an organization that (a) is experienced by its members, (b) influences their behavior, and (c) can be described in terms of the values of a particular set of characteristics (or attributes) of the organization” (Tagiuri/Litwin (Eds.) 1968: 27).

In short, organizational climate is ‘how people feel’ about their work place and work environment (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 119). The climate within an organization is, consequently, the ‘mood’ among members of the organization, resulting from the existing organizational culture.

As the above definitions show, there is a close link between an organization’s culture and its climate or internal, social environment. What is of further interest in the context of this study of HR management reforms are the questions concerning how an organization’s culture and/or climate can be assessed and whether organizational culture and an organization’s climate can be changed from the ‘top’ by taking certain management actions.

Since organizational culture is a mixture of ‘basic assumptions’, values, beliefs and expressed attitudes, an assessment must go beyond an analysis of mainly perceptional phenomena (Schreyögg 2000: 447; Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 120, 122-126). This applies even more so to large international organizations, with members of different cultural backgrounds (Schreyögg 2000: 460). Schreyögg suggests qualitative methods, such as interpretations of written statements by management, careful analyses of surveys and other analytical methods to determine organizational culture (Schreyögg 2000: 447-451).

Schein believes that “to really understand a culture and to ascertain more completely the group’s values and overt behaviour, it is imperative to delve into the underlying assumptions, which are typically unconscious, but which actually determine how group members perceive, think and feel” (Pierce/Newstrom (Eds.) 1990: 86-87). Schein’s
approach suggests, consequently, detecting the reasons from which conclusions can be drawn about the actual culture of an organization.

It is somewhat easier to identify organizational climate through surveys to collect data on individual perceptions (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 121). Since organizational culture and organizational climate are interrelated through shared experiences and assumptions on one hand, and influenced by individual beliefs and perceptions on the other hand, determining an organization’s climate will provide pointers for a subsequent analysis of that organization’s culture.

A positive organizational climate is signified by high staff morale, enthusiasm and expressed pride to be part of the organization and could confirm wide agreement among employees with an overall organizational culture that stands for high performance, respect and fairness. To the contrary, low levels of trust, beliefs of not being appreciated and feeling of isolation are indicators of a negative organizational climate as a result of a culture that supports rigid controls, does not recognize good performance and does not allow workers to participate in management decisions. Chances are that such a negative climate and culture results in low productivity, low staff morale, and probably high rates of resignations of employees with differing expectations.

Both organizational culture and organizational climate are social phenomena and as such are not static. They evolve over time and are influenced by a number of external and internal factors. Most scholars agree, nonetheless, that organizational culture cannot easily be dictated from the ‘top’, because it represents a collection of individual beliefs and patterns as reaction to management decisions.°

M.F.R. Kets de Vries and D. Miller also come to the conclusion that the personalities of top managers have an important impact on the organizational culture (Schreyögg 2000: 446-451). They argue that the personality profiles of managers determine actions, which either agree or clash with the values and beliefs of the other members of the organization. Conflicts between the upper-management culture and the values and beliefs of employees

° “It is not easy to convince employees who have worked for decades in an organizational culture of, for example ‘no mistakes’ to start taking personal risks” (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 116-117, 120; see also Schreyögg 2000: 466-471).
(as a sub-system of the organizational culture) would then lead to resistance towards and the rejection of the new value system.

It is evident from the scientific literature that the organizational climate must be considered a fundamental element in any reform plan, and that reforms cannot be introduced into an organizational culture, which might resist change or not be prepared for it.

In the context of the current UN HR management reform programme, the goal is to create an “organizational culture of empowerment” (A/53/414: para. 6) “that fosters high performance, managerial excellence, continuous learning and mutual trust and respect” (A/53/414: para. 31). In bulletin ST/SGB/1999/15, the SG states his commitment “to creating an organizational culture that is responsive and results-oriented, that rewards creativity and innovation”.

These statements not only assume that the existing culture of the UN does not represent such positive values, but imply that changes of the existing organizational culture will be necessary and possible. The implementation of HR management reforms and increased training activities to build greater awareness of existing management issues may introduce an organizational culture change and may transform the climate of the Secretariat. An important factor in this connection will be how these reforms are instituted and if the single measures as well as the programme as a whole will be believable and acceptable to UN civil servants by meeting their values and beliefs of a fairer and better HR management system.

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46 Evidence of the existing organizational climate in the UN shows that the organization is plagued by low staff morale, a lack of trust into its leadership and a certain reluctance towards changes (possibly resulting from negative, past experience). These conclusions are derived from statements made by UN officials and staff representatives and from reviews of OHRM, subject UN Staff reports and survey results published between 1995 and 2005. Observations made in the course of this study could further substantiate the existence of a negative climate among the staff of the Secretariat.
1.8 Why did they fail? Reform Initiatives of the Personnel Administration 1949 – 1985

1.8.1 Historic Overview

Since the UN came into existence, the UN HR management system has undergone several changes, eventually shifting from a strictly centralized to a more decentralized system, but remained in its principles a mainly headquarters-driven management approach. Many changes of the UN HR management system prior to 1985 were instigated by Member States. A number of changes were, however, also initiated by former Secretaries-General and senior managers; some of which for political reasons others plainly to improve the administration and management of the organization (Beigbeder 1987: 45-49; also Dicke 1994: 158-159).

The majority of these reform proposals were targeting specific issues, such as reductions of staff costs and re-organizations of the Secretariat, rather than taking an approach of wide-ranging changes that would include the various structural and managerial aspects of the organization. The shortcomings of such earlier attempts resulted from the lack of knowledge, if not ignorance of legislators and administrators that isolated modifications were insufficient, since policies, structures and processes were interrelated and changes had, therefore, to be coordinated not only within one area of management, but also with other management areas to ensure coherence within the system as a whole.

Previous reform proposals concerning the UN HR management did, for instance, take a narrow view by concentrating on policies such as the methodology to determine the geographical distribution of posts or the methodologies for the calculation of salary levels and other components of the staff costs. Other proposals focused on selection and recruitment processes and the creation of an office for personnel administration.

Since such single proposals for modifications were not incorporated into an overall reform strategy, even not into a general reform of the UN HR management per se, the few changes that were approved and implemented had a rather limited impact on the way UN staff was managed in the UN Secretariat, as the following list of committees and expert groups will demonstrate. Their proposals were a mosaic of isolated HR management issues unsuitable to introduce fundamental changes to UN HR management practices.
a. **Committee of Experts on Salary, Allowance and Leave System.** This Committee, appointed in 1949, constituted the first general body for the review of the personnel management of the Organization. It assembled three independent experts and its mandate was the review of salaries and other benefits (monetary and non-monetary) in comparison to other international organizations. The recommendations and findings of this Committee became the foundation for the common system with regard to conditions of service, incomes and entitlements for all UN employees. As Beigbeder states: “One of its main achievements was to re-group posts into four (now three) categories and to reduce the number of grade levels.”

b. **Salary Review Committee.** The appointment of this Committee can be considered as a second step towards the creation of common HR management standards, but was mainly concentrating on issues concerning salaries and allowances within the system. Appointed in 1955 on the basis of resolution 975 (X), the nine members were requested to “examine salary issues and the desirability of the common system in view of the considerable deviations” (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 16).

The final report made detailed reference to the structure of salaries, but gave also recommendations on issues of recruitment and conditions of service. It pointed to inconsistencies within the UN common system of salaries and HR management protocols and recommended a better coordination among different policies. The main result of this group was its proposal “to broaden the terms of reference of the International Civil Service Advisory Board (ICSAB)” in the interest of a better-coordinated common HR management system.

c. **Review of the Activities and Organization of the Secretariat.** In 1961, SG U Thant appointed, in accordance with resolution 1446 (XIV), a group of eight experts to review the “activities and organization of the secretariat” (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 17). In addition, the group was to review the question of geographical distribution.

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47 These four categories from top to bottom were the Director and Principal Officer, the Substantive Personnel and Special Service Personnel (which were later grouped into the Professional category) and the General Service Personnel (support staff); levels were fixed at a total of 13 grades, also called steps (Beigbeder 1987: 45-46).
The members of the group disagreed in a number of central issues as is reflected in the final report. So did the representative of the Soviet Union reject the existing system of geographical distribution by critically noting that mainly higher positions were continuously filled with nationals from western countries. The Soviet Union further challenged the existing structure of the Secretariat requesting to reduce the number senior posts, departments and the size of the personnel in general. Ultimately, the Soviet Union proposed to establish a troika leadership, consisting of representatives of the socialist, the neutral and the western hemisphere to replace the single position of SG.

The other Committee members disagreed largely with the proposals of the representative of the Soviet Union, especially with the idea of a troika leadership of the UN. As a result, the final report contained rather general statements on the overall management and made specific recommendations only with regard to desired limitations of the budget and the reduction of staff in a few areas (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 18).

d. Committee on Reorganization of the Secretariat. A second change effort in the area of administration was the appointment of a Committee by SG U Thant in 1968 with the goal that the group of seven experts would provide some ideas on how to improve the efficiency of the UN by optimising the use of resources. The review included the Secretariat, UN offices in Geneva and the secretariats of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the Regional Commissions (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 21). The committee made recommendations to cut posts in the Secretariat and focused mainly on savings. One of the most prominent recommendations was the establishing of a Department for Administration and Management in October 1968, which would be later renamed Department of Management (DM), and the new position of an Under-Secretary-General as head of the department (Beigbeder 1987: 48).

This committee further recommended a systematic review of administrative procedures and HR management policies, including workload studies and “a long-term plan for recruitment” (ibid.). It is noteworthy, that the catalogue of recommendations included also

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48 The ICSAB is the predecessor of the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC), which was established in 1975 (Beigbeder 1987: 46, 79).
the proposal to rotate senior officers of the D-1 level and higher at least every 10 years, and a recommendation to improve the overall mobility of employees. Further recommendations addressed improvements of training, promotions and pensions.

It was again the representative of the Soviet Union who demanded staff reductions by eight to 10 per cent and the elimination of permanent contracts in the increased budget and staffing table of the UN (ibid.). “Although a large number of the Committee’s recommendations were implemented, they did not lead to a reduction in the total UN budget as initially assumed by the Committee” (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 22).

e. Special Committee for the Review of the UN Salary System. This review of salary levels was the third attempt by Member States to verify the methodology for the calculation and adjustments of salaries and allowances since the UN’s foundation. The two subsidiary bodies to the GA, the Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), questioned in 1970 the adequacy of salary adjustments for the Professional and higher categories. As a result, the GA decided that no further salary increases would be approved until a review of the existing methodologies would be conducted which resulted in the appointment of this special committee of eleven experts in 1970 (Beigbeder 1987: 46).

In accordance with resolution 2743 (XXV), this committee was to examine the principles and criteria governing salaries and periodic adjustments. The group’s final report issued in 1972 confirmed, subsequently, that gross incomes of international officers of the UN were higher than those paid in the US public sector, which is still today the comparator civil service to determine the appropriate levels of remuneration of UN civil servants at the Professional and higher levels.

The Committee confirmed, nonetheless, the two methods that were used for the calculations (and adjustments) of UN salaries, namely the Noblemaire principle (for Professionals) and the Flemming principle (for the General Service and related categories). The Committee noted, however, the generous pensions the UN paid in comparison to other organizations. The final report also remarked the unreasonable increase of newly established posts. So had posts at the D-1 and D-2 levels more than doubled between 1956 and 1972 (from 5% in
1956 to 11% in 1972), while the findings of the Committee could not conclude that this had improved the coordination within the administration.

It is important to note that the report of the Committee remarked already then (in 1972) the critical average age of the UN personnel, a problem also discussed in the current reform programme. In fact, the problem intensified between 1972 and 1998 (one year after the initiation of the current reform programme). In 1972, 28 per cent of the UN work force were younger than 40 years and 4.6 per cent younger than 30 years; by 1998 the number of UN staff younger than 40 years had decreased to 25 per cent and only three per cent were younger than 30.\textsuperscript{49} That, despite those early warnings, the age structure of the UN Secretariat could further deteriorate over the next 26 years indicates that this phenomena was not taken into serious consideration by administrators and legislators and not addressed effectively in any of the revisions of the recruitment and selection processes during that period.\textsuperscript{50}

One of the most important recommendations of this Committee resulted in the establishing of the ICSC in 1975 as the successor body of the ICSAB (see hereto also resolution 3357 (XXIX)). The ICSC retained over the years its status as an independent body, with the mandate of ensuring coordinating policies and harmonizing UN Regulations and Rules in the area of personnel and overseeing the conditions of the international civil service under the umbrella of the common system (ICSC Bulletin 1997, Vol. 12, No.1).

\textbf{f.} Around the same time the Special Committee for the Review of the UN Salary System operated, two other reports by expert groups were published. Although these groups were not exclusively tasked with reviewing matters of personnel management, but were appointed to concentrate on the overall performance of the organization’s activities in the fields of economic and social development, a brief reference is made to their work to complete this overview of reform proposals that were somehow also related to an assessment of the UN HR management.

\textsuperscript{49} Beigbeder 1987: 47; A/53/375: para. 61. The issued of the ‘aging’ Secretariat will be further discussed in connection with the respective reform measures.

\textsuperscript{50} Optimistic expectations that future recruitments would almost automatically result in a rejuvenated UN work force could, obviously, not be fulfilled (A/45/226: paras. 178-179).
The two reports of interest are the *Jackson-Report* (1969) and the report of the *Group of 25* (1975). It is important to note that both reports mentioned the obsolete management methods and the (perceived) insufficient qualification of personnel of the organization (Dicke 1994: 177-179). Thus they contributed indirectly to later reviews by expert groups (Klingebiel 1999: 153).

Meanwhile, the GA approved in 1974 several reforms related to the personnel policy which established the basis for the HR management policies and strategies for the following years of the UN, such as the use of a classification system and roster, the principle to link promotions to staff mobility and the establishing of competitive selection methods (A/33/228).

g. Committee of Governmental Experts to Evaluate the Present Structure of the Secretariat in the Administrative, Finance and Personnel Areas. In 1980, SG Kurt Waldheim recommended to establish a group of experts to review the structure of the UN Secretariat and make recommendations, accordingly. The Committee of 17 members conducted a thorough review of the administration and management of the organization and submitted their report A/37/44 in 1982. This report acknowledged the initiatives of the SG, such as the establishing of the *Central Monitoring Unit* and the *Programme Planning and Budgeting Board* (PPBB).  

“Impressed by the new initiatives”, the Committee stopped, nonetheless, short of making actual recommendations on the issues it was supposed to report (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 28). After two years of studying issues such as a possible decentralization of the Secretariat’s management, administrative procedures and information technologies, the report touched a number of general management issues, but did not recommend or identify any further requirements for reform.

This concludes the synopsis of intended changes with respect to the UN HR management prior to 1985. Of the numerous reviews and recommendations made by these external expert groups three concentrated on issues concerning the remuneration, allowances paid
and leave entitlements of UN civil servants and three were concerned with questions of personnel and related structural changes. None of these activities produced major changes to the UN HR management system per se, but resulted in isolated modifications of the existing system. In hindsight, the various committees were initiating steps in the continuous endeavour to change the way the UN is managing its staff (and financial) resources.

The turning point came in the 1980s when the growth of the UN system and bureaucracy showed intolerable consequences in the view of Member States, such as difficulties in the programme coordination and planning (or lack thereof), the lack of (performance) evaluation and high administrative expenditures, including increased staff costs. Criticism of the observed tendency of duplications of programmes and activities eventually resulted in the building of political blocks among the members of the UN, which had grown significantly since the foundation of the UN. Member States had voiced their growing dissatisfaction with the existing organization and policies that resulted from the increasingly complex structures of the UN system for varying reasons.\textsuperscript{52}

Much of the criticism was certainly justified as the arguments and debates of the GA and its subsidiary organs demonstrate. It is, nevertheless, essential to acknowledge that many if not all of these problems resulted ironically from decisions of Member States themselves and not from actions by the UN administration or other, uncontrolled events. This applies also to HR management issues, including questions of the UN’s remuneration and compensation system, HR management policies and the bureaucratic organization of the Secretariat, which are the prerogative of the legislators. It is further important to note that many of the issues that became the focus of reforms around 1985 had been already subject of discussions in previous years and would reappear in connection with the UN’s first comprehensive reform programme of 1997.

\textsuperscript{51} While the group was established under SG Kurt Waldheim, it continued its work under his successor, SG Perez de Cuellar, who came into office in January 1982.

\textsuperscript{52} Müller (1992) and Beigbeder (1987) provided a comprehensive account of events.
1.8.2 The so-called Financial Crisis – Reaction or Chance for Renewal?

The increasing expenditures for administration and personnel intensified the disagreements among Member States and gave rise to objections to further budgetary increases by some of the wealthier members of the UN. These Member States criticised the high expenditures and low performance, poor management methods and inadequate qualification profiles of UN managers and staff.

When the repeated calls for more efficiency and effectiveness was underlined by the withholding of contributions in the mid-1980s, the ideological crisis of the UN turned into a financial one. Müller (1992) and Beigbeder (1987) discuss in some detail the reasons and developments of these events and conclude that the crisis was caused by expressed fundamental disagreement among Member States. The ‘politicisation of the organization’, and the hardening and final confrontation of the positions of the Western versus the Eastern countries on one hand and the Northern (industrialized) versus Southern (less developed) countries on the other hand had turned into a struggle for power and influence in which the majority of members used for one reason or another their financial weight (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 30).

Müller’s and Beigbeder’s analyses show how the criticism of the UN originated from the USA position, demanding more control and stricter monitoring of UN activities. The UK, Australia and Canada followed this line of criticism and were joined by less-developed Member States; the latter, however, based their criticism on the UN’s inefficiency in the provision of aid and assistance in support of programmes.53

The main goal of the USA was the reform of the UN’s budgetary and financial procedures. The US Senate also proposed changes of the voting system that would weight votes in accordance with each Member State’s assessed contributions to the regular budget (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 30; also Beigbeder 1987: 150).

53 As reported by Beigbeder, not all western nations fully agreed with the assessment of the USA at the eve of the UN’s 40th anniversary (1985); for instance Canada distanced itself from the USA in its disapproval of the UN administration (Beigbeder 1987: 16-17). Other western countries were also not in total agreement with the approach and view taken by the USA; a list of valuable sources relating to this question can be found in De Gara (1989).
Arguing that unless the organization initiated reforms the USA would not pay their full assessments, they paid only US$ 124 million of the US$ 198 million contributions due in 1985. Other Member States followed the USA’s lead and by the end of 1985 only 69 out of 159 members had fully paid their assessed contribution. Debtors included – in addition to the USA - Brazil, China, the Soviet Union, South Africa and France. The result was a budget deficit of US$ 242 million after borrowing from the UN’s Working Capital Fund and suspending refunds to Member States (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 32-34).

Increased commitments to peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the early 1990s brought the UN into an even more critical financial state. The combination of higher expenditures for new operations and the need to implement savings made a thorough reform of the UN increasingly difficult. As a result, reform became an issue of lower priority for administrators, who instead concentrated on short-term solutions, ‘fixing’ the system through re-organizations and by implementing measures requested by the GA with mixed results.54

The UN had dealt with shortfalls of payments before and the developments in the 1980s and 1990s did not represent the organization’s first financial crisis. They would, nonetheless, turn out to be the most serious and long-lasting.55 In fact, the UN never fully recovered from those financial difficulties and is still struggling today with financial shortfalls, while its operations continue to be hampered by the same politically-motivated reform discussions in connection with the approval of the budget for the biennium 2006/2007 (A/60/1). As a consequence, the GA approved the proposed budget only under the conditions of a spending cap of US$ 950 million for the first quarter of the biennium (Jan.-June 2006) and the satisfactory implementation of reforms (A/RES/60/247 A-C).

54 At the end of 1989, total outstanding contributions had amounted to US$ 461 million (Dicke 1994: 300). By May 1999, the total debt of the UN reached US$ 2.6 billion, of which US$ 1.5 billion were accumulated debt in the area of peacekeeping. More than 60% were due to the fact that the USA, the largest contributor to the UN budget, was withholding their payments (The Gazette, 6 September 1999).

In view of the already agreed approach to introduce (more) modern and flexible HR management policies and despite the GA’s approval of a decentralized HR management system, the GA reaffirmed in 2002 “the role of the General Assembly in carrying out a thorough analysis and approval of posts and financial resources, as well as of human resources policies” (A/RES/56/253: para. 7). In other words, legislators remain reluctant to give more authority to the SG and are determined to tightly control the UN administration, even if it were counterproductive to the efficient and effective operation of the UN.

This conservative position of Member States could have a reverse impact not only on the modernization of the UN HR management. Combined with the recent conditional approval of budget funds, it indicates reluctance, if not an unwillingness of Member States to support wide-ranging management reforms. These actions show, to the contrary, that the issue is not the improvement of identified obsolete mechanisms, policies and processes, but a controlled change process that is (again) driven by political motives.

Member States being the UN’s financiers and ‘owners’ have the absolute right to make changes to their organization, but should also consider that by keeping rigid controls or by introducing tighter restrictions they will reverse a reform process that is already financially constrained. In order to guarantee the continuous implementation of reform measures, the organization must be able to operate on a solid financial basis and will need further investments to achieve its long-term goals, in particular in view of continuous training needs and the updating of technologies.

Moreover, a modern management of the UN requires that the SG and senior managers be given greater authority under a more effective system of controls. It is also difficult to understand why the Member States, which selected and appointed the SG and all the senior UN managers, then display so little trust in their own judgment that they then micro-manage the organization.

As history shows, previous withholdings of contributions with the aim of forcing UN reforms have proved to be an impediment to the process rather than a supportive influence. The latest restrictions and threats applied by some Member States may equally miss their goal to impose reforms, in particular since many of these reforms have already been
approved and are in the process of being implemented, but are partially delayed due to the limitations of financial and human resources.

1.8.3 Lessons learned

The lessons that can be drawn from so-called reform attempts prior to 1985 can be summaries as follows:

a. Earlier efforts focused on modifications of single UN HR management aspects, such as the remuneration and compensation system (in 1949 and 1955), or on personnel structures (in 1961 and 1968), without considering a more inclusive review of the existing system and without integrating the aspects of HR management into an overall management change approach. Proposed changes were, consequently, isolated from any other management aspects and did not take into account possible long-term or hidden implications.

b. The failure to develop a reform strategy and long-term plan and the belief that isolated modifications would be sufficient and could be dictated and implemented from ‘above’ without involvement and participation of the larger part of the staff, managers and the Staff Union was fatal to those earlier attempts.

c. To select outside experts to develop reform plans and to appoint individuals with more experience in diplomacy than basic administration and very limited or no insider knowledge of the UN created an additional potential of conflict.

d. Once appointed for political reasons rather than their proven management qualifications, Secretaries-General were facing the challenge to manage an organization in permanent financial crisis and being given insufficient authority that would enable the occupant to introduce sweeping changes to the management of the organization’s human and financial resources. Conflicting expectations and political interests of Member States added to the difficulties to develop administrative changes and long-term improvements to the internal management system.

e. Moreover, legislators were not fully committed to a real reform of the UN and administrators did, consequently, not see an urgent need to implement organization-
wide reforms, especially since there were not given strict and clear instructions on the reforms expected by legislators.

The review of former attempts to change the UN management leads us to place the beginning of the actual reform process of the UN in the mid 1980s. It took, nevertheless, until 1997 when a comprehensive reform programme was developed and fundamental changes to the UN HR management system could be implemented. This 1997 reform programme has the advantage that it can refer to knowledge and experience that could be gained from previous reform attempts (including those undertaken between 1985 and the end of 1996).

Although these reforms were in the initial phase developed by again applying the method of reviews by experts with no or only limited, direct knowledge of the UN internal management, the administration has increasingly involved staff members and managers into the reform process. By also distributing information on planned and completed reform steps more widely, the potential of change resistance is lowered and the internal actors may identify themselves more with the reform goals.

The 1997 reform programme also involved from the start in a systematic approach the most senior managers. Different reform groups for instance established directly in the Office of the SG, under the Deputy Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Management as well as within the OHRM. In addition, management training was made mandatory starting with senior levels to build awareness and knowledge of new and future HR management aspects.

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56 Former SG Boutros-Ghali concludes that in 1995 Member States did consider “a major transformation of the entire UN system at some point in the future” (Boutros-Ghali 1999: 23). SG Boutros-Ghali’s assessment of the true intentions of Member States must be understood on the basis of his perception of the lack of support and clear guidelines by the GA for a thorough reform of the UN. This may explain why he saw no immediate or urgent need to implement quickly reforms despite the continuous demands of Member States and the obvious knowledge of a number of serious problems with respect to the internal management of the UN Secretariat.

57 Issues of change resistance are discussed in theories of change management and organization development (OD). The ‘not-invented-here syndrome’ is therein defined as the internal resistance by a system and members of an organization against the change proposed by outside experts and ordered from ‘above’ (Schreyögg 2000: 485-488; see also Harvard 1998: 73-74).
Another lesson that has apparently been learned by those who are in charge of the 1997 reforms is that reforms have to be applied in a coordinated manner and throughout the organization. UN HR management reforms are, though broken down into single aspects, such as recruitment aspects, training (staff development), career development and conditions of service to name only a few, approached as part of a system and embedded into a larger organizational reform programme.

1.8.4 Scenarios and Options of the Administrative Reform of the UN

The administrative reform and the reform of the HR management of the UN Secretariat was and continues to be influenced by a wide variety of factors. Besides the financial restraints, political pressures applied by the various groups of actors may modify any reform programme.

In view of these obstacles, the implementation of many reforms will be the accomplishment of SG Kofi Annan as the initiator of this latest reform effort. Although the realization of reforms is ultimately in the hands of the Member States as the legislators and financiers of the UN, the practical implementation of reforms is the direct responsibility of the SG, which extends into the appointment of those who will assist him in this task.

There are numerous possible scenarios in the further development and final outcome of this reform programme. The following four scenarios are to illustrate the possible developments based on given assumptions that may support or hamper this reform process:

a. In the first scenario, the current reform will suffer similar failures as earlier reforms due to the lack of long-term commitment of Member States, insufficient actions by the administration and/or resistance by the staff. To overcome such obstacles, a strong leadership and a committed group of managers as ‘cheerleaders’ for reform will be required. A strategic survival plan would be necessary to ensure the long-term success of the current reform programme, in case the support of Member States and the cooperation of middle- and lower-level managers and staff are diminished. A weakening of the current reform ‘enthusiasm’ could be a serious threat to the completion of current reform programmes and could create a loss of confidence and trust of legislators and the UN staff into the success of proposed reforms.
b. The second scenario is built on the assumption that Member States will continue to withhold (or further relapse into withholding) their contributions for political reasons. The UN administration has no powers to raise funds for a reform that is not wanted and supported by the majority of its members. Certain reforms cannot be implemented without the explicit approval by the GA. Consequently, the only option for the SG would be to win back the Member States’ support for his reform programme through diplomacy. If this would fail, the administration could implement only reform measures that could be approved by the SG under his authority as Chief Administrator of the UN and without additional investments. The result would be a partial reform and with the diminished financial and ideological support by Member States, it could fail to produce the long-term results.

c. In the third scenario, it is assumed that outside events (for instance a regional conflict or catastrophes) will interfere with the ongoing reform process by constituting new priorities. This could further delay the implementation of reforms and actors could loose their perspective of necessary, but unfinished reform issues. While internal management aspects are not on the top of the list of most career diplomats and their term at the UN is usually shorter than the term of the SG, the SG is a more constant factor in the reform process, in particular if appointed for a second five-year term in office,

d. The fourth scenario describes the most desirable one. Member States agree with the course of reforms, approve swiftly reform measures and support the reform process through their full payments of contributions and active support where required. Modifications of reform measures are identified and implemented if necessary and internal key actors, administrators and representatives of the staff, cooperate in the process. Continuity is secured by establishing mid-term and long-term plans and by appointing a group of reform coordinators for a period of several years to ensure stability in the implementation of reform measures. Sufficient financial and human resources are available to carry out the reform programme and to support the desired change of the organizational culture.
As the final editing of this document is completed, the ongoing reform process is hampered by the lack of support of UN Member States, despite their sharp demand for further reforms, the SG and his senior management team continue to be committed to complete the implementation of this unfinished programme. In spite of this, many UN civil servants appear to be reform fatigue after almost 10 years of reforms without end in sight. The appointment of a new SG as at January 2007 may create a change of reform climate and hopefully re-energize the ongoing reform process.
2  The International Civil Service – Theory and Reality

2.1  Theoretical Background

There is no theory of international organizations from which this study could draw in its analysis of the reform of the UN HR management. Any theoretical discussion of the UN’s internal management functions has, therefore, to be based on the principles of the UN international civil service as stated in the UN Charter and can only be complemented by selected organization theories, ranging from Max Weber’s classical model of bureaucracy to modern theories, and reform models of the public sector.

The usual organization theories that discuss the internal mechanisms of private sector organizations or public national administrations cannot fully explain the many influences and actions that take place in international organizations. They are also incomplete when trying to apply their models to reforms and changes in international organizations with their specific leadership, management structures and their global operations and multi-cultural staff. Since the UN is in many aspects distinct from national public administrations, and also from other regional and international organizations due to each organization’s specific mandate(s) and membership, it would be appropriate to construct a theory which considers these different typologies of international organizations, including the UN system.

An empirical analysis of the UN is particularly challenging in view of the organization’s complex structures and operations. There are 192 legislators (Members States) determining the rules and regulations and usage of the financial resources in an organization with international staff recruited from over 176 nations and employed worldwide.\(^{58}\)

Organization theories use a simplistic view of actors in organizations by dividing them into those who make the decisions and set the rules (the owners, shareholders or in public

\(^{58}\) In addition to main offices in the USA and Europe, the UN has offices in 134 developing countries and 77 Information Centres worldwide (A/59/299; http://www.un.org/aroundworld/unics/english/about.htm; http://www.un.org/reform/dossier.html)
administrations the heads of ministries, administrations and other institutions) and those who are to implement and execute those decisions. Following such a simplistic approach, actors in the UN can be divided into the categories of the political leaders (the Member States holding the legislative power), the internal leadership (the SG and senior managers, in the context of this study also referred to as the UN administration/administrators) with a defined decision-making authority over internal processes and with the responsibility to implement and execute the decisions of the Member States, and the staff at large who is the main target group of UN HR management reforms.

In practice, however, it is not always possible to easily separate UN actors into those who make the decisions and those who implement them. 59 UN actors interact in their work environment within a complex system of policy-making, administration, research and international assistance. Similar conditions apply to the members of governments, civil servants of national administrations and the diplomatic staff of the Permanent Missions to the UN.

Changes of positions and functions alter these individuals’ potentials to influence policy- or decision-making processes within their own bureaucracies before they might reach at some point of their professional or political careers a position which makes them part of the leadership in the UN. As these various groups of actors (‘nationals’ and ‘internationals’) closely collaborate and interact through many different channels, it becomes even more obvious that there is an undetermined amount of influence possible among these various groups of actors. 60

Members of the UN administration are not just recipients of orders from Member States, strictly following rules and regulations, but must often base their actions on their own judgement, especially if working in field duty stations where conditions may require a more innovative approach than that allowed by some restrictive internal policy. In some

59 Brunsson divides actors in organizations in those who lead and those who are led (Brunsson 1989: 71).

60 The complexity of these interactions and possible influences becomes even more apparent if we include scenarios of appointments of (former) diplomatic staff or secondments of national officers into the service of the UN or the reverse which would be the recruitment of a former UN civil servant into a key political position by his government which would give him some power to influence legislative decisions in the UN.
instances, UN employees may also knowingly violate rules or utilize their expert knowledge to influence the decisions of legislators (and senior managers), in accordance with Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracies.\footnote{In his classification of social action and his concept of social relationship, Weber points to the fact that in organizations with “a plurality of actors… the action of each takes account of that of the others…” (Weber 1964: 118). He further observed that the ‘advantage of professional knowledge’ (in reference to the ‘Überlegenheit des berufsmäßig Wissenden”; Weber 1972: 572) could lead to actions and behaviour of civil servants not conforming to the decisions of the political leaders.}

*Max Weber’s bureaucracy model* is an appropriate classical organization theory that also explains the UN bureaucracy and its administrative apparatus. Weber’s model describes four characteristics of bureaucracies that can also be identified in the UN: (a) the division of labour; (b) a hierarchical order; (c) regulated and uniform processes (‘Amtsführung nach festgelegten Regeln’); and (d) written records (Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 47-48). Furthermore, the administrative staff is completely separated from any ownership of the organization (Weber 1964: 331-332). Their functions are to execute the decisions of those who have the legal power (in the case of the UN, the Member States).

In Weber’s bureaucracy model, civil servants are employed under ‘free contractual’ relationships according to their professional specialization and are paid in accordance with an established scale of wages and within predetermined career steps during their long-term or lifelong careers which includes the guarantee of an entitlement to pensions (Weber 1964: 333). A system of controls combined with the hierarchical system of supervision and the requirement that the employment be the civil servants’ sole or at least primary occupation ensures that civil servants exercise their professional obligations within the established norms. Adequate remuneration, benefits and life-long career appointments are to ensure that the administrative staff remains loyal and untempted by corruption.\footnote{Weber recognized, however, also that loyalty “may be hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material self-interest” (Weber 1964: 326). Where corruption and misconduct are detected, penalties are exercised.}

The division of labour and uniform processes further allow the organization to replace single members of the bureaucracy without disruptions and without having to make any changes to administrative structures. Uniform processes, standards and rigid regulations
(norms) are intended to ensure both fair and equal treatment of clients (citizens) as well as the employed civil servants and that decisions are rational. Written records ensure that every action can be reviewed and that procedures are followed continuously and systematically in accordance with the organization’s regulations (Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 48-49). In Weber’s understanding, the pure form of bureaucracy guarantees, besides uniform and fair treatment of public servants and the recipients of those services, the highest form of efficiency as a result of its mechanical and technical processes and rational means (Weber 1964: 337; Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 50).

For critics of the UN, however, many of these elements are the very reasons for the inefficiency of the UN. In the eyes of these critics, the division of labour and the hierarchical order of the UN bureaucracy hinder the coordination of programmes. Uniform processes and rigid rules cause dysfunctions, such as the lack of cooperation and the organization’s inability to act and react immediately, effectively and to operate as (cost-)efficiently as desired.63

Steadily increasing controls and regulations in the UN also entail, as Weber already acknowledged in view of national bureaucracies, a danger that civil servants can become estranged from the overall purpose and meaning of the organization and might as a result feel as if they are just a small wheel within a larger machinery (Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 51). Weber was also aware of the potential conflicts between the administrative staff and those they are to serve that might result from the advantage of the civil servants’ specialized knowledge.

Weber further discusses the question of the selection and different characteristics of leaders in bureaucratic organizations. Among various typologies, Weber refers to the charismatic leader who gives directions to his followers and is legitimised through his election, status, and by the social and economic security the administrative staff enjoys under his leadership (Weber 1964: 370-371; 386-398; Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 53). Cox and Jacobson list a number of minimum requirements for the head of an international organization similar to those discussed by Weber, and include this individual’s ability to

63 For theories and studies on dysfunctions in bureaucracies see Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 63-64.
pay attention to the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ aspects of an organization (Cox/Jacobson 1973: 398-399).

The SG of the UN is appointed by the GA upon the recommendation of the Security Council, in accordance with Article 97 of the UN Charter. Consequently, he is usually not chosen from among and certainly not elected by the members of the administrative staff. The current SG Kofi Annan is an exception insofar that he is the first SG who went from UN junior Professional Officer to its most senior Chief Administrator. To the contrary, his predecessors were recommended for their acknowledged diplomatic background, rather than their experience in management and public administration (Kanninen 1995: xii-xiii).

Other theoretical constructs, which may be useful when analysing UN reforms, are Weber’s “conviction of the fundamental variability of social institutions” and “the inherent instability of social structures” (Weber 1964: 31-32). Thereby, Weber’s concept of individual behaviour is built on the assumption that individuals tend to make rational choices driven by their interests, values and material needs and allow to a lesser degree that affectations or traditions determine their decisions (Bea/Göbel 1999: 51-54).

For an examination of the UN management system, concepts of the ‘estrangement of man’ are as adequate as those developed through further critical reflections on Weber’s theories, such as the concept of innovative bureaucrats, perceiving civil servants as free, independent actors with a choice to conform with or to rebel against the system (Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 58-62; see hereto also Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 564-568). The UN reform programme must address possible dysfunctions discussed in such organization theories, including low morale among UN staff caused by the inadequate UN management system as again acknowledged by the SG when presenting his latest reform report in March 2006.64

Although Max Weber (1864-1920), Frederick Taylor (1856-1915) and Henri Fayol (1841-1925) discussed in connection with their classical organization theory constructs social relationships and the importance of interactions between people in organizations, they

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64 Examples are a top management structure that is insufficiently equipped to manage large and complex operations, inadequate means in the delivery of services by the UN Secretariat and an deficient placement and promotion system (A/60/692).
often treated the ‘human factor’ as a disturbance of an otherwise rational organization (Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 102-108). Neo-classical and modern organization theories, e.g. the Human Relations Approach and the Human Resources Approach, provide a better understanding of social interactions in formal settings, such as bureaucratic-structured organizations and, subsequently, for the analysis of internal management processes and this UN HR management reform programme.

The *Human Relations Approach* discusses the members in an organization, their behaviours and the dynamics of social relations in organizations. The psychological and social aspects examined therein, in relation to the performance and motivation of employees, are also important factors in view of UN reforms. Unfortunately, the Human Relations Approach neglects such aspects as organizational structures, incentives and wages, which are discussed in the context of current UN management reform and may equally influence the productivity and motivation of employees (Schreyögg 2000: 47).

A special discipline within the Human Relations Approach is the model of *Organization Development* (OD), which discusses the need to ‘unfreeze’ structures and to involve all members of the organization in the desired change process through consultations and surveys. OD hereby reflects on behavioural changes of organization members in the context of organizational change and the role of the managers as leaders in this process. Proponents of OD see open communication and cooperation among partners, combined with little or no rigid hierarchical behaviour as the basis for positive developments of and within organizations (Schreyögg 2000: 54; also Ulrich/Fluri 1995: 161-167).

The *Human Resources Approach* goes one step beyond the Human Relations Approach in that it represents a model of actual and not just symbolic participation of employees. It combines theories of social behaviour in organizations with the idea of building the necessary structures and processes to support employee motivation (Schreyögg 2000: 52-53). While the hierarchical division of processes through specialization (labour) and power (decision-making versus execution) was the fundamental principle of efficient organizations in accordance with Weber’s bureaucracy model, representatives of the

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65 As Ulrich/Fluri suggest, the Human Relations Approach basically supports the hierarchical order with the elite leader and subordinates (Ulrich/Fluri 1995: 169-170).
Human Resources Approach argue that the separation of planning and implementation, of decision-making and production, also obstructs the efficiency of organizational performance by creating frustration and lethargy among employees (Schreyögg 2000: 53).

The UN current reform programme comprises elements to improve the communication among managers and their staff, the cooperation within and among departments, and to change individuals’ behaviour (throughout the bureaucratic structures) through specific training, team-building and a number of other tools. As this reform introduces the first comprehensive change programme of the UN, linking changes of structures, functions, rules and policies with modern management methods, it acknowledges that organizational goals have to be balanced against the ambitions and goals of individual UN civil servants such as their personal development, but also family and job security.

Useful theoretical insights for this study of the UN management reform are also provided in connection with the reform movement of the public sector. The New Public Management, which combines various approaches of micro-economic theories, discusses methods to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organizations and proposes changes to increase their competitiveness based on methods of private management (Blanke/von Bandemer/Nullmeier/Wewer (Hrsg.) 2001: 71-73; 71-82). The theoretical background of this neo-conservative and ortho-liberal approach derives from theses of the New Institutional Economics (Blanke/von Bandemer/Nullmeier/Wewer (Hrsg.) 2001: 72). The interest of the representatives of the New Institutional Economics is to explain the regulation and control mechanisms in organizations. Organizations are perceived as systems with formal and informal rules (norms) to direct individual actions in order to accomplish a specific goal or a number of goals (Bea/Göbel 1999: 126). The UN reform approach of a results-based management derives from this theoretical background.

The New Institutional Economics approach is divided into the three theories, the Property Rights Theory, the Transaction Cost Economics, and the Agency Theory. All three theories see organizations as ‘networks of contracts’ among actors (Bea/Göbel 1999: 128-129). Individuals are basically related to each other by contractual agreements. Those who have ownership or represent the ‘owners’ of organizations (e.g. managers with
authorities delegated by shareholders) negotiate contractual agreements with individuals who offer their knowledge and skills in exchange for remunerations.\textsuperscript{66}

In the context of this approach applied to the UN, Member States are the owners of the organization, which gives them the ‘right of utilization’ of the organization. This ownership includes the utilization of financial resources and revenues, the right to change the organization’s organizational structures and the right to approve new mandates. In terms of the Transaction Cost Economics, which concentrates on efficiency to keep costs at a relative minimum, the UN is an institution with a hierarchic-bureaucratic control system. Critics of this approach point to the negative impact of strict controls, which demotivate employees by diminishing their initiative and pro-active behaviour. Accordingly, these strictly controlled actors eventually try to escape restrictions, leading to a possible ‘pathological spiralling relationship’ of increased control to which employees may respond with greater resistance (Schreyögg 2000: 74-75).

Similar phenomena can be observed in the UN. Publications by independent researchers such as Beigbeder and Bertrand, as well as surveys of UN civil servants indicate a high degree of frustration with the system of rigid controls. Despite the increased control and monitoring mechanisms introduced over the past years, many UN employees do not perceive the system to be (more) fair and transparent. In the course of this research, UN employees spoke to me of their frustrations with existing limitations, restrictions and controls, and also of their disappointment with the lack of trust demonstrated by Member States in the capacities and competencies of UN civil servants. The constant search for greater efficiency by Member States has created a system of additional new controls and increased restrictions to such a degree that the organization is over-regulated, representing a practical example of the pathological spiralling relationship phenomena highlighted by Schreyögg (ibid.).

The main focus of the Agency Theory is the relationship between the principal and the agent/s; this may refer to the relationship between shareholders and top-management or at lower levels of the organization to the relationships between managers and employees.

\textsuperscript{66} Comprehensive reviews of these three theories can be found in Bea/Göbel (1999), Kieser (Hrsg.) (1999) and Schreyögg (2000).
Two aspects of the Agency Theory are of particular interest to our study of HR management reform: (a) the information advantage of the agents (UN civil servants), and (b) the assumed tendency of agents to act in their self-interest and to be opportunistic; two issues which were already discussed by Max Weber in different form.

In view of the information advantage, UN staff and managers can either use their knowledge to advance the mission of the UN, or to manipulate actions by presenting selective information to senior management and legislators or even by withholding information. It is further possible that UN officials use their knowledge to gain status and power. The question of self-interest and opportunism presents a problem in the UN when legitimate expectations of career advancement and recognition turn into unethical behaviour to achieve personal gains (see hereto also Bea/Göbel 1999: 140-149).

The UN maintains a system of controls, rules and instructions, similar to those prescribed in connection with the New Public Management, in order to monitor and respond to problems such as abuse, ‘shirking’ or other improper actions by UN staff. In agreement with these theories, the UN also has a performance reporting mechanism in place and is, since 1996, discussing the creation of a system of incentives, e.g. a bonus system or performance-related pay system, in connection with a proposed model that would replace the existing system of grades and levels with a system of broadbanding (A/RES/51/216; A/RES/59/268; A/52/30; A/52/439; A/59/647).

So far the UN administration has instituted non-monetary incentives, such as the annual Long Service Award and awards for special innovations (SCB/1563; SCB/1566). Bea and Göbel (1999) are, however, of the opinion that it is difficult to create a perfect system of incentives, since the actual effect of bonuses or other awards for high performance is difficult to assess (Bea/Göbel 1999: 141).

In concluding this chapter on selected organization theories, it must be noted that this study was also influenced by models such as those presented by Peters and Waterman (1984) and by Brunsson (1989).
2.2 The UN as Organization and System

The UN is herein analysed as an organization (or institution) with specific hierarchical structures and as a system divided in sub-systems by functions and consisting of actors with indefinite common and/or conflicting goals.

Organizations are categorized as either action organizations or political organizations, operating on the national and the international level (Brunsson 1989). Cox and Jacobson (1973) use the typology of forum and service organizations. Other criteria of setting apart organizations take into account their functional purpose, as organizations with either specific mandates operating on a for-profit basis or as providers of social services on a not-for-profit basis.

The UN represents an international, not-for-profit organization, with the functions of a forum as well as a service organization to its members and the general public. Chapter I of the UN Charter lists the purpose and principles of the UN, namely “to maintain international peace and security and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.” The major purpose of the UN is the establishment and maintenance of a forum to discuss and harmonize the actions of nations in various policy areas. In addition to the issues of peace and security, the concerns of the founding states were directed at economic and social development, technical cooperation among nations and human rights. The composition of the UN as an organization created, financed and governed by Member States with particular interests defines the political nature of the UN.

UN members use the organization as a forum to promote their own cultural and ideological values. They propose and take actions in the legislative organs of the UN, and participate in actions (or boycott and veto decisions) to support or defend their national interest, their political views and their status and power. The organization is further an instrument to take actions and to provide services, which are jointly approved, financed and otherwise supported by its members.
Compared with other international organizations, the UN is unique in that its operation is worldwide, as is its membership. The UN as a whole constitutes a system of offices, entities with special mandates, regional commissions, programmes, funds and specialized agencies and is not limited to specific tasks or regions. This distinguishes the UN from other international organizations, which serve a particular purpose (e.g. the Red Cross) or are by definition restricting their membership to states of particular regions and purposes concerning that region (such as the EU or ASEAN).

UN activities and mandates range from development, technical cooperation, health and education to matters of fighting crime, defending human rights and peacekeeping. Despite the UN’s wider range of activities and its large, international membership, the UN is often underfunded, in comparison with most other international organizations which operate in a more restricted area and have fewer members (A/51/950: para. 21).

The UN organization has six principal organs, the General Assembly (GA), the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat as the organization’s administrative entity (Chapter III and XV of the UN Charter). The UN system (also frequently referred to as the UN family) is further structured into a system of regional commissions, programmes, funds and specialized agencies. Judgement of the ‘United Nations’ is either directed at actions (or non-actions) of UN Member States in the respective legislative organs, e.g. the GA or the Security Council, or at operations of the UN and in some instance at UN civil servants or other individuals employed by the UN (e.g. peacekeeping forces) in connection with successes or failures of UN operations.

The UN was successful in many ways by assisting nations to establish their own, independent governments and to strengthen their economies, but has often failed to take swift actions and to build the necessary agreements in order to prevent war, to stop

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67 The term United Nations is unfortunately often used in the public discussion without clear distinction between the organization as a system of organs, funds, programmes and specialized agencies with different mandates and the political organization, which symbolizes the actions of its Member States as the UN’s legislators.
atrocities and to provide the needed aid to civilians. In addition to the lack of success of programmes due to inactions, bureaucratic rules and structures of the UN administration have frequently hampered its operations.\(^69\)

For Peters and Waterman (1984) the key to success of organizations is the quality of their management, besides simple structure and, in large or very large organizations, smaller autonomous sub-systems with wide-ranging authorities. Structures and the management culture are also vital for the success of this UN HR management reform. How responsibilities and authorities with respect to the reform of the HR management progress are structured in the UN Secretariat is illustrated below.

The hierarchical ladder of actors with management responsibilities starts at the top with the leadership of UN Member States and ends with the lowest level supervisor within the UN administration. Member States hold the legislative power to decide the structure of the UN, to approve the UN budget, which includes funding of staff resources and approval of staffing tables, and to establish the regulations and rules administering the UN civil service. These decisions have an immediate impact on the organization’s HR management and its ability to fulfil its mandates (Albrecht/Volger 1997: 496-498). Moreover, Member States determine the range and speed of the reform implementation through their approvals of reform measures.

While the overall responsibility for the administration and management lies with the SG, responsibilities and authority for the HR management within the UN Secretariat are centralized in the DM. The implementation and more specific formulation of reform proposals into actions lie with the OHRM. Responsibilities for the HR management and application of specific reform measures is further dispersed to the heads of departments and offices and delegated to lower management levels. The Executive Offices provide the

\(^{68}\) There are 15 Special Agencies, not including the World Bank Group and the IMF, and about 84 Programmes, Committees and Commissions (http://www.unsystem.org). For further information refer to the UN Website http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html and the latest edition of the UN publication ‘Basic Facts’ (published annually by the UN).

\(^{69}\) We must, however, not ignore that in some instances outside events were responsible for the failures or shortcomings of UN operations, including the lack of cooperation of local authorities and rival groups.
necessary administrative support by implementing HR management decisions and by providing advice and guidance to managers and the staff (ST/SGB/1997/5).

Management as a collective action or various conflicting actions (of Member States, the SG and his senior managers and lower level UN administrators) is constituted in the UN, as in any other social system, “by means of communication and attribution” (Luhmann 1995: 137). The levels of responsibilities and authority with respect to the UN HR management reform within the Secretariat illustrate how reform proposals, programmes and expectations are communicated. In reversed order, performance and progress reports are submitted from the lower levels to the next higher ones.

As the diagram below shows, the UN management system is structured in a clear hierarchical order within the UN Secretariat. Responsibilities are delegated from the top to the lower management levels, which make managers and supervisors directly accountable for their actions with respect to the management of their staff. This explains further how such actions of individual managers can support or divert from the successful implementation of reforms. Managerial decisions have an immediate impact on the acceptance and credibility of reform measures.
Levels of Responsibilities and Authority with respect to the Reform of the Human Resources Management of the UN Secretariat

**Legislative Organs**
- GA and subsidiary bodies, e.g. Fifth Committee, ACABQ - Approve mandates, UN Staff Regulations and Rules, UN Financial Rules and Regulations; stipulate general policies through resolutions and recommendations

**Secretary-General**
and Deputy Secretary-General within authorities established by the GA
Develop and propose reform programme, including strategies, concepts and conceptual design of reform measures for the approval of the GA

**Under-Secretary-General for Management**
In accordance with reform concepts and strategies and guided by GA resolutions and instructions from the SG, formulates policies and procedures and provides strategic guidance, direction and support to OHRM

**Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management**
Formulates administrative instructions and is responsible for the direct implementation of reform measures

**Heads of Departments and Offices**
and managers and supervisors at lower levels
Hold responsibilities and are accountable for the management of personnel under supervision

**Executive Offices**
Execute decisions made by management and confirmed by the respective Review Bodies

The legislative level of the HR management is complemented by a number of subsidiary bodies. The *Fifth Committee* deals with administrative and budgetary questions of the UN, and is the central consultative and advisory body to the Member States in connection with the management of financial and human resources. Other relevant bodies are the *Advisory*
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC)\(^7\), the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) and the Advisory Committee on Post Adjustment Questions (ACPAQ). The roles of these committees and commissions is to advise the Member States and to assist the GA through consultations and reviews of particular management issues in rule-creating decisions and decisions of an operational nature and approvals of programmes.

2.3 The UN Secretariat – Role, Functions and Structure

The Secretariat is one of the six principal organs of the UN and represents the central administration of the UN, similar in its hierarchical organization to many national public service organizations. The Secretariat headquarters is located in New York and maintains the three main offices Geneva (UNOG), Nairobi (UNON) and Vienna (UNOV). In addition, it provides support to the major duty stations in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut and Santiago and numerous other duty stations worldwide.\(^7\) The Secretariat is structured in hierarchical order comprising 15 departments and offices situated in New York, in addition to the offices away from headquarters and the five Regional Commissions (for details see Annex I).\(^7\)

Departments and offices are headed by UN officials at the Under-Secretary-General level and further structured into areas of responsibilities under the leadership of an Assistant Secretary-General, in divisions and sections under the leadership of Directors and subsequently in lower units under the leadership of senior Professionals. The size of departments and offices and their areas of responsibilities are determined by the Member States, resources approved and mandates assigned by the GA. Functions of departments and offices are clearly separated. In connection with the overall reform of the UN, it is nevertheless envisioned to ensure more cooperation and coordination of the work of

\(^7\) The CPC is the main subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (A/RES/53/207: 2).

\(^7\) UNOG, UNOV and UNON are headed by Directors-General. Regional Commissions are headed by Executive Secretaries (all at USG levels).
various departments, offices and other UN entities in the five areas of core activities of the UN: peace and security, economic and social affairs, development, humanitarian affairs and human rights (A/51/950).

In its role as central administration of the organization, the Secretariat provides common services and supports the SG “in fulfilling the functions entrusted to him or her under the Charter of the United Nations” (ST/SGB/1997/5: 1). Other functions of the Secretariat are the provision of services and support to the other principal organs, in addition to the provision of staff resources.73 Decisions with respect to the allocation of funds for such support services and the required staff resources are taken by the GA.

In addition to its functions as service provider to the members and principal organs of the UN, the Secretariat provides support services to other UN entities and Specialized Agencies. Since the 1990s, the Secretariat increased significantly its cooperation with non-UN organizations (in particular with non-governmental organizations) and private businesses, but made also new efforts to work together with universities and independent research institutes. Further important areas of activities of the Secretariat are the compilation, analysis and publication of statistics, and the coordination and organization of international conferences to bring together various groups, not necessarily representing official governments (ST/SGB/1997/5: 2).

This list of functions of the UN Secretariat confirms the variety of qualifications, professional knowledge and skills that is required of the UN international civil service. In the performance of their functions, international civil servants are expected to respect the diversity of their internal and external environment. They work in an international organizational environment with colleagues of various cultural and ethnic backgrounds.

72 For further details see www.un.org; also A/60/310: paras. 9 & 12. In accordance with Article 97 of the UN Charter “the Secretariat shall comprise a SG and such staff as the Organization may require”. In accordance with Article 101, Secretariat staff is assigned to “other organs”; this includes independent bodies such as the Joint Inspection Unit. See also Unser 1997: 135-143. For statistics see respective chapter below.

73 Such services are for instance conference services, including translation and interpretation services. The six official languages of the organization, Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, of which English and French are the official working languages. Other services offered to Member States and other UN entities are general support services, e.g. in the area of information & communication technologies, legal services and information services.
and have to respect the local traditions of the countries they are posted in, without compromising the principles of the international civil service and the UN.

### 2.4 The Principles of the UN International Civil Service

#### 2.4.1 The UN Charter

The UN Charter institutes the vision of the founding nations to secure world peace, to honour human rights and to build a forum for cooperation among nations and with it the ideal concept of an UN civil service.74 “The Organization adopted from its inception the concept of career service” which was derived from its predecessor organization, the League of Nations (A/C.5/51/34: 2; see also The League of Nations 1921).

The seven principles of the UN international civil service in accordance with the UN Charter (not necessarily in the same order as listed therein) are the internationality, independence, neutrality, loyalty, integrity, competence and efficiency of the UN civil servants. Despite the increase of membership of the UN and the resulting influx of a wider range of social and cultural values by recruiting from a larger number of different nations, the UN civil service continues to be administered following these same principles and the UN Charter was not amended to change or to make any additions to these principles.75

New mandates and the creation of more field offices brought with them changes of the work conditions and additional responsibilities of UN international civil servants, some of which could not have been anticipated by the founders of the UN in 1946. For instance, while the international career civil servants of the early UN were mainly employed in a headquarters-based administration, today’s international civil servants work also in specialized fields ranging from communication technologies to drugs and crime prevention, mine-clearance, emergency aid, and many other modern professions. In order to fulfil its mandates, the organization requires highly trained Professionals with specific technical and scientific qualifications. These latest developments at the work place UN

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74 The declaration of the UN was signed on 1 January 1942. On 26 June 1945, 50 nations signed the UN Charter in San Francisco. Poland joined at a later stage as the 51st member. The Charter was ratified on 24 October 1945.

75 As detailed in the Introductory Note of the UN Charter, amendments were approved only in view of changes of the membership of legislative bodies.
contributed to changes of the work environment and, subsequently, to changes of the code of conduct.

The basic role of UN civil servants is to provide services to Member States (e.g. through conference services and public information services) and to provide assistance and aid to people in need in connection with humanitarian, political and peacekeeping operations in the field.

The most senior civil servant is the SG as the UN’s Chief Administrator. In accordance with Articles 97 and 98 of the UN Charter, the SG is responsible for the “proper running and administration of the Organization and implementation of its programmes” (A/48/452: 5). Nevertheless, the SG has only limited power to govern the organization and, in comparison with a head of government or minister in a national government, is in almost all relevant areas dependent upon and restricted by legislative decisions of UN Member States.

Although he has in principle full authority and wide responsibilities for the internal management of the UN Secretariat and its staff, Member States decide through their approval of the UN budget (and its detailed appropriations), the UN Financial Regulations and Rules and the UN Staff Regulations and Rules how the organization is managed.76 Moreover, they determine how efficiently and effectively the organization can operate through their financial contributions and by approving the staffing tables of the UN Secretariat.

Appointed initially for a term of five years, with the possibility to serve for one additional term, the SG has also responsibilities of a more political and diplomatic nature, in addition to his role as head of the administration. Article 99 determines the right of the SG “to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” The Charter does, however, not provide any further specifics of these expected duties, nor does it make specific reference

76 In accordance with Article 97 of the UN Charter, the SG is responsible for the HR management of the Secretariat staff with the exception of those recruited by subsidiary programmes, funds and organs with special status, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and others (A/59/299: para. 8).
to the possible right or obligation of the SG to bring to the attention of Member States any matter, which may threaten or hinder the performance of the organization and its staff.

None of the relevant Articles (8, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 and 105) specifically entitles the SG to propose any improvements and/or changes of the internal management, structure or operations of the organization. Article 105 which deals with the privileges and immunities of UN employees does not suggest the possibility that the SG may propose any amendments to existing privileges and immunities of the international civil servants. This remains the right of the Member States as per UN Charter Article 105, para. 3.

Former Secretaries-General tried to fill this vacuum of non-specified responsibilities and authorities through their own interpretation of the Charter with respect to the role and functions of the SG. For Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961), the second SG of the UN, the role of the SG was a dual function, namely of a political as well as of an executive nature. Hammarskjöld’s interpretation of the role of the SG and the international civil servants in general originated from the ideal of the international civil servant, which had been defined by the first SG of the League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond. After reflecting on the discussions and decisions of the founding nations of the UN, Hammarskjöld presented his understanding of the role of the international civil servant in his Oxford lecture (Foote (Ed.) 1962: 329-353).

In Hammarskjöld’s understanding, the SG and all international civil servants are to be impartial and independent from any outside influences and personal beliefs and their main consideration must be the common aims of the organization. Likewise, international civil servants, but in particular the Chief Executive Officer of the organization, could not remain non-political “where the official, in the exercise of his function, may be forced to take stands of a politically controversial nature” (Foote (Ed.) 1962: 337). Nevertheless, Hammarskjöld believed that it was possible for international civil servants to come to a judgement in international politics “without departing from the basic concept of ‘neutrality’ ” as long as UN civil servants, in particular the SG were not exposed to undue pressures from members (ibid.).

The principle of neutrality is addressed in Article 100 of the UN Charter, which determines that “the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any
government or from any other authority external to the Organization”. In its practical implementation, the principle of neutrality can present a conflict to international civil servants, for instance if they are asked to act as neutral observers or to provide aid while they live in an environment of constant violations of human rights.

Hammarskjöld answered to such concerns that the principle of neutrality did not imply that a UN civil servant could not “take a stand on a controversial issue when this is his duty” (Foote (Ed.) 1962: 348). Moral and ethical considerations may even justify that UN officials voice their opinions, for instance if this were appropriate in negotiations, although this may politically not agreeable to any of the parties concerned or to the Member States. When to take a stand and when to remain silent, is a constant challenge to the SG himself, but also concerns his special representatives and all international civil servants dealing with political, humanitarian and international legal matters.

In order to remain neutral and impartial in fulfilling their duties, international civil servants must keep their independence. Article 105 makes reference to the granting of “such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.” However, the international civil servants, in particular the SG, do not operate in a vacuum and are influenced by and, to some extent, dependent on their environment. The important question here is, how the independence of UN international civil servants can be guaranteed under such circumstances. The founders of the UN chose to apply the principle of separation of civil servants, as is also instituted in national public services, namely the division into career civil servants and politically appointed most senior administrators.

In practical terms, it is both important and unavoidable that the work of the administration relies on the advice of outside experts and on consultations with Member States in preparation of many of the administrative decisions. In addition, the SG relies on the assistance of Member States when searching for qualified senior managers or expert knowledge needed in the UN (JIU/REP/2000/3: iv). This reliance of the SG on

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77 To establish a non-partisan, professional civil service, administrative reforms were introduced in various sectors of the public service in western states during the nineteenth century with the overall goal to separate politics and administration (Knott/Miller 1987: 5; also Buse 1975: 19, 30-31).
governments in connection with specific recruitment needs of the organization did in the past not pose a serious threat to the authority of any SG, including Dag Hammarskjöld, as long as Member States would respect that the final decision of the appointment remained with the SG (Foote (Ed.) 1962: 340).

Neutrality and independence of UN international civil servants are consequently ideal values that are often challenged in real life. As much as international civil servants may be exposed to influences interfering with their independence, their own perception of neutrality of their actions may be distorted by their experience and their beliefs, e.g. of what is expected of them. Furthermore, the organization relies on series of informational data (such as national statistics) and intelligence provided by national or other non-UN sources.

The question of loyalty is indirectly formulated in Article 100 of the UN Charter in terms of the obligation of international civil servants to “refrain from any actions which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization”.\(^78\) It is further emphasized in Article 1 of the Staff Regulations, which constitutes the UN Oath of Office (complete text is contained in Annex II), and in chapter I of the 100 series of the Staff Rules.\(^79\) The loyalty of international civil servants is closely related to their independence, which in turn is guaranteed by their immunity and their integrity.\(^80\)

In addition to the provisions of Article 105 of the UN Charter, the principle of immunity is expressed through numerous host countries agreements.\(^81\) As past and present incidents unfortunately showed, the immunity of UN employees is a fragile privilege, often ignored or violated by officials of host countries and groups opposing established or interim governments.

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\(^78\) This principle derives from principles also applied in national civil service administrations in western cultures. In the case of the UN international civil service, the UN official is, however, accountable to the international leadership and not to a single state.

\(^79\) *Code of Conduct* of the UN (ST/SGB/2002/13)

\(^80\) The key to a loyal, impartial and efficient civil service in western public administrations was the creation of a highly paid and competitively selected group of civil servants on the basis of lifetime careers with entitlements through state-funded pensions and privileges in order to avoid corruption and partisanship (Grottian (Hrsg.) 1996: 21).

\(^81\) The term *host country* refers to the any country in which the UN maintains a duty station or office.
For Hammarskjöld, the question of the **internationality** of the UN civil service to be recruited “on as wide a geographical basis as possible” (Article 101, para. 3) was of central importance also in view of the UN’s principles of loyalty and independence. He felt, nonetheless, that the drafters of the UN Charter had given priority to the qualification of the UN international civil servants as the “paramount consideration in the employment of the staff” (Article 101, para. 3; Foote (Ed.) 1962: 337; for details on the actual, limited geographical distribution of posts see chapter 2.5.3).

The principle of **integrity** is also addressed as one of the core values in connection with the current reform of the UN HR management. In accordance with Article 101, “the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity” is paramount in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service. “The concept of integrity includes, but is not limited to, probity, impartiality, fairness, honesty and truthfulness in all matters affecting their work and status” (ST/SGB/1998/19: 15 and ST/SGB/2002/13: 15 - Staff Regulation 1.2).

While the degree of integrity and competence of any single civil servant may be measured based on their behaviour, actions and (past and proven) performance, it is uncertain how the organization is to determine or to secure the **efficiency** of the staff. This is in particular of interest, since there is no established definition of efficiency that could be used as benchmark, as has been established in chapter 1.7.4.

With respect to the **competence** as one of the considerations in the recruitment of UN international civil servants (Art. 101), the UN administration developed a model of competencies in conjunction with the current UN HR management reform. Competencies are herein defined as a “combination of skills, attributes and behaviours that are directly related to successful performance on the job” (Competencies for the Future 1999; see also ST/SGB/1999/15). The model contains core competencies and managerial competencies (for further details see chapter 3.3.5).

Concluding the list of the principles of the international civil service, it is remarkable that the UN Charter contains no particular reference to such human rights of UN civil servants as the right to free speech, representation, education and the choice of profession. Such provisions are only made with respect to the functions and powers of the principal organs.
of the UN (e.g. for the GA in Art. 13, for the ECOSOC in Art. 62). Issues such as discrimination, racism and sexual harassment or abuse in the UN civil service were obviously not considered when the Charter was drafted.

The Charter states in Article 8 “the UN shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs”. This provision refers, however, to the representatives of Member States. The provisions of Article 105, on the other hand, although endorsing the privileges and immunities of international civil servants “as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization” is insufficient to ensure the protection of UN employees within the organization or from any administrative injustice. Privileges refer to UN civil servants’ status towards a third party; no mentioning is made in the UN Charter of the rights and protection against negative occurrences at the workplace.

Though not mentioned in the Charter, the right of representation is regulated by the UN Staff Regulations and Rules (Staff Regulation 8.1; Staff Rule 108.1 & 108.2). In addition, bulletins, information circulars and administrative instructions are issued to clarify and regulate rights and obligations of the UN civil servants in view of such issues as discrimination, harassment and sexual abuse.\(^82\)

While these problems are addressed in many UN Member States at the latest since the 1980s and 1990s by instituting national laws and regulations in the public sector, the UN is only now and in conjunction with the ongoing reform of the UN HR management, starting a slow process of building wider awareness about abuse, discrimination and harassment within the organization. That this reality of the UN international civil service could have been ignored in the internal and public discussion is as much embarrassing as the fact that

\(^{82}\) See hereto for instance ST/SGB/2003/13. Some of the rights of employees in international organizations and other issues of concern are regulated by standards of international labour law. To assure that the administration and management of the UN honours the applicable international law and conforms to established UN-specific regulations, the Member States established a complex system of monitoring and controls. The UN also adopted over time ethical standards of its personnel management, following the example of western public administrations, foremost those of the US and the British civil service.
it exists at all in an organization, which proclaims to fight against this very same unethical behaviour.

That UN international civil servants are equally confronted with issues of loyalty and integrity is also discussed by Beigbeder: “International civil servants are no more perfect than national civil servants or employees in the private sector. They have their foibles, their deficiencies, their ambitions, and their frustrations. A staff member of a UN organization who feels that his merits have not been recognized, or whose contract is terminated, may, contrary to his oath, ask his government to intervene. A few may serve as overt or covert government agents, allowing their national obligations to prevail over their international allegiance” (Beigbeder 1988: 26).

With regards to the competencies (qualifications) of UN employees, Pitt and Weiss suggest that the internationality of the UN with the principle of geographical distribution may be disadvantageous to the selection process and may have an effect on the competency of the organization (Pitt/Weiss (Eds.) 1986: 192). Their conclusion appear to be drawn from their observation that many of the top and mid-level managers of the UN are ‘political appointees’ who are alleged to be more concerned about the political prestige and power play than being interested in (or even knowledgeable of) managerial aspects of their jobs (Pitt/Weiss (Eds.) 1986: 28).

There is no empirical evidence to support the suggestion of Pitt and Weiss, since the organization did not measure managerial performance of its most senior officials in the past. The renowned interference of governments in the selection of senior managers leads, however, to the widespread belief that appointments of individuals are in many instances made on the basis of political alliances, rather than proven professional competencies and excellent management skills.

The principles of the UN civil service constitute an ideal concept, which remained constant since the foundation of the organization. In order to support the mission of the UN, they represent valuable, desired attitudes and privileges of international civil servants. Nonetheless, individuals join the UN service bringing with them their different cultural and moral values. Once in the service of the UN and exposed to the UN organizational
culture, their attitudes and beliefs may change based on their experiences. They will adapt their actions to what they perceive is expected of them or is acceptable.

Although one may wish that ideal and reality are closely related, they deviate. The leadership of Member States and UN managers have, consequently, the responsibility of role models by living the ideal they wish to see in the performance of UN international civil servants. In conjunction with HR management reform, much is talked about the responsibility of managers to perform in accordance with the principles and the specially designed competencies. Little is, however, mentioned about the moral responsibility of governments and their representatives in support of the principles of the UN international civil service. The political leadership has, nonetheless, the central power to ensure that these principles are realities in the day-to-day lives of UN international servants as anticipated by the founders of the organization.

2.4.2 The Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct constitutes a list of privileges, duties and responsibilities of the UN international civil service in line with the principles of the international civil service. The Code is part of the UN Staff Regulations and Rules and is, consequently, a legal norm (ST/SGB/2002/13: paras. 2 and 5). It further includes the Oath of Office to be given by each newly recruited UN civil servant.

Together with the commentary, the Code serves as guideline for staff members in their daily work. While the UN Staff Regulations and Rules were repeatedly revised, the Code of Conduct remained unchanged in its draft of 1954 until December 1998. Changes of the conditions of service, new functions of UN staff members and added accountabilities and responsibilities of UN managers were, therefore, not reflected in an amended Code although such consideration were made by the administration since the mid 1990s (A/C.5/49/1: 7-8).

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83 At that time, it was anticipated that separate Codes would be prepared for employees in the Field Service category, and those with special status in the framework of the review of the 200 and 300 series of the UN Staff Rules (ST/SGB/1998/19: 2; see also A/RES/52/252 and GA/AB/3218). Such provisions were finalized in December 2002 (ST/SGB/2002/13: para. 2.2).
While a first revision of the Code was under review between 1997 and 1999, the Staff Union raised strong objections against the draft prepared by the administration, calling it “draconian, antediluvian and archaic” (UN Staff Report Vol. 22, No. 1: 4). During consultations on the following revision, the Staff Union’s condemnation of the lack of cooperation on the part of the UN administration with staff representatives was repeated. Since the legality of the proposed revision was questioned by the Staff Union, the Coordinating Committee of International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations (CCISUA) recommended that the proposed Code be reviewed by the Sixth Committee, before it would be enforced so any legal questions could be addressed if necessary (UN Staff Report Vol. 23, No. 1: 5).

Both staff representative organizations, the CCISUA and the Federation of International Civil Servants’ Associations (FICSA), voiced their criticism of the restrictive rather than protective clauses of the new Code. They also had reservations about the lack of clarity in the draft document regarding the rights and responsibilities of management and staff members, and the right of full staff representation (if not staff participation) in management decisions (GA/AB/3218).

The Assistant Secretary-General for HR management rejected these claims of staff representatives. In her response to the Fifth Committee, she mentioned, to the contrary, the extensive consultations between the administration and staff representatives and informed the legislators that the draft Code had been 42 times amended as a result since February 1997 (ibid.).

At the end, the new Code of Conduct was approved and became effective in January 1999, despite the objections by the staff representatives and their additional request to have the final draft reviewed by the Sixth Committee and by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (SCB/1467: 2). This version was revised effective 1 December 2002 to

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84 The Code of Conduct was published with a commentary to the existing Staff Regulations and Rules in December 1998 under the UN Official Record code ST/SGB/1998/19. A recent revision and commentary was issued on 1 November 2002 (see ST/SGB/2002/13), which replaces ST/SGB/1998/19. The initial standards of conduct were issued in 1954 and published as part of the ICSAB report (A/C.5/49/1: 7) and in 2001 revised and updated by the ICSC (ST/SGB/2002/13: para. 7).
incorporate the new standards of conduct, which had been adopted by the ICSC (ST/SGB/2002/13).

That the new Code of Conduct was introduced despite strong objections by the UN Staff Union provides an unfortunate confirmation of the difficult state of the UN staff representation. The history of the revision of the Code shows the lack of cooperation and the level of participation the UN administration has granted to staff representatives, in particular with respect to UN HR management reforms. The Member States have also largely ignored the concerns raised by the UN civil servants, which has further damaged the morale and trust of UN employees towards the leadership of the organization.

Unlike in western and other national public administrations of Member States, UN civil servants have no strong representation and no recourse to legal action to overturn decisions that may violate employees’ rights of participation and representation. UN international civil servants have no expressed right to strike in protest against decisions that may have a negative impact on their employment conditions. The existing mechanisms of the UN system of justice are inadequate compared with those in many Member States and national public services. As a result, the system is under review in connection with this reform.

Furthermore, UN employees have no law enforcement system (international police force) at their disposal if, for instance, Member States violate international agreements concerning the protection of international civil servants or do not fulfil their obligations under existing agreements between the UN and the host country. In those cases when UN civil servants are harassed by local authorities or even arrested without trial while serving in field offices, UN civil servants rely on the local system of justice of the host country or the intervention of the respective most senior UN official to negotiate with those in power and violation of the host country agreement a suitable solution.

### 2.5 The Realities of the International Civil Service

#### 2.5.1 The Practical Application of the Principles of the International Civil Service

The realities of UN international civil servants are determined by the actual conditions of service, the working conditions, their functions and remuneration, and the living
conditions at the respective duty station, and by individuals’ perceptions and expectations in terms of career development and desired status in the organization, including professional aspirations, personal interests and beliefs. These (actual or perceived) realities can, obviously, more or less divert from the principles of the international civil service. This chapter presents some reflections on these realities in the practical application of the UN international civil service principles.

In general, all employees of the UN bear the same responsibilities with respect to the principles of neutrality, independence and loyalty to the organization and enjoy similar privileges and immunities (Art. 105 of the UN Charter). There are, however, specific entitlements that differ between duty stations and among staff members based on their status within the organizational hierarchy.

High-level UN officials like the SG and Special Representatives of the SG enjoy, for instance, full diplomatic status, which is not granted to other civil servants of the UN. UN staff employed locally and those with appointments of limited duration are administered by specifically designed Staff Rules and by defined instructions (for instance those applicable to non-international staff members as per UN Staff Rule 104.6; ST/SGB/2004/1). Consequently, privileges and immunities, although in principal applicable to all UN civil servants vary in their actual application by status and employment conditions.

The question of neutrality and independence of international civil servants in combination with their immunity and security is of particular concern in duty stations with unstable political conditions. To work in a hostile environment, providing assistance to the local population and having to witness the effects of wars or repeated human rights violations, is often a challenging task for UN staff in field missions. As much as UN civil servants may remain neutral and impartial in their daily performance of duties, they are not immune against attacks by local governments and partisan groups.

The tragedy of the attack on the UN office in Baghdad in 2003 was the most atrocious wake-up call. Various other incidents in field missions before had already shown the
reality of insufficient security measures of the UN. Yet, UN administrators and legislators believed that the principles of the UN Charter and basic security measures at field duty stations were sufficient to protect the lives of UN civil servants. In addition to local and political circumstances, conditions in field missions are often complicated by the lack of financial and staff resources, which can put the principle of competence and loyalty into question.

Personal and professional interests of civil servants also play a role in the practical application of the principles integrity and loyalty. Misconduct and corruption among international civil servants are the extreme negative realities of the international civil service, but despite reported cases of mismanagement and corruption and a widely acknowledged low staff morale, there is sufficient proof that the large majority of the UN staff perform their duties in accordance with the principles of the international civil service, honouring the ideals of the UN. The deep dedication of UN staff could not only be observed during my own research, but was also indirectly confirmed by surveys conducted in 1995 and 2004 (see hereto UNOG Staff 1995 and Deloitte Consulting 2004).

Among the principles of the UN international civil service, the principles of independence, neutrality and internationality appear to be of particular importance in view of the conditions of service, the safety and security (in connection with their immunities and privileges or violations thereof) and in view of the obligation of the SG to recruit “on as wide geographical basis as possible” (Art. 101 of the UN Charter). The following two chapters discuss these issues in more detail.

2.5.2 Immunity and Security

Article 105, paragraph 2 reads: “Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization.” It continues in paragraph 3: “The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1

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85 According to statistics 678 UN staff members died due to malicious acts between 1948 – 2006 (source: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/).
and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.”

Accordingly, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (for the UN Secretariat staff), the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, and the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, which is supplemented by the Optional Protocol adopted by the GA in December 2005, constitute the legal basis for the security and safety conditions of UN personnel (A/53/501: 3; GA/AB/3325: 16; A/RES/60/42). By ratifying these conventions, Member States agree to protect UN employees inter alia from any criminal and unwarranted actions when operating in their territory.86 Host country agreements and Status-of-Forces Agreements further regulate the privileges and immunities of UN staff of peacekeeping missions and peacekeeping troops.87

While the security of UN personnel is the responsibility of the respective host country in accordance with the Charter, the “responsibility for the coordination of all security matters rests with the Secretary-General” (A/53/501: para. 22). In order to exercise this responsibility, the SG appointed a Security Coordinator.

In field duty stations, responsibilities for security are delegated to a designated senior official in the respective country. These designated officials are directly accountable to the SG for all safety and security matters, but report through the Security Coordinator (ibid.). The network of security management in field duty stations is then further extended into a local advisory security management team, a Professional-level field security officer (or chief security officer at peacekeeping missions) who assists the designated official, and local area coordinators with security matters away from the main offices of the field mission (A/53/501: para. 23). Security wardens are appointed at the local level “to ensure implementation of security measures” (ibid.).

Country-specific security plans are prepared for each duty station, and “arrangements are kept under continuous review by the SG, the executive heads of United Nations agencies,

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86 The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, which entered into force on 15 January 1999, has been ratified or acceded to by 79 states (A/RES/60/42).

The reality of UN employees’ personal safety and security is, unfortunately, often in stark contrast to the announced concepts and legal frameworks. Violations of existing agreements increased significantly since the early 1990s, when the UN significantly expanded its peacekeeping operations and increased its operation to assist in elections and other peacebuilding activities.

Between January 1992 and 18 September 2000, 198 civilian staff lost their lives in the service of the UN. From January 1994 to September 2000, some 240 staff members were taken hostage or kidnapped. Staff members of the UN did also experience “an unprecedented number of cases of rape and sexual assault, armed robbery, attacks on humanitarian convoys, car-jackings, harassment and arrest and detention” during that period (A/55/494: para. 2). By August 1998, the year of the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the UN’s peacekeeping programme, the number of 17 civilian UN staff killed in the line of duty in any one year exceeded for the first time in the history of the UN that of military peacekeeping forces (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 August 1998).

Such statistics and the bombing of the UN office in Baghdad, followed by numerous other attacks on UN offices and personnel since 2003, make it evident that the UN security management system must be further strengthened to provide the necessary protection against harassment, unlawful detention, torture, rape and physical attacks, including armed assaults directed at individuals or UN offices. They also proof that the changes to the system in the 1980s were insufficient to guarantee a better protection of the staff in the field.

Appeals and UN resolutions are, obviously, not effective if governments and partisan groups do not honour existing agreements, in particular in instances when the presence of UN civilians and peacekeepers is strongly opposed. According to the 1998 report of the SG, the majority of violations and attacks on UN premises and personnel are committed by representatives of governments, military authorities and political groups who strive for

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87 These agreements are also binding to opposition groups and fighting fractions, if these groups and fractions are in agreement with the presence of the UN.
power and control over local territories (A/53/501: paras. 8-19). Recent violations of the immunity and privileges of UN staff and the necessity to evacuate UN personnel from field missions that were previously considered relatively stable shows further how security and safety conditions can change rapidly.\(^8\)

In addition to such external threats by governments and other groups, the UN administration had also to deal with improper behaviour and criminal acts committed by UN employees towards other individuals and UN property, which caused the Working Group on Staff Security established in 2001 by the UN Staff-Management Coordination Committee to request the rigorous application of international human rights standards, as well as stricter reviews and screening processes in the recruitment of individuals with a known record of human rights abuses (WWS Vol. 7).

In view of the improvements already implemented to the system, three measures need to be taken into account to further strengthen the security and safety system and its management: (a) the establishing of protective mechanisms to secure UN premises; (b) the adequate presence of security personnel resources, including their training; and (c) the readiness of UN employees. While the bulk of activities related to the first two measures will require some significant investments and more financial resources, the building of readiness of UN employees will need less drastic expenses.

Improvements will necessitate changes of policies concerning the security and safety of UN personnel and sufficient funding by Member States. If field missions are insufficiently equipped with funds to establish the full scale of the minimal operating standards required for the safety and security of their personnel, UN staff will continue to work under insufficiently protected conditions. If such working conditions are not correctly addressed, it may become increasingly difficult for the UN to attract staff for its field operations. Furthermore, the psychological effects on UN personnel who live and work under dangerous and unsafe conditions (while fearing or knowing that there is inadequate security provided) are not fully examined and can, therefore, not be analysed in view of their impact on the motivation and performance of field staff.

\(^8\) This was, for instance, the case in Eritrea and Lebanon during 1998 (A/53/501: paras. 11 and 17) and also in a number of field offices in the Middle East in 2006.
Field operations such as political and humanitarian assistance missions are often at a particular security risk. Any UN operation without strong military or police protection is a ‘soft’ target to armed attacks by groups opposed to the presence of the UN in an environment of already heightened conflict (A/53/501: paras. 27-29). Even those UN missions with military personnel (peacekeeping forces) are not necessarily in a better position, since peacekeepers and UN security forces are often not authorized to carry or use their weapons except for narrowly specified purpose and for self-defence.

The International Criminal Court may represent a juridical system for UN civil servants, but is in fact not giving any guarantees that criminal acts are prosecuted unless the local government and territorial authorities cooperate. The absence of an international law enforcement system or UN police force leaves the investigation and prosecution mainly in the hands of the negotiators. Consequently, the success of identifying and prosecuting those who committed violations against UN personnel or UN property depends on the willingness and ability of governments to assist and cooperate with the UN administration.

Issues of personal safety and security of UN staff are directly related to a number of other principles of the UN, beyond the principle of independence and the status of UN civil servants regarding their immunity and privileges. The freedom of movement guaranteed by sufficient security in the field enables UN civil servants to perform their duties as is expected of them. Any restrictions imposed by threats or violent acts against UN personnel, on the other hand, has a negative impact on the ability of the organization to fulfil its mandates and on the efficiency and effectiveness of the work of the UN.

As the above discussion shows, security and safety issues and the guarantee of immunities are important factors of the overall conditions of the UN international service. Despite a growing awareness in the organization, they are still not sufficiently recognized as factors that can seriously affect the performance and well-being of UN staff.

In October 1998, SG Annan reminded Member States of their obligations with respect to security and safety concerns of UN civil servants. In October 2000, he renewed his call for support to introduce changes to a security management system that was initially

89 “It is time for Member States to recognize that the cost of providing security is the price of implementing successfully the mandated activities of the Organization” (A/53/501: para. 81).
“designed to meet the operational requirements of the United Nations system which existed 20 years ago” (A/55/494: para. 2) and was no longer “able to adequately fulfil its responsibilities despite the best efforts and dedication of all those involved in the present security management system” (A/55/494: para. 3). How these issues are incorporated into the HR management reform programme is further discussed in the chapter 3.3.8.

2.5.3 Geographical Distribution

The principle of equitable geographical distribution was agreed by the founding nations of the UN to ensure the organization would employ its international civil service on “as wide a geographic basis as possible” (UN Charter Article 101, para. 3). This principle is in practice followed since 1948 and is applicable in the initial recruitment at the category of the Professional Service and above (A/C.5/46/2: 2). Consequently, geographical aspects are not an issue in connection with decisions following the initial appointment, e.g. promotions and transfers (Perry 1993: 11).

The geographical distribution of posts in the UN Secretariat does not entail the right of a Member State to any specific position within the administration. It is rather a method to ensure equal ‘representation’ of all nationalities of UN members within the organization. Although applied in connection with the recruitment throughout the organization, it is applicable only to a limited number of posts set aside for this purpose.

Posts subject to geographical distribution vary by number depending on the total number of posts approved by the GA and constitute the basis for the calculation of desirable ranges for each Member State. Such posts, “known as ‘posts subject to geographical distribution’, are those posts encumbered by staff of the regular Secretariat in Professional and higher-level posts who are appointed for at least one year by the SG. They include not

90 According to Perry, the term representation was rejected by the former head of personnel of ILO and chairman of the Federation of Associations of Former International Civil Servants, Mr. Ali, in view of the independency of international civil servants, not representing any government (Perry 1993: 12).

91 Geographical quotas are established on factors of membership, population and contribution of members to the regular budget. Quotas constitute a range (minimum 1 – 5 posts) with a median value and are calculated for each Member State on the basis of the total number of posts approved by the GA for the purpose of geographical distribution under the respective budget (resolution 153 (II); resolution 1559 (XV); A/C.5/35/7; A/C.5/46/2; Perry 1993: 11-15).
only the posts authorized in the regular budget but those authorized out of extra-budgetary funds, since the exclusion of posts from the system is not justified by the source of financing alone” (A/C.5/46/2: para. 4). Revisions and adjustments of the number of posts subject to geographical distribution are made upon request by the GA, if new members join the UN and when the number of established posts changes.92

These desirable ranges established for all Member States allow for a flexibility factor of plus/minus 15 per cent as the upper and lower limit for each mid-point (the median value of the number of posts established for each Member State), which gives the administration some flexibility in the selection and recruitment of nationals (Perry 1993: 12-15; also A/C.5/46/2: paras. 9-10). Member States carefully monitor the adherence to the principle of geographical distribution, in particular in connection with the current HR management reform (GA/AB/3531: 1).

Despite all this attention devoted to the issue of geography, the number of posts thus allocated is small when compared with the overall number of employees of the UN Secretariat and the UN system. Statistical data show that posts and staff actually recruited against posts subject to geographical distribution within the UN Secretariat range usually (e.g. since the 1990s) between 15 to 17 per cent of the total number of posts approved by the GA (A/56/956: para. 9).

The largest contingent of posts excluded from this principle are all those “posts that are not allocated to the United Nations Secretariat but to the secretariats of subsidiary organs that have been granted a special status” (A/C.5/46/2: para. 5). These exceptions include posts of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the International Trade

92 The base figure for the calculation of desirable ranges to determine the geographical quota of Member States was initially set at 2,700 effective 1988 (A/C.5/46/2: para. 18; also A/59/299: para. 39 and Table 2). In January 2005, the base figure was adjusted to 2,800 and a total of 2,833 ‘geographical’ posts were approved, accordingly (A/60/310: para. 39).
Centre (ITC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other established UN courts\textsuperscript{93} and the United Nations University (UNU). Also excluded are the Specialized Agencies of the UN system, since it was anticipated that those organizations would need to recruit highly specialized personnel due to their specific mandates. As research by Perry shows, most UN entities apply, nevertheless, a system to honour equitable representation of nationals of their members (Perry 1993: 12).

Of all occupational categories within the UN Secretariat not included in the geographical distribution, the largest group is staff appointed in the General Service and related categories (i.e. most locally recruited staff), those with special language skills and the Field Service staff. Further excluded from the geographical distribution are “posts for staff specifically appointed for mission service” (A/C.5/46/2: para. 5; Mission Appointees) and posts financed from special funds with limited appointment status; the latter applies to the recruitment of consultants and personnel with specific skills and recruited for specific projects, appointed under the 200 and 300 series of the UN Staff Rules. Not excluded are gratis personnel (A/RES/51/243: para. 11(a)).

Of the total 2,581 ‘geographical’ appointees as at June 2005, the majority (1,380) holds a permanent contract, 144 appointees are on probationary contracts and 1,057 are fixed-term appointees (A/60/310: Table A.2).

In view of the many exceptions and the small number of geographically distributed posts in the UN Secretariat, it is not surprising that a significant number of Member States is under- or unrepresented. Although the SG reported some accomplishments over the past 10 years, statistics show that there were no improvements between 2001 and 2005 when nine Member States were underrepresented and 17 unrepresented as detailed in table 3 below (A/60/310: 11; A/59/264; A/59/446).

\textsuperscript{93} These are the International Criminal Courts for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, and the new International Criminal Court of the UN.
Table 3: Number of unrepresented and underrepresented Member States, 1994-2005

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<td>Underrepresented</td>
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Source: A/59/264: Table 1 and A/60/310: Figure 2; (as at 30 June of each year)

It is, furthermore, interesting to note that between 1996 (the year before the introduction of UN HR management reform) and 2004 the absolute number of geographical appointees remained at the same level. By June 2005, the actual number of ‘geographical’ appointees increased to 2,581 posts compared with the total number of 15,989 staff employed at that date (A/60/310: para. 13).

Reason for the slow progress may have been, “the significant reductions of geographical posts at the P-2 and P-3 levels” as noted by the GA in 1999 (A/RES/53/221: Section IX, para. 2). These reductions had resulted from approvals of the post structures by the GA and could also have long-term effect in further diminishing these countries’ chances to reach higher levels of representation in the upper management of the UN Secretariat (see hereto also A/RES/53/221: Section IX, para. 2). Between 2002 and 2004, there were slight improvements in “geographical” appointments at the P-2 and P-3 levels, and it will have to be observed if this positive tendency will continue in the coming years.

In order to improve the representation of under- and unrepresented countries at all levels, UN HR management policies would have to pay close attention to the recruitment of candidates from junior Professional levels to the appointment of senior managers. Data on the geographical distribution among developing countries, developed countries and countries with economies in transition, show no clear tendency to a steady increase of candidates from developing countries (who represent the majority of the un- and underrepresented countries), even in view of the representation at the senior and policy-

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94 In June 1996, there were 2,514 ‘geographical’ appointees (out of a total 15,178 staff) and in June 2004, they accounted for 2,515 out of a total of 14,823 staff (A/C.5/51/34: para. 14; A/59/299: para. 12).
making levels, ranging from the levels of Directors to those of Assistant Secretaries-General and above (A/57/414: Table 2; A/59/299: Table 2).

This also reiterates the observations made in the 2000 report of the JIU on the subject which states: “Many Member States, in particular developing countries continue to be inadequately represented in senior-level positions” (JIU/REP/2000/3: v). Actual appointment figures of senior managers between July 2003 and 2004 show that the majority of appointments (at all levels) were nationals from developed countries, as has also been the case in the years before. Of the 208 appointments to posts subject to geographical distribution (2003/2004), 110 were shared among Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the USA. For the period 2004/2005, these numbers did not change much, except that the previous countries with the highest employment ratio were joined by the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland and counted for 104 out of the total of 206 ‘geographical’ appointments (A/60/310: Table A.3).

Un- and underrepresentation is also linked to gender imbalance, which is in particular noticeable at the senior management levels. Statistics for 2002 show that among the 174 Member States represented in the UN administration, “37 had no women nationals represented in the Secretariat compared to 31 in the last reporting period.” Although the number of unrepresented countries had been decreased from 24 countries in 1999 to 16 countries in 2002, female nationals were now unrepresented in even larger numbers than in 2001.

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95 Among those countries represented with at least one appointee, eight were represented at higher management levels, namely Ghana, Guyana, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Moldova, Singapore and Venezuela (A/59/299: Table A.3).

96 Source: A/57/447: para. 2. It is noted that there is a slight discrepancy of one staff member between the numbers for 2002 reported in other sources (see table 3 above). Details of unrepresented countries and those with no women in the international civil service of the UN Secretariat are contained in footnotes of A/57/447: para. 2. Corresponding data for the year 2004 were not available in comparative format.
Pitt and Weiss (1986) suggest abolishing the principle of geographical quotas all together, arguing that it hampers the recruitment of the best and most competent candidates.\textsuperscript{97} One may, on the other hand, reject the principle of geographical distribution as meaningless, since it applies to such a small number of Secretariat posts in comparison with the total number of UN positions. Neither argument recognizes, however, the symbolic importance of this principle in view of the international character of the UN.

Quota systems are also applied in national administrations and are constituted by national labour laws to ensure equal treatment of the disabled, of racial minorities and with respect to gender. It would be incongruous for the UN to abandon the principle of geographical distribution and recruit exclusively on the basis of rigid competitive factors.

Although the principle of geographical distribution is formally only applicable to the initial appointment of staff to those posts particularly set aside for this purpose, Member States and administrators referred to its application over the years also in connection with the overall recruitment practices of the UN. As a consequence, it became informally extended to all HR management decisions (appointments, placements and promotions) and throughout the organization, including the employment of temporary staff, such as seconded personnel, short-term consultants, individual contractors and experts, even to gratis personnel.

Despite the objections of the UN Staff Union, it became also applicable with respect to the recruitment of former General Service staff into the Professional Service category after successfully passing the G-to-P examination.\textsuperscript{98} In connection with ongoing UN HR management reforms, several new efforts were made to improve the geographical representation throughout the Secretariat, e.g. in connection with departmental HR action

\textsuperscript{97}“What is needed for the dinosaur is to acquire a powerful brain. This means a career civil service, the abolition of country quotas, with entry on merit, by competitive examination; the encouragement of an esprit de corps and loyalty to the international community; and a staff college to train experts in techniques and social sensitivity. They should be professionals, with a sense of the interdependence of variables, and of what is socially and politically feasible” (Pitt/Weiss (Eds.) 1986: 192).

\textsuperscript{98}G-to-P examinations stands for the examinations General Service and related categories staff have to complete in order to be appointed into a position at the Professional Service level. Such examinations are usually held once a year in selected professional categories and for a limited number of posts at the P-2 entry level.
plans, special recruitment missions by the OHRM to under- and unrepresented countries to identify qualified candidates together with the governments of those countries, and the introduction of a ‘fast-track’ recruitment procedure (A/59/264).

The application of the principle of geographical distribution of posts will become more important as the organization tries to improve its gender balance. The principle of geographical distribution and of distribution of posts by gender will have to be taken into account in order to improve the representation of women from less developed countries at all levels of the administration.

The organization is currently reviewing whether it is adequate and financially affordable to make changes to the system, e.g. by increasing the number of allocated posts and by expanding the principle of geographical distribution also to posts of the General Service and related categories. A final decision on this subject is still pending (for more details see hereto A/59/724).

2.6 The Composition of the Secretariat Staff

2.6.1 Categories and Structure

The composition and structure of the Secretariat staff result from the approval of the budget with its proposed allocations for posts by the Member States. Since 1971, the SG is required to submit annual reports on the composition of the Secretariat to the GA, which provides statistical data on the structure by staff categories and other criteria. These reports are the basic source of monitoring whether policies and decisions of the Member States have been implemented (A/57/414).

The most recent report on the composition of the Secretariat available in the context of this study is report A/60/310, which covers statistics up to June 2005. In addition, the SG has submitted reports in the course of this reform programme on specific matters, such as geographical distribution and on the improvement of the status of women in the UN Secretariat, some of which were also considered in the following discussion of the composition of the UN Secretariat staff.
The fact that Member States demand annual reports on the composition of staff and specific reports on HR management-related issues ideally indicates their fundamental interest in the organization’s personnel management. It also underlines the fundamental importance they assign to the UN civil service’s qualification and performance in the interest of the organization’s efficiency and effectiveness, as Member States have repeatedly acknowledged.99

Their failure to instigate reforms to address some of the long-known shortcomings of the UN HR management system, however, raises the question of whether the interest of Member States in UN reforms was (so far) rhetorical rather than genuine. Besides, it suggests that the organization was for various reasons neither ready nor able to vigorously pursue reforms before in 1997 a clearly defined programme of comprehensive reforms was presented by SG Annan.100

Member States’ concerns about high staff costs and related administrative costs, caused by the growth of the UN bureaucracy, exchange rate fluctuations and adjustments of salaries, did not take into account any possible long-term (negative) impacts of such measures as the abolishing of posts, the suspension of recruitments, promotions and permanent appointments on the composition of the Secretariat staff. Suspensions of recruitments certainly affected the UN’s goal to hire ‘new blood’.101 Structural changes have also negatively influenced the morale of civil servants, especially, when staff reductions in departments were accompanied by the establishing of a new post at the senior management or policy-making level.

The categories and personnel structures of the UN Secretariat have basically not changed. The majority of staff members at headquarters in New York and in the three main offices in Geneva, Nairobi and Vienna fall into two groups, Professionals and General Service staff; all other categories, such as Trades and Crafts, Safety and Security, and employees

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99 “The General Assembly, reaffirming that the staff of the United Nations is an invaluable asset of the Organization, and commending its contribution to furthering the purposes and principles of the United Nations” (A/RES/55/258: 1).

100 Beigbeder suggests that some representatives may be simply incompetent and other delegations may be too small to be able to review and comprehend the many administrative details (Beigbeder 1997: 8).
with special language skills (e.g. interpreters, translators and revisers) are smaller in numbers.

At present about two thirds of all UN Secretariat staff (of various categories) work in the field (A/55/253: 4). As at June 2004, the number of staff financed under the regular budget was less than 52 per cent of the total number of staff working in the UN Secretariat (A/59/299: Table 1). By June 2005, this ratio had further decreased to 48 per cent of UN civil servants employed in the Secretariat (A/60/310: Table 1).

Effective 1 January 2003, all employees of the UN Secretariat are referred to as ‘international civil servants’, “regardless of the category they are employed in” (DSG/SM/176: 3). This change of terminology eliminates at least linguistically the separation of UN employees into the two categories (see hereto also SG’s letter to the staff of 23 September 2002; Highlights No. 25, January-March 2002: 3; ST/SGB/2002/18).

The two main categories of Professionals and General Service are each subdivided or complemented by related categories. Professionals of higher categories are those appointed as Principal Officers and Directors at the D-1 and D-2 level, Assistant Secretaries-General and Under-Secretaries-General; the latter two levels are also referred to as the senior or policy-making levels. Related to the Professional category is also staff with special language skills (e.g. translators and interpreters). The General Service related categories include the Security Service, Trades and Crafts, and the Field Service staff. A more detailed discussion follows below.

The UN civil service is administered by the UN Staff Regulations and different series of Staff Rules for the various types of appointments. The Staff Rules for the 100 series “are applicable to all staff members appointed by the Secretary-General except technical assistance project personnel and staff members specifically engaged for conferences and other short-term services” (Staff rule 100.1). Those not covered by the 100 series consequently belong to the group of project personnel with functions depending “on the existence of project funds” (A/C.5/51/34: para. 44b) and are administered under the 200 series. A third category of Staff Rules, the 300 series, is applicable to all those UN

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101 This slogan was already a point of discussion in the mid 1980s in connection of the necessity of the UN to hire more young people and to build a future cadre of UN civil servants.
employees with non-career appointments, e.g. holding short-term appointments or appointments of limited duration (A/C.5/51/34: para 44c; ST/SGB/2003/3).

The three series of Staff Rules differ in the way they regulate recruitment, appointment and contractual conditions. Details on the structure of those professional categories of the UN Secretariat are listed in Annex III. Due to the similarity of the various Rules, this study does not further elaborate on their differences, but will note any significant implications of current reforms on particular categories of staff.102 In view of long-term career opportunities, it must be noted that only those recruited under the 100 series are eligible for conversion to permanent employment.

Professionals and higher categories (D-1s and above) were considered up to 2002 to be the international civil servants of the UN per se, and as such were distinct from the other occupational groups. The functions of the Professionals at various levels of the UN bureaucracy can be compared with the various management levels in national (western) civil services.

Minimum qualification for appointment is an advanced university degree (e.g. Masters or equivalent). Appointments at the entry level (P-2 and P-3 positions) are usually made upon the successful completion of a national competitive examination. Such examinations are organized annually by the UN, especially in under- and unrepresented Member States in order to identify qualified candidates from those countries and to reach for a wide geographical representation of nations in the UN Secretariat, in accordance with Article 101 of the UN Charter.

Exceptions from this selection process and the strictly applied geographical principle are made when the organization requires specific professional skills and expertise. Also excluded are appointments to peacekeeping operations, which are considered of temporary nature due to the limited funding of posts. Despite that, the general management approach of ensuring the internationality of the UN civil service is also valid in the recruitment for field missions, though less rigidly applied.

102 This is for instance the case for the career development of staff currently employed in the GS and related categories.
The (basic) Professional Service is divided into five levels (grades P-1 to P-5). Each of these levels is further divided in up to 15 steps. Positions in the higher Professional levels (D-1 and D-2) are sub-divided in smaller steps taking into account that the seniority of those occupying positions in the higher echelon will spend less time in the service of the organization before moving into other senior positions or before retiring from the service. Assistant Secretaries-General and Under-Secretaries-General do not receive any salary increases, but fixed salaries as approved by the GA.

*Personnel with special language skills* are appointed under various contractual arrangements.

*General Service* staff is mainly locally recruited to perform support services; those referred to as the staff of the General Service related categories are assigned to specialized functions, in addition to clerical functions. Preconditions for their employment are the certification of their qualifications for the job, a valid work permit in the country of employment and the necessary fluency in one of the UN working languages. The UN administration has also developed specific tests to screen the candidates’ proficiency in required clerical skills that might be required for the job.

Appointments at specific levels within the various levels of the General Service are made based on years of professional experience and after considerations of the last position the candidate had in the national or private sector of the country of employment. The General Service is divided in seven levels (GS-1 to GS-7) and corresponding steps. Generally, General Service staff does not have any management functions, but if appointed at the more senior levels (GS-6 and GS-7) can be assigned as supervisors of junior General Service units.

Advancing from the General Service (and related categories) to the Professional category is only possibly after the successful completion of the General Service-to-Professional

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103 As detailed in Annex III, steps vary between levels and constitute the status of seniority of individuals serving at the particular level, which until April 2002 determined the eligibility of staff to apply for higher-level positions within the organization and system. The number of P-1 positions in the UN Secretariat is insignificant and applies to this date only to posts with special language requirements (A/59/299).

104 A GS-8 grade exists in some of the Regional Commissions. GERWUN recommended expanding this grade to all UN offices (GERWUN 2002).
Service examinations, known as the ‘G-to-P exams’. Over the past years, the application of geographical distribution, so far not applicable to these internal recruitment tests, became of greater concern to Member States. Member States feared that uncontrolled appointments from overrepresented countries from the General Service into positions at the Professional level would disturb the principle of balanced geographical distribution within the Secretariat. Consequently, the GA introduced a similar geographical quota for the G-to-P examinations as applies to appointments through the national competitive examinations. Since June 2001, appointments of qualified staff from the General Service to the P-1 and P-2 levels of the Professional category are, accordingly, not to exceed a 10 per cent margin of all appointments at those levels (A/RES/55/258: para. 17; A/RES/53/221: para. 22).

The internal discussion about the pros and cons of limiting the possibilities of staff from overrepresented countries to move from the General Service to the Professional category took mainly two lines of argument. The supporters argued that since the principle of geographical distribution was applicable to all initial appointments of Professionals at entry levels in conjunction with the national competitive exams, a similar approach had to be taken for the G-to-P exams. On the other hand, it was felt that experienced internal candidates should not be denied their fair chance of career advancement, since it would represent a discrimination of these individuals due to their nationalities and, therefore, not in agreement with the principles of the Charter which stated that the geographical selection of candidates was applicable only at the initial appointment of staff.

It must also be noted that the division of UN Secretariat staff into Professionals and General Service has been debated for several years. The UN Staff Union and other interest groups object to this division of UN civil servants as antiquated (Equal Time, Spring 2000: 10). It is remarkable that other UN entities, such as the UNDP and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), have taken the progressive step by eliminating this ‘dual-class system’ of their staff several years ago, while the UN Secretariat continues to distinguish between the different categories with their different entitlements and pay scales.

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105 The official terminology used for movements from the General Service to the higher-ranking Professional Service category is ‘recruitment’ and as such recorded in UN statistics and official reports (A/57/414: para. 78).
Other categories related to the General Service are groups of specifically trained and technical professional groups, including the category of Trades and Crafts, and the Security and Safety Services, which are discussed below.

The *Trades and Crafts Staff* comprises individuals with vocational training in carpentry, upholstery, as mechanics, painters and gardeners. Employed under similar conditions and terms as the General Service staff, members of this category are divided in eight levels (TC-1 to TC-8) and corresponding seven steps (see Annex III). The number of employees in this category was steadily reduced since the early 1980s by outsourcing such services as the UN catering services, electricians and the group of gardeners.

As of June 2005, the total number of staff in this category remaining under the direct employment of the UN Secretariat was 172 (A/60/310: para. 48). Following examples of other organizations in the public and private sector, it appeared to be more economic to contract private companies or hire tradesmen under special services agreements rather than recruiting personnel under the regular conditions of the UN Staff Regulations and Rules. How much such outsourcing could in fact produce real cost savings rather than re-shuffling costs from one to another section in the budget provisions would have to be further analysed (Frederickson 1999: 703). Experts on this matter argue about the true savings and benefits of such actions in organizations, and it appears reasonable that the UN administration would conduct new studies before outsourcing further services of the UN Secretariat as proposed in the latest reform proposals of March 2006 (A/60/692).

Another related category is the *Security and Safety Service* with 231 staff as of September 2002 (A/60/310: para. 48). Members of this category are trained in national police forces and private security companies or as firemen and safety inspectors. This category is divided into seven levels with up to 13 steps (S-1 to S-7) as detailed in Annex III.

Corresponding with the occupations of the category Trades and Crafts established for employment at headquarters and UN main offices is the category *Field Service*. Members of this occupational group are trained professionals such as mechanics, electricians and craftsmen, but are exclusively recruited for field missions and for limited duration. This category was established by the GA in 1949 to have a permanent, mobile pool of specialists on hand from which the organization could draw to employ quickly into field
missions, mainly to provide technical support to UN military contingents in the field (Dicke 1994: 158, Fn. 11).

As the mandates and operations of the UN changed over the years, so did the assignments of the Field Service. Originally recruited to be part of a highly mobile professional group, some were employed for long periods in established field missions in the Middle East with occasional assignments in temporary peacekeeping operations. As an increasing number of Field Service staff gained seniority and was promoted to supervisory positions, they now occupy positions within the organizational hierarchy for which they were initially not recruited. Since Field Service staff are often not sufficiently qualified in personnel management and in financial matters, it is recommended in connection with the current UN HR management to re-train Field Service staff to better adapt to their current and new functions as field managers and to discontinue this category (A/55/305-S/2000/809: paras. 139-140).

The salary structure and career development in the Field Service category is divided in seven levels and up to 15 steps, whereby the lower levels are equivalent to the lower levels of the General Service category (e.g. FS-1 to GS-1) and higher levels are comparable in pay and supervisory functions to those of the Professional level, with the highest level of FS-7 being roughly equivalent to a First Officer at the P-4 level.

Conversions from the Field Service to any of the other categories, e.g. General Service or Professional service, are possible within the internal recruitment and selection programme of the UN through lateral transfers (at comparable levels between services). Recruitment of FS-1 to FS-5 staff into the Professional Service constitutes a promotion and is possible after the successful completion of the competitive examination (the G-to-P examination). “Successful candidates in the Field Service category who are at these levels (FS1 to FS-5, the author) shall be recommended for promotion to P-2” (ST/Al/360/Rev.1: para. 4).

Like their colleagues in the other occupational categories, e.g. in the Professional, General and Security Services, the majority of the approximately 720 Field Service staff is administered under the 100 series of the UN Staff Rules (A/60/310: Table 1, Fn. a). Although the larger number of Field Service staff have been appointed to established missions, the job security of individuals depends on the funding of the respective field
mission. While each new mission may open up the opportunity to transfer to another duty station, the ability to pursue a systematic career plan is reduced for staff members in the Field Service, as they compete more rigorously for new assignments and are transferred frequently to new duty stations.

The majority of Field Service staff members spend their professional life exclusively in field missions, away from headquarters, and are often separated for long periods from their families, the psychological effects and the impact of conditions in the field on their professional performance and their health has not been fully explored.

In addition to these categories, the UN employs a number of individuals on secondment and as gratis personnel (A/RES/51/243). Secondment remained for many years, in particular between the 1960s and up to 1997, an important instrument to secure personnel with specialised skills and training for specific UN operations (Perry 1993: 17-22; A/RES/47/226). The secondment of national civil servants has been, however, subject to scrutiny by the GA for many years. The former Soviet Union and a number of other mainly socialist and communist countries were criticised for selecting their secondees based on political loyalty to their governments rather than for their qualifications, integrity and competence (Perry 1993: 17-18).

In view of the continued use of secondees, the SG reiterated in his report A/C.5/45/12 to the Fifth Committee in 1990 that the principles of Article 101, paragraph 3 were equally applicable to personnel seconded to the UN. This includes geographical considerations in the selection and acceptance of secondees by the SG. The GA followed this view by reaffirming in June 2001, “that secondment from government service is consistent with Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter and is beneficial to both the Organization and Member States” and urged “the SG to pursue this practice on a wider scale” (A/55/890/Add.1: Section IV, para.19).

Secondment is defined as the temporary assignment of an official of a government or organization to another organization for a specified period under defined terms and conditions (Perry 1993: 17).
Although the organization relied on gratis personnel\textsuperscript{107} in particular in view of the increasing number of UN peacekeeping operations and in view of the organization’s limited budget, Member States applied stricter limitations on such use of ‘free’ expertise since 1997 (A/RES/51/243). Thereafter, the SG can accept gratis personnel (of type II) only if there is no expertise available within the organization for the functions the individual is to perform, and if the use of such gratis personnel is limited in time and constitutes an urgent requirement. The GA further requested that quarterly reports on changes of the use of gratis personnel be submitted to the ACABQ (ibid.).

Gratis personnel are divided in type I (e.g. interns and specifically listed experts; A/55/728) and type II. In accordance with ST/Al/1999/6, Section I, type II gratis personnel is “personnel provided to the United Nations by a Government or other entities responsible for the remuneration of the services of such personnel and (who) do not serve under any other established regime such as that applicable to interns, associate experts.”

Gratis personnel stationed at the UN headquarters and in field missions was in the past often and for some years exclusively, provided by developed countries, such as Canada, the UK, France, Germany, Sweden and Finland. This situation changed in recent years. Latest statistics for the year 2004 show a total of 1,290 of type I from 114 countries and a total of 85 type II gratis personnel from 33 countries. While the three most represented nationalities among the type I gratis personnel are the USA, Germany and Kenya, the three largest groups of type II gratis personnel were nationals of the UK, Norway and Denmark (A/59/716).

For functions requiring highly specialized knowledge, the organization obtains \textit{consultants} and \textit{individual contractors} to be paid at agreed fees for limited durations. The definitions provided in report A/53/385 make a clear distinction between both groups of hired experts,

\textsuperscript{107} Gratis personnel is inclusive of all those in the service of the UN paid for or sponsored by their own governments or other organizations. They are either seconded or have applied through other means for temporary positions for which no remuneration is made by the UN (see hereto also A/RES/48/226 C; for a official definition of gratis personnel and related statistics see also A/55/728 and A/56/839).
which was endorsed by the GA in 1999.\footnote{108} Neither consultants nor contractors are to perform functions assigned to established posts (A/RES/57/305). The SG is required to report on this type of personnel biennially since 2003. The first report issued in August 2004 covers the period 2002 to 2003. Accordingly, the UN had contracted 3,543 persons as consultants and 1,401 individual contractors (A/59/217).

This concludes the list of the various categories of staff employed by the UN. It becomes obvious from the variety of personnel, ranging from UN civil servants to free labour provided by governments, that the organization has an international obligation to properly manage its diversified personnel from various cultural backgrounds and with different work experiences ranging from private to national public sectors. The following chapter provides statistics to illustrate the actual composition of the UN civil service.

### 2.6.2 Statistical Data on the Composition

This review of UN statistics is based on annual reports on the composition of the UN Secretariat submitted by the SG and UN official statistics courteously provided by OHRM. It provides a broad analysis of the composition of the UN Secretariat staff by category, contractual status and age structure, and discusses statistical data in view of separations, gender balance and geographical distribution.

Within its 40 years of existence, the UN Secretariat grew from 1,546 posts funded from the regular budget in 1946 to 11,423 employees in 1986 (A/41/49: para. 4). In 1996, the year before the introduction of the comprehensive reform programme, the number of staff employed under the regular budget was 8,781 (A/51/421: Table A). Latest statistics available show that there are 7,753 staff members employed under the regular budget as at 30 June 2005. Including posts funded by extra-budgetary sources, the UN Secretariat employs a total of 15,989 staff with contracts for one year and more, whereby not all of the

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\footnote{108 Consultant: “an individual who is a recognized authority or specialist in a specific field, engaged by the United Nations under temporary contract in an advisory or consultative capacity to the Secretariat”. Individual contractor: “an individual engaged by the Organization from time to time under temporary contract to provide expertise, skills and knowledge for the performance of a specific task or piece of work against payment of an all-inclusive fee.” (A/53/385: para. 4; A/RES/53/221).}
191 nations (full members as at June 2005) are fully represented as has already been discussed in chapter 2.5.3 (A/60/310: paras. 11-12, Table 1 and Table 10A).

Table 4: Staff employed by the United Nations Secretariat by category and source of funds, as at June 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regular budget</th>
<th>Extrabudgetary resources</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional and higher</td>
<td>Project Personnel</td>
<td>General Service and related</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and higher</td>
<td>3,133</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4,616</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A/60/310: Table 1

The Secretariat has considerably fewer staff than other international organizations and public sector administrations, particularly considering the many mandates of the UN, its large membership and the population of 6.5 billion people the UN is serving worldwide. In comparison, the European Commission (the executive organ of the European Union) employs over 20,000 people and serves 25 Member States with a total population of less than half a billion (Europäische Kommission (Hrsg.) (2001); http://www.europa.eu.int). Even many of the national and local public sector organizations are significantly larger in staff numbers, although they serve much smaller numbers of clients at a national, regional or district level.\(^{109}\)

Thus, the argument of a ‘wasteful’ and ‘bloated’ UN bureaucracy can hardly stand, when balancing the total number of UN international civil servants with the current estimated

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\(^{109}\) Among the many examples is the US State of New Jersey with 179,000 full time civil servants as of 1998 (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 38).
world population and after evaluating the cost of peacekeeping and other special operations with the cost of comparable operations of other organizations.\textsuperscript{110}

Figure 1 below provides a chart of the Secretariat staff by category. The group of General Service and related categories (women and men) constitutes the largest occupational group with 61 per cent (7,181) of the base number of Secretariat staff (11,746) as of June 2005.\textsuperscript{111} The ratio of employees listed under the Professional Service account for 35 per cent (4,124) and appointees in the higher categories account for over three per cent or 382 (Directors) and 0.5 per cent or 59 (Assistant Secretaries-General and Under-Secretaries-General) of all UN Secretariat employees.

With respect to contractual conditions of UN staff, statistics show that the large majority of UN civil servants (61% of all categories combined) are employed on fixed-term contracts. 37 per cent are permanent staff, of which 43 per cent (or 163) belong to the category of Directors, 49 per cent (or 2,008) to Professionals and 30 per cent (or 2,135) to the General Service and related categories. Two per cent of the Secretariat staff is on probationary contracts (A/60/310: para. 51 and Figure 8).

\textsuperscript{110} Based on an estimated population of 6.5 billion in 2005 and a total number of about 65,000 staff employed in the UN system as a whole, including funds, programmes and specialized agencies and the Bretton Woods organizations (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), each single UN international civil servant serves about 100,000 people worldwide (sources: United Nations (Ed.) 2005 and http://www.unis.unvienna.org/en/faq/index.htm ). That the UN is operating at less cost than many other national and international organizations is a stated fact in several speeches by UN officials.

\textsuperscript{111} The total of 11,746 refers to all Secretariat personnel on appointments of one year or more under the 100 series of the Staff Rules, irrespective of sources of funding, except mission appointees, Field Service staff and language teachers. The category of General Service and related categories are further broken down in 6,778 GS, 231 Security and Safety staff and 172 in the Trade and Crafts category (A/60/310: para. 43).
The age structure of the UN Secretariat is of particular concern to UN reformers. The review of UN statistics during the further development of the HR management reform programme in 1997 showed that the average age of UN Secretariat employees was 49 years. Although the trend of a UN aging work force was known since the 1970s, it had not been addressed (Beigbeder 1987: 47). Thus the ratio of UN staff younger than 40 years had decreased from 28 per cent in 1970 to 14 per cent in 1997 (A/51/950: para. 230). Figure 2 below shows the distribution by age groups in detail.

These developments had mainly two reasons: (a) the advanced age of many new recruits, and (b) the relatively high numbers of separations of younger UN employees. Reform efforts first succeeded in reversing this trend by decreasing the average age of UN civil servants to 45.8 years in late 2000 (Highlights No. 18, October 2000: 2).

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112 The term *separation* refers to retirement, resignation, expiry of contracts, agreed termination, inter-agency transfer, termination for health reasons, death, dismissal, as well as the termination or abandonment of a post (A/59/299: para. 66).
By June 2002, the average age had, however, again risen to 46.1 years (A/57/414: para. 71; Re-Reform No. 3). Latest statistics for June 2005 show that the current average age remains at a level of 46 years. Nonetheless, the actual average age of UN employees must also be seen against the global development of an aging work force (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 93-96; United Nations (Ed.) 2002). Whereas Member States and UN administrators have failed in the past to change the HR management strategy of the UN Secretariat to reverse the ‘aging’ of the UN work force, the UN is undoubtedly exposed to the global phenomenon of an aging population like many other organizations.

Figure 2

![Distribution of age groups in the Secretariat as at 30 June 2005](source: A/60/310: Figure 10)

In order to introduce significant and long-lasting changes in view of the average age of the UN civil service, the organization will have to recruit younger candidates in much larger numbers. This may be achieved through a changed recruitment policy, possible introducing an age restriction for entry levels, and by expediting promotions to create more vacancies for the recruitment of junior staff. It remains, nonetheless doubtful whether such

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113 A/60/310: para. 54. Broken down by categories, the average age of Professionals is 46 years, while the average age in the General Service category is 44.5 years.
a measure will guarantee a speedy rejuvenation of the UN’s work force, since the numbers of separations can significantly fluctuate and larger number of retirements will not automatically increase the chances of being promoted to UN Secretariat staff.

While between July 2001 and June 2002, a total of 4,208 staff members separated from the service of the UN Secretariat, separations between July 2002 to June 2003 dropped drastically to 627, before they increased to 794 in 2003/2004 and then decreased again to 770 for the period 2004/2005.\textsuperscript{114} Table 5 further shows that 499 junior Professional staff (P-1/P-2 levels) separated between 2001 and 2002, which represents almost 12 per cent of all separations.\textsuperscript{115} Corresponding separation rates of junior staff in the following periods accounted for 19 P-2s (or 3\% of all separations) in 2002/2003, 27 P-2s (or 3.4\%) in 2003/2004, and 38 (or almost 5\%) in 2004/2005, respectively.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
  & Separations & Separations of junior staff (P1/P-2) & Retirements & Recruitment of junior staff (P1/P-2) & Recruitment ratio of junior staff & Turnover rate all staff (in \%) \\
\hline
2001/2002  & 4,208  & 499  & 283 & 547 & 12.8 & 7.7 \\
2003/2004  & 794  & 27  & 204 & 92 & 21.6 & 5.4 \\
2004/2005  & 770  & 38  & 320 & 98 & 13.6 & 5.1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Separations and Recruitments 2001 – 2005}
\end{table}

Sources: A/57/414; A/58/666; A/59/299; A/60/310

The annual reports on the composition of the Secretariat do not provide details on the age structure of new recruits.\textsuperscript{116} I refer consequently to data on the recruitment at the P-1/P-2 levels under the assumption that these junior posts are generally filled by ‘younger’


\textsuperscript{115} The majority (4/5) of all separations in 2001/2002 were due to the non-extension of short-term mission and fixed-term appointments (A/57/414).

\textsuperscript{116} Since there are, likewise, no compatible data presented on the age structure of recruits into the General Service and related categories it is also not possible to examine those professionals groups.
In 2001/2002, there were 547 recruitments into the P-1/P-2 levels, compared with 102 into P-2 positions in 2002/2003, 92 into P-2 positions in 2003/2004 and 98 recruitments into P-2 positions in 2004/2005. These data show that the organization made since 2002 significant efforts, and with success, to recruit into entry levels far more staff than there were junior level separations.

Although the overall turnover rates of less than 10 per cent for the period 2001/2002 and slightly above five per cent for the years 2003 to 2005 do not allow for a sure prognosis, they suggest that a quick change of the age structure of the UN Secretariat will not be possible without introducing new and drastic measures. Since there is no obvious correlation between the various events, separations, retirements and recruitments, it is, however, not possible to come to any relevant conclusions.

After taking into account the debates and reform proposals with respect of the rejuvenation of the UN, which go back to the mid 1980s, the following reflections on this issue appear appropriate, some of which are also mentioned in official UN HR management reports:

a. The decrease of the average age of international civil servants will depend on the ability of the organization to recruit and to retain younger and highly qualified staff, regardless of the expected numbers of retirements.

b. As the rate of resignations among younger and highly qualified employees could be slowed down in recent years, it will now be important to increase recruitment efforts of younger staff and to continuously monitor short-term and long-term developments.

c. High numbers of resignations may be due to better employment conditions and career opportunities in other international organizations, including the World Bank

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117 It is, nevertheless, noted that the average age at the entry level (P-2) is as reported in 2005 37 years and that it is not uncommon that also individuals at the age of 40 and older are among P-2 recruits.

118 Turnover rates are based on the calculation of a standard labour turnover index, which is obtained by comparing the number of actual staff departures over the period observed with the number of active staff as at the first date of the period observed; A/57/414: para. 73.

119 In the first years of this reform (between 1996 and 1998), the number of resignations at middle levels was larger than those of personnel retiring and more people left the organization than were recruited (UN Staff Council 1999: para. 28; and SCB/1467: 2).
and the European Union, which requires that these conditions are improved further to retain highly qualified staff in the service of the UN Secretariat.

d. Since the latest salary review of the mid 1990s by the ICSC, it is evident that the UN offers a less attractive remuneration and benefit scheme than other international organizations and some private sector industries. Changes will, therefore, be necessary to attract (and retain) individuals.

e. In addition to less attractive employment conditions and remuneration packages, there may be a number of hidden and unknown factors that cause higher rates of resignations. Such factors would need to be detected and addressed in conjunction with this reform programme’s goal to re-establish the UN as attractive employer.

f. The expected number of retirees over the coming years is not sufficient to guarantee a prompt rejuvenation of the UN Secretariat. For instance, the initial forecast was that some 4,500 staff would retire between 1997 and 2007 at an annual average of 338 (A/51/950: para. 230; also A/59/299: para. 74). Actual statistics (see table 5 above) proved, however, these projections wrong. Furthermore vacancies due to retirement will be filled in part through promotions, lateral moves and transfers (e.g. in connection with the mobility scheme), but will also be open to non-UN candidates and for recruitment of nationals under the provisions of the geographical distribution of posts and of women in order to improve their representation. A ‘natural’ increase of vacancies at the junior levels as a result of more promotions can, consequently, not be expected and would, in addition, have some time-delayed effects.

g. As the largest group expected to retire between 2004 and 2008 consists of staff of the General Service and related categories and their separations are an average of

120 Such suspected hidden factors could be, for instance, disagreement with the rigid, hierarchical system of the UN Secretariat, expressed in an old-fashioned management style that can be observed in some UN offices, a tendency to exclude younger, not-conform staff members in the decision-making process, and disappointment with the existing career opportunities (Some of these reasons were also mentioned by the Assistant Secretary-General for HR Management in her responses to the Fifth Committee in December 1999); see hereto also http://www.un.org/News/facts/salaries.htm).
58 per cent, recruitment actions to place young candidates in vacant General Service level posts, will further widen the age gap between the Professional (with an average age of 46) and higher categories and the General Service (with an average age of 45 years) and related categories.\textsuperscript{121}

To ease the burden on the UN Pension Funds due to expected retirements over the coming years and disregarding the goal to rejuvenate the organization, the GA approved the new mandatory retirement age for staff members who had joined the organization after 1 January 1990 to be set at 62 years instead of the former mandatory age of 60 years (A/57/413: para. 3). Legislators and UN administrators anticipate that this increase of the retirement age will have a minimal impact “in respect of the Organization’s age profile, geographical distribution, gender balance and career development opportunities” (Highlights No. 24, October-December 2001).

2.7 The UN HR Management System

2.7.1 Issues of the practical UN HR Management

The fundamental task of management is to steer an organization to be successful, and to provide leadership (Ulrich/Fluri 1995: 13). The quality of management is measured by its application of such leadership in achieving the organization’s goals. HR management begins with the selection and recruitment of personnel and extends into the day-to-day management of the already employed staff and finally into the handling and processing of personnel actions when employees leave an organization. HR management is, consequently, a mixture of strictly administrative tasks and the more complex, socio-psychological aspects of managing people, like providing guidance and coaching or conflict management.

The UN HR management is ruled by the principles of the UN Charter, the UN Staff Regulations and Rules and administrative instructions issued to regulate the HR management of the UN Secretariat. In accordance with Article 101, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter, the SG is responsible for the appointment of the staff in his capacity as Chief

\textsuperscript{121} In 2002, 57% of all separations related to the General Service and related categories; in 2003 and 2004 they accounted for 59% (A/57/414; A/58/666; A/59/299).
Administrative Officer of the organization (A/60/310: paras. 8-9). The paramount considerations for the employment of the staff, e.g. internationality, independence, efficiency, competence and integrity, were discussed above in connection with the principles of the UN international civil service.

As has also been mentioned above, the SG delegates his authority and responsibility for the UN HR management of the UN Secretariat to the Under-Secretary-General for Management, the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources, the heads of departments and offices and the lower management levels. Heads of offices away from headquarters New York and Executive Directors of UN funds and programmes are given varying degrees of delegated authority to manage their own personnel. Meanwhile, OHRM remains responsible for monitoring HR management actions of managers and keeps fulfilling a number of HR management functions, which are not (yet) performed by all departments and offices throughout the Secretariat.

Brunsson’s study of decision-making and actions in organizations concludes that there are clear differences in the recruitment strategy among action organizations and political organizations. “The principle of recruitment in the action organization is agreement” (Brunsson 1989: 15). The political organization, on the other hand, so Brunsson “recruits its members – or at least its management – according to a principle of conflict” (Brunsson 1989: 20). Brunsson’s ‘principle of conflict’ can equally be applied to the UN HR management, in so far that Member States compete in their attempts to be represented within the administration of the organization, and in particular at the senior levels, through their nationals.

By pervading the UN administration through the placement of their nationals, the members of the UN have imported their own national ideologies and values into the organizational culture; some of which may be incompatible with each other. Although the common interest of Member States is to ensure the widest diversity of personnel and a fair and equal representation of all members of the organization in the legislative organs and in the administration, the hegemonial interests of governments is to secure and increase their power and influence in the organization (see hereto also Brunsson 1989: 19-31).
The interference of Member States in the internal management of the UN must be further understood as actions of shareholders not only in view of national and political interests of members of the organization, but also with respect to the best utilization of their contributions (investments). Members of the UN will insist on their right to interfere in internal management decisions if they are not satisfied with the decisions taken by the SG and his representatives. As financiers of the organization, governments also expect to be represented in the UN civil service in accordance with their financial contributions to the UN and on the basis of the applicable geographical quota which as well will warrant to some extent that ethical and professional values of the various national services will imported into the UN international civil service.

The line between rightful representation and undue manipulation of the internal management procedures of the UN is narrow. In accordance with the UN in the Charter, no Member State or regional group of members has formally a rightful claim to hold a specific management position. The traditional appointments of the same nationals into certain senior management positions shows, however, that Member States have reached an informal agreement to occupy these key positions in succeeding years. Certain members of the UN pursue these interests more rigorously than others, while some may be simply less successful in influencing the appointment decisions. While all Member States pledge formally to acknowledge the SG’s authority for the recruitment and appointment of the staff, it is common knowledge that some countries occasionally lobbied for their candidates. Other members of the UN developed the less aggressive strategy to support their junior nationals in their career development through the hierarchical system of the UN administration as a way to gain more representation and, subsequently, influence in the UN senior management. If these actions could indeed change managerial decisions is unknown.

At a time when the UN became less attractive to many highly qualified managers, but also to junior staff from Member States with high social and economic standards, these countries established systems to subsidize their nationals as further motivation to remain
with the service of the UN rather than to leave for better paying jobs and more attractive careers in their home countries.\footnote{123}

Other Member States went the opposite way by demanding from their nationals in the UN service to pay a certain percentage of their UN income basically as a fee for the privilege to be selected by their governments for temporary service in the international civil service of the UN.\footnote{124} Both practices are in violation of the UN Staff Regulations and could impair the neutrality of international civil servants (A/RES/37/126: Section II, para. 2).

The problem of undue interference in HR management decisions by Member States appears repeatedly in reports of the SG throughout the history of the UN as a clear violation of Articles 100 and 101 of the UN Charter. Interferences are known from the beginning; they appear in internal documents during the terms of SG Trygve Lie (1946-1952) and SG Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-1961), but also during the era of SG Perez de Cuellar (1982-1996) (Beigbeder 1988: 48-51; 65-79). The two major powers interfering in HR management decisions of former Secretaries-General were the USA and the Soviet Union who directly demanded the appointment or dismissal of specific nationals. For obvious reasons, appointments of top managers in the UN will always remain an issue of negotiations that might border on undue pressures administered by specific members in the reality of the UN management (see hereto also The Guardian (London), 6 January 2001 and the discussion about the best method to identify and select candidates for the position of SG).

On the other hand, the SG relies in his search for qualified and experienced candidates in middle management and senior management positions on Member States and other institutions, including headhunters. The SG has regularly invited Member States to submit

\footnote{122} An example is the position of the head of the DM, which is held since the 1980s by an American. Appointments into many senior positions in offices away from headquarters follow similar traditions in the succession of the same nationalities.

\footnote{123} For further details related to the interference of Member States in the UN HR management authority of the SG see also Childers/Urquhart 1994: 159-160; Beigbeder 1988: 47-50, 65-74; Beigbeder 1997: 150-152; Bertrand 1995: 91-93; Albrecht (Hrsg.) 1998: 74-75; Gordon 1994: 68; and Perry 1993: 12-14. Among countries publicly known to subsidize their nationals within the UN civil service were Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria and the USA.
the names of qualified candidates and intends to continue this practice (A/C.5/49/5: paras. 35-38).

Like most of his predecessors, SG Annan rejects, however, the idea of formal consultations with Member States before making his final selection. SG Annan insists on basing his decision solely on the qualifications and competence of candidates submitted, in addition to considerations of geographical distribution and gender balance, rather than on political reasons (A/55/423/Add.1: para. 5 in response to recommendation I of the JIU report JIU/REP/2000/3: iv). It is, however, the principle of geographical distribution that provides Member States at times with a legitimate tool to interfere in internal HR management decisions (Perry 1993: 12).

2.7.2 UN Staff Regulations and Rules

UN personnel is administered and managed in accordance with the UN Charter (Articles 8, 97, 100, 101 and 105) and the UN Staff Regulations and Staff Rules. The GA established the Staff Regulations of the UN according to Article 101 of the Charter by resolution 590 (VI) of 2 February 1952. Between 1953 and December 1996, the UN Staff Regulations were amended 55 times (ST/SGB/1998/20: v).

The scope and purpose of the Staff Regulations is to outline “the fundamental conditions of service and the basic rights, duties and obligations of the United Nations Secretariat” (ST/SGB/2002/13: 11). The Staff Regulations “embody the fundamental conditions of service and the basic rights, duties and obligations of the United Nations Secretariat. They represent the broad principles of personnel policy for the staffing and administration of the Secretariat” (ST/SGB/2003/5: 1). They apply to all UN employees with a valid letter of appointment (see hereto also Article 97 of the UN Charter). Article 1 of the Staff Regulations (Regulation 1.1) contains the Oath of Office to be made by each individual before entering the international civil service (attached as Annex II).

The text of the Staff Regulations provides “the authority for the issuance” of the UN Staff Rules (ST/SGB/1999/5: iii). While the UN Staff Regulations were established in 1952, the

124 Such practices were for instance known of the Soviet Union and China who ‘taxed’ their nationals seconded to the UN during the term in the UN service (see Perry 1993: 35).
UN Staff Rules were initially issued on 1 April 1958. Between 1958 and January 1997, the year of the initiation of the current reform programme, nine revisions of the UN Staff Rules have been issued (ST/SGB/1999/5: iv).

To address the different employment conditions of staff recruited by the UN, the GA approved three series of Rules (100, 200 and 300 series). The majority of UN civil servants are administered by the 100 series of the UN Staff Rules, which apply to “all staff members appointed by the SG except technical assistance project personnel and staff members specifically engaged for conferences and other short-term services” (ST/SGB/1999/5: 2). Personnel recruited for specific projects are appointed under the 200 series of Rules. Short-term employees, in particular if recruited for limited projects with no continuous funding, are appointed under the 300 series (ST/SGB/2002/13: para. 3).

Since the 1997 UN HR reforms, the Staff Regulations and Rules have been repeatedly amended to reflect the changes introduced during the reform implementation. To provide all members of the organization, in particular managers away from headquarters, with the latest updated information on Staff Regulations, Rules and other important decisions concerning the UN HR management, an electronic HR handbook is available on the UN Intranet website since January 2001 (Highlights No. 20, January-March 2001).

To complement the Staff Regulations and Rules and to elaborate on the Code of Conduct (see chapter 2.4.2), the UN administration publishes bulletins, administrative instructions and information circulars to the staff on changes and procedural details concerning Staff Rules. The UN Staff Regulations and Rules together with the Code of Conduct are legally binding and regulate all matters of the UN HR management (from the appointment to the termination, including any benefits).

The purpose of administrative instructions is to provide HR managers and the staff with clear instructions for the application of Regulations and Rules. Bulletins and circulars are a tool to distribute to the staff and managers common interpretations of the Regulations and Rules with the intent to ensure the correct and uniform application of those policies throughout the UN, which is of special importance in an international, multi-ethical organization and in view of the variety of work environments at the various UN duty stations (A/RES/55/258 and A/55/427, paras. 62-66).
The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (adopted by GA resolution 22 (I) of 13 February 1946) and the commentary on the Code of Conduct (ST/SGB/2002/13) do not constitute a legal norm, but provide some guidance to UN international civil servants with respect to their status, basic rights and duties (ST/SGB/2002/13: para. 5).

Staff Regulation 1.1(a) determines: “Staff members are international civil servants. Their responsibilities as staff members are not national but exclusively international.” Regulation 1.1(b) contains the Oath of Office. In accordance with Regulation 1.1(c), the SG is to ensure that the rights and duties of staff members are respected (ST/SGB/2003/5: 1). Subsequent provisions of Regulations refer to the privileges and immunities of staff members. The Regulations continue to refer to the core values and general rights and obligations of UN staff members.

UN staff is to respect the UN principles, the belief in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal right of men and women. They are further to “uphold the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity”, including “probity, impartiality, fairness, honesty and truthfulness in all matters affecting their work and status” (Staff Regulation 1.2; ST/SGB/2003/5: 2).

In accordance with Rule 101.2, UN civil servants are bound to “follow the directions and instructions properly issued by the SG and their supervisors” and are independent in the performance of their duties in that they are not to “to seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization” (Article 100 of the UN Charter; Staff Regulation 1.2d; ST/SGB/2003/5: 2). This, however, does not provide them with full immunity from the laws of the countries they work and live in. As individuals, they remain responsible to “comply with local laws and honour their private legal obligations, including, but not limited to, the obligation to honour orders of competent courts” (UN Staff Rule 101.2c).

The UN Staff Rules begin with a list of duties, obligations and privileges that represent a list of ‘not-to-dos’ rather than outlining in positive and motivational terms the mission of the UN and the purpose of the civil service. What follows are specific rules referring to the regulation of official holidays, remuneration scales, benefits and other basic
administrative matters. As the implementation of reforms continues and the organization will undergo further changes, further revisions of the UN Staff Regulations and Rules will be necessary.

2.7.3 The UN Remuneration and Benefits System

The basic principles to determine UN salaries and benefits remained unchanged since the foundation of the UN, although the methodology for the calculation was changed and new entitlement policies were introduced over the years (Perry 1993: 28-34). Salaries of the Professional staff of the UN are based on the Noblemaire principle, while salaries of the locally recruited staff of the General Service and related categories at headquarters and main offices of the UN are calculated in accordance with the Flemming principle.125

Both principles are based on the philosophy that UN salaries and benefits must be equivalent with those paid by comparative national institutions, but oriented at those with the most advantageous conditions, e.g. highest pay levels. According to this philosophy, the UN will only than be able to attract and retain the talents and skills of highly qualified individuals if it pays competitive salaries and offers very good employment conditions (ICSC Bulletin 1997, Vol. 12, No. 1: 2).

The remuneration levels and benefits package for UN Professionals and equivalent levels were established using the US federal civil service as the comparator (Perry 1993: 30). Salaries of the General Service and related categories are determined in accordance with “the best prevailing conditions of employment in the local area for staff with similar skills and experience as the comparator” (Perry 1993: 33). For employees of the General Service at headquarters New York, local salaries and employment conditions are adjusted in accordance with conditions of New York City and surrounding states, New York State, New Jersey and Connecticut, and reflect changes of the cost of living index.

The remuneration system of the UN Secretariat is structured for both occupational groups (i.e. the Professionals and higher categories and the General Service and related categories) by levels and steps that reflect the seniority of staff and determine the pay

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125 Both principles are the basis for setting the salaries of UN civil servants since the early days of the UN (ICSC (Ed.) (1994); Beigbeder 1997: 144-146).
levels of UN employees (see hereto Annex III). Steps are granted as an annual or biennial increment to the individual’s salary.

Salary scales of Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General are not subdivided into steps. Their salaries are determined on the basis of existing remuneration systems of executives in the public service of the USA, although there are no direct equivalencies between the UN common system and the US public sector, in accordance with findings of the ICSC, and consequently some doubt about the adequate remuneration package for UN senior managers (A/47/30: paras. 204-207; also Perry 1993: 29). A final decision on the adequate levels of UN top senior managers’ salaries is still pending.

The base salary of internationally recruited UN staff is supplemented by two components. The Staff Assessment constitutes “an internal UN form of ‘taxation’ and is analogous to taxes on salaries applicable in most countries” (Perry 1993: 32). In accordance with the UN Staff Regulation 3.3, staff assessment is deducted from salaries of all international civil servants.\[126\]

The Post Adjustment is a positive or negative adjustment applied “to the base salary in each duty station to adjust for variations in cost-of-living factors and currency variations” (Perry 1993: 30). In accordance with UN Staff Rule 103.7, post adjustment is applied to salaries of the Professional and higher categories and of the Field Service category.

In addition, staff members may receive education grants\[127\] for their dependent children, and a number of allowances, e.g. non-resident’s allowances (UN Staff Rule 103.5) and language allowances (applicable to General Service, Security or Trades and Crafts, or in the Field Service category up to and including level 5, UN Staff Rule 103.6). Further benefits are dependency allowances for spouses who earn no major income and for children living at home, rental subsidies (paid under specific conditions and no longer than

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\[126\] The funds collected through the staff assessment are used primarily to reimburse staff members who are taxed by their government on their UN income. Remaining funds are redistributed to the Member States.

\[127\] The education grant was introduced in 1946 for internationally recruited UN civil servants and is designed to support parenting staff members in their obligations to pay for international schools at the duty station or for the education of their children, including boarding costs, in the respective home country (UN Staff Regulation 3.2 and UN Staff Rule 103.20).
seven years) and a number of other benefits that are similar to those paid in many national public sector organizations.\textsuperscript{128}

In addition to these monetary benefits, the UN offers a number of non-monetary entitlements, like the entitlement to six weeks of annual leave (which accumulates at a rate of 2.5 days per month), paid sick leave, special leave (for advanced studies or research or as family leave), as well as home leave “at UN expense for the purpose of spending in that country (the staff member’s home country, the author) a substantial period of annual leave” (UN Staff Rule 105.3).

As in other organizations, the UN offers a pension plan and various health insurance plans, suitable both for staff members at headquarters and those stationed in offices away from headquarters, including field missions. Other benefits are training programmes free of charge, e.g. language classes, IT training and increasingly (in connection with the growing training programme in support of this reform) training in communication skills and other social skills’ training. In addition, the UN offers under certain conditions to reimburse the cost of external training taken by staff.

Salaries of staff members are “fixed by the Secretary-General” (UN Staff Regulation 3.1) in accordance with the amounts determined by the GA (and on the basis of ICSC reviews). Consequently, the GA and its subsidiary bodies determine the levels of salaries and benefits and frequently review specific adjustments of the salary levels and benefits with respect to the cost of living index and developments of the comparative remuneration systems.

Although the level of salaries paid to UN civil servants was a constant topic of contention among Member States, it was only in 1990 that “a floor net salary level for staff in the Professional and higher categories by reference to the corresponding base net salary levels of officials in comparable positions serving at the base city [DC] of the comparator civil service” (Perry 1993: 32) was introduced.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{128} There are, for instance, the salary and wages increments (UN Staff Rule 103.8), the salary policy in promotions (UN Staff Rule 103.9) and the special post allowance (UN Staff Rule 103.11).

\textsuperscript{129} DC refers to Washington, D.C., the capital of the US.
In 1994, the ICSC conducted a review of the application and suitability of the Noblemaire principle and Flemming principle in view of today’s remuneration systems in other public service organizations and the UN system. Although salaries and benefits were adjusted at regular intervals, no systematic analysis of the trends of remunerations and compensations paid in various Member States of the UN has been undertaken in the light of those two principles.

The comprehensive review of the ICSC revealed a number of issues: (a) it showed that the USA, which have been used as comparator for determining levels of Professional salaries since the foundation of the UN, were no longer the best paying civil service among Member States and affiliated states of the UN; (b) the compatibility of the two principles and their appropriateness was put in question by developments of salaries and benefits in the private and public sector in many industrialized countries; and (c) the UN remuneration and other benefits (e.g. pension and health insurance) were no longer competitive with those offered by other international organizations.

As a consequence, the “Commission decided to report that, in view of the request of the General Assembly to examine all aspects of the application of the Noblemaire principle, with a view to ensuring the continued competitiveness of United Nations common system remuneration, the superior conditions of the German civil service vis-à-vis those of the United States federal civil service could be considered as a reference point for margin management” (A/50/30: para. 172(b)(iii)). In view of the Commission’s finding that UN salaries were not fully competitive, the SG urged Member States to “adopt, as an immediate priority, the recommendations of the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) to raise the remuneration of international staff” (GA/AB/3043/Rev.1: 1).

The Commission had conducted a previous review of the Noblemaire principle in 1975, but conditions and parameters had changed since this earlier review, which caused the GA to call for a new study in 1992 (A/50/30: paras. 61-81; A/RES/47/216).

A/50/30; see also Addendum. Incomes of civil servants in the German civil service were on average 110.5% higher than those paid in the US civil service, followed by those paid by Japan and Switzerland (A/50/30: paras. 123 and 145). In addition, the reference studies conducted in connection with the examination of the Noblemaire principle and the adequacy of UN salary levels “showed that the World Bank and OECD were paying 40% to 50% more than the common system while the current comparator (the US civil service, the author) was 10% behind another national civil service” (A/50/30: para. 253).
Despite the findings of the ICSC, the remuneration system of the UN remains to this date unchanged in its principles. The US civil service is still the comparator used to determine the levels of salaries and benefits for Professionals in the UN. That no fundamental changes were made is mainly due to the reluctance of Member States to come to a clear and mutual agreement on what would be an adequate remuneration and benefit system. After deliberations, the GA approved a meagre 0.4 per cent increase of Professional Service salaries (ICSC Bulletin 1997, Vol. 12, No. 1: 3). In other words, the GA did neither follow the factual findings of the ICSC nor the Commission’s so carefully worded recommendations, one of which was to increase salary levels by an average of four per cent (ICSC Bulletin 1997, Vol. 12, No. 1: 2).

Four years after the ICSC’s review of the remuneration and benefit system of the UN, the President of the FICSA noted to the Fifth Committee in 1999 “that salaries were not competitive with the private sector, other intergovernmental bodies or the foreign services of industrialized countries” (GA/AB/3325: 1). At the same time, the President of the CCISUA reiterated that, due to the financial crisis, which had forced the organization to downsize and which had negatively affected the adjustments of staff entitlements, current salaries were no longer competitive and “seemed to be designed to extend a salary freeze well into the next millennium” (GA/AB/3325: 15) with respect to salary levels of the General Service.

UN staff representative bodies continue to criticise the inadequacy of the remuneration and benefit system of the UN, claiming that the developments have more severe consequences than a deterioration of salaries of the UN civil servants.132 In view of the acute problems of the organization to recruit and retain young and highly qualified individuals within the UN international civil service, a revision of the pay system of the organization is an important issue among a number of other actions the organization (the Member States)

132See for instance the statement of the President of the CCISUA: “Since over a decade, the financial crisis and its immediate impact on the budget of the Organization have brought about a stagnation in jobs and salaries, promotion and recruitment and – above all – a deterioration in conditions of service of the international civil service” (SCB/1467, 10 November 2000: 2).
will have to take into serious consideration to ensure that the principles of Article 101 of the UN Charter are followed.\textsuperscript{133}

\textbf{2.8 The Common System of the UN HR Management in the Context of Reform}

The UN Charter provides the basis for a common HR management within the UN system. As the UN system developed, many UN entities established their own policies and rules and continued to do so over the years with the result that today staff of various entities could be employed in the same field duty station (even under similar job descriptions) at differing conditions.

Obviously, such discrepancies present a confusing and unfair situation for those staff members. Member organizations of the UN \textit{Common System} pursue, as a consequence, to establish common policies and regulations that will ultimately create a HR management system throughout the UN system that treats all staff equal and fair.\textsuperscript{134} Since the ICSC was established in 1974 with the mandate of harmonizing the UN HR management, a number of improvements were made, which were reported mainly for the area of salary scales and methods to calculate and adjust the remunerations of the approximately 52,000 employees of the participating organizations in over 600 duty stations worldwide (ICSC (Ed.) 1994; ICSC Bulletin 1997, Vol. 12, No.1).

The realization of a UN common management system is, however, still a far way away. Although there are consultative mechanisms in place, member organizations such as the UNFPA maintain their own promotion and personnel structure system without the intention to fully meet the common system requirements. The different HR management approaches and policies of programmes, funds and specialized agencies of the UN system

\textsuperscript{133} Para. 3 of Art. 101: “The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity…”. It must also be noted that in September 2005, the senior management itself raised concerns about the inadequate levels of salaries of Professionals which were no longer competitive with the result that the UN had difficulties to attract and retain qualified staff in particular at the D-1 level (CEB/2005/HLCM/27).

\textsuperscript{134} Participating organizations are the UN, its affiliated Programmes - UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, WFP - and a number of Specialized Agencies - FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IFAD, ILO, ITU, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WHO, WMO, IMO, WIPO, and WTO (ICSC Bulletin 1997, Vol. 12, No. 1).
can, on the other hand, serve as models or pilot studies to the UN Secretariat’s reform efforts. Such an example is, for instance, the UNDP relocation grant pilot scheme, which proved satisfactory in the first year of implementation and was acknowledged by the participating members of ICSC as useful initiative from which also other organizations could profit (INF/184).

The ICSC does not play a direct role in the HR management reform of the UN Secretariat, but introduced its own reform programme which concentrates on new contractual arrangements, the creation of a common personnel data base, and a number of proposed changes in connection with the pay and benefit system for UN staff system wide. These ICSC reform proposals in part support and in part supersede the reform programme of the UN Secretariat. The comprehensive reform programme introduced in 1997 with its overall aim to improve the cooperation and coordination (of programmes and management actions) within the system is in this context additionally promoting that HR management be widely harmonized.

2.9 The Complex System of Monitoring and Control

The UN is tightly monitored and controlled by its shareholders who established various mechanisms for this purpose (Beigbeder 1987: 53-56; 59-62; 65-76). There are three independent bodies with various degrees of authority and mandates to inspect, investigate and audit the management practices of the UN.

The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) was originally created on a preliminary basis in 1968 and established as permanent, independent body in 1978 by resolution 31/192 (Dicke 1994: 268-275). The JIU has its office in Geneva, but conducts investigations, inspections and evaluations of UN administrative and financial practices system-wide. The JIU is a group of eleven inspectors appointed by the GA as independent experts for an initial term of five years, with the possibility to be extended for a second term (JIU/1). The aim for establishing the JIU was to ensure that financial resources were used efficiently and the UN was run economically (Beigbeder 1987: 5).

The JIU has issued numerous reports on the UN HR management over the years. Among other issues, the JIU has reviewed the former Performance Evaluation Report system
(PER) and has contributed to the development of the succeeding PAS, which has been introduced in the late 1990s to monitor and assess the performance of UN civil servants of the UN Secretariat (see hereto also the case study on this subject). In view of the latest UN HR management reforms, the JIU has contributed reports for consideration by the SG and the GA on the administration of justice (JIU/REP/2000/1), the delegation of authority (JIU/REP/2000/6), the recruitment, management and retention of young Professionals in the UN system (JIU/REP/2000/7), the use of consultants or consulting firms (JIU/REP/2000/2; JIU/REP/99/7), the question of senior-level appointments (JIU/REP/2000/3) and, though not directly related to HR management, on the result-based budgeting (JIU/REP/99/3).

The second body, the Board of Auditors consists of three external auditors who are appointed by the GA. In accordance with the UN Financial Regulations and Rules, Article XII, the appointees serve on the Board for three years, whereby each year one of the three auditors is replaced. Their terms of reference authorize the external auditors to gain access to all records and documentation they may consider relevant to their audit. While the Board is mainly concerned with the efficiency of the financial procedures, the accounting system and the internal financial controls, it is also authorized to make observations and consequently recommendations with respect to the administration and management of the organization (Beigbeder 1987: 55). The external auditors report through the ACABQ to the Fifth Committee as the subsidiary body of the GA.

The third body authorized to monitor, audit, investigate and inspect UN financial records and management practices is the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). OIOS was established in 1994 by merging the former UN internal audit and inspection units into one office with unrestricted audit, inspection and investigation authorities.

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135 The external audit of the UN is used as a control of the internal audit conducted by OIOS. Financial Rules 110.41 (internal audit) and Financial Regulations 12.4 and 12.5 (external audit, scope of audit) basically duplicate auditing functions without clear distinction of the internal and external auditors’ levels of authority.

136 The ACABQ is a group of 16 appointed financial experts appointed by GA with the mandate to review the budget proposals of the SG and to assist the Fifth Committee (Beigbeder 1987: 43).

137 OIOS is the successor organization of the Office for Inspections and Investigations (OII) established by SG Boutros-Ghali in 1993.
The Under-Secretary-General of OIOS is appointed by the SG in accordance with Article 101, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter and on the basis of Staff Regulation 4.5 for the maximum term of five years (A/RES/48/218 B; ST/SGB/273; JIU/REP/2000/3: iv). All other OIOS employees are appointed in accordance with UN Staff Regulations and Rules. OIOS is fully integrated into the UN administrative structure of the UN Secretariat and operates independently “under the authority of the Secretary-General” (ST/SGB/273: para. 2; A/RES/48/218 B: 2-3).

Since its creation in 1994, OIOS has developed a number of additional new functions, such as a management consulting service. Among the contributions of OIOS are a number of very specific recommendations to improve peacekeeping operations and a number of investigations of fraud, embezzlement and mismanagement, which led to the recovery of significant moneys.\footnote{OIOS reported for 2004 “recoveries and potential savings to the Organization” of over US$ 16 million (Press Release Note No. 5902, 27 October 2004).}

Within the framework of ongoing UN management reforms, the functions and range of the management reviews by OIOS were extended to include evaluation and assistance in the overall reform process of the organization. Besides the annual reports (see for instance A/50/459; A/51/432; and A/55/436), OIOS has prepared reports on discrimination (A/56/956) and on crime prevention and criminal justice (A/56/83). OIOS produced also a comprehensive report on the impact of UN management actions (A/59/253) in September 2004, which is the most valuable and reliable source of information to date by providing an impartial evaluation on the reform progress.

Member States have an understandable interest in monitoring the organization’s activities with respect to financial spending, the allocation and actual consumptions of funds for programmes. The system of external audits, inspections and internal oversight is expected to correct any management practices that are either in violation of existing rules and to help to further improve the existing management system.

UN administrators, on the other hand, often perceive investigations and scrutiny by these independent bodies as an aggravation and as “not always conducive to the effective implementation of substantive activities” (A/50/507/Add.1: para. 4). The organization
requires resources and time to comply with the many recommendations made by the three bodies.

The implementation and application of new procedures resulting from recommendations and observations made by the Board of External Auditors, the JIU and/or OIOS create additional work and would require further resources. The requirement to prepare frequent follow-up reports on specific management issues to these entities further adds to the regular workload of managers and staff and the already extensive reporting system of the Secretariat. If, on top of these ‘annoyances’, the recommendations are not perceived as true improvements, managers resist – though unsuccessfully – the need to report and fully implement those changes.

The JIU, OIOS and Board of Auditors have produced a vast amount of reports and made numerous recommendations resulting from reviews and audits. In view of the state of the organization, it is, nonetheless, questionable if and to what extent these three entities could in fact contribute to real improvements of the internal management and, therefore, higher efficiency of the UN.

So far, their work was little coordinated and as a result their recommendations were to a large degree isolated and not systematic in their approach. Further research would be necessary in order to assess objectively the practical impact of these entities’ proposals. It would, for instance, be helpful to evaluate on a system-wide scale whether recommendations were fully implemented throughout the organization, and at which costs and to which benefits such actions have been leading. Unlike in the case of OIOS, no data are available on the number of implemented JIU or Board of Auditors’ recommendations and on the eventual resulting improvements of such actions. Only through such an analysis of the costs and benefits would it be possible to determine the effectiveness of the JIU, OIOS and Board of Auditors.

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139 As reported by the UN administration, there are about 500 audit recommendations issued each year (UN Management Reforms: 2005, downloaded from the UN Intranet, 26 May 2005). For previous years, see annual reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (e.g. for 1998: A/53/428; for 1999: A/54/393; and for 2000: A/55/436.

140 The annual OIOS reports contain in their Annex an overview of their recommendations on which corrective action has not been implemented.
It may also be advisable to review the terms of the Board of Auditors and the OIOS to ensure a closer cooperation between the Board and OIOS and better coordination. In conjunction with the 1997 reform programme a number of new mechanisms have already been established. More improvements are expected through the establishing of new mechanisms in combination with the restructuring of the DM, including the establishing of the Office for Oversight and Internal Justice and the Oversight Committee. Furthermore, a study on UN auditing and oversight practices is pending which may lead to additional improvement of the audit, inspection and investigation system. A separate study would be required to review the overlapping functions and duplications of work of the JIU and the OIOS.
3 The new UN HR Management

3.1 Reform Steps 1985 - 1996

This chapter discusses the events, reform proposals and actual changes of the UN HR management since 1985, which eventually led to the comprehensive reform programme of 1997 proposed by SG Kofi Anna.

1985: The starting point of the current reform movement was the decision by the GA on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the UN to establish a Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts with a mandate to review “the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations”. 141

The debates of the 40th GA once again exposed the different views of Member States and their contradictory expectations from UN reforms. National interests and the struggle for power within the legislative bodies of the UN remained basically the same as in previous years, shaped by the differing interests of Western versus Eastern Block nations and those of the developed versus the less developed and developing countries.

Members such as the USA criticised the mismanagement and the growing expenditures of the organization, fearing that their influence within the organization would further be weakened in view of the grown majority of less developed and developing countries in the UN (Dicke 1994: 279-300). The Soviet Union and other members of the Eastern Block were equally concerned about loosing their influence in the UN, as they had been using the organization as a forum to promote their ideologies. In light of the dominant role of the western nations, the Eastern and other communist countries objected to any proposals that could further strengthen the influence of these countries within the organization.

The less developed, the developing and the small island states were the most dependent on the financial and technical support of the organization and thus its main donor nations. For them, the UN was a forum to negotiate programmes and international assistance to realize

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141 A/RES/40/237. In the following also called the ‘Group of 18’; for information on the composition see Müller 1992, Vol. I: 41.
their national aspirations of development, their participation in the global decision-making process and their interests of peace and security. It is, in this context, understandable that those countries, which relied the most on international aid, vehemently criticised the withholding of contributions as blackmail and neo-imperialism (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 33-35; 42). Ironically, at the eve of the 40th anniversary of the UN, 90 members out of 159 had joined the USA (as the biggest debtor with accumulated, unpaid assessments of US$ 86 million) in the withholding of their payments to the regular budget and to special funds for various reasons (Beigbeder 1987: 149-153; see also chapter 1.8.2).

Despite the differences in political and national interests and the growing rift among Member States, they all agreed on the need for reform. The initiative to start a new reform progress was taken by Japan, which proposed to establish an expert group that could produce a catalogue of required reforms (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 38; also Dicke 1994: 285). The Japanese proposal was quickly supported by Australia, the Comoro Islands, Finland, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, and during the preparations of the final draft resolution also by Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Jamaica and Samoa (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 38-40). Although the US government had repeatedly criticised the UN for not introducing the necessary changes, the US representative did not involve himself in the drafting of this “reform resolution” A/RES/40/237.

Unfortunately, the instructions issued by Member States to the Group of 18 were vague with respect to the expected review. Restricted in terms of resources and time, the members of the Group faced the problem of familiarizing themselves with the many aspects to be considered and with the organization’s complex structures and operations. The Group members’ limited knowledge of the UN’s internal management and their different interests resulting from their individual professional experiences in various
national services, combined with political intentions, created additional obstacles, which made it difficult to find agreements on some recommendations.  

**1986:** While the Group of 18 was conducting their review, the SG introduced drastic measures in January 1986 to resolve the organization’s cash crisis by initiating savings in the area of administration and personnel. Measures concerning the HR management included an immediate recruitment stop, postponement of the adjustment of salaries for General Service staff, delaying all promotions by about six months and limiting official travel by UN officials. In the area of general administration, the proposed savings were directed at the suspension of maintenance work and repairs at headquarters (Beigbeder 1987: 151). In addition, the SG proposed economic measures, including “the deferral of certain programme activities” and major construction projects in Africa and Asia (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 42).

Aside from the continuing financial difficulties, the 41st session of the GA (1986/87) was dominated by the recommendations of the Group of 18. After the SG addressed in his opening statement the “failure of Member States to meet obligations flowing from the Charter”, the newly elected president of the GA acknowledged the need for reforms in order to “cut bureaucratic waste” and to “streamline the administration” (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 54-55).

The US government defended their continued withholding of contributions by arguing that unless the UN introduced major improvements of its management practices and enhanced the control of its financial resources, the US Senate would not agree to pay their full

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142 A critical account of the work of the Group of 18 and of the expertise of the members of the Group is provided by Maurice Bertrand, himself a member of the group (see Bertrand 1988). In this connection it must be, however, noted that Bertrand himself was of the opinion that the UN is basically incapable to reform itself (Bertrand 1988: 87). Bertrand states that most of the members appointed by the GA were not sufficiently qualified for the task of such a comprehensive management review, despite their experience in international diplomacy. A detailed summary of events and the debates in the legislative and consultative bodies is provided by Müller (1992).

143 Report A/41/49 was submitted in August 1986 to the 41st GA.
contributions.\textsuperscript{144} Other members of the UN also continued to withhold their contributions in violation of international law. Their lack of financial support increased the resentment of those Member States who had paid on time and intensified the disagreements among the members of the organization.\textsuperscript{145}

The report of the Group of 18 contained 71 recommendations ranging from proposals to improve the work and efficiency of the “intergovernmental machinery” to recommendations concerning the structure of the UN Secretariat and planning and budgetary procedures, of which 22 related to HR management issues.

The introduction of the report referred to the growth in staff numbers and high expenditures, but also to the “inadequate” qualifications of staff, “in particular in the higher categories”, and to inefficient working methods (A/41/49). Overall, the report reflected the political struggles among the Member States and the financial constraints of the organization as the analyses of Bertrand and Müller illustrate.

The number of regular budget posts had increased from 1,546 in 1946 to 11,423 in 1986 (A/41/49: para. 4). Expenditures for personnel (salaries and common staff costs) had, as a result, increased from 55 per cent of total expenditures in the year 1946 to 75 per cent in 1986 (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 182). This increase of staff and related costs, which had occurred over a period of 40 years, had sound reasons.

The organization of the UN Secretariat had developed into a network of offices, committees and programmes with ever increasing responsibilities for development, technical assistance, peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs. The creation of these new bodies, funds and programmes and the expanding operations of the organization naturally resulted in the establishment of new posts, the recruitment of additional staff and higher expenditures for staff-related costs. As salaries were adjusted in accordance with the cost

\textsuperscript{144} Dicke 1994: 33. Dicke discusses extensively the illegality of contribution withholdings by UN members, which was also acknowledged by legal experts in the US at the time (Dicke 1994: 213-222).

\textsuperscript{145} Müller (1992) provides a comprehensive list of statements during the 41\textsuperscript{st} session of the GA that reveal the different positions of Member States.
of living index and the *Flemming* principle and the *Noblemaire* principle, the proportion of staff-related spending (compared with total expenditures) had risen.\footnote{Despite such adjustments and as has been discussed in chapter 2.7.3, UN salaries are no longer competitive with those paid by other international organizations; see also Müller 1992, Vol. I: 49-50.}

Since the increase of posts and the adjustments of salaries and benefits were all closely monitored and required the approval of the UN legislatures, it cannot be argued that these developments between 1945 and 1985 happened uncontrolled and unnoticed by Member States. As Müller’s analysis shows, the salary scales of Professional staff had in fact not been increased since 1975 and cost-of-living adjustments for this group had been frozen in December 1984. As a result, UN salaries “did not even increase to offset inflation for nearly six years” following the decision of the GA in 1985 (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 49).

Despite these realities of UN staff incomes, the Group of 18 blindly shared the perception of many Member States that the incomes of UN civil servants were unreasonably high, and thus recommended reductions to entitlements and benefits, including cutbacks of annual leave entitlements from six to four weeks (A/41/49: Recommendation 61). The ICSC’s review of 1989 with respect to the conditions of service of the Professional and higher categories would prove that this recommendation had been inappropriate if not perilous in “that the remuneration had fallen to the point that recruitment and retention were becoming a problem for the Organization” (A/45/226: para. 192).

The Group of 18 proposed as a second conventional solution to reduce “the overall regular budget posts by 15 per cent within a period of three years” and the number of regular budget posts at the level of Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General by 25 per cent (A/41/49: Recommendation 15). The 15 per cent post reductions were expected to result “in savings of US$ 141 million per biennium”, while the reduction in higher level post was to save the organization an additional “US$ 3.3 million per biennium on salaries and common staff costs” (Müller 1992: Vol. I: 173-174).

These staff cuts would have reduced the UN staff by one third to one fourth (in total numbers between 2,800 to 3,800 UN employees; Perry 1993: 3; also Müller 1992, Vol. I: 47). It is not surprising that UN administrators and staff representatives objected...
vehemently to such reductions. Some Member States, in particular the less developed countries, and likewise the ICSC questioned as well the rationale of this recommendation, in particular as it was not obvious how the Group of 18 could have arrived at these proposed percentages.¹⁴⁷

Overall, the Group’s recommendations concerning the UN HR management were rather conservative. They comprised a revision of the UN Staff Regulations and Rules and the creation of a Personnel Manual (recommendation 42), a proposed increase in the proportion of appointments at junior levels (recommendation 44), the development of a “job rotation system among the various duty stations” (recommendation 49), various modifications (i.e. of the mandate of the ICSC; recommendation 53), and the introduction of a system of competitive tests for junior positions. A more progressive proposal to introduce assessment tests for appointments of senior managers (recommendation 43) was not seriously considered by legislative bodies at the time.

In general, many of the proposed “measures regarding personnel” (A/41/49: 19-23) were replications of former reform proposals and reconfirmations of expressed goals and policies, such as the ratio between permanent and fixed-term contracts (recommendation 57).¹⁴⁸ Such duplications of previous reform ideas included further questions of contractual arrangements (recommendation 45) and promotions (recommendation 51), mobility (recommendation 49), improvement of the status of women (recommendation 46) and geographical distribution of posts (recommendation 47). The GA had discussed most of these issues before and their importance had been re-iterated time and again by Member States. The fact that the report of the Group of 18 restated these matters is a plain

¹⁴⁷ Bertrand (1988) and Müller (1992) give a rather detailed account of the internal discussions of the Group of 18, but also of the statements made by single Member States in the legislative and consultative bodies, which were repetitive queries into the methodology used by the Group to arrive at their proposed ratios for these staff reductions.

¹⁴⁸ In fact, the recommendations of the Group, that permanent appointments should be offered at a ratio of “at least 50 per cent of the nations of any Member State working in the Secretariat” (recommendation 57) and after three years of service (recommendation 45) were both obsolete as the 50% ratio was already a declared goal of the organization and the conversion to permanent appointments after three years of satisfactory service had been general practice in the UN Secretariat.
confirmation that none of the issues had been addressed effectively up to this date, neither by the administration nor by the legislators of the organization.

Some recommendations, such as the reduction of annual leave or the elimination of education grants (recommendation 61), were not only in conflict with the Noblemaire principle, but contradicted the fundamental accomplishments of trade unions in Western countries. Such unconsidered proposals were obviously not well received by the UN Staff Union and they may have contributed to later suspicions among the staff towards newer reforms and outsiders who were invited to provide any independent advice for internal change. Moreover, some of the Group’s conclusions turned out to be insufficiently (or not at all) supported by reliable data and were criticised by numerous Member States.  

Yet, the Group also proposed some valuable changes, for instance to simplify the structure of the (then-called) Department of Administration and Management by merging operational units (recommendation 30) and the introduction of a Personnel Handbook. Another valuable recommendation was to strengthen the role of the head of personnel suggesting that this would minimize any future interference in HR management decisions by internal or external parties (Member States) not concerned with the placement and appointment decisions of the organization.

In hindsight, some recommendations caused unpredicted and negative effects, others proved harmful to the organization in terms of staff morale (Bertrand 1988: 89 and 93; see also JIU/REP/95/8). So did, for instance, the recruitment freeze limit the organization’s ability to appoint experienced personnel and to recruit younger individuals into junior positions. The latter caused an eventual increase of the average age of UN personnel that reached its peak in the late 1990s.

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149 Neither the acclaimed lack of qualifications, nor the alleged low performance of UN civil servants was based on objective data. In the absence of records that could support these and other judgements, the members of the Group based their conclusions on common beliefs or on the members personal opinions (Bertrand 1988: 88 and 91). See also Müller 1992, Vol. I: 98-130.

150 In accordance with recommendation 41, a central Office for HR management was established within the Department of Administration and Management (the predecessor of the DM).
Although the main focus of the UN administration remained “financial uncertainties” (A/45/226: 3) during 1986, a number of changes were introduced following the report of the Group of 18. Nonetheless, modifications of the UN HR management system were selective and did not introduce a visible improvement in the way the organization managed its human resources.

The establishment of the Group of 18 was, therefore, a rather symbolic act, which led to the re-activation of a reform debate that would last for many years and would be an important factor in view of the legitimacy of the UN. The statement of the Australian Permanent Representative expressed the subsequent experience when he stated: “The Organization is in danger so long as it refuses or postpones reforms” (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 71).

One of the practical consequences of this review exercise was the *Vacancy Management and Staff Redeployment Programme* introduced in December 1986. This programme replaced the UN’s annual promotion review system by taking a more central management approach. Formerly decentralized HR management functions were removed from programme managers and HR management authority (about recruitments, appointments, promotions, transfers and separations of staff) especially with financial implications became strictly centralized at the UN headquarters in New York.151

In practical terms, this meant that promotion registers were no longer published and promotions were significantly reduced. As a result of the organization’s precarious financial situation, it was decided not only to delay promotions until the financial standing of the UN could be improved, but also to introduce a temporary recruitment freeze. These measures, together with a central HR management approach was expected to guarantee that despite the financial difficulties vacant post could be filled “in a rational and efficient manner” (JIU/REP/96/6: paras. 42-43).

This new system was expected to provide a higher degree of fairness and increased staff mobility within the system, but it soon became evident that the Vacancy Management and

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151 Kanninen 1995: 87. Programme managers are heads of departments or offices and appointed at the level of Assistant Secretary-General or Under-Secretary-General, in some cases at the level of D-2.
Staff Redeployment system did not fulfill these expectations. Quite to the contrary, it instituted lengthy “bureaucratic processes for redeployment, rotation and promotion” and resulted in denials of legitimate transfers “between departments and duty stations” (Kanninen 1995: 87).

1989: Although the SG noted in his annual report on the work of the organization to the 44th GA that administrative reforms based on the recommendations of the Group of 18 had been largely implemented, no noticeable, systematic changes and improvements to the UN HR management system had been introduced. Policies on the recruitment, placement and promotions of staff remained unchanged (after the changes of 1986).

Staff reductions had almost reached the requested 15 per cent recommended by the Group of 18. Reductions of the high-level posts were, however, not realized at the ratio recommended (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 428-429). The report of the SG on high-level posts in November 1993 would later propose “changes in the senior management structure of the Secretariat” that would produce “a net reduction in the amount of $437,200” (for the biennium 1994-1995), instead of the expected $3.3 million based on estimates of the Group of 18 (A/C.5/48/9/Add.1; also Müller 1992: Vol. I: 173-174).

1990: By the time the UN celebrated its 45th anniversary, the UN Secretariat had “undergone a major internal restructuring and considerable reduction of staff” (A/45/1: 32). In his statement to the Fifth Committee the Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management noted: “The programme of administrative reform initiated in 1986 had thus largely been accomplished” (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 491).

Such acclaimed accomplishments were in accordance with the Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 41/213 (A/45/226: paras. 170-219) - comments on the true state of implementation in accordance with my findings are added in brackets:

a. The initiative to reduce posts, resulting in a new programme for re-deployment (which was by the end of 1989 still in a stage of incomplete implementation);
b. General results in the administrative streamlining of the OHRM (without any long-term policy or HR planning strategy in place and any lasting reorganization of the OHRM being initiated);

c. A partial revision of UN Staff Rules;

d. A preliminary draft of a Personnel Manual (to be simplified and completed once staff resources would become available);

e. The implementation of national competitive examinations for the P-1 and P-2 levels (but no progress to institute a systematic selection procedure by testing or through specific interviewing techniques for higher levels of Professionals);

f. An increase of appointments into entry positions (P-1 to P-2) compared with earlier years (whereby the age of those junior level appointees ranged from 25 to 40 years);

g. The initiative to develop a training programme (which had little immediate effect and made no significant progress until 1996).

Of all actions, staff reductions created resentments and uncertainties among UN civil servants, while reorganizations of parts of the Secretariat had an additional influence on the staff morale. Absolutely no progress was made with respect to the employment and promotions of women into higher categories of the Professional Service; equally, no progress was made on a job rotation system to promote mobility among Professionals. Only marginal progress was made in the area of appointments of candidates from developing countries into senior management positions.

Overall, the few random changes could not produce noticeable, immediate improvements of the UN HR management. Although the administration spoke in official reports of their ‘strategy’ and ‘reform programme’, there was no clear and coherent long-term strategy of HR management reforms. This applies to actions taken under the administrative authority of SG Perez DeCuellar (1982-1991), but also to those taken by his successor, SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996).
1992: As a consequence of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) judgement of November 1991 which found that there was no longer justification for the temporary suspension of promotions, the SG lifted previously applied restrictions which included “the end of the recruitment freeze” and the introduction of a new vacancy management system (JIU/REP/96/6: paras. 49-50).

The Placement and Promotion System was established in January 1992. This new system allowed heads of departments and offices to reassign staff within their departments to vacant posts at the same level (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 51). Under this new system, vacancies arising from such reassignments (placements) were published by OHRM, providing staff members with the opportunity to apply. Staff members could obtain a promotion by applying directly for higher posts, but were still dependent upon their supervisors’ recommendations and support.

The Placement and Promotion System constituted a version of the strategic HR management model discussed by Condrey (1998) with respect to the US public sector. This strategic HR management model involves managers in the selection process and establishes mechanisms for collaboration between line managers and personnel officers in the review and evaluation of applications, but without fully decentralizing HR management to the departmental levels (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 7-13).

The new UN procedures gave heads of departments and offices similar authorities. In addition to their authority to reassign staff to vacant posts at the same level, heads of departments and offices were permitted to recommend a candidate among applicants from another department or office. Nevertheless, the final review was in the hands of joint appointment and promotion bodies consisting of managers and representatives of OHRM, and the final authority and responsibility of UN HR management actions remained centralized within OHRM.

“The major difference between this programme and the previous annual review system” was that managers could now intervene if the appointment and promotion body’s recommendation disagreed with the choice of the department or office (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 53). Despite the expected improvements of the Placement and Promotion System, it
was soon criticised “even from some senior United Nations officials” and by subsidiary bodies for its emphasis on seniority rather than qualification and for supporting cronyism rather than a fair process (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 54).

In addition to the changes to the appointment and promotion policies, SG Boutros-Ghali proposed the establishment of a career development programme as an integrated system with elements including HR “planning, job classification, recruitment, staff training and development, staff performance evaluation, staff mobility, career counselling and promotion”, which would eventually be facilitated by the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) (A/C.5/47/6: paras. 5-6). Although the theoretical groundwork had been already at that time presented in the SG’s report to the Fifth Committee, the proposed career development system has yet to be implemented in the UN Secretariat.

1993: As a result of the criticism of the 1992 Placement and Promotion System, a revision was introduced in November 1993. The new Placement and Promotion System was to “increase the transparency of the placement and promotion processes” to “reward staff for competence, creativity, versatility and, increasingly, mobility” (ST/SGB/267: para. 2). Vacancies were now advertised monthly for staff members to apply for posts at the same level or one level above their current positions.

These new procedures were expected to make the recruitment process more flexible and to enable the organization to fill vacancies “within a minimum of delay” (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 57). The basic rules remained unchanged in that heads of departments and offices were asked to recommend a candidate who was in their assessment best suited for the job. By allowing managers to review applications (though these may be pre-selected by the OHRM) and to make their recommendations of what they perceived as the best suitable candidate, heads of departments and offices had as of 1993 greater influence in selection and appointment decisions.

Nonetheless, the final decision was, as before, with OHRM who reviewed the departments’ as well as the joint appointment body’s recommendation before making the final decision. The implementation of the minor revisions of the review process took five and a half months, but did not silence criticism by the staff for its lack of fairness and
transparency and did not improve the changes of UN civil servants in view of their career development (JIU/REP/96/6: paras. 58-70).

The GA became “increasingly unhappy with Secretariat attempts to provide more substantive reforms” and requested “in late 1993 to establish a new, transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility by January 1995” so programme managers could be held accountable for their management and use of personnel and financial resources (JIU/REP/95/8: 3).

1994: In reaction to the stronger growing pressure by the legislators for noticeable reforms became stronger, the UN administration proposed in 1994 “a strategy for the management of the human resources of the Organization” which included recommendations to link HR planning with the strategic planning of the organization (A/C.5/49/5: para. 2). The proposed strategy was to change the existing management culture through training and by holding managers accountable for their HR management actions.

This new HR management strategy was proposed to the GA as a tool to modernize and re-energize the HR management of the Secretariat. It complemented the SG’s report on the “establishment of a transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility” of programme managers that would ensure the “effective management of the personnel and financial resources allocated to them” (A/C.5/49/1: para. 1b).

In line with this new system of managerial accountabilities and responsibilities, the UN HR management was further decentralized. OHRM, on the other hand, was to remain “the centre of human resources management planning and policy, and the guardian of the Secretary-General’s authority” (A/C.5/49/5: para. 10; see also affirmation by the GA in its 2005 resolution A/RES/59/266: para. 2).

1995: During the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the UN, the debate on reforms reached a stage of increased urgency. Member States, in particular the USA, were demanding clear improvements in a wide range of management areas. The debates touched on various areas of operation with a central focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN. Negative publicity resulting from events in Somalia, the Balkans
and Rwanda where the UN had set up peacekeeping missions added to the criticism of the failures of the UN including its management practices.

The lack of action on the part of the administration does not surprise, since the SG had already forewarned legislators in his report to the Fifth Committee in October 1994 that his HR management strategy was not intended to raise “undue expectations without regard to (a) the length of time that the changes intended can take to implement; and (b) success being conditional on the availability of adequate human and financial resources in 1995, and in the programme budget for the biennium 1996-1997” (A/C.5/49/5: para. 16).

While OHRM officials praised the 1993 Placement and Promotion System “as excellent”, a survey of UN staff in 1995 revealed that UN employees criticised it “almost as strongly as the previous system” (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 64). Statistics of 1995 showed that over 1,000 Professionals, including the most senior levels, had not been promoted for over five years, and more than six hundred had remained at the same levels for over 10 years (JIU/REP/96/6: paras. 64-65). Retrenchments instigated following the recommendation of the Group of 18 had reduced the number of promotions significantly and showed its “demoralizing effect on the staff”. The Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions “cited insufficient career opportunities as a major factor of resignations or non-acceptance of contract renewals” by UN staff (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 67).

A later review in 1999 by the UN Staff Council, the elected group of union representatives, showed that 35 Directors at the D-1 level, 655 Professionals and 2,364 General Service staff members had not been promoted for 10 years; an unspecified number of staff members had not been promoted for more than 15 or even 20 years (UN Staff Council 1999: para. 7).

Other shortfalls of the Placement and Promotion System were its failure to support greater mobility (in particular in view of the promotion of staff) and the possibilities for manipulation and abuse the system offered to managers, some of which had been
sanctioned by OHRM.\textsuperscript{152} The system remained, nevertheless, unchanged until May 2002, in spite of criticism by Member States, the JIU, the ICSC and the UN Staff Union.

As the JIU observed, selective changes to the UN management had been implemented without systematic planning (JIU/REP/95/8: Recommendation I). HR management reforms were part of a series of mainly unrelated reform proposals ranging from improvements to the UN’s programme planning, financial resources management, budgetary processes and information technologies (A/50/507/Add.1: para. 7). In accordance with resolution 48/218, the SG had introduced by January 1995 a new accountability and responsibility system. Meanwhile a number of HR management reforms, in particular with respect to the “hapless staff performance evaluation system” and recruitment procedures were still outstanding (JIU/REP/95/8: para. 6).

Although the SG referred to the different proposed changes in the various management areas of the UN Secretariat as if they were part of an ongoing comprehensive reform, including the many important reform measures that were designed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources, there was no clear reform strategy or HR management concept presented to the GA. We have consequently to conclude that reform efforts were in (almost) all areas isolated actions without a long-term reform programme in place.

1995 was, nonetheless, a turning point in the reform process of the UN, as a number of proposals were developed at the time and brought into the discussion, which would later be taken up in the 1997 reform programme of SG Kofi Annan. Examples are the proposals to establish the post of a deputy to the SG and the creation of an Executive Office with a Chief of Staff (JIU/REP/95/8: vii-viii). A proposal was made and preparatory actions were taken to establish a new planning and development service within

\begin{footnote}{\textsuperscript{152} As observed by the JIU, managers used their power and status to influence the decisions of the APBs (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 34). In some instances, managers undermined the system of fair selection for promotion by transferring favoured staff members to the post in question in order to justify these individuals’ promotions over other possible, eligible candidates (JIU/REP/96/6: paras. 79-86).} \end{footnote}
OHRM. Management training introduced in 1993 was further expanded and introductory training for the PAS, the new system to assess individual performance, was initiated.

1996: The report on UN recruitment, placement and promotion policies issued by the JIU in 1996 reminded legislators and administrators of previous intentions to establish a career development system (e.g. in 1978, 1983, 1985 and again in 1992) which would eventually be linked to human resources planning supported by a skills inventory, promoting mobility and staff development (JIU/REP/96/6: paras. 68-70; see also A/C.5/47/6: para. 2).

The subject JIU report stated that the UN administration had failed to fulfil its pronouncements to establish a career development system; it found further no evidence that such a system was intended to be introduced in the near future as no reference to a career development system was made in the proposed medium-term plan for 1998-2001 (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 73; see also A/51/6(Prog.24)).

Despite a continued acknowledged need for reforms, the GA passed during its 50th session only one resolution that concerned directly UN reforms, namely the reform of the internal justice system (A/RES/50/240).

The lack of visible and measurable changes was seen by some Member States, especially the USA, as SG Boutros-Ghali’s reluctance to introduce reforms. The SG’s perceived inability to manage the desired reforms, together with his political disagreements with the US government, led to the objection of the USA to grant Mr. Boutros-Ghali a second term in office.

The former Division for Personnel Policy Development and Analysis of OHRM had been abolished in 1987 (JIU/REP/95/8: paras. 18-22).

JIU/REP/95/8: paras. 31-35 and 36-45. The organization-wide implementation of the PAS would, however, not be completed before 2003 (see hereto also the subject case study below).

Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali gives his personal account of the late months in office in a publication of his UN memoirs (Boutros-Ghali 1999). Considering the circumstances at the time, the administration was not yet prepared for a full overhaul of the organization. It appears, nevertheless, reasonable to acknowledge that SG Boutros-Ghali, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, Richard Thornburgh and the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management, Dennis Halliday, did prepare the path for many of the following reform measures implemented after 1997.

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To conclude this review of reform steps from 1985 up to the end of 1996, it is noteworthy to mention that, in addition to random changes of the HR management, a number of structural changes to the UN Secretariat were initiated between the late 1980s and the late 1990s with the intent of introducing a flat organizational structure. None of these measures were, however, sufficient to bring about immediate changes of attitudes and managerial behaviours without building a new awareness among managers and supervisors through training.

As has been discussed in chapter 1.7.5, changes to an organization’s culture are not possible within a short, pre-determined period of time, nor can they be dictated from above. Changing organizational culture is a process that takes time and requires the full participation of top management. The sporadic changes introduced by the administration between 1985 and 1996 were not perceived among the staff as part of a clear strategy and the repeated suspension of recruitment and promotions as well as reorganizations undertaken for political rather than for operational reasons, caused a further deterioration of the organizational climate.  

Without giving a detailed analytical explanation for the reasons why these earlier reform efforts failed, a few questions may be allowed to explore the shortcomings of the attempts to improve the internal management of the UN Secretariat between 1985 and the end of 1996:

a. Why did Member States not follow through and press for immediate reforms by using their legislative powers and the information available to them if? Member States had not only requested the majority of those reviews and reports on management and administrative issues, but could have used their legislative power, the financial control and formal and informal channels to initiate and realize actual reforms.

156 Such changes could in particular be observed in the mid-1990s when the offices of the Department of Administration and Management (OHRM, OPPBA and OCSS) were re-organized in an attempt introduce a flat organizational structure, but without prior information and without new guidelines and instructions issued to those affected by these changes.
b. Why did the UN administration not introduce the kind of sweeping reforms between 1985 and 1996 that were expected by legislators? The review of the Group of 18 had produced a number of recommendations, which could have been combined with numerous other proposals of independent experts published at the time to initiate an overhaul of the UN management as part of a framework for an inclusive reform programme.

c. Why did the few changes that were in fact introduced not establish the expected improvements?

The four brief answers are: oversimplification, ignorance, disturbance and lack of political will.

**Oversimplification:** The many debates within intergovernmental bodies and the statements of UN officials lead us to believe that legislators and UN administrators expected simple and single alterations, such as the reduction of staff and revisions of rules, to be sufficient. The review of earlier reforms efforts confirms, what theory and practical experience had already uncovered, namely that isolated modifications of a complex organization cannot set in motion a change process. Neither Member States nor senior UN administrators took into account that a successful reform of the UN had to involve all HR management aspects, such as policies, structures and functions, but also attitudes and behaviours of managers.

**Ignorance:** Member States and UN administrators ignored (or may not have been fully knowledgeable of) the reasons leading to the deficient HR management. Instead they blamed the symptoms, such as inadequate management skills, wasteful use of resources and bureaucratic structures, for the inefficiency and lack of effectiveness. Bureaucratic structures and rigid rules had created a culture of avoidance. UN managers and staff had learned that innovative, proactive behaviour was not appreciated and advancements in knowledge and skills were often not supported and acknowledged by the organization.

Failures of former so-called reforms and actions of Member States and the UN administration had created a climate of mistrust towards the leadership. The introduction of changes with no or very little involvement of those who were most affected by those
changes resulted in ‘reforms’ that were in some instances incomprehensible to UN civil servants and were not necessarily improvements in view of the practical operational requirements of the organization.

**Disturbance:** External and internal factors disrupted reform efforts. The demands of increasing peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s and the lack of financial support of Member States hampered real reforms. Changes to recruitment and appointment policies and structural changes did not bring about more stability and coherence to an unsatisfactory and possibly unfair system, but instead confused and frustrated internal actors. The overwriting goal of creating savings further hindered attempts to develop a more systematic reform programme.

**Lack of political will:** Despite repeated requests for reforms, Member States had no consensus on the type of reforms desired, and UN administrators did not pursue changes as a matter of priority, in particular since they were not given clear and concise guidance by legislators. The vague guidelines issued by the GA to the Group of 18 and the following decisions of Member States did not provide the necessary direction for comprehensive management reforms.

**Inadequacy:** Single measures, although they might have been presented as part of a reform package, could not produce the required changes to the organizational culture and did certainly not create a climate of reform enthusiasm among the majority of actors. Additionally, some of them failed or even led to the opposite of what were expected. Too little of the experience available through national public sector reforms was put into use in the development of UN reform proposals and neither Member States nor the UN senior management considered that changes had to take into account the conservative UN bureaucracy and management system.

Reforms introduced after 1997 address these issues with more or less success. The development, implementation and realization of what was to become the new UN HR management uses the knowledge gained from past reform failures and incorporates both old and new reform ideas into a wide-ranging reform programme of structural and policy changes, in addition to a long-term strategy to change to organizational culture of the UN.
As the UN HR management reform is part of a comprehensive reform, the year 1997 must be seen as the start of new era of UN reforms. It is in deed the first managed organization-wide reform process the UN has ever undertaken.

3.2 Renewing the UN HR Management

“The Secretary-General has set forth a new vision for management that will support a more relevant, more effective United Nations that better serves the Member States; a simplified structure that avoids duplication and achieves greater impact; empowered and responsible staff and managers; a leaner and more efficient United Nations Secretariat; and an organization that fosters management excellence and is accountable for achieving results determined by the Member States” (A/51/950: para. 224).

The management reform, with the proposed changes of the UN HR management at its centre, is part of a comprehensive, organization-wide reform programme that includes all levels of the organization, from the intergovernmental bodies to lower management, and is designed around the five core operational areas of the UN: security and peace, economic and social affairs, development, humanitarian affairs and human rights.

The challenge of such wide-ranging reforms to the UN HR management is the alignment of structural changes with changes of policies and procedures to build a new coherent system. Changes must be introduced with as little interference as possible into the running operation and must be in sync with corresponding modifications to the financial area and in electronic applications.¹⁵⁷

A vital component vigorously pursued by the SG in his effort to reform the UN and to modernize its management is a change of the organizational culture in order to build a

¹⁵⁷ Changes of entitlements will, for instance, affect the calculation of the monthly pay and must be reflected in the electronic programmes to calculate and process payroll and payment transactions.
more flexible and reactive organization. The new HR management system is the tool to implement this change.\textsuperscript{158}

Such a change of organizational culture requires changes in behaviour and attitude not only from the UN civil servants, but also from Member States. Member States must be cooperative and supportive of the UN’s mission, in particular in view of the proposed reforms. As legislators, they must work together to come to the necessary consensus on policy changes to enable these administrative and structural reforms. As financiers of the UN, Member States ought to pay their contributions on time so that reforms can be implemented swiftly.

Proposed reforms are divided into three strategic stages: the immediate steps, the medium-term changes and the long-term modifications of the UN Secretariat and the UN system. Proposed measures can be further broken down into those, which can be approved by the SG based on his authority as UN Chief Administrator and those needing the approval of Member States. The majority of the proposed HR management measures actually requires the approval of the GA as they include changes to the staff rules and regulations (e.g. to allow for a more efficient recruitment and for a fairer promotion system) and will require additional funds for the implementation of reforms, such as the proposed increased training activities.

In practical terms, HR management reforms are designed to make the UN once more an attractive work place with good benefits and career opportunities, with an open and flexible management system that allows for the efficient selection, recruitment and placement of qualified candidates, and a mobility plan that supports the work of the organization and takes into account the family needs of staff members.

This requires in accordance with the report issued by the Task Force on Human Resources Management in 1998 that a number of actions are taken and some obstacles are removed, such as:

\footnote{\textsuperscript{158} “Among the Secretary-General’s initiatives for strategic change was a thorough review of human resources management aimed at creating an organizational culture that is responsive and results-oriented, rewards creativity and innovation, and promotes continuous learning, high performance and managerial excellence” (A/57/293: para. 4).}
a. To clearly define the core “business” of the UN, whereby the top leadership must “formulate and communicate a vision of the mission and direction to the taken by the Organization.” UN top managers are expected “to nurture an organizational culture” that values and facilitates “change and model organizational values.”

b. “The role and prerogatives of the SG in his capacity as the Chief Administrative Officer under the Charter” is clearly defined.

c. The human resources strategy is clearly defined and “fully integrated within the overall organizational strategy, and widely accepted throughout the Organization.”

d. “An integrated system of human resources planning, with an appropriate technology platform to underpin all human resource management functions” is developed.

e. “The definition and validation of core organizational values and competencies, and managerial competencies, for us as a basis for recruitment, development and career progression.”

f. “Streamlining of human resources policies, processes and rules in the area of staff administration so as to provide a minimum number of rules and guidelines based on the best practices.”

g. “Vesting the primary responsibility for day-to-day management of human resources with the line managers as a result of comprehensive delegation of authority to Heads of Departments, together with guidelines and measures for follow-up and accountability.”

h. “Strengthening the managerial capacity of the Organization.”

i. “Refocusing the role of OHRM on formulating strategies, developing policies, and working in partnership with line managers in providing professional guidance and support, and implementing specific organization-wide core responsibilities.”

j. “A simplified, flexible, timely and cost-effective system of recruitment and placement” that would serve “the needs of programme managers”, would meet “legislative mandates” and enable “staff to fulfil individual career aspirations.”
k. The introduction of a career development system.

l. Making continuous learning an “organizational priority”.

m. “Encouraging mobility at all levels across functions, departments, duty stations, and organizations of the United Nations system.”

n. “Fostering an atmosphere of mutual trust between staff and managers, and resolving disagreements without excessive recourse to litigation.”

o. “Developing conditions of service that are progressive, competitive and reflect innovative approaches in both the public and private sectors and which enable the Organization at attract and retain high quality staff.”

The proposed decentralized HR management system provides managers with direct staff management authorities to improve the responsiveness of the personnel management system. New technologies and a number of new mechanisms are proposed to improve the system, e.g. a new electronic job application and staff selection system (Galaxy) and by establishing a staff planning system to allow managers and the administration to better forecast and plan for future staff requirements. To support the organizational culture change, training and continuous learning is the vital component of these reforms. Training and continuous learning allows staff to gain additional knowledge in their professional field and to develop and learn the necessary skills to perform their functions in the new management system.

The strategic approach of this reform programme involves the various actors in the planning and design of reform measures either through active participation or through a campaign of continuous information about the latest status of reforms, additional proposed reform steps and the accomplishments of the ongoing programme to ensure that reforms are accepted by Member States as well as the UN staff. Consultations with staff and managers are particularly important since these reforms affect the job security,
employment and work conditions of UN civil servants, which might have some impact on their performance and the staff morale.\textsuperscript{160}

Almost none of the proposed HR management reform measures are new to the UN. The majority originates from past reform discussions, some as recent as proposals made in 1994 (A/C.5/49/5). Some of the proposed measures were already introduced prior to 1997, such as management training, or being tested within the UN system, as is the case with performance-related pay. Others, like the newly proposed selection method known as the \textit{Assessment Centre Approach}, which requires significant investments of money and time, and the decentralization of the HR management, have, in fact, been discontinued by some national public service administrations as being ineffective and costly.

This current reform of the UN HR management system uses elements from various reform models and theories that were developed and applied over the past 20 years in private and public sector organizations, including elements of the New Public Management approach.\textsuperscript{161} In an attempt to make the UN HR management more responsive, the SG proposes to decentralize HR management responsibilities to heads of departments and offices who in their turn further delegate these authorities to lower level managers. This transfer of HR management responsibilities consequently changes the role of the OHRM. Subsequently, OHRM is no longer responsible for the day-to-day staff management, but is a central staff management advisory body monitoring and controlling managers to ensure that established rules are correctly applied and delegated authorities are not abused.\textsuperscript{162}

On the other hand, the new management philosophy and desired culture change require that some of the traditional attitudes of UN civil servants, such as a strong belief for the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{159}“This reform is being carried out in partnership with all players, staff and managers, bringing about, for the first time, an organization-wide collaboration. …A number of factors that were absent from previous attempts – monitoring of implementation and of compliance, training, staff participation through dialogue and communication – are an integral part of the current process and will enhance the likelihood of its success” (OHRM Newsletter Issue No. 1, 1999: para. 10). See hereto also A/RES/51/226.
  \item \textsuperscript{160}The GA asked, consequently to also hear the views of the staff on the HR management reforms proposed by the SG (see hereto A/C.5/53/34; A/RES/35/213).
  \item \textsuperscript{161}A/59/632. For a comprehensive overview and literature on the topic of New Public Management see Blanke/Bandemer von/Nullmeier/Wewer (Hrsg.) (2001): 71-82.
\end{itemize}
necessity of rigid rules and the strict application of hierarchical orders, become much less desirable. The new UN management requires UN civil servants with skills such as the ability to work independently, as well as in small teams without hierarchical structures. The new generation of UN civil servants is expected to be innovative, instead of performing strictly in accordance with instructions, and to be flexible by accepting change as a chance to improve performance rather than a threat.

One advantage of a decentralized UN HR management system is that managers and supervisors are in a better position to identify the right mix of professional skills and personal attitudes of an applicant to join their teams than HR professionals in a central office. Through their direct interaction with the staff, managers and supervisors are most knowledgeable about individual staff development needs (training) and know best their staff requirements, based on their work plans, which allows them to do a more accurate staff planning than could possibly be done in a central personnel management office.

A decentralized HR management system requires, however, managers with strong interpersonal and communication skills, who are able to objectively assess the performance of those they supervise. Managers with direct HR management responsibilities must, for instance, be able to identify training needs of their staff and the talents and skills permitting them to make the right placement decision. Where such management skills are underdeveloped or mechanisms to enable managers to fulfil their responsibilities are missing, there is a risk of costly consequences to the organization and unfair, biased management decisions that could lead to a rise in appeals (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 6-7).

With the introduction of further features of the decentralized UN HR management system (Galaxy), a range of management authorities were delegated to managers in 2002. Unfortunately, as the practice shows many managers are not sufficiently prepared to perform their new HR management functions, despite eight years of ongoing management training within the UN Secretariat, and in some instances departments are still insufficiently equipped to handle the full range of HR management responsibilities with

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162 An earlier proposal of decentralization of HR management responsibilities was made in 1994 (A/C.5/49/5: paras. 9-10).
the result that many HR management functions are still handled centrally by OHRM or local Personnel Officers.

In August 2000, while this reform programme was in its third year of development and implementation, a separate report on the reform of the UN’s peace operations was issued. This special reform proposal complements the comprehensive UN reform strategy, but was tailored to address specific components of peacekeeping including HR management practices in field missions. It contained, however, useful information that prompted questions into the need to align HR management practices of headquarters and main offices with those of non-established field offices, which rely to a large degree on local staff and qualified individuals appointed for limited durations only. Interestingly, the proposed reforms of DPKO’s HR management practices addressed many of the same aspects, such as training needs, the need to make conditions more attractive in order to retain highly qualified staff beyond their initial terms of appointment in the service, and the lack of a staff development system for field staff.

SG Annan demonstrates a strong determination to succeed with this reform programme. This determination is presumably based on his personal experience as a career UN civil servant and his knowledge of the organizational culture and climate. As the first SG, who was promoted to this highest position in the UN, he has a direct knowledge of the internal management procedures and policies. In addition, he is aware of the political struggles of his predecessors, including their reform efforts, and knows the problems of HR management system through his first hand experience as former head of the OHRM between 1987 and 1990. SG Annan’s insider knowledge was certainly instrumental in the development of reform strategies and has won him greater trust and support of this reform programme than some of his predecessors may have had among the staff.

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163 This Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations is commonly known as the Brahimi-Report (A/55/305 – S/2000/809), the recommendations of this group were submitted to the 55th GA in September 2000 and delivered to Heads of States and Governments during the Millennium Summit (6-8 September 2000, New York). The GA established consequently a Committee on the reform of peacekeeping operations.

This is not to say that this reform programme will not have to deal with change resistance from stakeholders at various levels of the UN hierarchy. Reform and change resistance are possibly the biggest opposing powers as well as the most fruitful partners as each challenges the other. Member States may resist changes if the proposed reforms are not in agreement with their own (national) perceptions of change. Increases of expenditures or fears that reform measures may interfere with preferred programmes are other possible reasons why Member States may not support some of the proposed reform measures.

Change resistance within the bureaucratic hierarchy of the UN Secretariat may occur if UN civil servants perceive the proposed measures as a threat to their careers and financial security or if changes are judged to be time-consuming additional duties with no real improvement to work processes. A serious obstacle in connection with this reform process is the lack of trust among the various actors and the scepticism from staff towards the UN management, but also towards the political leadership of the Member States.

UN civil servants mistrust Member States since their demands for reforms over the past 20 years have not accompanied by improvements, but by actions that brought little or no enhancements to cumbersome procedures and restrictive rules. In addition, staff experienced the effects of the withholding of Member States’ contributions, as it required that recruitment be suspended with the result that posts remained vacant and employment conditions were adversely affected. Resistance among staff and managers will consequently depend on personal experiences with the negative impact of so-called former reforms.

In order to reduce change resistance, a wide range of information and communication tools are being used in this reform. Information on planned reforms and the latest accomplishments is distributed through the Intranet and Internet to inform stakeholders and the public, in addition to printed information, like newsletters and statements by the SG and his senior managers.

While the SG and his senior management team will have to address the reform resistance among Member States and among higher management levels within the organization through a well-structured consultation process, resistance at lower hierarchical levels will
have to be managed by the SG and senior managers through direct communication with and participation of the staff. So were UN staff members, for instance, invited to participate in working groups and through other media to assist in the development of reform measures. The best selling points will be, however, results and visible improvements of the UN HR management practice.

The initial reform programme was developed and designed by a Task Force with the direct involvement of the SG. While in the initial phase of the reform development senior management was assisted by outside experts and consultants in the formulation of the reform programme, internal working groups composed of representatives of OHRM and staff representatives prepared the detailed proposals for individual HR management measures.

Change programmes of bureaucracies usually trigger a number of structural changes and the creation of committees and consultative groups intended to build consensus among internal actors and to coordinate changes within the organization. Structural changes in direct support of the new HR management were the establishing of the position of Deputy Secretary-General in March 1998, of a Strategic Planning Unit within the Executive Office of the SG in August 1998 and of the Senior Management Group in September 1998 (A/51/950 & Add.1; also: Chronology 2002).

In addition, the Management Performance Board established in May 2005 as the successor body of the Accountability Panel assumed the task to “monitor the manner in which senior managers exercise all aspects of the authorities that has been delegated to them, including their performance in achieving the objectives contained in human resources action plans” (ST/SGB/2005/13: para. 1.1 (b)).

SG Annan appointed two women into the two central positions concerned with UN HR management reform activities: (a) the newly established position of the Deputy Secretary-General, who is responsible for the reform coordination, and (b) the Assistant Secretary-

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165 The practice shows, however, that the actual participation of staff was unsatisfactory in the opinion of the UN Staff Union as well as individuals who volunteered to participate in such working groups. The process remains to be managed and influenced by a mostly exclusive group of individuals, while the majority of staff is not participating in the actual discussion.
General for Human Resources Management, who is in charge of the development and implementation of reform measures.\textsuperscript{166} It is nevertheless noteworthy that, although the improvement of the representation of women on all levels of the Secretariat is a fundamental goal, as are improvements of the geographical distribution of posts and the age structure of UN staff, the representation of women is not listed as a separate reform issue, but appears to be incorporated into the overall reform approach as is the improvement of the geographical distribution of posts.

The Senior Management Group constitutes the first cabinet the UN. The aim of establishing such a cabinet is to improve the coordination and cooperation within the UN Secretariat as well as among various UN funds, programmes and agencies in the five areas of operations. This forum ensures, in agreement with the new, promoted organizational culture, the direct involvement of senior managers into the change process, a frequent exchange of views and information on the day-to-day operations and constant dialogue between the most senior managers.

In the course of this reform programme, advisory groups were appointed and reform units were established within various departments of the UN Secretariat and entrusted with the reform planning and implementation in specific areas as peacekeeping operations, the Office of Central Support Services (OCSS) and in the main offices UNOG, UNOV and UNON.\textsuperscript{167}

Many reform measures were developed, tested and implemented in-house. The organization relies, nevertheless, on independent bodies (e.g. the Board of Auditors, OIOS or JIU), but also on outside expertise to evaluate the impact of reform measures and to identify areas of concern that may obstruct the desired culture change. The

\textsuperscript{166} The idea to establish the post of a deputy to the SG to manage the organization, while the SG is dealing “with world leaders on weighty problems”, originated in the mid 1990s (JIU/REP/95/8: vii). The selection of two women in these key positions was certainly a symbolic step taken by SG Annan to demonstrate his zeal to improve the representation of women.

\textsuperscript{167} The probably most publicly known reform proposal among the series of proposed measures by such groups relates to the management and organization of peacekeeping activities is the so-called Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809). In order to ensure implementation of the proposed measures, the new position of Director of Change Management was created within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
implementation of reform-related training programmes relies almost exclusively on outside expertise.

As stated by the SG and his senior managers, this reform programme is not about cutting posts. The initial reform proposal of 1997 contained, nevertheless, cost savings by eliminating 1,000 posts in the early stage of the first period of the reform implementation (A/51/950). In early 2005, the SG requested the GA to provide additional funds for a one-time staff buyout to free posts for the recruitment of younger staff and possibly to abolish positions within the Secretariat (A/59/2005: para. 190).

The HR management reform is designed around 10 building blocks derived from the initial fact-finding of the Task Force, which had concentrated on five areas with the support of Working Groups.168

These 10 building blocks are:

1. Human resources planning;
2. Streamlining of rules and procedures;
3. Recruitment, placement and promotion;
4. Mobility;
5. Competencies and continuous learning;
6. Performance management;
7. Career development;
8. Conditions of service;
9. Contractual arrangements; and
10. Administration of Justice.

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168 These Working Groups were headed by representatives of OHRM and consisted of staff members appointed from various departments of the UN Secretariat and representatives of the staff. Critical statements in view of the actual cooperation between management and staff representatives can be found in the following reports issued by the UN Staff Union: UN Staff Report Vol. 22, No. 5: 3; Vol. 23, No. 1: 1-2; and Vol. 23, No. 5: 1 & 4-5. For further information see Report of the Task Force on Human Resources Management, July 1998; also A/53/414 and A/57/293. For the composition of the Task Force see Annex IV.
The Reform Working Groups used knowledge gained in reforms of national public services and private companies. The UN administration invited, for instance, experts from a number of countries to present their experiences with national reforms to the members of the Working Groups and interested staff members. In the beginning, the various Working Groups also received guidance and advice from the Task Force.

With only randomly collected data available with respect to specific questions of the UN HR management practices, the Working Groups had to gather data and consolidate information about the status quo before they could develop their work programmes and start designing measures. Although the Task Forces had provided some general guidelines, the Working Groups were to define their own work programmes and strategies of how to approach their tasks.

All groups were accountable for their specific area of expertise and reported frequently to senior management. The results of their reports were incorporated in reports presented by the SG to the legislative organs. Although the purpose of these Working Groups was to involve the staff in the reform discussion and ensure the involvement of staff representatives, interviews with staff representatives indicate that the work of these Groups was strictly controlled by the administration (OHRM) and contributions of staff representatives was often not seriously taken into account.

The following chapters present the various measures developed and implemented with respect to the 10 reform building blocks. This review also illustrates how closely the different areas of HR management are interrelated, whereby some will not succeed without the effective support and input of another. The summary assessment of these reform actions is presented in the context of the overall assessment of the new HR management reform in chapter 4.
3.3 The 10 Building Blocks of the HR Management Reform

3.3.1 Human Resources Planning

“The UN has never done any proper forecasting and planning. Managers and Personnel have just waited until the post was vacant. Often this was very difficult for those others in the units. After the person left, there was nobody else who took really over, so those who were still working there had to do this person’s job on top of their own. Now, there will be a proper system to make early arrangements that people are selected and recruited, so they promise.”

(UN Staff Member, New York, April 2002)

In 1994, the GA had approved the establishment of a planning unit within OHRM (A/RES/49/222: Section I, para. 2). In conjunction with the reforms initiated in 1997, the SG presented in 1998 his reform objective for the establishment of a strategic, integrated human resources planning system for the entire Secretariat (A/53/414: para. 15(a)). Specific work force planning requirements for field operations were, thereafter, identified in connection with the comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations in 2000 (A/55/305-S/2000/809).

The Working Group tasked to develop a proper system of work force planning started in 1997 with preparations for the Skills Inventory. This inventory was to compile data on UN staff, including their professional experiences, skills, education and continuous training, personal interests and career aspirations.169 Most of this information, such as biographical data, education, professional training and work history was already available, but had been filed in kept often in separate paper files at the various duty stations UN staff had served and was, consequently, not electronically and centrally available.

The aim of the Skills Inventory was to build a database for the HR planning, to project demographic developments in the UN Secretariat and to take a thorough count of available skills and talents among UN staff on which placement and appointment decisions could be

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169 Plans to conduct a Skills Inventory were discussed within the Secretariat as early as 1992 (A/C.5/47/6, paras. 10-12; see also Perry 1993: 44).
based. It was anticipated that latest by 2000, the inventory taking would be completed and a solid database with the up-to-date information could then be established (A/55/499: para. 6).

The collection of inventory data obviously required the participation of the staff by completing the electronic forms and by submitting the information at the required due date. The initial request sent to UN staff in fall 1998 had a very low response rate with the result that the deadline had to be extended and the exercise was repeated in March 1999.\textsuperscript{170} Once the information was collected, it would have been necessary to verify the input of each staff member and to complete the information on staff by compiling data that might be scattered throughout other records, e.g. personnel files, before it could be entered or added in one electronic database as a reliable source of information to managers for workforce planning purposes.\textsuperscript{171} Since 2000, no information on the state or progress of this inventory has been published and the data collected has been not verified (cleaned) through follow-up queries to those staff members who had participated in the inventory taking of 1998 and 1999.

Nonetheless, the SG included since 1997 key characteristics of the Secretariat staff, trends and evolutions in his annual reports on the composition of the Secretariat that provided some detailed information to Member States in view of all aspects of the UN HR planning.\textsuperscript{172} He relied thereby on data, which was available from the IMIS and other electronic information systems.

In April 1999, the GA emphasized that “effective human resources planning has an impact on all aspects of human resources management” and “expressed concern at the growing

\textsuperscript{170} Reported responses in the first attempt counted for about 33\% of all staff invited to participate on a voluntary basis; see also Highlights No. 4, February 1999. Final responses accounted for 42\% of all Secretariat staff (A/54/279: Table G).

\textsuperscript{171} The Skills Inventory was anticipated to be an ongoing exercise (A/54/279: para. 68). No further requests have, however, been sent to Secretariat staff since the initial inventory which would have allowed staff members to update their data.

\textsuperscript{172} The 1997 report contained for the first time an analyses “of the major demographic characteristics of Secretariat staff with respect to a number of standard human resources parameters, for example, distribution of staff by category and grade, nationality and gender spread, geographical distribution of staff, appointment type, staff age and length of service, as well as the number and type of recruitments, separations, turnover rates” (A/52/580: paras. 3-5).
number of resignations of staff in the Secretariat, in particular of those in the Professional
category”. The GA requested, consequently, “the SG to carry out a study to ascertain the
causes of such separations and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth
session” (A/RES/53/221: 4).

This report was submitted in August 2000 and informed Member States that a Secretariat-
wide Human Resources Management Information System (HRMIS) had been established
and in 1999 departmental/office human resources action plans were instituted that would
serve “as the main instrument of planning” (A/55/253: Annex I). The HRMIS should
enable managers to search via Intranet worldwide for qualified staff to fill vacancies in
their areas of authority. This global HRMIS is supposed to be integrated into the IMIS. It
is, however, not known if and to which extent this integration has been successfully
completed to this date.173

The departmental action plans include HR management aspects, such as succession
planning, geographical and gender balance, mobility, performance appraisal and staff
development. As monitoring tools and mechanisms of accountability, action plans were
“to ensure compliance with the overall human resources objectives of the Organization”
(ibid.). The goals serve as indicators of the HR management performance of managers of
the respective department or office.

As observed by OIOS, the HR management annual action plan reviews are, however, more
likely compliance exercises than useful tools for the planning and measuring of
departmental performance. As the action plans rely on the input from OHRM and are not
always based on credible indicators they do not constitute a solid strategic HR
management planning system (A/59/253: para. 86).

173 A/55/253: Annex I; HRMIS was developed to become an integrated module of IMIS with links
to the staff selection system, Galaxy, which is since early 2003 fully operational as an electronic
vacancy and application system for internal and external applicants. Latest reform progress
reports do not provide any information whether HRMIS is used or fully operational as a search
tool for qualified candidates as intended (see also below).
The Skills Inventory and the development of HRMIS faced problems during their implementation due to shortage of financial resources and staff resources. More recent reports of the SG unfortunately provide no details on the specific progress of either module. For instance, it could not be established how effectively the roster management module in the Galaxy e-staffing system which was to be finalized in late 2004 is meanwhile used by managers and Personnel Officers (A/59/263: para. 56). In none of the progress reports issued is there, however, any mention of the results of the Skills Inventory, nor is there any conclusive information as to whether the data collected in 1999 has been made available to managers directly or through another tool, e.g. the HRMIS or through an electronic link to the Galaxy roster.

OIOS reports that “despite the abundance of data in the IMIS and Galaxy databases” the work force planning of the UN Secretariat remains inadequate by focusing simply on the forecasting of vacancies due to retirements and that there are insufficient staff resources for the task (A/59/253: paras. 89-90). This confirms that the UN administration has not yet managed to establish a central system for effectively planning and forecasting new and future staff requirements, and for a more flexible allocation of posts throughout the Secretariat on the basis of staff qualifications.

3.3.2 Streamlining Rules and Procedures

“We have cleaned up a lot of redundant instructions and simplified the UN recruitment procedures and most of the personnel rules. There is still some work to be done, but most has been finalized and soon it will be up to line managers to manage their own staff.”

(UN Staff Member, New York, April 2002)

UN Staff Regulations and Rules were subject to numerous amendments and revisions over the years. Under the current reform of the UN HR management, the overwriting goal is to streamline procedures and policies to speed up processes and simplify procedures. Revisions of and amendments to UN Staff Regulations and Rules are required to comply with new HR management processes, among them the new selection, recruitment and

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174 As a result, work on the Skills Inventory was not completed by late 2001 and the development of HRMIS was still in progress in 2002 (A/55/499: 2).
appointment procedures with delegation of authority assigned to heads of departments and offices under the decentralized system.

In view of the organization’s culture change and the highly publicised misconduct by individual UN civil servants in 2004 and 2005, the latest revision of the Code of Conduct of 2002 gains the most importance of the latest changes to the UN Staff Regulations and Rules. The Code of Conduct (Article IX of the Staff Regulations and Chapter I of the 100 series of the Staff Rules of the United Nations) outlines the duties, obligations and privileges of international civil servants (ST/SGB/2002/13 with comments; also ST/SGB/2005/5).

This revision of the UN Code of Conduct is complemented by the revised and updated ‘Standards of Conduct in the International Civil Service’ issued by the ICSC in 2001, to “assist staff members and executive heads of the organization to understand better the obligations placed on staff conduct by the Charter and the Staff Regulations and Rules” (ST/SGB/2002/13: para. 7).

In 1998, the GA approved the new Staff Regulation 1.2(n), which requires UN civil servant at the Assistant Secretary-General level and above to provide financial disclosure statements to ensure that there is no conflict of interest between UN officials and their spouses or children’s economic activities (A/RES/52/252; ST/SGB/1998/19: 6-7, 21-22; ST/SGB/2002/13: 6). In September 2005, the SG proposed to the GA a further amendment to the Staff Regulations that extends the financial disclosure requirement to particular groups of staff (e.g. Finance and Procurement Officers; A/60/365).

In connection with this reform measure, the UN Staff Union was particularly critical of the UN administration for their lack of management-staff consultations during the revision of the Code of Conduct (ST/SGB/2002/13: para. 5; see also GA/AB/3218). In response, the UN administration promised to work more closely with the Staff Union, but took the basic line of argument that the SG was ultimately responsible for setting and recommending

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175 Revisions of the respective chapters 1 of the 200 and 300 series were issued to staff administered under those rules, accordingly.
policies to the legislators and that it was not the Staff Union’s function to co-manage the UN.176

An important improvement in this area of HR management is the issuance of the first electronic Human Resources Handbook, which became accessible through the UN Intranet in December 2000 (ST/IC/2001/15). Through regular updates, managers and staff can now refer directly and worldwide to the latest revisions of UN Staff Regulations and Rules and HR management references. The Rules Streamlining Project was subsequently acknowledged during the UN 21 Awards for its successful work in simplifying and organizing the HR rules and making the information available online (internal broadcast on 29 October 2001).

It would be hasty, however, to conclude that the activities related to this building block of HR management reform have been successfully completed. To the contrary, of all building blocks, the streamlining of policies and procedures and the regular updating of the electronic handbook will remain a continuous process independent from this reform process, as changes of the UN management system will continue to occur.

3.3.3 Recruitment, Placement and Promotion

“Right now, there is no fair selection. It is not so much how much a staff member knows, but whom you know. If you haven’t already made your connections, nobody will hire you and like before they will always get the ones they want, no matter how good you may be. Yes, may be the new system will work better, but we have to see, don’t we?”

(UN Staff Member, New York, April 2002)

The mandate of this Working Group was to recommend and introduce changes to the system of recruitment, placement and promotion that would be fair, timely, simple, cost-effective and transparent. During their review of existing policies and procedures, the group also took into consideration earlier proposals including recommendations by the JIU with respect to the existing recruitment and placement system (JIU/REP/96/6).

176 This conclusion was reached through interviews of several senior managers within OHRM.
As a first step, the group undertook a review of UN Staff Regulations and Rules and Administrative Instructions related to the recruitment, placement and promotion system of the UN Secretariat. The main task was to develop methods to expedite the selection and recruitment of new candidates and to improve the placement and promotion of internal applicants. This requires in turn that a functioning work force forecasting and planning system with a reliable roster of qualified candidates would be in place that could be used by managers in their search for qualified replacements of staff. As a result, the success of this group is closely linked to the progress made in the area of work force planning.

The strategic goal of the new HR management is to decentralize HR management functions and delegating those responsibilities to departments. The idea of a decentralized UN HR management had been discussed since the mid-90s and was resumed in the 1997 reform programme. In December 1998, a first step was taken by delegating 15 processing actions to the heads of departments.

The decentralization of HR management functions requires that the roles of managers be defined to capture these new responsibilities in their job descriptions. OHRM turns subsequently from a central office in charge of all kinds of personnel affairs to a centre, which monitors HR management actions of managers and assists departments in their efforts to forecast and plan future staff requirements. Hence this reform measure is also linked to the new mobility policy and to measures of career development as a greater

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177 See A/C.5/49/1 and JIU/REP/96/6: paras. 112-113. At the time, the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) had warned that a transparent and efficient system of monitoring could only be established if at the same time certain controls and methods to include the HR management functions in the performance evaluation of managers would be implemented. Furthermore, the CPC suggested that specific training in the management of financial and HR matters would be required before managers could be trusted to handle a full delegation of authority. The GA approved these recommendations of the CPC and requested SG Boutros-Ghali to implement such measures by January 1995 - a mandate he did evidently not comply with. This latest proposal for decentralization was approved by the GA in July 2001.

178 Among the authorities delegated to managers were for instance the extension of fixed-term contracts for up to two years and the approval of home-leave; for a complete list of the administrative responsibilities delegated see ST/AI/1999/1. The JIU concluded, “this so-called ‘delegation of authority’ has sometimes resulted merely in ‘dumping of clerical tasks’ without concomitant shift of resources” (JIU/REP/2000/6: 6). According to the subject JIU report, departments rejected or refused to administer some of the delegated tasks or requested that the transfer of such responsibilities be postponed “as it was deemed that departments had neither the time nor the specialized knowledge” (ibid.).
flexibility of recruitment and placement throughout the UN system is envisioned (A/53/414: para. 21.(b)). The decentralization of HR management functions is further connected with the implementation of the departmental action plans to measure managerial performance with respect to HR management.

The most prominent effort to improve the recruitment, appointment and promotion process is the new Staff Selection System (SSS) with the introduction of an electronic on-line application system, Galaxy. Both were launched on 1 May 2002.\textsuperscript{179} SSS replaces the Placement and Promotion System of 1993 (see also chapter 3.1) and is the starting point of the decentralized UN HR management putting managers in charge of and holding them accountable for decisions related to the recruitment, placement, managed mobility and promotion of their staff.

The improvements of the new SSS in comparison with the previous system are that:

a. SSS integrates the recruitment, placement, promotion and mobility of staff by expecting from all UN international civil servants up to and including those at the D-2 levels to move periodically to new functions throughout their careers;

b. SSS introduces a managed reassignment mechanism for junior Professionals;

c. Heads of departments/offices have full authority to make the selection decisions, as long as the respective central review body is satisfied that the evaluation criteria have been properly applied and applicable procedures were followed. This is expected to create a more flexible and efficient HR management system that can respond quickly by recruiting and placing the right talents into the appropriate jobs;

d. The issuance of a compendium of vacancies encourages the mobility of staff and informs staff members and outside candidates of immediate and anticipated vacancies as well as of anticipated field mission needs;

e. SSS makes mobility a criteria for succeeding promotions of staff members;

\textsuperscript{179} The new system is replacing the Placement and Promotion System of 1993 and is designed to put managers in charge of decisions related to the recruitment, placement and promotion of their staff, and to promote and support a managed mobility programme. See also ST/AI/2002/4.
f. SSS introduces a new and improved central review system in connection with the recruitment, placement and promotion of international civil servants; and

g. SSS utilizes new technologies, e.g. an electronic vacancy announcement and application system.

SSS is promoted by the UN administration as an efficient and effective management tool. Together with the Galaxy e-staffing module it is advertised as a fairer, more transparent and speedier method of managing the appointment and placement of staff. The Staff Union, however, objects that the new procedures are flawed, instructions are incoherent, and the UN administration has failed to put the necessary mechanisms in place to strictly monitor managers’ HR management decisions. The Staff Union also criticizes that none of the required accountability measures in place and that there is no adequate internal system of justice to protect staff in case of unjust actions of managers with respect to their placement and promotion (A/C.5/59/4: paras. 30-38).

OIOS called the SSS “an entirely new approach with particular shortcomings”, that “has not yet fully demonstrated its expected impact” (A/59/253: para. 6). With the introduction of Galaxy, the number of applications increased to such high numbers that managers and OHRM could hardly handle the flood of applications within the routine timeframe for review and evaluation. As a result, the recruitment process was initially not shortened, but the new tool certainly attracted more applicants. OIOS concluded accordingly that even in 2004 “staff, managers and human resources personnel are still learning to navigate the new process” and Galaxy (ibid.).

The view of OIOS also showed that a number of necessary supporting features of the SSS were not in place two years of the initiation of the new system, including easy access to the

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180 In the report to the Fifth Committee, the Staff Union pointed out the fact that procedures published in connection with the evaluation and role of Central Review Bodies, established in July 2002 to replace the former Appointment and Promotion Bodies (APBs) as of 1 May 2002, were inconsistent and asked the Fifth Committee to provide clear confirmation of the proper procedures introduced by the UN administration and their role in the recruitment, placement and promotion process (A/C.5/59/4: 8-9). Prior to this report, the Staff Union had already appealed to Member States to approve a revision of the draft proposal to ensure that the Central Review Bodies would have equal numbers of members from the management and the staff side (ST/SGB/2002/6; ST/IC/2002/26 & Add.1).
roster of similarly qualified candidates and a standard interview scheme. Both features would, however, be helpful in a more efficient selection process.

One of the controversial proposals in connection with a reform of the recruitment and placement system is the introduction of the *Assessment Centre Approach*. This new selection mechanism is discussed to replace the existing selection process with its traditional interview system. It would introduce extensive written tests and simulated work-related exercises over several days to test the candidates (Highlights No. 19, November-December 2000). This selection method has been introduced on a trial basis in some duty stations, e.g. at headquarters and UNOG, and for selected professional groups. With respect to the recruitment for all P-2 and P-3 positions, the GA reaffirmed nevertheless in June 2001 that the competitive examinations be continued to select suitable candidates.

The actual advantage of an UN-wide *Assessment Centre Approach* would have to be further examined, since there is so far no scientific proof that it guarantees a better selection than conventional methods, e.g. the screening of candidates through a series of individual interviews (Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 321). In addition, the problem with this approach is that there is “very little published research that describes how to actually conduct” assessment centres and no research data to prove its advantages over other selection methods (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 349). To the contrary, it is assumed that the various tests by means of presentations, leadership games or group discussions are “nothing more than a proxy measure for intelligence”, rather than a method to detect or assess the applicant’s qualification for the job or his actual management skills (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 316).

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181 Within modern organization theories, models of organization psychology and management theories tried to explain and describe the attitudes of ‘leaders’ and successful managers. The *Assessment Centre Approach* reflects a renewal of this ideology in that it is believed that specific (managerial) skills and attitudes can be identified and tested in a laboratory environment (Kieser (Hrsg.) 1999: 177).

182 National competitive examinations for the entry levels (P-1 and P-2) were introduced in the 1980s in the UN Secretariat. For P-3 positions such tests were conducted for specific professions and in selected countries, only from the early 1990s on an experimental basis (Perry 1993: 51).
The example of the European Commission’s recruitment system, which uses multiple tests, equivalent to the *Assessment Centre Approach*, shows that the recruitment process (period between vacancy announcements and expected appointment) is over 365 days.\(^\text{183}\)

The recruitment system of ILO for young Professionals, which was in 2000 still in a test-phase and not fully operational, also uses the principles of the *Assessment Centre Approach* and was estimated to take about 15 months (450 days) from the date vacancies are published to the date the successful applicant is recruited according to findings of the JIU (JIU/REP/2000/7: 8).

In view of the goal to shorten the UN recruitment process significantly and to simplify procedures and based on what we know about its practical application, the introduction of the *Assessment Centre Approach* presents based on the experience of other international organizations a questionable effort. It is interesting to note that most recent reports issued since December 2000 do not make reference to the Assessment Centre approach. The ICSC is, nevertheless, pursuing this issue as a possible tool for the selection of candidates within the UN common system. Queries sent to the office in charge for the development of this component within the OHRM remained unanswered, which may be a further indication that the *Assessment Centre Approach* is - at least for the time being - no longer a priority issue in the HR management reform programme.

The UN administration states considerable improvements in the shortening of the recruitment and placement of personnel by reducing average recruitment periods of about 275 days in late 2000 and 174 days in 2004, although significant variations continue to exist among department’s recruitment and appointment periods (GA/AB/3398: 3; A/59/263: para. 58; A/59/253: para. 19; also A/60/692: 25(b)).

In contrast to these timelines, it was determined that the “average number of days from the departure to the dates candidates are appointed” decreased from 435 days (in 2002/2003) to an estimated 410 days (in 2004/2005) with a target of 350 days for the period 2006/2007 (A/60/6 (Sect. 28C): Table 28C.9; A/60/7: para. 63). A possible explanation for such

\(^{183}\) Information on the European Personnel Selection Office informs: “A recruitment competition takes roughly one year from the time of publication until the drawing up of the reserve list” (downloaded from [http://europa.eu.int/epso/faq/faq-home_en.cfm#25](http://europa.eu.int/epso/faq/faq-home_en.cfm#25) on 17 May 2006).
discrepancies is the different count based on the recruitment process (e.g. the actual vacancy period versus the period between announcing a vacancy to the final appointment of a candidate). We can assume that the recruitment period referred to in A/60/6 was based on the (full) vacancy period, which counts from the date a post became vacant to the appointment (occupancy of that post by the new staff member).

The official stated goal of the UN administration remains to shorten the recruitment process to a maximum of 120 days (A/55/253: 18). Meanwhile, a vital factor for speeding up the recruitment process, namely the question to reduce the closing period for vacancy announcements from 60 days to 45, was postponed by the GA until its 61st session (A/59/650: II-3).

Without proper mechanisms in place to closely oversee UN HR management practices and to take, where necessary, corrective actions or hold managers fully accountable for their actions, the new recruitment, placement and promotion system has not become a more transparent and fairer system than the previous Placement and Promotion System. The UN administration agrees that a lot more has to be done and that the reform of the recruitment, placement and appointment system did not eliminate the “cumbersome and complex” procedures and “lack of transparency” of recruitment, placement and promotion decisions (DSG/SM/112: 3).

Despite the problems of the lengthy recruitment process, its lack of a career development system and the system of short-term and fixed-term contracts, which add up to a lesser attractive employment conditions compared with a number of other international organizations or public services, many young Professionals apply for the UN national competitive examinations each year and respond to vacancy announcements. Un fortunately, many of those young Professionals resign from the UN international civil service after a few years for a variety of reasons.

184 “The need to allow an intake of fresh talent at all levels has been acknowledged from the start of the Organization. There were always certain areas in which the Organization would benefit from the recruitment of new staff that could provide fresh expertise and a new outlook. Such would be the case in technical areas requiring state-of-the-art knowledge, or in more traditional areas in need of renewal for better functioning. The need for fresh talent is explicitly recognized in staff regulation 4.4.” (A/C.5/51/34: Annex, para. 16).
To offset this undesired phenomena in an organization that is planning to rejuvenate its work force, a managed mobility scheme for young Professionals was introduced and incorporated in the new SSS (see hereto also the following chapter on mobility).

While the most senior UN managers (e.g. at level of Assistant Secretary-General and above) are appointed under specifically designed selection mechanisms and for defined periods in accordance with UN Staff Regulation 4.5, the new SSS is applicable in the recruitment, placement and promotion of all other Professionals up to the D-2 level. The vacancy announcement for the post of Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources in August 2002 on the Galaxy website was an exception in that it was advertised as any other (lower-level management) position in the UN Secretariat.¹⁸⁵

How the new system will contribute to a fairer recruitment, appointment and promotion system and to greater mobility remains to be seen. It will have to be further observed whether the decentralization of the system will continue “to ensure that the principle of equitable geographical distribution and the goal of gender balance are respected” (A/RES/55/258: Section IV, para. 7).

As documented by the report of OIOS on the issue of possible discrimination due to nationality, race, sex, religion and language in recruitment, promotion and placement covering the period 1996 to 2001 (before the introduction of the decentralized HR management system SSS), there were noticeable disparities in the recruitment, promotion and appointment between men and women under the previous system (A/56/956: 2). It will, therefore, be important to establish effective measures in the SSS to ensure that the two principles, geographical distribution and gender, will be adequately observed by managers.

¹⁸⁵ The subject vacancy announcement 02-HRE-DM-300611-R-NEW YORK was issued and published on 21 August 2002 on http://jobs.un.org. The JIU noted that “all Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General appointments are ‘political’ and that, by implication, the recruitment process for these positions is neither merit-based nor transparent” (A/55/423/Add.1: para. 4). In other words, while there is a fair process in place to recruit and appoint international civil servants for lower positions up to the D-2 level in the UN Secretariat, the top management of the UN continues to be assembled under external influence (or in some instances even pressure) of Member States.
A clear disadvantage of the SSS is its introduction into an organizational culture and climate, which is not ready for it. Staff members and managers are sceptical and do not necessarily perceive the new HR policies as improvements. The automated system in support of SSS, Galaxy, is not in use in all duty stations and requires further improvements to make it more user-friendly and beneficial throughout the Secretariat, for instance by making it fully accessible as search engine for candidates by qualifications.

Up to this date, managers do not take advantage of the 15-day and 30-day marks for review of eligible internal candidates, but continue to wait until the full 60-day deadline for applications is expired and they receive the pre-selected applications from OHRM or in offices away from headquarters from their respective HR management services, before they shortlist candidates. This non-observation of established phases in the selection and appointment process is distorting the organizational goal to reduce significantly the recruitment and placement process. In addition, the built-in lengthy procedures due to reviews by OHRM and the Central Review Bodies are time-consuming and will not allow any drastic reductions in the recruitment process as the above-mentioned prognosis in connection with the proposed budget 2006/2007 already indicated.

In view of these realities, it is unrealistic to expect that the recruitment could be reduced to 90 days, a stated goal of the current UN administration (UN Reform Dossier: 1997-2002). Whether or not the SSS is eventually contributing to more efficient, effective and fairer selection, appointment and promotion system will have to be analysed, once the necessary improvements and planned modifications to the system are completed and the electronic tool, Galaxy, is fully incorporated into a system of HR/vacancy planning.

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186 The UN organizational culture is far from being the desired results-based and pro-active management, which is proclaimed by UN reformers. It is also unfortunate, that the Staff Council declined in June 2004 to cooperate with the UN administration by not submitting their nominations to the CRBs in protest to the apparent lack of confidence in the new procedures established for the review process of the SSS (A/C.5/59/4: para. 28).
3.3.4 Mobility

“I would like to move to another place. So I applied several times – I don’t even know anymore how many - for jobs in my field. The last position I applied for matched hundred per cent what I am doing now, so you would say I was perfectly qualified for it, but nothing came out of it. They didn’t even call me. Guess, when you sit away from New York, they don’t even bother. If you ask me, the UN will have to introduce a system like in the foreign services or the army. They have to organize it and make it mandatory. They really should look at the ways countries organize their diplomatic services. If they can do it, the UN must be able to do it.”

(UN Staff Member, Nairobi, July 2001)

Plans to introduce pilot programmes and managed staff mobility programmes in the UN Secretariat to promote movement of staff between duty stations and different occupational groups have been discussed since the early 1990s without any practical implications.  

The UN reform of 1997 invigorated the issue of mobility as part of the UN staff management. In May 2002, a new mobility policy was introduced in connection with the SSS and Galaxy. The first managed mobility scheme for P-2 officers was established in January 2000 on a voluntary basis (Highlights No. 18, October 2000). The objective of rotating junior Professionals to would serve as on-the-job training and an orientation programme for these new recruits had been under consideration since 1994 (A/C.5/49/5, paras. 88-89). Within the framework of the new reform programme, junior Professional are now transferred under this managed mobility scheme of junior Professionals every two years to another position or duty station.

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187 A/C.5/47/6: paras. 50-55; also A/51/656/Add.1: para. 18.
188 The scheme is implemented in four phases starting with lower levels of UN civil servants and volunteering programmes (e.g. in 2002-2004; 2004-2005; and 2005-2006) until by 2007-2009 all Professional and senior GS-level staff will have moved to another position or duty station. Mobility is thereby defined as the movement to another function, post or duty station.
After several years of promoting mobility in the context of this reform, the mobility rate of UN Secretariat staff remains low. As the review of OIOS shows, the percentage of staff moving between main duty stations did in fact decrease since the introduction of the new mobility policy from 1.6 per cent in 2002 to 1.4 per cent in 2003. That the overall mobility of Secretariat staff continues to be insignificant in numbers is also an indication of the failure to increase mobility across departments and particularly between duty stations of such combined efforts as the introduction of the new SSS, the web-based advertising of vacancies and mobility incentives.

Moreover, low mobility rates so far indicate that it cannot be expected that larger numbers of UN civil servants will move between duty stations and/or professional fields until the fully managed mobility scheme will be enforced in 2007. By then, it would be useful to know the reasons behind these low mobility rates to assist in the placement of staff. For instance, if the immobility of staff is caused by family reasons, expected career disadvantages or by factors that are within the system, adequate, corrective actions would have to be taken before the deadline 2007 to ensure that such (known) obstacles are no longer existent. The voluntary mobility programmes for selected groups introduced between 2004 and 2007 may provide in this connection useful, but not sufficient information to make the necessary adjustments.

The managed reassignment programme of Professionals at the P-2 level is somewhat more successful. A closer exploration of the limited data published shows, however, that also in this category “one third of all lateral moves by P-2 staff participating in the reassignment programme occurred within their respective departments/offices and did not involve geographical moves” (A/59/253: para. 44).

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189 The mobility rate in the UN was never high. Statistics in 1978 showed that over 61% of Professionals with at least five years of service had never changed their duty station. Among those with over 10 years in the service slightly higher numbers had served in one or more other duty station. Broken down by service years in categories of 10-year frequencies, those who had only served in one single duty station remained at 45%-50%, with those of 30+ years having the lowest rate (45%) among the staff that had served in only one duty station (A/33/228: 34).

Although information on the results is sparse, the experience of the mobility programmes introduced on a voluntary basis and for Junior Professionals shows that a number of issues have to be further examined and supportive actions have to be taken until the scheme can be fully implemented in 2007. By then all Professional staff up to the P-5 levels will be required to move latest every five years, those at the D-1 and D-2 levels every six years either laterally, through promotions or redeployments. For UN civil servants of the General Service category special conditions will apply, whereby GS-5 to GS-7 level staff members are included in phase III of this scheme (20005-2006). With the introduction of this scheme, mobility is a real condition of service and a pre-condition for promotion. So will, for instance, a promotion to the P-5 level (upwards mobility) granted under this new scheme only after a staff member has moved at least twice laterally (A/59/253: 72-73; DSG/SM/112: 4).

Observations made during my research provide strong indication that staff members in less attractive duty stations (e.g. in UNON) welcome this new approach, while staff at offices in Geneva, Vienna and New York are wary about the mobility scheme. The concerns of many staff members are the implications of the managed mobility programme on their careers, but also on their families, e.g. schooling of children and employment opportunities of their spouses (see hereto also A/RES/47/226: Section 3).

In addition to the operational costs to the organization to finance the mobility scheme, it is not clear how the managed rotation of staff will work in practice.\(^\text{191}\) Although the scheme is presented as a system by which staff will refer to a ‘network’ of colleagues, supervisors and managers throughout the organization, the many cases of unsuccessful job applications indicate that such networks are non existent and would have, therefore, be established by individual staff members which will take time. In the context of establishing a fairer and more transparent HR management actions, the question would then have to be raised whether such networking would support a fairer system of appointments or whether networking would serve a less objective selection of candidates (Ameri 2003: 66-77).

\(^{191}\) The SG is expected to provide more detailed information on the cost and actual administration of this scheme before the end of the 59th session of the GA, but has not done so as far as known.
A stringent mobility scheme will further require an electronic, web-based system (an electronic Job Bank which may or may not be linked to Galaxy) to allow staff to advertise their own post in exchange to a posting at another duty station and to search for new postings. Such an electronic Job Bank will yet have to be established if staff members are to start their search in time before the due date of January 2007.

The plan to assign staff periodically to different jobs or different duty stations requires a number of additional new mechanisms, including training that will allow staff to study subjects also outside their current occupational field. The current training programme is too narrow, and it is questionable – based on observations made – whether managers who in the past have shown little support for external training of their staff will now give the necessary support for such a progressive programme by allowing their staff to participate in professional training that is not directly related to their actual work, but will prepare them for their next career move instead. The mobility scheme will, consequently, require much more than just policy changes; it will require a radical change of the organizational culture and perception of what is meant when the SG is speaking of an investment in the organization.

The discussion of the proposed mobility scheme also demonstrates the close links between the decentralized HR management with its new recruitment and placement concept, and the requirement for a working HR planning system. The proposed system of new contractual arrangements, which will be discussed below, is expected to also contribute to a higher mobility rate among staff.

Critics of this reform measure predict that this scheme will be hard to implement and will eventually fail by making mobility (e.g. frequent moves to another post, function or duty station) a requirement for all UN civil servants. As the full implementation of this scheme will take place in 2007, it is obviously not possible to come to any conclusive assessment at this point of time. As other organizations, such as national diplomatic services, are using similar schemes, it likewise feasible that the UN can achieve a working model of mobility within its system of regional offices, programmes, funds and specialized agencies worldwide.
3.3.5 Competencies and Continuous Learning

“We had actually a number of especially female staff, mostly at the General Service level. They went for training and some went the extra step and got an outside degree and then passed the G-to-P and now they work at another duty station as a Professional. I am really happy for them. It is good to see that increasing your knowledge and learning gives people that kind of success in their careers.”

(UN Staff Member, New York, April 2002)

Initially designated as the Working Group for Staff Development, Performance Management and Career Support, this group was divided into the three groups on Competencies and Continuous Learning, on Career Development and on Performance Management in the later reform programme design.

The group was tasked with the defining of core competencies and to develop training programmes in the UN Secretariat, the group conducted interviews and worked with focus groups “comprising a cross-section of staff at all levels from different departments at six duty stations” (ST/SGB/1999/15). The development of competencies and continuous learning (staff development) is seen “as a responsibility shared by the Organization, by managers and by staff themselves” (ST/SGB/1998/6).

The model of core values, core competencies and managerial competencies was to be used as benchmarks when measuring performance and in connection with the recruitment and promotion of staff. The core values and competencies are based on the principles of the UN international civil service (UN Charter) and doctrines of modern management and are presented in bulletin ST/SGB/1999/15 as follows:

a. Core values are integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity.

b. Core competencies are communication, teamwork, planning and organizing, accountability, creativity, client orientation, commitment to continuous learning, and technological awareness.

192 The reform programme introduced by SG Boutros-Ghali had already introduced 10 managerial competencies (A/50/503/Add.2: para. 36).
c. Managerial competencies are leadership, vision, empowering others, building trust, managing performance, and judgement/decision-making.

The UN Secretariat is known for its chronic under-spending in staff training compared with other international organizations and organizations of the public sector. With the implementation of an expanded training programme in 1997, funding allocations for training increased slightly, but are not sufficient to cover all training requirements (A/59/253: para. 77). With the additional training requirements in support of the mobility scheme, it will be important to increase budgetary provisions for training at a much faster pace or to find extra-budgetary sources of funding such training activities.

With the initiation of this reform programme, training activities were steadily increased, mainly by introducing training for managers, supervisors, but also staff without supervisory responsibilities. Some training courses were made mandatory in order to ensure that every staff member would receive training at one point of his career.

While the bulk of training prior to 1997 had focused on computer skills, language training and on a small scale on specific training for selected occupational groups, e.g. for Procurement and Finance Officers, the newer training goals include courses on developing interpersonal skills in the area of managing, supervision, negotiations and conflict management.

It appears that meanwhile training and building awareness on subjects such as negotiation skills and career development (while the organization has no functioning career development system in place) absorb most resources set aside for training. Professional

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193 In 1999, the organization spent 0.75% of cost related to personnel on training according to the CCISUA (UN Staff Council 1999). As reported in the latest reform report of the SG published in early 2006, current spending for training and staff development remains at 1% of the “staff budget” (A/60/692: para. 26(j)).

194 Training had been already offered since 1995 to those staff members working at headquarters and at senior management positions; under the new reform programme training was continued ‘from the top down’, with higher-level managers being trained first (A/51/950: 73).

195 By August 1998 some 95% of all Director-level staff and a not specified number of P-4 and P-5 level professionals had participated in the People Management Training Programme (A/53/266: para. 20; also A/50/503: para. 34). This training programme of senior UN managers had originally been introduced in 1996 and continued to be implemented after 1997 in three phases, with the third phase being launched in December 2000 (Highlights No. 19, November/December 2000: 5).
skills training of staff working in HR management, finance, procurement or auditing and inspections, on the other hand, seems to be neglected.

Lack of training – on professional subjects as well as on general managerial skills - is also an issue for the staff in peacekeeping operations, in particular for staff of the Field Service category (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 140). While my research showed that up to 2002, training in the field was sporadic or simply non-existent, the situation in many field duty stations has improved after 2003 by appointing Training Officers and by establishing training units in those field offices. As new aspects are addressed by the ongoing reform, like harassment, fraud and ethics, the requirement for training on these issues will further grow.

Despite the apparent improvements of training activities in field missions, it is vital that training in offices away from headquarters and non-main offices is evaluated from time to time to ensure that staff members in remote duty stations have no disadvantages, especially in view of the new mobility scheme. Moreover, it will be necessary to introduce an effective evaluation programme for all training activities to determine the usefulness and to measure the actual impact of such training, e.g. by detecting positive changes of behaviour or improvements of performance.

Up to 2005, there is no meaningful evaluation of training programmes in place, which in fact could justify the activities and expenditures in this area, nor do participants have a system of self-assessment to verify the outcome of their training, e.g. in terms of improved skills. So far, participants are asked to complete a brief questionnaire right at the end of course (and in the presence of those who provided the training). This method is, however, measuring the participants’ mood and opinion of the instructor at the moment rather than compiling valuable and objective evaluation data on the actual learning results of participants.

To institute an effective evaluation system appears also recommendable since numerous respondents in the pilot study conducted as part of my research were reluctant to agree that reforms and training up to 2002 had in fact improved management attitudes and skills of their immediate supervisors. Since these responses give an indication, but do not represent
a confirmed finding on the perceptions and believes of staff, it will be important to analyse in more depth the impact of training.

To evaluate training activities will be further of importance to gather data on actual progress through training programmes, which will provide sufficient justification for the effectiveness of training (and related expenditures) to Member States. 196

3.3.6 Performance Management

“There is no performance management in the UN. The Performance Appraisal System expects the supervisors to talk to their staff about performance and work schedules. In our unit, the boss never talked to us. They just decide who gets promoted and does what. Then managers were told that they could not give high ratings, like a four or a five to more than one third of their staff. So whoever is rated later will get the worse ratings. Is this fair? I don’t think so. The PAS is a joke and nobody is taking it seriously anyhow, if you ask me. So, if you don’t have a fair performance evaluation, how can there be fair management?”

(UN staff member, New York, April 2002)

Managing performance is about “getting results” (Pollitt/Bouckaert 2004: 126). Performance management (PM) as one of many management functions is, however, more than getting individuals (or teams) to perform better, or the simple appraisal of workers’ performances. 197 It is a management approach promoting “different values such as participation, a philosophy of improvement and concern for employee well-being” (Williams 2000: 1).

Williams defines three types of PM models (Williams 2000: 9):

a. As a system for managing organizational performance;

b. As a system for managing employee performance; and

c. As a system for integrating the management of the organizational and employee performance.

196 See hereto also the recommendation of the Board of Auditors “to improve the evaluation of the results achieved through training so as to ascertain its impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of operations” (A/59/5 (Vol. I)).
PM at the level of managing employee performance requires managers to consult with their staff and to involve their teams in the planning and organization of their work which is in turn based on the higher organizational units’ work plans and ultimately the organization’s mission. If productivity needs to be improved, managers must be able to identify and analyse employees’ talents and skills in order to place them strategically in the most suitable position. It further requires managers to plan for the development of their staff and support these individuals’ aspirations to learn and to progress in their careers.

PM is consequently a complex process of planning and identifying the necessary qualifications and additional training, as well as of performance evaluation of individuals as the basis of management decisions (either to reward, coach and train or to take any corrective actions). Most importantly, PM requires managers and staff to be in continuous communication about the work progress and any obstacles that may endanger the outcome of the project or programme.

So far, the UN has not reached its goal and developed a functioning PM system that goes beyond performance appraisal, even though the SG has reported in August 2002 that the PM system had been strengthened. Although the PAS, the system to evaluate individual performance introduced in the late 1990s in the UN Secretariat for all UN civil servants, including those at the Under-Secretary-General levels, is designed to incorporate features of results-based management into the process of evaluation and managing individual performance, the system is mainly used as a rating system for agreed performance goals (ST/SGB/1997/13).

The PAS is promoted as a tool for staff and managers to negotiate development goals in addition to the agreed performance goals. By design, the system of appraisal should initiate a process of ongoing communication (personal interaction) between managers and their staff on issues related to the individual’s performance, including career development

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197 Performance is defined as the record of outcomes produced on a specified job function or activity during a specified time period (Williams 2000: 75).

198 A/57/293: para. 9 (d). As per report of the SG the goal is: “To create a fair, equitable, transparent and measurable system of performance management for all staff members throughout the Secretariat in support of a results-based culture that recognizes and rewards excellent performance and adequately addresses underperformance” (A/59/263: para. 105).
goals, but also in view of their future career aspirations. As each annual report contains learning goals and competencies that are of particular importance to the function of the individual UN staff member, the system encourages individuals to plan their future careers and to have a dialogue with their supervisor about their professional ambitions.

Unfortunately, the necessary culture change that would support such open and creative dialogues between managers and staff has not yet taken place throughout the organization. The majority of staff and managers go through the process of initial goal setting, mid-cycle reviews and end-cycle appraisal with a main focus on ratings as a measure of performance, rather than approaching the process as an opportunity to exchange views and, where necessary, to make changes (A/59/632: para. 19).

There are further indications that the PAS has not brought about more frequent and open discussions between UN managers and their staff that would involve work planning and the organization of work programmes. It also appears that PAS could not open up (more) creative ways of approaching the various issues influencing individual performance (A/59/632: paras. 17-20).

The PAS has a number of further deficiencies, in addition to not being embedded in a functioning PM system. So far, there is no mechanism that would systematically reward good performance, e.g. through (accelerated) promotions. Low performance ratings are not further examined to determine the reasons for such alleged low performance. Despite the lack of effective consequences of any deviation in the performance of staff and managers detected by OIOS in connection with their review on the impact of the HR management reform A/59/253, the PAS and PM plans for heads of departments are, nonetheless, presented as “means to ensure accountability” (A/55/270: 4).

There are no mechanisms in place to review whether the ratings were accurate nor is there a support system that could be used by managers and staff members to take a more analytical approach when causes for failures in the performance are stated. Ideally, the identification of such causes could lead to corrective actions (towards the supervisor and/or the supervised) through training, the modification of work processes and the provision of supporting tools (e.g. appropriate software). In the existing system, low
performance ratings show only consequences at the end of the review period and these being rebuttals of the ratings given by the supervisor. This is a consequence that is neither helpful to any of the parties during the review period, nor to the overall annual organizational performance.

In its practical application, two components of the PAS are of interest: (1) the capability of the system to objectively evaluate individual performance, and (2) the reliability of such performance evaluations conducted by individual managers.\(^{199}\) It is of particular importance that the assessment is fair and the method by which performance is measured is as objective as possible, if the UN Secretariat is to introduce in the future a system to “reward excellent performance and address underperformance” (A/53/414; para. 32c; see also A/52/439: para.6 (d)).

Practitioners and researchers agree that measuring the performance of employees and the management of performance-related rewards are problematic, since they are driven to a large degree by subjective motives (Williams 2000: 10-11). Observations stemming from this research show that the process of appraisal in the UN Secretariat is equally often flawed. Performance ratings are frequently a matter of personal preference of the manager rather than grounded on specific, measurable and realistic objectives.\(^{200}\) The annual assessment of performance, in itself questionable in the way it is applied by many UN managers, has no consequences in most cases, neither for those who are supposedly managing nor for those whose performance is seemingly managed.

In addition to the dilemma that awards and bonuses would have to be based on a questionable system of subjective judgements by managers, there is the issue of the rational of an award and bonus system as scholars like Shaper (1985) point out. Knott and Miller (1987) argue in their chronological review of reforms of the US public sector that the benefits of bonus systems are questionable; they join a number of other researchers in

\(^{199}\) The question of reliability (to produce consistent results) and validity (to measure the relevant functions and behaviour) is discussed in great detail by Shaper (1985): 96-119.

\(^{200}\) See hereto also findings of the JIU in: A/59/632: para. 17; also A/RES/59/283 by which the GA stressed in 2005 “the importance of the proper implementation of a sound performance appraisal system as a potential means of avoiding conflict” which suggests that legislators are not convinced that the current PAS is sufficient (ibid.: 3).
their assessment that such systems do not guarantee better performance and can even be counterproductive.\textsuperscript{201}

While Peters and Waterman believe that a reward system is an appropriate tool of PM, they reject a punitive system of demotions or money deductions in case of low performance. In their opinion, such measures have a negative impact on the motivation and performance of employees and can harm their loyalty to the organization (Peters/Waterman 1984: 57-58; also Williams 2000: 173-174). In the context of performance evaluation systems, Foullong and Jurkat agree that a positive performance evaluation system must relinquish any sanctions for performance below the set or expected standards, and must instead put the employee into the centre of the performance review as an autonomous individual (Selbach/Pullich (Hrsg.) 1992: 460).

When considering whether to introduce a system to award good performance in the UN, one would have to take into account that performance awards (or monetary rewards) are among many motivational management tools. As some of the referenced research suggests, such performance-related awards may in fact only increase the performance and motivation of employees if combined with other motivational factors, like a good work environment and a productive relationship among colleagues and with the boss.

Moreover, it is often very difficult or even unrealistic to establish objective criteria, especially in political organizations and hierarchical bureaucracies with many layers of decision-makers. This also is to some degree applicable to the UN Secretariat, which is exposed to unpredictable outside influences due to actions by legislators, natural disasters or other unforeseen events, as well as internal procedures and politics of interests among various actors in the organization.

\textsuperscript{201} There is in particular the basic question of the organizational benefit of monetary reward systems. It is questionable if performance-related pay systems are truly contributing to higher levels of performance and, therefore, increase the output (Knott/Miller 1987: 245-246; Williams 2000: 170). In fact, the survey carried out by Marsden and Richardson (1994) in the UK demonstrated that pay-for-performance does not increase the performance, nor does it have a major impact on the motivation of civil servants (Williams 2000: 170-177). Peters and Waterman (1984), on the other hand, believe that a reward system with monetary and non-monetary incentives can improve the motivation and, subsequently, the performance of employees as their example of Wal-Mart seems to confirm (Peters/Waterman 1984: 43, 246-247).
In the UN, it is not always possible to determine the exact factors leading to the output of a programme nor is it easy to establish in each case every individual’s contribution(s) to a particular programme of the UN, especially of such accomplishments were a joint effort of a teams or the cooperation between various departments. When results cannot, however, be directly associated with individual performance, any bonus system in the UN could be superfluous.\(^{202}\)

The UN administration introduced in 1996 a non-monetary award system for successful efficiency proposals and inventions by UN employees.\(^{203}\) These awards are, however, not directly linked to the performance evaluation of individuals or groups of staff members.

The methods for incorporating a system of monetary or non-monetary incentives into a new career and salary structure are currently discussed within the ICSC and among internal actors in the UN in connection with a possible introduction of *broadbanding* in the UN (SCF/6, Vol. II, No. 4). In which way underperformance would be addressed in a possible new remuneration system is not fully explored. It is, however, obvious that the introduction of *broadbanding* – a model by which UN professional categories would be grouped in a broader range of career steps - would require changes of the personnel structure, remuneration system and the conditions of service of UN civil servants.\(^{204}\)

OIOS offers no substantial observations on the failure of the UN to develop a PM system, other than that the PAS has not reached its potential as a performance reporting/appraisal system (A/59/253: paras. 58-61). PAS was supposedly used by over 80 per cent of UN staff in 2004 (A/59/263: para. 109). A high ratio of implementation of a performance

\(^{202}\) Knott and Miller (1987) promote the proposition that in case of the absence of clear, objective criteria on which managers can decide and justify the rightful entitlement of individual employees, the contribution of awards will be made on the basis of personal preferences and political considerations.

\(^{203}\) None of the UN organizations of the Common System use monetary awards. Based on the recommendation of ICSC, performance awards and bonuses were not to exceed 30% of the work force (A/52/30, Suppl. No. 30: 52). During the earlier reform development in 1997, the GA and the SG considered, however, to establish a system that would reward individuals also financially for outstanding performance (A/RES/51/216: 3, para. 8; A/52/439).

\(^{204}\) For further details on the discussion on broadbanding in the UN common system see website of the ICSC [http://hrpilot.commonsystem.org/](http://hrpilot.commonsystem.org/)
evaluation system does, however, not determine its functional and/or managerial significance, especially if its application is mandatory to staff and managers.

Future PM activities in the Secretariat are primarily linked to improvements of the electronic PAS (e-PAS) and the respective connections with IMIS and Galaxy to establish an electronic platform that would be useful in the staff selection and the monitoring of performance (A/57/293: para. 54). Despite the stated goal to link performance with staff development, there is no evidence for any practical progress in this direction (A/53/414: para. 33; also A/57/293). The introduction of an award and bonus system has been further delayed, because it was felt that such a system could not be introduced before “the new PAS was … sufficiently rooted” (A/55/253: para. 7; see also A/53/266: para. 25).

In view of the financial implications of a performance-related system and the required amendments to UN Staff Rules, changes of the existing pay system would be subject to the approval by the GA. At the present state of disagreements among Member States about the course of management reforms, it appears unrealistic to expect that Member States will agree to any immediate changes of the remuneration system, which may have some bearing on the administrative expenditures of the organization. In addition to the operational difficulties, evidence of research suggests that the introduction of an award or bonus system is not recommendable until required changes have been made to the PAS and some of the other already mentioned basic requirements are in place.

### 3.3.7 Career Development

“Career development? There is no career development. Look at the many colleagues who have not moved on for so many years. It’s not that they don’t want to – they just can’t get to the next level or even transfer to somewhere else. It is all about whom you know, not about what you know. It is just not working. I have a few guys in my unit, they are working very hard, but nobody sees it, because none of those up there ever come down to our offices or talk to us.”

(UN staff member, New York, April 2002)

The introduction of a career development system in the UN Secretariat “awaited ever since 1978” remains also today “an idea that is often invoked but never implemented” (A/49/219, para. 86). There were numerous requests made by the GA to implement
systematic career development. The UN administration presented over the years various proposals in response. An organization-wide and coherent career development system will yet have to be implemented to match the lip service paid by legislators and administrators over the past 25 years.205

According to Perry, earlier efforts to introduce a career development system were hampered by the financial crises of the UN (Perry 1993: 43). Findings of the JIU suggest, however, that more progress on this reform goal could have been made already 10 years ago despite the financial constraints of the organization (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 5).

In response to the lack of a career development system observed by the JIU in 1994, the administration reiterated the importance of a functional career development programme. “No matter how committed individuals are to serving the United Nations, the Organization has an obligation to provide growth opportunities for all staff members, so that they can reach their fullest potential. This can take several forms, but includes the existence of a management culture that supports, encourages and empowers individuals to contribute to achieving the goals of the Organizations” (A/C.5/49/5, para. 57).

Although the reform programme of 1997 envisions support for staff development needs and career aspirations of UN civil servants, the JIU noted no provisions or references to career development in the proposed medium-term plan 1998-2001 (JIU/REP/96/6: vi; see also A/53/414: para. 31). The most recently proposed budget (2006/2007) also does not mention career development as a programme covered by the provisions related to the UN Secretariat’s HR management.206

Career development is ideally linked to PM and to staff development. Since the UN has not yet introduced a working PM system that would fully acknowledge professional

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205 Examples of such statement are: (a) the announced establishment of a career development system in 1978 (ST/SGB/166, which was in 1999 formally abolished by ST/SGB/1999/11); (b) a mandate by the GA to establish a career development system (A/41/49, Suppl. 49: para. 46); (c) the acknowledgement of the SG for the need of such a system in 1987 (A/42/234: para. 50); (d) a further resolution of the GA passed in 1990 requesting that a “comprehensive career development system for all categories of staff” be established (A/RES/45/239: para. 16); and (e) the report A/C.5/47/6 of the SG on the subject in 1992.

206 It contains, nonetheless, an allocation of US$ 25.6 million for training (A/60/6(Introduction): para. 65).
learning efforts in the rating of the overall performance of UN civil servants, it is not surprising that no actual progress has been made towards the introduction of a system that would take educational accomplishments (e.g. a professional certificate or a university degree) into account when decisions are made about the possible promotion of a staff member.

To the contrary, managers led by the organizational culture often regard educational programmes attended by their staff as “their private affairs” and fail to count such initiatives as achievements, especially if the respective education (or studies) are not directly linked to the job description of the staff member. These attitudes of managers, but more so the failure by the organization to formalize the recognition of such external learning efforts of staff to further their professional and academic education have frustrated in particular numerous staff members of the General Service and related categories by denying them career progress from this lower level category to the Professional category, unless they would participate – as all those without academic degrees – in the G-to-P examinations.

Career development is, however, one of the most important issues for many UN employees. A progressing career is a confirmation of their contributions to the goals of the organization and a reward for good performance, which often includes service in hardship duty stations. Career advancement increases self-esteem and is a motivational factor to remain in the service of the UN as the OIOS review of career supporting efforts by OHRM indicates (A/59/253: para. 74).

Unfortunately, the reality is different for many UN staff members. Many remain stuck for several years at some point of their UN careers. Reasons for such stagnations of individual career development are not always related to performance and qualifications, but resulted in some instance from the financial difficulties of the UN, which caused in the past the deferral of promotions. A survey by the CCISUA in early 1999 showed that about 655 Professionals and 2,364 General Service employees had remained at the same level for 10
A survey conducted by GERWUN in February 2002 – five years after the introduction of HR management reforms - revealed that 85 per cent of respondents called the “career advancement system at the UN” unfair (GERWUN 2002: 7-9).

Observations in connection with this study seem to confirm the survey results obtained by the CCISUA and GERWUN that many qualified UN civil servants, some with advanced degrees and extensive field experience, are frustrated and have become disillusioned with their UN career progress, because their applications for vacancies in their professional field are repeatedly unsuccessful. Recruitment and appointment records confirm the tendency of managers to appoint and promote from within departments and duty stations rather than recruiting candidates from other duty stations and other UN entities (see also latest statistics in connection with the low mobility rates as mentioned in chapter 3.3.4). As a result, many resign from the UN civil service because they are dissatisfied with their career development (see hereto also Responses to the Fifth Committee by Assistant Secretary-General for HR management, December 1998).

Poor career development might be related to a low mobility record. The managed staff mobility could in this respect be supportive of an effective career development system. Experiences with the programme of mentors in preparation and support of the managed

\[207\] My observations are that there are very few individuals working in the UN Secretariat who would not care about their professional career development. Of those I spoke to and who left the organization, the majority did so when they realized that their career aspirations could not be fulfilled in the UN.

\[208\] Staff Council (1999). The JIU had already in 1994 established that the majority of UN Secretariat employees were facing limited or unsatisfactory career opportunities during their service in the international civil service (A/49/219: 33). As a result, the JIU stated that a fundamental rethinking of the career development opportunities had to take place, in particular if career development was to be connected with the new appraisal system (PAS) within the UN Secretariat.

\[209\] During informal talks with staff at duty stations New York, Geneva, Nairobi, Vienna and in the two field missions, UNTSO and UNAMA, the main reasons for failed applications to the next higher levels mentioned by colleagues were: (a) no personal relationship with the head of the future office/section or (b) no support by their current supervisor, or (c) the vacancy had been ‘reserved’ for an already determined candidate. Some staff members concluded from their past negative experience that to apply for any further vacancy would be a ‘waste of their time’. It would be important to explore these observations further through a methodological analysis of successful and failed applications. These results could be useful in connection with the mobility scheme and a career development programme in the UN.
reassignment programme (mobility scheme) of junior Professional may provide some valuable insights for the development of a career development system in the UN.

Career development across various categories is especially hampered by the strict division of these categories Professional Service versus General Service and related categories. As has been mentioned already, the existing system does not reward staff members at the General Service levels for obtaining an academic degree while they are in the service of the UN. In order to have their degree accepted in the application process for a vacancy in the Professional category, General Service (and related categories) staff would have to resign and apply like any external candidate. Otherwise, their only chance to move up into the Professional category is the successful completion of the G-to-P examination, regardless of their additional academic degrees or advanced education during their employment in the UN system and their professional experience (see hereto also chapter 2.6.1).

First actions towards a system of career development were undertaken in 1999 by introducing annual workshops for staff and managers to build awareness on issues of career planning, interviewing skills and career development.210 In April 2000, OHRM issued the Career Support Guide to provide staff with assistance and literature (Highlights No. 18, October 2000). This guide presents an optimistic scenario of the future career development programme and encourages UN civil servants to look for new opportunities and to plan their career in a systematic way.211 A next step to build a more systematic career development system was the introduction of the Career Resource Centre at headquarters New York on 30 September 2002 and at the Economic and Social

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210 Annual workshops were held since 1995/1996 at headquarters; see also Responses to the Fifth Committee by Assistant Secretary-General for HR management, December 1998.

211 The guide suggests for instance to staff “to create opportunities by finding ways to meet changing organizational needs” (Career Support Guide 2000: 32). One can, however, hardly imagine that this HR management reform will turn the UN into such an innovative organization with flexible management structures that would allow staff to find or even “create” new professional niches. Post structures are approved by the GA in connection with the approval of the budget and managers are in no position to establish new posts outside this approval process.
Commission for Western Asia. Career Centres in the various duty stations offer in addition to the career workshops a library with reading material and videos, self-study programmes and career practice sessions, including advice on how to write resumes and cover letters and specific training, for instance on interview skills. The DPKO established its own career development unit in order to address the special career development needs of field staff.

The administration reported in August 2004 that “a comprehensive career development policy“ was “put in place” (A/59/263: para. 112). According to this report, a series of career support and career development measures are established. Unfortunately, these apparent activities of OHRM are widely unknown to the staff and are vastly under-utilised as could be observed. It will have to be seen whether the mobility requirement effective 2007 will change this situation by stirring higher interests among the staff to utilize these services offered by their local HR management services.

To this point, there is no obvious connection between staff development (continuous learning), the performance appraisal and career development. In light of the proposed changes, the UN Staff Union recommends to undertake of a thorough career paths review within the UN Secretariat and for all categories of staff (A/C.5/59/4: paras. 58-64).

It will have to be observed in which way the new mobility scheme will contribute to improvements in the career development of UN civil servants. Within the existing organizational culture and in view of the overall management approach, it can be expected that movements into different professional fields will remain the exception in the Secretariat. After instituting the managed mobility scheme, it would be important to develop a corresponding approach of managed career development with clear educational/training requirements and supported by a PM system that could identify existing or potential talents.

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212 The opening and initial calendar of the Centre was announced through the internal e-mail system of the UN; see also A/59/263: para. 121, which states that centres are “now being established in all major duty stations.”
3.3.8 Conditions of Service

“Responding to recent positive developments in the political situation, [the UN staff members] have shown readiness and enthusiasm for a higher level of activity in the cause of peace. However, there is a limit to the additional effort that can be reasonably required from the staff. I feel that if member states wish the Organization to maintain, as it must, the highest standards of competence and integrity, they need to ensure that conditions of employment of [the] staff remain competitive.”

(SG de Cuéllar, New York, October 1988; Source: Taylor/Daws/Adamczick-Gerteis (Eds.) 1997: 268)

When speaking of the conditions of service in the UN civil service a variety of issues come to mind from safety and security concerns to contractual conditions of UN civil servants. When speaking of the conditions of service in the UN civil service a variety of issues come to mind from safety and security concerns to contractual conditions of UN civil servants. In view of the worldwide operations of the UN, conditions of service can differ significantly both among duty stations and within the same duty station, pending on the individuals’ contractual status.

UN employees work under circumstances and are faced with conditions unfamiliar to the majority of national civil servants and employees in the private sector. This applies in particular to UN civil servants employed in the field where work and living conditions are sometimes extremely difficult and dangerous. In addition to the political and social situation in some duty stations, environmental and climatic conditions place at times high risks on the health and physical safety of UN employees.

In order to identify the main obstacles to the conditions of UN international civil servants, the administration conducted a work/life survey in all locations of the UN Secretariat in early 2002. This survey gathered information on staff members’ views on mobility, including family, spousal employment, safety and security concerns, health, location, education, childcare and welfare in the work place (A/57/293: para. 64; A/55/499: para.

213 The question of contractual arrangements is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
18). Although the intention to conduct such a survey had been announced in October 2000, it took twenty months until this project was implemented (A/55/499: para.18 and letter by Assistant Secretary-General for HRM to all UN staff of 10 January 2002).

As a result of this survey, the UN administration introduced flexible working arrangements in the UN Secretariat in February 2003 to address some of the work/life issues identified through the survey. The reform programme concentrates otherwise mainly on better work/life conditions of service as well as on harmonizing conditions of staff within the UN common system (A/55/253). This includes questions of contractual arrangements, remunerations and benefits, employment of spouses, childcare and flexible work arrangements.

Improvements to conditions of service with respect to personal security, safety and physical health became a stronger focus of this reform programme after 2001. In view of increased security concerns, the UN administration implemented training programmes for field staff and is in the process of implementing improved security measures. The SG, representatives of the OHRM and the DPKO organized several meetings with the staff to distribute information and called for conference on the issue of staff security in the late 1990s and early 2001.

Concerns for the safety and security of international civil were already an issue over the past decade due to the constant rise of threats and violent actions against UN personnel in the field (SCB/1506; United Nations (Ed.) 1998b; A/RES/52/126; A/55/494; A/56/848). Concerns were further heightened by recent terrorist acts at many UN duty stations, with the bombing of the UN offices in Baghdad in 2003 being the most tragic.

It should be noted, however, that flexible working hours (staggered hours) had been already introduced on a trial basis in 1995 (ST/Al/408).

The Working Group on conditions of service was to develop a package of rules and guidelines to address the special conditions of the international civil servants worldwide, taking into consideration the changes and conditions in many national civil service organizations. Examples are for instance the social security of US civil servants and the subsidized pension scheme of German civil servants.

A/56/469; A/59/263; A/59/365; see also chapter 2.5.2. The UN Charter and the UN Staff Regulations and Rules constitute the legal agreements between the UN and the staff by which the SG is responsible for the coordination of all security matters (A/53/501: paras. 22-24).

Many field duty stations are to this date not sufficiently equipped to provide medical service beyond first aid to UN employees. As a result, many UN civil servants in those duty stations rely on other health care providers, such as international organizations or clinics set up by armed forces cooperating with UN peacekeeping operations. Since the effects of stress, harassment and mobbing were acknowledged as phenomena also present in the UN organizational culture, psychological counselling is increasingly offered in various duty stations (main offices and field missions).

A number of other important issues related to the conditions of service have to this point not fully address by reforms, including:

a. Changes of career expectations and attitudes of the new generation of UN civil servants compared with those of former generations are not yet fully explored.

b. The division of the UN international civil service into various categories and “classes” of employees (depending on their employment status) has not been examined as a serious option to modernize the personnel structures of the UN Secretariat.  

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c. Possible discrimination due to gender, nationality, race, cultural background or religion as well as issues of harassment and mobbing are only recently being openly discussed within the organization, but are not mentioned in the context of conditions of service or in view of the required change of the organizational culture, nor are they yet fully examined as obstacles in the UN HR management culture.  

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219 The Group on Equal Rights for Women in the United Nations compares the division into the two classes (Professionals and higher categories vs. General Service and related categories) a “caste” system, inappropriate in a modern organization (Equal Time, Spring 2000: 10).

220 In 1998, the Working Group on racial discrimination of the UN Staff Committee “identified a number of continuing patterns of administrative behavior which it considered to be inimical to the purpose and principles of the Organization, particularly in the matter of racial equality” (UN Staff Report Vol. 23, No. 5: 2-3). A review by OIOS, on the other hand, in 2002 could not identify “any systematic and consistent preferences or exclusion that impaired equal opportunity” for any regional group of UN civil servants, e.g. Asian, European or others (A/56/956).
The current system of established and extra-budgetary posts, permanent, fixed-term and short-term contracts and the three sets of Staff Rules is no longer suitable in an organization they is set to modernize its HR management practices. Nor are they taking into account career expectations of the newer generations of UN civil servants (JIU/REP/2000/7).

Past generations of UN Professionals were predominantly recruited from national public sector organizations. While a selected number of experts were sent on secondment by their governments into the service of the UN, the larger group of civil servants was released from their national duties to serve for limited periods in the UN and joint the UN civil service on permanent employment after a few years a second career.

Current generations of UN Professionals have been mainly recruited through national competitive exams into the lower ranks or through public vacancy announcements into middle and upper management positions based on their former work experience. These UN recruits have specific career expectations that certainly differ from former generations of UN civil servants.

Although these differences are not yet fully examined, there is reason to believe that this new generation of UN civil servants is less tolerant towards bureaucratic hurdles and an elitist, authoritarian management style. The larger influx of employees recruited in offices in less developed countries has further changed the characteristics of UN staff.

Many of today’s new recruits, in particular if they are at the beginning of the work-life careers, may be proud to serve in the UN for some years and expect to learn new skills, but may not perceive the UN as their life-long and only employment opportunity. At the same time, many national civil service organizations have developed new concepts to the permanent employment of national civil servants. On overhaul of the UN conditions of service would, consequently, have to take into consideration possible changes in attitudes of the newer generation of UN civil servants as well as learn from similar reforms of national public service organizations.

That UN conditions of service are no longer competitive with those of other international and national civil service organizations is a known fact since over 15 years (Beigbeder
1988: 5-9; also Krannich/Krannich 1990: 225). It is also known that UN employees do not enjoy the same benefits and “assured, comfortable security of employment of national civil servants” for a variety of reasons (Beigbeder 1988: 6). A review of the UN conditions of service should, therefore, also include the disparate treatment by governments of their nationals while active in the UN civil service as well as after they leave the UN civil service and return to their home countries to ensure a reasonable degree of equal status of current and then former UN civil servants.\(^\text{221}\)

Although it has been widely acknowledged that remunerations paid by the UN are less competitive than those of other international organizations, which may make the UN a less attractive employer, no concrete actions have yet been taken to introduce necessary improvements.\(^\text{222}\) A review of remuneration systems in the UN system by working groups and by the ICSC to harmonize the salary and benefit packages paid by various UN entities and develop necessary improvements is still ongoing. Since any changes to the existing remuneration system will require further deliberations by the GA and its subsidiary bodies, it is not feasible that alterations to this aspect of the conditions of service will be introduced in the coming months.\(^\text{223}\)

The UN Staff Union is highly critical of the slow progress made towards improving the conditions of service (A/C.5/59/4). They see serious flaws in the management of the safety and security of staff in the field as a result of inactions of the UN administration to improve the arrangements despite the experience of 2003 and in the following years. The Staff Union also rejects certain reform proposals with the argument that these proposed

\(^{221}\) Some governments, for instance, expect their citizens to pay contributions to a social security system, while nationals of some countries lose without any compensation their entitlement to national benefits and unemployment pay during their active service in the UN outside their home countries. UN civil servants may further loose their right to vote in national elections while they reside abroad during their UN service. Disparities are further the various taxations of UN pensions in the different Member States.

\(^{222}\) A/55/253: para. 71; A/59/263; see hereto also chapter 2.7.3. SG Boutros-Gali had warned already in 1995 that unless the salaries of the UN were adjusted to the levels of other international organizations (i.e. the World Bank) and the more attractive salaries paid in the national civil services of Germany and Switzerland or the private sector, the UN would face increased difficulties to attract and retain qualified personnel (GA/AB/3043/Rev.1).

\(^{223}\) This will include the finalizing of job classification standards, questions of broadbanding and pay for performance (A/59/263: para. 129).
measures will further undermine the job security and career development of many staff members. Such concerns are foremost directed at the introduction of continuing contracts, which is supposedly to go hand in hand with the abolishing of permanent employment in the Secretariat, and the design of a new system of justice, which will be further examined in the following chapters (ibid.).

In connection with this reform of the conditions of service, the SG has also suggested to examine the future role and mandate of the ICSC. This review could possibly lead to a change of the statute of the ICSC so it could open itself up to cooperate conscientiously with outside institutions to investigate and possibly absorb models of modern HR management practices into the UN common system. The ICSC and a number of Member States have, however, rejected the suggestion to reform the ICSC as they believe that it is not the role of the SG to propose a reform of a subsidiary body to the GA such as the ICSC which is perceived as his interference in the legislative authority of the Member States of the UN (GA/AB/3325).

The list of actual achievements with respect to conditions of service is rather limited. Many of the wide-ranging questions of the overall conditions of service are complex and must be reviewed in connection with existing procedures of the common system. This makes any rapid process impossible. In addition, many of the changes with financial implications will require the approval of the GA; this makes for another lengthy process of reviews, consultations and revisions by various committees before final decisions can be made.

Improvements to the conditions of the international civil service in the many aspects discussed in this chapter are only feasible if long-term strategies are developed and implemented step by step in coming years. Changes of the conditions of service go, obviously beyond the basic questions of remuneration, benefits, spousal employment, personal safety and security. They are closely related to issues of conditions of employment (e.g. contractual arrangements) and in case of unfair management decisions or discrimination to the UN system of justice.
In this respect, Member States bear a considerable responsibility to secure the best conditions of service by fulfilling their obligations as political leaders and legislators of the UN, but also by providing equal opportunities and conditions for their nationals during and after their UN service.

### 3.3.9 Contractual Arrangements

“Sure, it would be good to have everybody on a more secure and long-term contract, but it cannot be that permanent contracts are discontinued. This is the central principle of the international civil service and any deviation from that will deteriorate conditions of the UN staff.”

(UN Official, New York, April 2002)

Since the foundation of the organization, the UN employs a pre-determined number of staff on permanent contracts equivalent to many national civil service organizations. Following the principles of the League of Nations of a permanent international civil service, the founders of the UN also established a permanent civil service to be the “key factor in ensuring the independence of the international civil service” (A/C.5/51/34: 2).

Offering long-term job security with all necessary benefits (e.g. medical insurance and a pension plan) was, furthermore, perceived an indispensable measure to attract and retain highly qualified individuals, but also to ensure good staff morale, quality of work and efficiency. On the other hand, the UN is from time to time given only limited funding for certain mandates and must consequently restrict appointments to positions for which no regular budget funds are available. Financial difficulties of the UN have, in addition,

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224 Among the founding nations, it was mainly the Western countries who favoured the establishing of an independent corps of UN civil servants, while the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries preferred a UN civil service that would consist in the majority of temporarily assigned national civil servants or individuals seconded from Member States rather than the establishing of a career civil service of the UN. See also Beigbeder 1988: 3, 21-27, 65-73.
resulted in the restrictive recruitment and in temporary suspensions of permanent appointments.225

The advantage of a core civil service on long-term (if not life-long) employment is that the organization has a stable work force, that will be trained and gain experience as individuals move up the organization’s career ladder which ensures continuity, consistency in the application of standards and values of the organization (A/C.5/51/34: paras. 8-11 and Annex; A/RES/37/126: Section IV, paras. 4-5; A/RES/53/221: Section I, para. 6). To build an organization exclusively with a permanent civil service would, on the other hand, hamper the organization’s ability to be more flexible in its employment management.

After SG Boutros-Ghali had been unable to realize his 1996 proposal of a dual-track system that would clearly make a distinction between career and non-career appointments, SG Annan proposed a new concept of continuing contracts in connection with his 1997 reform programme (A/C.5/51/34; A/53/414: para. 50; A/55/253: para. 45).

These new contractual arrangements are to replace the current system, which is divided into the three groups of (a) permanent appointments, (b) fixed-term appointments and (c) short-term appointments. While traditionally only permanent appointments have been considered career appointments, eventually fixed-term appointments were recognized as well as a possible career path for the reason that an increasing number of fixed-term appointees was serving in the service of the UN on a continuous basis of contract extensions and for many years. This reform proposal envisions, subsequently, to formalize the status of these long-term UN civil servants on fixed-term contracts and to grant them

225 In past years, suspensions of permanent appointments were sometimes due to re-organizations of the UN Secretariat, but mainly to the continuous financial difficulties of the organization. This was the case in 1985/86 and in 1989 (A/RES/44/185). Between 1992 and 1994, permanent appointments were suspended for reasons of a restructuring of the Secretariat. The suspension of 1995 was again a consequence of severe shortages of financial resources of the organization (A/C.5/51/34: 47).
the same entitlements and benefits as permanent civil servants, including better job security under new contractual arrangements.\textsuperscript{226}

This seems to be a sensible proposal since over 61 per cent of all UN civil servants are currently employed on fixed-term contracts, compared with the less than 37 per cent of UN staff on permanent contracts.\textsuperscript{227} Figure 3 below provides a visual image of the total distribution in the UN Secretariat, regardless of categories of staff or geographical distribution of posts.

Ratios of permanent appointments in the UN Secretariat varied over the years, but remained mostly below 50 per cent. Within the category of appointments subject to geographical distribution, the ratio of permanent contracts was usually around three quarters (A/C.5/51/34: paras. 16, 20-27).

Since 1998, the official share of permanent appointments with respect to posts subject to geographical distribution is set at a 70 per cent ceiling (A/53/342: para. d (xiii)). The actual distribution of geographical posts between permanent and other types of contracts did, however, never reach the threshold of 70 per cent, but declined continuously reaching in 2004 less than 56 per cent and in 2005 less than 54 per cent – or a total of 1,380 out of 2,581 posts (A/59/299: para. 53; A/60/310: para. 52).

\textsuperscript{226} In the current system, fixed-term contracts can be converted into probationary appointments and thereafter into a permanent appointment upon the recommendation of the respective line manager. Strictly speaking, permanent appointments are, however, reserved for staff recruited through competitive examinations (A/59/263/Add.1: Annex I).

\textsuperscript{227} The remaining 2\% of all UN Secretariat employees represents appointees on probationary contracts, expecting to be converted to permanent appointments after two years of satisfactory service in the organization. Professionals have with 49\% the highest ratio among those with permanent appointments, followed by Directors (43\%) and the General Service and related staff (30\%) (A/60/310: para. 51 and page 30, Figure 8).
The proposed new contractual arrangements promise to introduce a more coherent system in which there would be three types of appointments: (a) short-term, (b) fixed-term, and (c) continuing (open-ended) appointments (A/55/253: para. 47). The praxis of a permanent UN career civil servant with life-long employment would be eliminated, though as idea of open-ended employments not totally abandoned. UN civil servants could in this model of continuous contractual arrangements not only be terminated for reasons of misconduct or other serious misbehaviours as provided for in the existing UN Staff Regulations, but also “in the interest of the Organization” (A/59/263/Add.1: para. 4(c)).

The UN Staff Union has welcomed the proposal to create a new contractual construct that would guarantee more job security and extend some of the benefits and entitlements to those UN civil servants who are currently employed under less advantageous conditions
than their colleagues on permanent contracts (SCB/1552: 2). The Union objects, however, to a possible discontinuation of permanent appointments as this would violate the principles of the UN civil service, such as loyalty, consistency, neutrality and independence, and could contradict the standards of competence and integrity of Article 101 of the UN Charter (A/C.5/59/4: paras. 22-25; GA/AB/3531: 1; Highlights No. 17, 26 September 2000: 4; WWS Vol. 4).

The Staff Union further argues that permanent contracts have “served as a principal pillar in securing equitable geographic representation, equal representation of women, and retention of a modicum of institutional memory, multilateral skills and professional loyalty to the Organization” (SCB/1466: 3). To discontinue permanent appointments would lead to a further deterioration of the staff morale without producing any of the expected, positive results.228

These arguments are valid from a traditional point of view and, yet, do not necessarily hold, since there is no factual evidence that staff recruited on contracts other than permanent is less loyal to the organization. In this connection, one would have also to consider that for millions of employees in organizations without a life-time guarantee of employment, job satisfaction, motivation and the perception of personal economic security are based on such factors as their confidence in the senior management of their employing organization, their relationships with immediate supervisors and co-workers, the organizational (management) culture and the overall institutional stability (solvency and legitimacy of an organization). Their contractual conditions may, therefore, be responsible for only a portion of their “loyalty” to their employing organization, but not the only decisive factor.

228 The argument for discontinuing a permanent civil service is that long-term employees become over time less productive and proactive. There is, however, to my knowledge no scientific evidence on the negative relationship between high job security (life-long employment) and individual performance (work ethics). Moreover, I am not aware of any study that could establish that permanent civil servants are less efficient or productive than employees on other types of contracts. It seems, however, that rigid structures and regulations combined with poor management can lessen the motivation and initiative of staff with destructive affects on the productivity and efficiency of an organization. See hereto also Blanke/von Bandemer/Nullmeier/Wewer (Hrsg.) 2001: 32.
If the expectations of young Professionals are directed at greater job mobility and flexibility over their work life compared with the ‘older’ generation of UN civil servants, as the study of the JIU (JIU/REP/2000/7) likes to suggest, the promise of permanent employment may be a less decisive factor for new UN recruits (see hereto also chapter 3.3.8 on conditions of service). Work conditions, recognition and career prospects may have a much greater influence on their decision to continue their UN service or to resign irrespectively of the long-term job security offered by permanent contracts.

The GA postponed its final decision on this matter and requested the SG to report on the differences and advantages between the existing and the new system at its 57th session (Highlights No. 21, April-June 2001; also A/55/890/Add. 1: 3). This report was issued two years late, in September 2004 (A/59/263/Add.1). Although Member States appear to accept the introduction of a simplified three-tier contractual system in the UN Secretariat, a final decision by the GA is still pending as the final editing of this study is concluded.

3.3.10 Administration of Justice

“We doubt that the single office of the Ombudsman will be able to deal with all those cases and then there will be only advisory power given to that person. That is not much of an improvement, isn’t it?”

(UN Official, Geneva, June 2002)

The reform of the Secretariat’s system of justice is ongoing since the introduction of this reform. Although a number of changes have been introduced since 1997, the system under review remains incomplete to fulfil the criteria of the new UN HR management
approach. In the words of the JIU, it is still too “slow, costly and cumbersome” (JIU/REP/2000/1: vii).

The GA likewise criticised the existing system for its flaws and the slow, cumbersome processes and highlighted the apparent inaction by the UN administration to resolve the problems of backlogs, which have been observed for over 25 years.

Before any changes could be introduced, input was gathered from all duty stations duty stations and a review of practices of UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies was conducted. As a result of these reviews, the UN introduced in November 2001 its intranet-based UNAT Judgements Database and proposed to the GA for approval the establishing of an Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman formally opened its operation in October 2002 (A/60/376: para. 3). Existing bodies, such as the Panel on Discrimination and other Grievances and the Joint Appeals Boards and Joint Disciplinary Committees at the four main offices, New York, Geneva, Nairobi and Vienna, continue to exist outside the Ombudsman’s direct management directive to this date (April 2006), although they are no longer active “in many of these locations” as confirmed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

It was expected that the establishing of an Ombudsman would contribute to a fairer and more effective system of justice by processing cases more expeditiously and also help to

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229 The changes introduced up to 2005 could not effectively enough diminish the backlog of appeals nor resolve the delays of cases brought to the various bodies involved in the whole process ranging from Rebuttal Panels (reviews of disputed PAS ratings) to the Panel on Discrimination and other Grievances, Joint Appeals Boards and the UN Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) as highest instance of the system of justice, and the Committee to Review the Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Court of Justice. The lengthy process until a final judgement or solution is reached is not only costly to the organization, but can also have serious financial consequences for UN civil servants in case of decisions concerning the appointment, reinstatement and promotion.

230 As was the case with other components of the HR management system, criticism of the existing system of justice has a history in the UN Secretariat and grew stronger since the mid 1980s. Particularly the backlog of appeals and rebuttals is a long-standing problem of the UN system of justice, repeatedly mentioned in debates and reports by various bodies for over 20 years (A/RES/39/245; A/RES/55/258; A/RES/57/307; A/55/253; A/55/514; A/59/449).

231 The idea of introducing an Ombudsman had been pursued in the Secretariat since 1985 and was discussed by the SG in a feasibility study, which was submitted to the Fifth Committee (A/C.5/40/38). In 1986, a report followed which also considered observations made by the JIU with respect to the administration of justice (A/C.5/41/14; A/41/640).
diminish the backlog of cases filed by staff members against administrative decisions. It was further hoped that with an Ombudsman in place conciliations, mediations and negotiations could lead to resolutions before a formal appeal became unavoidable.

The pronounced reform goal is, consequently, to streamline “protracted and lengthy proceedings that are in the interest of neither justice nor of the staff or management” (A/55/253: para. 51). Required activities are to eliminate inadequate processes, to train individuals who serve on panels and review bodies and to shorten the time schedules of the various steps from reviews to the mediation process and the appeals procedures.

As evidenced by a vast number of publications, up to 2002 no significant changes of the internal system of justice materialized other than the establishing of the Ombudsman’s office and no improvements were made in the view of Member States and the JIU. By terms of reference, the Ombudsman performs similar, if not the same functions as the Panels on Discrimination and Other Grievances established at the UN headquarters (New York) and offices in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut, Geneva, Nairobi, Santiago and Vienna. These panels, as well as the Panel of Counsel and the Counsellor’s Office with the OHRM continued to operate after the Office of the Ombudsman was established in 2002 with the intention that further reforms of the system would include a review of these various units.

That neither the backlog could be sufficiently reduced nor appeals could be handled more expeditiously even after the Office of the Ombudsman was fully established remains a

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232 For terms of reference of the Ombudsman see ST/SGB/2002/12. “The Ombudsman shall remain neutral and shall not assume the role of advocate for any party” (ST/SGB/2002/12: para. 3.8). This means that, unlike in public service organizations in some Western countries, the UN Ombudsman is not an established function to represent the interests of the employees (or citizens), but an independent mediator. For comparison with other UN organizations, see also A/C.5/40/38: paras. 7-11. For statements on the continuous shortfalls of the system up to 2002 see A/RES/57/307; A/RES/59/283; JIU/REP/2000/1; JIU/REP/2002/5; A/59/408; A/C.5/59/4: para. 77.


234 It might be noted that the existing system has been called into question for some time by the Staff Union and the administration. The system of various panels, committees and boards was for some time no longer perceived to be an adequate, objective and timely system (A/C.5/40/38: paras. 31-32).
serious setback. Any longer-pending case can have serious consequences for the staff morale, productivity and the overall climate in a work unit, but also major financial implications for the organization (A/RES/59/283).

In order to shorten appeals processes in the interest of an overall greater efficiency of the system, OIOS recommended the establishing of clear time lines and to allocate additional staff resources to the varies bodies. OIOS further recommended that cases be selected and processed taking into consideration the urgency of appeals instead of processing cases in the order they were filed. Another recommendation was to provide more training to those serving in the different bodies and to introduce an electronic tracking system (A/59/408: 21-25).

The UN administration basically concurs with the recommendations of the OIOS, but makes the shortage of staff mainly responsible for the larger part of the observed delays (A/59/449: para. 35). Setting time lines for single stages in the process would, therefore, not necessarily ensure that cases were processed more efficiently. It would be rather necessary to establish a sufficient pool of qualified board and panel members to ensure that cases were processed in reasonable times. It would be indeed short-sighted to base a performance evaluation of the system purely on the time required for the “final disposition of cases” as some cases may require more time than others (A/59/6 (Prog. 24): 6).

In view of the “difficulties in identifying a sufficient pool of staff on the Joint Appeals Board and the Joint Disciplinary Committee”, the administration proposes to introduce a “jury” system (A/59/449: paras. 29-30). The recommendations of OIOS to ‘professionalize’ the system, e.g. by introducing a full-time presiding officer at the New York Joint Appeals Board and systematic training to those who are to serve in various bodies of the system of justice, is generally accepted by the UN administration, in particular in view of the “quality of the advice by the panels to the Secretary-General” and

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235 As reported by the OIOS, the appeals process is still taking between 10 and 37 months at the four headquarters duty stations, New York, Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi (A/59/408: 2).

236 It was for instance proposed that cases of non-renewals of contracts could be given priority over other appeals, since the unemployment of UN civil servants could lead to serious “financial implications” (A/59/408: para. 19).
may in fact increase the chances that the recommendations of those panels are more acceptable to the SG (A/59/449: paras. 33-34).

The execution of justice depends to a large degree on the organizational culture, and improvements of the system of justice relate to progress made in many other areas of the UN HR management system. This is particularly valid for the state of the present management culture of the UN, e.g. the way managers and their staff relate to each other. Employees will be less likely to dispute management decisions if such decisions are perceived to be transparent and fair.

Although the UN administration has become more aware of internal problems of personal misconduct of managers, e.g. of abuse, harassment and mobbing by supervisors, the organization is only beginning to implement effective policies. For an organization with a clear mandate to protect basic human rights and international labour law, such employment-related violations of the basic rights of its employees are an embarrassment.

One would, therefore, expect the UN administration to assign top priority to issues of abuse and other neglects of international standards. Unfortunately, as selected cases discussed by Ameri show, the organizational culture of the UN is not yet prepared to deal with such issues in the most sensitive and effective way (Ameri 2003: 232-261). Recent incidents, which reached wide publicity, have nonetheless forced the SG to act swiftly and to dismiss UN official who were found guilty of sexual harassment, abuse and other unethical behaviours.

The system of justice is a central component of this HR management reform as it is the system on which UN civil servants rely if they disagree with management decisions. It is regrettable that the UN administration has not moved more quickly and thoroughly to change the system and has not worked more closely on this issue with the UN Staff Union.

Many issues of required improvements have not been discussed in this reform. It is also unfortunate that the SG has rejected recommendations to establish a truly independent system outside the DM (JIU/REP/2000/1; JIU/REP2002/5; A/59/408; A/59/449). In view of the minimal progress made in this area of the UN HR management reform, judgement must be suspended until recommendations are proposed by the external panel, which was
appointed by the SG in early 2006 following the demand of the GA in its resolution 59/283, and actual changes are introduced.  

237 The report A/61/205 of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations system of administration of justice was issued on 28 July 2006 and is analysed as the editing of this thesis is concluded.
4 Assessment of the UN HR Management Reform after 1997

4.1 Methodological Approach

This chapter reviews the implementation and progress of HR management reforms since 1997. In view of the complexity of the reform activities, the HR management reforms were evaluated applying various methods.

Information about the proposed reform measures and on the status of implementation was gathered from official records published by the UN, including the progress reports of the SG on HR management reform.\(^{238}\) Data retrieved from official sources of the UN administration were compared with information provided by representatives of the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General, the DM, including OHRM, and then verified against official records of the GA and its subsidiary bodies, including information published by the ICSC. This information was then compared with findings and recommendations of various independent entities, such the OIOS, ICSC and JIU and reports and statements of bodies and groups representing the staff (e.g. Staff Union and GERWUN) on specific subjects in order to validate and assess the actual status of implementation and the degree of acceptance of those actors.

Specific queries on selected issues for which no verification could be obtained from official records were addressed directly to respective UN offices to obtain the necessary clarification. Where inconsistencies in the findings of various sources were detected, these could be resolved either by scrutinizing the information against additional data or from other, independent sources. In some instances, such as with respect to the question on whether the time for recruiting and placing new candidates could be shortened, such disagreements could not be resolved and are stated as such.

This assessment of UN HR management reforms includes further a case study on the PAS, which was phased in since the late 1990s to evaluate (appraise) individual performance and which serves as illustration of the UN administration’s problems of implementing a new mechanism into an environment not prepared and ready for change.
In order to capture data on the acceptance and perceptions of internal actors (UN managers and other staff members), I conducted a pilot study in the sixth year of this ongoing reform process, 2002. The exact methodology applied in this pilot is presented together with the questionnaire and the data analysis in the respective Annex (see Annex VI).

Further included in this assessment of HR management reforms are results gathered from surveys on specific questions prepared by internal and external groups during the course of this reform, such as the survey on integrity (by Deloitte Consulting in 2004), on the PAS (by the UN Staff Union/CCISUA in 2005) and management reviews by the JIU and OIOS.

To provide the reader with some reference points in the following assessment of reforms, reform initiatives concerning the reform of the UN HR management are summarized in table 6 and presented in chronological order beginning with the year 1997. This table was compiled from reports issued by the UN administration and information publicized on the UN Website.

\[238\] In addition to the documents listed in chapter 1.6, information on the status of reform activities was also obtained from the UN Reform site [http://www.un.org/reform](http://www.un.org/reform).
Table 6: Summary of UN Management Reform Initiatives with a particular emphasis on changes of the HR Management from 1997 to 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>REFORM INITIATIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Late January</td>
<td>Structural changes to group UN departments, funds and programmes under four sectional areas: peace and security, economic and social affairs, humanitarian affairs, and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 March</td>
<td>Initiation of “Track One” of organizational reforms</td>
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<td></td>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>New communication strategy (A/AC.198/1997/CRP.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 July</td>
<td>Presentation of reform programme “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform” (A/51/950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 July</td>
<td>Initiation of “Track Two” of organizational reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 September</td>
<td>First general debate of the reform programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 December</td>
<td>GA endorses the reform programme (A/RES/52/12) including structural changes of the UN Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>First steps in the decentralization of HR management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 March</td>
<td>Ms. L. Frechette assumes newly-created post of Deputy Secretary-General (A/51/950, Add.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Report of Task Force on Human Resources Management (A/53/414) is finalizes (published in October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Unit is established within the Executive Office of the SG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>1st meeting of high-level Accountability Panel and first written compacts with all senior managers established as part of the performance appraisal of senior managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 August</td>
<td>Report of the SG on HR Management Reform (A/55/253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 August</td>
<td>Reform proposals of the UN Peace Operations (A/55/305, S/2000/809 also known as the “Brahimi Report”)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 September</td>
<td>Millennium Declaration (A/RES/55/2) a symbolic act for reform</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 October</td>
<td>Reinforcement programme of the UN Security Management System (A/55/494) is introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>UN operations at headquarters are progressively linked through IMIS with offices away from headquarters and field missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Electronic HR Handbook published for access to all staff, managers and administrators</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Number of abolished documents due to a review and streamlining of rules reaches 460</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 September</td>
<td>Road map towards the implementation of the UN Millennium Declaration (A/56/326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>UN Staff College, Turin, becomes an independent UN training entity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>Introduction of the SSS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Initiation of e-PAS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>First Staff Ombudsman is appointed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 August</td>
<td>UN Security Coordinator (full-time at the ASG level) is appointed (see 1st report on staff security)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>2nd reform report “Strengthening of the United Nations: An agenda for further change” (A/57/387)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>First induction programme for newly appointed senior managers introduced</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Management Committee established (ST/SGB/2005/16)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>Management Performance Board (successor of the Accountability Panel of 2000) holds its first meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>SG reports on the impact of HR management reform (A/59/263)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Roster management module in Galaxy finalized for implementation in late 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Introduction of flexible working arrangements throughout the Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March/April</td>
<td>SG submits updated programme budget proposal for 2004/2005 which includes increased allocations for staff training (total remains still less than 1% of the biennial budget of $ 2.8 billion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>Report of the SG on the status of implementation of A/57/387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Establishing of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Jan. – June</td>
<td>Further revisions of UN Staff Regulations and Rules after those of 2002 and 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>Roster management module in Galaxy finalized for implementation in late 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>First selection system for senior managers introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>Management Committee established (ST/SGB/2005/16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 June</td>
<td>First induction programme for newly appointed senior managers in DPKO introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 July</td>
<td>Management Performance Board (successor of the Accountability Panel of 2000) holds its first meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 July</td>
<td>New financial disclosure policy for senior UN officials approved by the Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>New whistleblower protection submitted to the Management Committee for approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Anti-fraud and corruption policy to be endorsed by the Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>Establishment of Ethics Office (ST/SGB/2005/22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Implementation of Reforms

The two questions to be answered in this assessment of UN HR management reforms are (1) whether reforms have been implemented successfully and completely, and (2) whether implemented changes have brought about actual improvements.

The brief answers to both questions are that many reform measures are not fully implemented, many are still under review or further revised, and of those that were (completely or partially) implemented so far many failed to introduce the improvements that were initially suggested and expected. As a result, the SG proposed again a package of reforms in March 2006, which reiterates his HR management reform programme of 1997 and, therefore, confirms his own assessment of the inadequate progress of reforms.

For this study, reforms were grouped in the four areas concerning (1) the ideological changes, (2) the strategic changes, (3) functional changes and (4) structural changes. The implementation of reforms was evaluated by identifying for each proposed action key measurable results, which were examined in view of the achievements within the given time frame (1997 until end of 2005).

Annex V provides an overview of the reform actions and measurable results by date of initiation and completion. It must be noted that not every action had been announced at the initiation of this reform programme. As reforms progressed, new actions were added to the programme and, consequently, included in this assessment together with the corresponding, expected (or accomplished) measurable results as such information became available in detail over the course of this reform process. As the reform implementation continues, this analysis captures the status of a continuing implementation process and discusses accomplishments to the date the final editing of this thesis was concluded.

The status of implementation of each result is shown in Annex V on a nominal scale for the complete (Y) or the incomplete accomplishment (N) of the announced, expected results. If and to which degree reform measures were ultimately effective and successful is discussed on the basis of findings of independent bodies such as the OIOS, JIU and the Staff Union, which are compared with the information provided in official records.

Ideological changes are directed at creating a new organizational culture that is supportive of the mandates of the UN Secretariat and supports more effective cooperation and
coordination of programmes, including reform activities. The new HR management culture is, subsequently, expected to be (more) responsive and results-oriented.

Before this new organizational/HR management culture can be established, it will be necessary to build awareness and acceptance among all actors by promoting the new organizational culture within the organization through open and direct communication and by providing easy access to information to all stakeholders and in conjunction with training programmes.

Regular consultations and a continuous dialogue between senior managers and Member States representatives is of particular importance to win and maintain the trust and support of Member States as a positive element of the planned overall culture change. To assist in the building of consensus and support among the UN’s legislators, regular progress reports on specific HR management reform were issued to the GA in addition to the frequent meetings and consultation between the SG and his senior managers with Member States representatives. The majority of Member States appeared to support the reforms of SG Annan and re-elected him for a second term to allow him to continue with the implementation of his reforms beyond 2002.

The most recent reform debates (since late 2005) among Member States have, unfortunately, changed to a less cooperative atmosphere which has its main causes in the political disputes among Member States rather than in fundamental disapproval of concrete reform issues. As in 1985, the disagreement and conflicting interests of Member States appear, for the moment at least, to be in the way of actual reforms. The call for a reform of the UN is hence in danger to again become nothing more than a codeword for a long-lasting crisis of the UN caused by the political battle between the developed and developing countries for more power.

Meanwhile, the SG has introduced a number of new guidelines and policy changes to support the development of the new organizational culture and to encourage managers and staff members to act in concord with the new (HR) management philosophy and the announced standards and values. In this context must also be seen the strategic changes which include the decentralization of the UN HR management and by which greater
autonomy and responsibilities are assigned to single managers for the management of their financial and human resources.

Changing the organizational culture will require that staff and managers, in addition to the Member States, change their attitudes and behaviours over time. These changes will possibly also contribute to the already stated action to promote the UN’s image as an attractive work place that offers fair employment conditions and is managed in a cooperative spirit by its political and administrative leadership.

The strategic changes are developed in view of the overall goal to strengthen the leadership capacities of the organization, in particular the leadership position of the SG. The logical extension of this strategic reform approach is the decentralizing of HR management functions and the promotion of a results-based and performance-oriented management approach, in addition to a strategy to increase the productivity, reduce spending and to improve the performance, also with respect to the HR management of the Secretariat.

Strategic changes bring about a number of necessary functional changes in the HR management system mainly resulting from the decentralization of the HR management. The delegation of HR management responsibilities and the overhaul of the system that is divided into the various areas (see discussion of accomplishments with respect to the building blocks below in this chapter) are supposed to create a more responsive and progressive HR management. These functional changes include additional monitoring and control mechanisms and the increased use of new technologies.

In connection with these functional changes, the UN research and training capacities are to be more involved in the design and support of HR management reforms. In addition, it is proposed to take more advantage of independent research institutes and new technologies to create a more efficient and effective management in the UN. The decentralization of HR management functions requires further that functions and roles of OHRM (as the office formerly responsible for the processing of HR management actions) be rewritten also resulting in a variety of structural changes.

Structural changes of the Secretariat are a reflection of the desired organizational culture change, the strategy to modernize the UN HR management system and result to some
degree from changes of the internal functioning of the organization. Reforms of the UN HR management system have a particular impact on the organizational and management structures of the DM and the OHRM as a result of their changed roles and new functions.\textsuperscript{239} They include among other changes the establishment of new and additional monitoring and control mechanisms; some of these measures are to involve the Staff Union in the selection process (e.g. decision concerning the recruitment and promotion of staff). Examples are the new Review Bodies in connection with the introduction of the new SSS that replace former panels and committees with similar purposes. Others, for instance those in connection with the establishing of a new justice system, are still under review.

Just as functional changes have an impact on the structure, so do structural changes create new functions. The functions of the new committees, panels and other bodies created in connection with these reforms are an illustration of such developments. Structural changes require, for instance, a re-definition of functions of managers and the rewriting of job descriptions (ST/SGB/1997/5; also ST/SGB/2002/11).

It is important to note that a significant number of structural changes have been undertaken to establish new committees and panels at the most senior levels of the UN administration. This indicates that the SG gives high priority to the immediate involvement of UN senior managers in the reform process. Senior managers are to actively participate in the development of management reforms and are expected to exchange views with respect to the implementation of reforms. This approach by the SG can be understood as an attempt to build a sentiment of cooperation, acceptance and responsibility for the accurate application and implementation of reform measures at the most senior levels of the organization.

The creation of new senior management entities for various purposes adds, nevertheless, to the already complex structure and appears to contradict the stated reform goal to create a smaller, more responsive Secretariat. The most prominent changes in order to strengthen the executive management of the Secretariat are the establishing of a cabinet (the Senior Management Group) in 1997, the appointment of a Deputy Secretary-General in 1998, and

\textsuperscript{239} For the three possible models of HR management: the traditional model, the reform model, and the strategic model see Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 6-7.
the creation of a High Level Committee on Management in 2000, all directly concerned with management reform issues.

As of May 2005, the SG formed two new committees to “reinforce the capacity at the highest level in the Organization to provide the necessary level of strategic direction on the important challenges facing the United Nations Secretariat” (Note to Staff by the Chef de Cabinet, 4 May 2005). The Policy Committee will “focus on issues requiring strategic guidance and decisions” and is to identify other “emerging issues”. It comprises the SG, the Deputy Secretary-General, the Chef de Cabinet and a number of senior managers involved in the areas of peace and security, peacekeeping operations, development and humanitarian as well as human rights affairs. The Management Committee “will deal with internal reform and management-related issues” by endorsing reform proposals and by providing strategic advice to the SG on any reform issues (ibid.). It comprises the SG, the Deputy Secretary-General, the Chef de Cabinet and the heads of the Department of Management (DM), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of General Assembly and Conference Management (DGACM).

In addition, a Management Performance Board “will monitor and analyse the performance of managers to ensure that they are properly undertaking the responsibilities entrusted to them” (ibid.).

It will have to be seen whether this strategy of involving the most senior managers in the development and discussion of reforms will have any impact on the attitudes and motivations of managers at the lower levels of the UN Secretariat.

As to the overall implementation of HR management reforms, the administration proclaims that numerous measures have been successfully implemented in almost all areas of the UN HR management system between 1999 and 2000.240 The UN administration advertises further that according to the General Accounting Office of the United States 85 per cent of reforms proposed in 1997 have been implemented and that a number of reform measures were fully implemented (http://www.un.org/reform/chronology.html).

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240 A/55/253. Although an online tracking system of management reforms (Progress and Impact Reporting System) has been introduced, reports do so far not provide more specific information on real improvements and progress of HR management reforms (see for instance A/60/70).
My assessment of the implementation of HR management reforms comes, however, to a less positive conclusion. Progress in the four areas of reform activities that involve the organizational culture change, a new strategic approach, functional changes and structural changes, has been diverse, with the most visible successes in view of changes that are instrumental to the new HR management, e.g. the structural changes and the introduction of new technologies.

Good progress has been made, for instance, in the revisions of Staff Rules and Regulations, the introduction of an electronic HR Handbook, the abolishing of obsolete instructions, and by introducing the new SSS. Structural changes have been implemented by establishing a range of new bodies (e.g. panels, committees) and new administrative units supporting the further development of HR management reforms as well as resulting from these reforms, as has been mentioned above.

Examples for the increased use of new technologies include the implementation of the final phase of IMIS, which included the introduction of HR management components, the introduction of the Key Item Management Reporting System (KIMRS) which is a tool to track and monitor the use of human resources (in addition to financial resources), and the introduction of new systems such as Galaxy and e-PAS. In addition, specific e-training programmes were established which facilitate the self-study efforts of UN staff members and permit the administration to manage mandatory on-line training, such as a security training course (in 2004) and a quick study programme on ethics (in 2005).

Nonetheless, progress in the area of new technologies is not as smooth as the results of implemented programmes may indicate. It took the organization over 10 years to design and implement the IMIS with all its components. IMIS was specifically designed for the use of the UN Secretariat with its complex rules and regulations for the management of the financial and staff resources. After the system became finally operational throughout the UN Secretariat worldwide by 2004, IMIS is already perceived as outmoded and inadequate and first steps have been taken to replace it with a new more suitable management information system.

Galaxy and e-PAS are also not without flaws. Galaxy was only recently (just about two years after it became operational) updated in order to make necessary improvements to the
system (ST/IC/2005/17). E-PAS introduced Secretariat-wide in 2004 is an electronic system to process the annual performance appraisal reports, but has not been integrated with the other existing HR management systems in order to improve the administration of staff and to facilitate the recruitment process. It remains unclear if and how the administration and managers make practical use of the data captured through e-PAS.

The least success among the four reform areas has been made in the area of ideological changes (towards the new organizational culture) and the strategic changes to strengthen the leadership and to improve the HR management. The organizational culture of the UN Secretariat remains conservative and stagnant. The reform strategy, although with the intention to reach managers at all organizational levels (e.g. through training), pays great attention to the involvement of senior managers in reform decisions, but leaves the traditional hierarchical order of the organization unchanged which defeats the reform goal of creating a more flexible and responsive (and hopefully less authoritarian) management style.\textsuperscript{241}

The administration’s assessment is, nonetheless, correct in so far as that in almost each of the 10 key areas reform measures have been implemented. How completely and effectively these implementations were carried out is discussed with reference to table 7. This table provides an overview of the actual state of implementation with respect to the 10 HR management building blocks, which were discussed in detail in chapter 3.

As this overview shows, none of the buildings blocks are fully implemented as of this date, despite the fact that numerous single reform measures have been introduced in each of these building blocks.

\textsuperscript{241} Structural changes are in the majority due to the establishing of committees, panels and other bodies composed of the most senior managers, leaving managers at the lower and middle management levels with functions in review panels in connection with already implemented reform measures.
Table 7: Assessment of reform measures proposed in connection with the reform in 1997 by date of complete implementation and ratings (Status: December 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building Block</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HR Planning</td>
<td>A medium- and long-term integrated HR planning system that specifies corporate and other objectives at the level of individual departments/offices.</td>
<td>Basic work, like the Skills Inventory, establishing of departmental Action Plans and a central OHRM Planning, Administration and Monitoring Service, is completed. Successes were made in vacancy management, gender balance and mobility of staff, but lack of resources and staff did not allow for the full implementation of a functioning work force planning system.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streamlining rules and procedures</td>
<td>Eliminate obsolete, redundant rules and procedures and related documents; streamline rules and documents; easier access through electronic means; consistent / uniform application.</td>
<td>A first review and revision in total of the Staff Rules and Regulations was completed with several additional revisions between 1997 and 2005 including the revision of the Code of Conduct. Further revisions will be required as other reform measures are introduced.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment, placement and promotion</td>
<td>A system based on predicted staff needs that is timely (max. 120 days), holds managers accountable, and facilitates mobility, placement and advancement opportunities for staff.</td>
<td>Introduction of the SSS and electronic system (Galaxy). Requires further improvements and a complementing system of justice and clear monitoring/control mechanisms have yet to be established.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>Ensure that the Organization is able to move people between functions, departments, occupational groups and duty stations as required; prepare staff to operate in a multidisciplinary environment.</td>
<td>With the exception of the introduction of the managed mobility scheme for P-2s, no changes were introduced as of this date. The mobility scheme was presented to the staff in 2005, although the effective date from which the five-year occupancy will be counted was 1 May 2002. No specific mechanisms are, however, in place two years before the first organization-wide mobility comes into effect in 2007.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competencies and Continuous Learning</td>
<td>Define and validate core organizational and managerial competencies; promote shared values and common standards; build organizational capacity; develop a culture of continuous learning.</td>
<td>A number of training programmes were introduced, but the system is lacking evaluation of the impact (success) of the training and has, therefore, little to no evidence to justify its activities and the effectiveness of its operation.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Block</td>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Management</td>
<td>Create a fair, equitable, transparent and measurable system of performance management.</td>
<td>No consistent system throughout the Secretariat in place. Efforts were patchy with the PAS remaining inapt, as it does not produce objective and reliable performance ratings, but mainly measures the relationship between supervisor and supervised staff and is not measuring the essential: actual outputs in the context with the unit’s/department’s programme performance.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Development</td>
<td>Build and maintain a highly competent, multi-skilled and versatile international civil service… to meet the development needs and career aspirations of individual staff members.</td>
<td>No fully operational system in place. Efforts were made to involve managers into the career development, similar to their authorities with respect to the HR planning, but neither the climate nor the organizational culture is present that would support an organization-wide and uniform career development unless there are clear guidelines and policies established. Actions are sporadic and not widely advertised throughout the system.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions of service</td>
<td>Provide staff with a better work and life environment and develop a competitive compensation system within the common system that will attract and retain staff of high calibre.</td>
<td>Work continues on the remuneration system through streamlining and simplification. The work and life task force continues to develop improvements in the work environment (e.g. for family members of staff, in view of flexible work arrangements etc.). New contractual arrangements were proposed to, but not approved by the GA as of this date and are highly criticized by the Staff Union. No improvements/adjustments of salaries for Professionals and higher categories were undertaken.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual arrangements</td>
<td>Adapt contractual arrangements to better serve the operational need.</td>
<td>No actual implementation of the new contractual system has started and no changes of the existing system have been made to this date.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration of justice</td>
<td>Improve the effectiveness of the system by streamlining the process and through informal mechanisms.</td>
<td>Office of Ombudsman was established in March 2002, a number of improvements, including the revision of disciplinary procedures, are still outstanding. Related changes, like those concerning the Panel of Counsel, are also still pending.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Goals were compiled from A/55/253 and A/59/263 and are presented in abbreviated form
The development of a Secretariat **HR planning** system has not been completed and suffers from the lack of funding and staff capacity, and possibly also from a lack of adequate expertise. In addition, there is no central database available and no clear HR planning or management strategy. Although HR action plans have been established since 1999 with a reported participating 26 departments and offices by 2004, “success in meeting” the set targets “has been mixed” (A/59/263: para. 27). Components, such as organized staff development and a functioning PM programme, which will eventually have to be linked to the mobility scheme latest by 2007, are not in place in order to support proper HR planning. The new Planning, Administration and Monitoring Service of the OHRM may provide an organizational structure, but HR planning in the UN Secretariat is a programme without real practical application without clear guidelines and strictly applied methodologies.

From the earlier discussion of the necessary continuous progress with respect to the streamlining of staff rules and HR management procedures, it is evident that this building block cannot be considered completed as long as the UN is evolving as an organization with changing employment conditions.

Reforms of **recruitment, placement and promotion** procedures were among the first to be implemented. The implementation of the SSS and the decentralization of HR management functions have been instrumentally implemented since 2002. Unfortunately, the system was introduced into a culture not fully ready for such a change and without having basic conditions in place, such as necessary monitoring mechanisms.

OIOS subsequently observed a number of shortcomings in the execution of the selection process by individual managers. Interviews with short-listed candidates were in many instances not conducted in accordance with best management practices. OIOS found, for example, that no proper interview panels had been established and interviews did often not follow a standardized interview methodology such as the competency-based interview method promoted in the Secretariat since the introduction of the SSS. In many instances, no evaluation criteria had been established before the interviews were conducted and interviews were not properly recorded. Such deficiencies in the selection process make it difficult to accurately review recruitment decisions of managers who are ultimately
responsible for the appointment of staff under the new decentralized HR management system.

The new electronic tool, Galaxy, has brought about an enormous increase of applications, but not necessarily an improvement in view of the qualifications of applicants (A/59/253: para. 7). To this point, managers, Personnel Officers in OHRM and applying staff “are still learning to navigate the new process” (A/59/253: para. 6). It could, however, not reverse the decline of promotions of junior staff that was observed in 2002 and 2003.242

Although the administration and OIOS state that the new system has reduced the time to fill vacancies, statistics previously referenced in chapter 3.3.3 raise questions of actual improvements with respect to the recruitment and appointment process, and challenge the reliability of official statements.243 In the best-case scenario, it still takes the organization about six months to fill a vacant post if managers pursue the case vigorously. Until managers are forced (e.g. by OHRM) to observe the 15-day and 30-day review options for internal applicants and have access to a well-managed roster of candidates, it remains to be seen whether better progress can be made in the near future.

Member States, OIOS and the Staff Union agree that there are insufficient monitoring and accountability measures in place to oversee managers’ HR management decisions and to take corrective actions where necessary (A/RES/59/272; A/59/253; A/C.5/59/4). The Staff Union also questions the legitimacy of procedures established in connection with the evaluation and selection of candidates. As a result of the disagreements between the Staff Union and the administration, staff representatives are not participating in the process until their request for clarification through the Fifth Committee has been answered.

The absence of staff representatives in the Central Review Bodies defies, however, the principle of the Staff Union’s participation in the recruitment and promotion selection. Considering these unresolved issues surrounding the reform of the recruitment, placement and promotion system, it is difficult to predict when reforms in this area of the UN HR management will be completed.

242 According to OIOS’ findings, “the percentage of P-2 staff promoted annually to the P-3 level decreased steadily between 1998 and 2003 from about 18 per cent to 12 per cent” (A/59/253: para. 12).

243 A/59/263: para. 58 and A/59/253: para. 19 versus A/60/6 (Sect. 28C)
Little real progress has been made in the mobility of staff and managers since the initiation of HR management reforms. The managed mobility scheme for junior Professionals established in 2000 is a forced rotation programme between functions, department/offices and duty stations, but has shown that one third of lateral moves at the P-2 levels have simply been rotations within the same departments/offices and duty stations (A/59/253: para. 44). The experimental phase of voluntary managed reassignments before the mobility scheme will be fully activated in May 2007 will provide some valuable indications on the manageability of the scheme and the costs to the organization.

There are still many uncertainties with respect to the practical execution of the mobility scheme, which will be applicable to all staff from G-5 to D-2 levels. A number of related actions have to be put into place to successfully support the mobility of staff, such as training, a permanent electronic platform and sufficient staff resources to manage the mobility of staff. Moreover, the administration will have to provide more information and clear guidance in order to overcome the reluctance and resistance among managers and staff towards the idea of a managed mobility scheme. Before the mobility programme can be fully established, the SG is required to report to the 61st GA on expected financial implications. It will then be the call of the legislators to give this programme their full endorsement and, if necessary, provide additional funding for the execution of this programme (A/59/650).

Substantial improvements have been made in view of the building block competencies and continuous learning. This area of HR management reforms is the most successful among all reforms implemented to this date in terms of training activities. This is valid even more so when taking into account the limited financial resources the organization has had at its disposal for the development of the wide-ranging training programme introduced since 1997.

The issue in question remains, nonetheless, how effective the many training activities are. To this date there is no evaluation mechanism in place permitting for an objective assessment of the impact of training on the overall management and individuals’ HR management skills. The general perception among staff is that training has not introduced marked changes of the way the organization is managed, nor has it produced changes in the UN’s overall conservative and hierarchical management culture. The results of the
pilot study discussed in chapter 4.4 on the perception and acceptance of this reform
indicate, nevertheless, that 65 per cent of respondents believe that reforms and training
have contributed to some improvements in the behaviour and attitudes of supervisors.

Unless, however, an objective evaluation of the impact of training on management
practices and attitudes of managers can be established, it will be impossible to determine
whether improvements can be linked directly to training or are associated with other
measures, such as changed procedures, the increased use of new technologies or even a
slight change of the organizational climate. Until a comprehensive assessment of the
training programme is completed, the investments in training since 1997 cannot be
justified by objective accomplishments of this programme and its clear benefits to the
organization.

Although the UN’s expenditures for training activities are much lower than those of many
other national and international organizations, Member States are beginning to question
the intention, volume and type of training. If the organization needs to train every
manager on such basic issues like communication skills, work planning and performance
evaluation, the issue being raised by representatives in the debate about reform and
training is whether the quality of the UN screening and selection process might be
insufficient.

This argument ignores, of course, the reason for these reforms, especially the UN’s
acknowledged vacuum of proper HR management skills. The decentralization of HR
management functions creates an additional necessity to train UN managers so they are
ready and capable to fulfil the HR management responsibilities. Furthermore, even though
the UN hires experienced managers from within and outside the organization, there will be
a continuous requirement for various types of training as in any other organization. Senior
staff will have to be given the opportunity to refresh their knowledge and to stay informed
on latest developments; junior staff and staff at lower management levels will have to be

244 The proposed UN regular budget for 2006/2007 of US$ 3.8 billion contains provisions for
training in the amount of US$ 25.6 million (A/60/7: 157) or about 1% of the “staff budget”
(A/60/692: para. 26(j)). In comparison, UN programmes and funds spend a forth time higher
percentage of their budget for training according to a paper issued by the UN administration in
May 2006. The SG is, meanwhile, suggesting additional spending for training of $10 million
per year (A/60/692: para. 31).
trained (and tested) before being promoted into higher-level management functions. Unfortunately, such career development mechanisms have yet to be established in the UN. Training will also become increasingly important in conjunction with the mobility scheme and the reform goal to build a new cadre of UN managers with system-wide and cross-section experience.

The question raised by Member States on the quality of the current screening and selection process is, nevertheless, valid and ought to be seriously considered since the revision of the recruitment, placement and promotion procedure is ongoing and the review of the OIOS has detected a number of serious shortcomings in the current staff selection process as already mentioned.

Since the UN Secretariat has not accomplished to establish a performance management system as discussed in chapter 3.3.6, the only existing pillar is the PAS, which is examined in more detail in the subject case study presented in chapter 4.3.

Unfortunately, even with this single component of the future PM system in the UN Secretariat, there are problems. As has been observed by OIOS, “the PAS process, and especially e-PAS ratings themselves, are often perceived as a compliance exercise rather than a method for managing performance” (A/59/253: para. 59).

Reforms aimed at establishing a career development system are also not fully implemented yet, even though the UN administration claims that “a comprehensive career development policy” has been put in place. The UN Staff Union has, on the contrary, pointed to the many inaccurate and unfinished issues that would need to be addressed in order to establish a fair system (A/C.5/59/4: paras. 57-64).

Concrete steps towards a career development system have been taken since mid 2005 by setting up Career Support Centres in various main offices and by offering training to managers and staff on career development issues through one-day seminars and by offering other information through their Career Support Centres’ libraries. The predicted budget shortfalls for the biennium 2006/2007 will, however, make the development of a solid system under already limited budget allocations difficult (A/59/253: para. 77).

The new mobility scheme will create additional challenges to the realization of the career development system. On one hand, staff are encouraged under the mobility programme to
prepare themselves for their next career inter alia by obtaining additional skills to be able to move change into another occupational field; on the other hand, supervisors are required in a career development system to take a pro-active role by developing their staff’s skills through specific training in the respective professional field in the interest of succession planning.

Such changes of a much more open and flexible HR management strategy require a supporting organizational culture which has not yet been established throughout the UN Secretariat and will necessitate a number of further functional and structural changes in addition to the sound funding. The current uncertainties surrounding the approval and release of provisions of the 2006/2007 UN budget are, therefore, a dilemma for the immediate realization of management reforms.

The least progress has been made in the areas of conditions of service and new contractual arrangements. Achievements to this date do not exceed preparatory work, such as inter-agency reviews of existing practices, existing contractual arrangements and the pay and benefit systems (by the ICSC) (A/59/263: paras. 128-130). Since early 2003, the UN has introduced flexible working arrangements in main offices, not without creating some tensions between supervisors and those staff members who took advantage of these options.

Although a number of real improvements have been introduced addressing staff security, several acute problems persist, in particular in field offices. These are partially due to the insufficient funding and insufficiently trained and qualified personnel. Similar shortcomings can be observed in the provision of medical services mainly in UN field duty stations.

In view of the disparate conditions within the UN system, the remuneration system of the UN Secretariat has yet to be harmonized together with other employment conditions to ensure that UN civil servants are employed under the same conditions with comparable pay and benefits. Proposals to reform the contractual arrangements of the UN, in particular the suggestion of discontinuing the permanent status of UN civil servants, have caused strong resistance by the Staff Union. The discontinuation of permanent contracts could, indeed, contradict the principles of an independent international civil service in
accordance with the UN Charter and the ideas of the founders of the UN. It also could undermine reform efforts to create a functioning UN career development system with long-term career paths, depending on the design of such new contractual arrangements and possible implications on alternative career decisions of staff.

There have also been unnecessary delays in the development and implementation of reforms of the UN administration of justice, as observed in chapter 3.3.10. The ACABQ has noted in its report of February 2005 that the UN administration has failed to establish all necessary measures of a more efficient and effective administration of justice (A/59/715). In response, the UN administration explained that these delays were caused by the financial constraints of the UN Secretariat. The view of Member States remains, nevertheless that inappropriate administrative processes and procedures are the reason for the inefficiency of the justice system and are associated with the poor culture of staff-management relations (A/59/715: para. 8).

The problems surrounding the establishing of an adequate system of justice has “a significant impact on staff morale and productivity as well as the efficiency of the Organization, and could have a significant financial impact” according to the ACABQ (A/59/715: para. 3; see hereto also the report on the cost implications of recommendations provided by the OIOS (A/59/706). As a consequence, the GA requested that the SG establish a panel of external and independent experts to review the system and make recommendations for its improvement (A/RES/59/283: paras. 47-53). The report of the Redesign Panel is expected in July 2006.

4.3 Case Study: The Performance Appraisal System (PAS)

4.3.1 Background

The performance of the UN, both in terms of the overall organizational performance and of the individual performance, is understandably of high interest to Member States, since they expect the most efficient use of their investments (contributions) and specific results from their mandates to the organization. “The goal of performance appraisal is the enhancement of organizational effectiveness” (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 368). The system of individual performance evaluation is part of the complex system of inspecting, monitoring and
evaluating the activities and output of the organization, including the management of the financial and human resources of the UN.

The UN has used various systems of performance evaluation over the years (A/49/219: paras. 31-46). None of these systems were, however, adequate to measure objectively individual performance. Despite five attempts to introduce a more adequate system of performance evaluation between 1978 and 1994, the UN administration had failed each time to implement an adequate system in accordance to a study by the JIU.

The review of management practices by the Group of 18 addressed, consequently, also the question of a proper performance evaluation system in connection with the installation of a system of accountability and responsibility of programme managers, with the result that the GA demanded the implementation of a new, adequate system by January 1995. Around the same time, the ICSC also recommended the introduction of a new performance evaluation system (Müller 1992, Vol. I: 166). In December 1993, Member States reiterated their demand to the SG to “establish, as part of an overall system of accountability and responsibility, an objective-based performance appraisal system for all officials” (A/C.5/51/55: para. 1).

To support the development of new performance review mechanisms, the JIU investigated this issue and submitted a report in August 1994, which gave valuable insights into the failures of then effective system of performance evaluation, the PER. Based on their findings, the JIU gave recommendations for the implementation of a new, more effective and appropriate system (JIU/REP/94/5 in: A/49/219). One of the central findings of the JIU was the lack of a clear link between performance evaluation and staff development.

The PER, so the report of the JIU, was neither linked to established performance standards, nor was it useful or capable to provide information on which objective management decisions, for instance with respect to promotions, could be based. The

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245 A/49/219: iv and 12-13: Ratings given did not reflect the actual performance of staff. On the other hand, staff claimed that the performance evaluation system was not a fair system, but ratings were given by supervisors randomly and not an impartial reflection of work performance and professional knowledge.


consequence drawn by the JIU was, consequently, that the PER was of little relevance to the staff development in the UN Secretariat.

4.3.2 Development and Practical Application of PAS

The new system was called the *Performance Appraisal System* (PAS) to distinguish it from any previously existing system. The appraisal of performance was expected to serve two purposes: (1) to measure the individual performance of employees at all levels in terms of job-relatedness functions and in terms of productivity, and it was (2) to provide data to support adequate HR management decisions, ranging from decisions with respect to the placement, promotion, training needs or, in extreme cases, the dismissal of under-performing staff.248

The JIU had warned in 1994 that any new system could be success only if fundamental changes of the management culture would be implemented at the same time. The JIU specifically stressed the importance of introducing a performance-oriented management culture, as had also been recommended by the ICSC in 1993. In addition, a number of fundamental changes of the HR management system would be required, such as “a dynamic human resources planning” and the introduction of clear responsibilities and accountability measures (A/49/219: paras. 79-87).

The JIU emphasized further that legislators and the SG would be directly oversee the development and implementation of the new system to ensure its successful implementation. In addition, managers and staff had to be involved from the very beginning in the design and implementation of the new system to ensure their acceptance and, consequently, their commitment to apply it honestly (A/49/219: paras. 88-91).

It would, therefore, be vital to establish early on clear guidelines for the upper and middle management and to train the users in the proper application of the new system. Training was also important to change attitudes by building a new awareness and perception of the

248 ST/AI/2002/3; also Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 368-372. Klingner (1980) distinguishes between person-based and performance-based criteria, but suggests that only the performance-based evaluation is a useful tool to identify performance standards and training requirements (Klingner 1980: 228-231). The PAS of the UN Secretariat is a combination of a person-based and a performance-based system in that it uses the competency model as well as performance goals to assess individuals. For competencies see also chapter 3.3.5.
value of performance evaluation among all staff, so the recommendation by the JIU (A/49/219: paras. 137-141).

According to the assessment of the JIU, the UN Secretariat of 1994 was “not ready for this challenge” and had no “requisite support systems” available. Any new system had, subsequently, to “overcome the heavy scepticism and cynicism generated by the prior systems” if it were to be successful (A/49/219: paras. 144 and 146).

Despite such cautions raised by the JIU and shared by the ICSC, the PAS was phased in without real consideration of the issues that had been raised by the JIU (JIU/REP/96/6: para. 99; Highlights No. 20, January-March 2001). As a result, the launching of the incompletely developed PAS in 1995 was unsuccessful. Several modifications and revisions were required in the following years until the PAS became operational by late 1998 and in early 1999 in parts of the UN Secretariat and in its today’s format.249

While it had been anticipated that the initial year of introduction of the PAS was a transition period and the full installation of the PAS in the UN HR management system of the Secretariat would be completed soon thereafter, it took at the end over three years until the system was fully operational at headquarters and another five years until the system was used at all main offices (A/C.5/49/1; ST/AI/1997/5; ST/AI/2002/3).

The introduction of the modified PAS was meanwhile not only overtaken by the initiation of UN HR management reforms after 1997, but the process of its implementation with repeated revisions and changes to the format of the PAS let to confusion and a further loss

249 ST/IC/1995/32; ST/IC/1997/83. Before 1998, PAS was used only randomly in the UN Secretariat (JIU/REP/2000/3: para. 78). Up to 1999, the PAS was, for example, not used by departments within the UN Secretariat in New York, such as the DESA, DM and DPI. As a result, PAS reports had to be issued retroactively during the summer of 1998 (DPI) and winter 1998/99 (DESA and DM) to comply with the deadline set by the SG. The PAS was further not in use in field offices, such as UNTSO. Moreover, the PAS was not introduced in DPKO field offices before the end of 2004, where performance evaluation often was a matter of random and incoherent reporting. Various UN official records disagree on the reported date of implementation: The JIU dates the implementation of the PAS in the year 1995 (JIU/REP/96/6); other records determine its introduction as of “1 January or 1 April 1996” (A/50/507/Add.1: par. 15; also A/53/266) or date its implementation to the year 1997 (A/52/439: para. 8). A monthly newsletter issued by the UN OHRM in 1999 states on the other hand: “The PAS has now been implemented throughout the Secretariat” (Highlights No. 3, January 1999: 1). The reality of the application of the PAS differs from such statements.
of credibility into the competence of the UN senior management among supervisors and
the staff (A/49/219: para. 93).

Moreover, the many revisions of the PAS up to the latest conversion into the electronic
system (e-PAS) was not in sink with UN HR management reforms and these reforms did,
on the other hand, not complement the PAS; reforms proved to be slow, for instance, by
putting in place new monitoring mechanisms and by developing a functioning staff
development system as had been recommended by the JIU and ICSC.

By the time e-PAS was introduced Secretariat-wide in late 2004, there were (still) no
systematic controls or reviews on a departmental level or even organization-wide to ensure
the consistent and correct use of the new system and to hold managers truly accountable
for not complying.  

By concept and design, the aim was to introduce a new system of performance review
through which the administration could gather reliable data of individual performance and
personal ambitions based on objective measures, and to support the establishing of a new
organizational culture, which would foster open communication and active cooperation
among the various levels of the administration, starting with a more productive
coordination of activities between managers and their staff.

Furthermore, the new system was meant to identify training and coaching needs to
increase individual performance and consequently departmental outputs (A/53/414). A
third expected result of such regular performance appraisals was the detection of talents
and skills in combination with a planned system of career support and career development

The design of the PAS is fairly straight forward and follows the typical model of modern
performance evaluation systems using the basic measures of goal-setting and performance
planning (Williams 2000: 79-80). The revisions and modification to the PAS in terms of
review processes, ratings and the format were to simplify and enhance the system. Several changes to the system were also made with the goal of introducing an electronic version (e-PAS), which became operational in some UN offices between 2002 and 2004.\textsuperscript{251} With this new version, the review cycle for appraisals was synchronized to begin on 1 April “in order to promote consistency of approach and to facilitate reporting” (ST/AI/2002/3: para. 3.1).

The PAS rating system consists of five categories and leaves room for additional comments by the first appraising officer (the immediate supervisor).\textsuperscript{252} The ratings apply to performance goals associated with the functions and work assignments of the staff member. For each of their performance goals, staff members must indicate related actions and success criteria based on discussions and negotiations with their supervisor.

The annual PAS process requires at least three formal meetings between the supervisor and the staff member. During the initial meeting, they are expected to discuss and agree on the work plan, goals and success criteria. Supervisor and staff member further negotiate “at least one professional development goal” (formal training of the staff member); for staff members with supervisory responsibilities they also will agree on a supervisory or managerial goal to demonstrate the staff member’s commitment to manage their own staff (see hereto P.91/A(2-01)-E Guide). The second formal meeting occurs at the mid-point performance review, and the final and third meeting is the occasion of the appraisal in March of each year (ST/AI/2002/3: 2). In addition to the appraisal of the performance, the supervisor is expected “to comment on the staff member’s efficiency, competence and integrity” (P.91/A(2-01)-E, Guide: 7).

\textsuperscript{250} The Management Review Committees established “to provide leadership for the application of the PAS”, were composed of managers and supervisors without any representation of those who were subject to the appraisals, the staff. To our knowledge, there were no uniform terms of reference available, which would clearly determine the responsibilities of those committees and frequency of their meetings or measures against managers who failed to utilize the PAS by the date it was supposedly introduced (ST/AI/411: 13). There are, furthermore, reported cases of staff not having received a PAS report for one or more reporting periods, which is a basic requirement for job applications.

\textsuperscript{251} Highlights No. 20, January-March 2001: 2. For specifics on the revisions see A/57/293: para. 53.

\textsuperscript{252} Those ratings are divided in the following categories: (a) consistently exceeds performance expectations; (b) frequently exceeds performance expectations; (c) fully meets performance expectations; (d) partially meets performance expectations; and (e) does not meet performance expectations (P.91/A(2-01)-E, e-PAS Form and Guide).
The difficulty of this process for both the supervisor and the staff member lies, however, in the selection of relevant performance goals, while to ensure that the selected goals are consistent with the overall organizational goals, the departmental work plan and the functions of the staff member. One would expect that managers have become over the past years more acquainted with goal setting in connection with their responsibilities for the programme planning and the budget performance reporting process. Findings by the ICSC as well as Deloitte have, nonetheless, identified deficiencies in the setting of goals (http://hrpilot.commonsyste.com/?tab=pal; also Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 2005).

The PAS was originally designed to apply to all civil servants regardless of their rank and position (JIU/REP/2000/3: para. 76; ST/SGB/1997/13). With the latest modifications PAS is applicable to civil servants with “appointments of at least one year under the 100 series of the Staff Rules, except for staff at the level of Assistant Secretary-General and above who report directly to the Secretary-General” (ST/AI/2002/3: 1).

In order to introduce a performance review system for the most senior managers, the SG introduced in 2000 a system called ‘Compact’ that is effectively in use since June 2002. This ‘Compact’ for upper management stands for a contract between the SG and each senior manager on specific performance criteria including HR management criteria. The SG reviews and evaluates senior managers’ performance yearly against these criteria (Highlights No. 17, 26 September 2000: 4; also DSG/SM/112: 6). Although this process is as confidential as the PAS of any other staff member, performance indicators such as the success or failure to recruit in accordance with policies on gender balance or geographical distribution become public knowledge latest through the publication of the SG’s reports an the composition of the Secretariat.

The JIU has warned that the performance appraisal of senior managers is vital for the monitoring of the programme managers, and is also an important factor in ensuring that the PAS is accepted by the staff at large (JIU/REP/2000/6: paras. 85 and 88). According to research by the JIU, only one Under-Secretary-General and one Assistant Secretary-General and only between two and nine Directors and Principal Officers at the D-1 and D-
2 level had been appraised in the years 1996 to 1998.\textsuperscript{253} As a result, the overwhelming majority of top managers in the UN Secretariat went without being evaluated (JIU/REP/2000/3: para. 81 and Table 2).

Future plans to introduce a 360-degree feedback system, in which a staff member is assessed by peers and supervisors and, if applicable, by subordinates, have been discussed since 2000, but have not been implemented yet to ensure that “managers would be assessed by their immediate colleagues, regardless of their place in the hierarchy” (Highlights No. 17, 26 September 2000: 4) in connection with the PAS. While the lower levels of UN staff would welcome the option to comment on co-workers, but most of all on their supervisor’s management qualifications, there appears to be some resistance among managers to agreeing on a 360-degree appraisal system.

In any case, it would be important to examine first whether a 360-degree review could be managed effectively before introducing such a mechanism that is more complex than the existing PAS. For the time being, PAS remains a process in which managers judge the quality of performance of those under their supervision, while the staff members have the option to include brief, written comments on the supervision and quality of guidance they received from their managers. If and how these comments are analysed by OHRM is unknown.

To make the system effective and reliable, it is necessary that both parties, managers and staff, cooperate and complete their respective parts of the appraisal form with the utmost care. The fundamental requirements of any fair performance review is that evaluators and those who are being evaluated are given a clear and easy to use rating system and have a full understanding of their roles and responsibilities in the organization, as well as a full understanding of their roles and responsibilities as partners in the performance appraisal process. According to findings by the OIOS, the performance appraisal process is, however, in many instances “a compliance exercise” with insufficient control mechanisms (A/59/253: para. 59).

\textsuperscript{253} In those years, there were over 200 senior managers at the D-1 level, almost 70 at the D-2 level, fifteen Assistant Secretaries-General and about 21 Under-Secretaries-General appointed on geographical posts only (source: A/53/375: Table 12). The total number of senior managers throughout the UN Secretariat is not published in any of the annual reports of the SG for those years.
Staff members who disagree with the performance ratings have the right to appeal to their Executive Offices (at headquarters) or the Chief of Administration (in offices away from headquarters) to request a review of their appraisal. In this respect the rebuttal process has not been changed compared with policies of the previous PER system.

In addition to the problems surrounding the implementation of the PAS from 1995 to 2004, the application of ‘forced distribution’ undermined the credibility of the PAS as well as the intentions of the UN administration.\textsuperscript{254} When it became known among UN employees that heads of departments had received instructions from senior management to rate no more than a specified percentage of their staff above average and these orders were handed down to lower supervisory levels, UN staff members lost their confidence in the new system even further.\textsuperscript{255}

While they had been wary about the fairness and competency of their managers to administer this new appraisal system, they now were simply looking at the ratings to be given by a lucky (or unlucky) draw, not as the result of a fair and seriously managed performance evaluation. The UN administration has, however, disputed that such instructions had been given to managers.

4.3.3 PAS and UN HR Management Reform

As the brief overview of events during the implementation of the PAS shows, its introduction has been full of obstacles and disadvantages. These problems are lingering to this date. The organization has not yet created a sound basis for the appraisal of individual performance. Based on the observations of the OIOS and its practical application, the PAS has not fundamentally changed the way staff performance in the UN is evaluated. It did

\textsuperscript{254} Forced distribution in the performance evaluation of employees refers to the requirement that the evaluator places “some fixed percentage of those evaluated into each of three or four categories (e.g. one fourth in the lowest category etc.)” (Shaper 1985: 104). As the experience in the US Air Force explored by Shaper shows forced distribution can lead to the loss of highly qualified employees due to unfairly given performance ratings. Performance evaluation becomes a performance rating lottery rather than an assessment of objective performance criteria, which are as such problematic in any performance evaluation as has been discussed already above.
not contribute to a more open, constructive and trustful relationship between managers and their staff.

While the request to introduce a new performance evaluation system in the UN Secretariat derives from recommendations made by the Group of 18 (see also chapter 3.1), and the initial development and introduction of the PAS took place before the implementation of the 1997 HR management reforms, the PAS became one of the components of this reform programme. In connection with the building block performance management, the PAS is also linked to the two building blocks competencies and continuous learning and the UN career development.

Although training on the PAS had been offered to staff and managers from 1995 on, by the time the first fully operational version of the PAS was introduced, most UN employees could hardly remember what they had been taught about the correct execution of the system during their training sessions. In any case, the half-day training courses initiated in 1995 were not sufficient to assist UN staff and managers to make the transition from the PER to the new concept of appraisal. The (former) PER system had been a simple rating process of straightforward job-related functions. The PAS, on the other hand, required a distinct understanding of the appraisal process, including the proper selection of performance goals, action and success criteria that needed to be agreed between the supervisor and the staff member.

More seriously was, however, that the many modifications and revisions of the PAS led to additional uncertainties among the staff and managers about the correct process, the ratings and the reliability of the system in general. To make matters worse, staff were asked to formulate their individual performance goals without being given the necessary information of the work plans (and related performance goals) of their departments and

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255 The impact of lower ratings becomes clear when reviewing the survey conducted by OHRM. 71% of the respondents did not feel that their work efforts were recognized and appreciated through the PAS process (GERWUN 2002: 14-15; also Steering Committee on Reform, 18 July 2001, Assessment of the Performance Appraisal System; Part II (Revision): 3, paras. 18, 21 and 25).
work units, simply because work plans had not been prepared at the time the appraisal process was initiated or had not been distributed to all staff members.\textsuperscript{256}

In terms of the review and monitoring of the execution of the PAS, two committees are established in each department, the Management Review Committees and Joint Monitoring Committees (ST/AI/2002/3: paras. 11.1 and 12.1; ST/AI/1997/5). Of these, only the Joint Monitoring Committees have representatives of the staff as full members (ST/AI/1997/5).

It is difficult to evaluate these committees’ effectiveness to work towards the establishing of a functioning UN PM system and their success in ensuring that formalities of the performance appraisal process are correctly followed without having the necessary, detailed information for such an assessment. The responsibilities of these committees, such as to “provide leadership and guidance” and to “monitor and review the implementation” (as outlined in ST/AI/2002/3: paras. 11.3 and 12.2) are offset by infrequent meetings, which may suggest that their input into the reform decisions concerning the PM must be of rather restricted significance.\textsuperscript{257}

It is also not fully clear which role the third body plays, which is the Global Joint Monitoring Committee. This is a subsidiary body of the Staff-Management Coordination Committee with a similar composition like the Joint Monitoring Committees, namely with representatives of management and the staff, to “examine policy issues involved in PAS implementation” (ST/AI/2002/3: par. 13.2). In good, old bureaucratic fashion, the system has apparently created here a number of sub-systems without visible advantages to the actual purpose, the establishment of an efficient PAS process.

To provide the grounds for a more rigid application of the PAS and possibly for the development of future performance awards and bonuses, Administrative Instruction ST/AI/2002/3 reminded the staff and managers of UN staff rule 103.8 (a) in that “the

\textsuperscript{256} A/59/253: para. 66. In addition to these findings of the OIOS that in many instances departmental work plans were not available to staff members, my observations are that work plans are sometimes formulated in such a way that makes it difficult for a staff member to establish individual performance goals, actions and success criteria that match the department’s work plan.

\textsuperscript{257} The Management Review Committee is expected to “provide input for the yearly departmental human resources action plan”, while the Joint Monitoring Committee “shall meet three times a year” (ST/AI/2002/3: paras. 11.4 and 12.4).
granting of salary increments is subject to the satisfactory performance and conduct of staff members” (ST/AI/2002/3: para. 16.1). Therefore, only civil servants with ratings of the three higher levels could in future expect the periodic salary increments.\textsuperscript{258} It is, nonetheless, no case of such administrative actions known.

The information collected through the PAS, as unreliable and inaccessible it may be at times, is supposedly also utilized in making HR management decisions about the placement, promotion and training of staff.\textsuperscript{259} Considering that the performance goals, related actions and the success criteria agreed upon by the staff member and the manager are expected to be used as reliable and objective measures of the individuals performance on which in future salary increments or, in extreme cases of non-performance, the discontinuation of contracts may be decided, one would like to assume that the PAS is measuring what it is supposed to measure – the performance and competencies of the UN civil servant.

The examples provided in the guide to the new PAS are, however, little helpful for the establishing of success criteria and give only vague measures for the appraisal of whether or not goals have been accomplished.\textsuperscript{260} This is just one example of the issues that will need to be addressed to further improve the PAS to make it an efficient and fair process as part of the future UN PM system.

4.3.4 Conclusions

The conclusion drawn by Shaper is that performance evaluation “has to be done, but there is no objective, reliable and valid way to do it” (Shaper 1985: 118). Performance evaluation in the UN is in some instances particularly complicated, since departmental performance and individual performance often rely on the concerted efforts of various actors and many tasks are performed in accordance with strictly regulated policies that cannot be simply changed by individual staff or their managers. In addition, performance

\textsuperscript{258} These are: (a) consistently exceeds performance expectations; (b) frequently exceeds performance expectations; and (c) fully meets performance expectations.

\textsuperscript{259} As reported by OIOS, PAS files are, however, frequently unavailable during the hiring process (A/59/253: para. 64). In this connection, it would be useful to further analyse the influence of the PAS records on the actual decision to appoint an internal applicant and if other factors were also influencing such HR management decisions.
in the UN can be influenced by outside factors, such as natural disasters, political crisis and corresponding changes of priorities.

Such interdependencies make it sometimes difficult to identify with certainty why individual performance goals could not be met as initially planned. The PAS offers for such events the possibility to adjust or change performance goals, related actions and success criteria to reflect any unforeseen changes of work plans.

The final electronic version is in its format certainly easy to use and to complete. The three meetings between managers and each individual under their immediate supervision provide the floor for discussions and information exchange on a personal level as well as the opportunity to discuss specific work-related issues, which may influence the performance of the individual and of their teams. Unfortunately, these opportunities appear not be used in a constructive manner as the findings by the OIOS suggest.

The PAS does not provide for an objective appraisal of performance, but leaves room for interpretation and personal judgement of the supervisor. Final ratings are influenced by the quality of communication and the general relationship between the supervisor and staff member and is often less based on strict, measurable results, as these are difficult to pre-establish in a service organization such as the UN.

To ensure that the performance appraisal in the UN is, nonetheless, as objective and reliable as possible, it would be helpful to use a variety of methods to measure performance and behaviour. The PAS allows supervisors to record specific information on the staff member’s performance and attitudes. Such information, if entered consistently by supervisors, could add value to the appraisal process in a constructive manner. If supervisors would be required to enter at least three critical incident records in each annual

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260 Suggestions given in the guide are for instance: “Timely analysis is provided” or “Quality of information...fulfils the requirements” (P.91/A(2-01)-E, Guide: Example A).
261 See here also Shaper 1985: 96-101. Daley concludes that even the “objective BARS and MBO appraisal systems are only as good as the people who use them” (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 380). BARS stands for behaviourally anchored rating scales, used to measure job knowledge, relations with others, motivation, and supervision (Shaper 1985:104-105). MBO stands for management by objectives. MBO is a strongly result-oriented management approach and is applied in connection with performance evaluation by planning and setting goals to measure individual performance during a performance period (Williams 2000: 79-84).
PAS report, they would be forced to observe more closely the behaviour of their staff over the reporting period, instead of simply monitoring their output (Shaper 1985: 109-111).

The introduction of peer reviews could provide additional information against which the appraisals given by immediate supervisors could be verified. The introduction of the 360-degree review would formally allow staff members to comment on their supervisors’ performance as managers, which could provide useful information in managers’ performance appraisal by their own supervisors. It would further provide information on the guidance or support these managers had given to their staff in areas such as on-the-job training and other progressive learning aspirations in the interest of the UN’s staff development programme.

That senior managers at the upper-management are evaluated based on a different performance review system is justifiable since their leadership roles differ from those managers at the lower levels of the organization. It would be, nevertheless, valuable to conduct regular reviews of performance appraisals and ‘Compact’ evaluations. This would to confirm corresponding (or conflicting) indicators of individuals’ performance in each department from the top to the bottom. Such an analysis could be extreme useful for a variety of purposes. It would verify the reliability of the appraisal processes throughout the department and add to the performance evaluation of top managers by confirming their leadership qualities.262

It is widely acknowledged and confirmed by findings of the OIOS that PAS was introduced in an organizational culture that was not prepared for it. The PAS is a central tool of a PM system the UN has yet to establish. The major handicap of the PAS is, however, that it was implemented in such a way that did not enhance the deference for performance evaluation throughout the Secretariat.263

262 The management style of the head of an office or department is undoubtedly influencing the management culture of this entity and has, consequently, an impact on the behaviour and performance of lower-level staff.

263 The survey Picture of UN Staff 2005 showed that over 31% of all respondents believe that the current PAS is “a waste of time” and over 25% believe that the system is time-consuming (UN Special, Issue No. 646, Décembre 2005). A more recent survey conducted by the CCISUA in 2005 showed that 23% (173 out of 750 respondents) considered the PAS a waste of time and not a useful and appropriate tool (PAS Survey 2005).
As the UN is reforming not only its HR management processes, but is changing its management strategy, it will be necessary to decide on an adequate system that will actually be relevant to the management of performance. It would need to be a tool that is no longer exclusively based on results, but would measure and evaluate processes in order to identify requirements for improvements that may go beyond analysing purely means of individual performance improvements. In other words, an effective PM system would require a system that would detect flaws and provide for creative changes of any processes and policies that may hamper performance in the future.

The main focus must remain to change the organizational culture and to introduce a systematic staff development programme, which should be linked to a HR management-planning scheme. If performance appraisal is developed into a tool of managing performance by improving skills and changing processes and rather than measuring outputs without any real consequences, chances are that the new PAS will be taken seriously and embraced by the staff and managers as a useful mechanism of managing and organizing work rather than being defied as a useless, time-consuming obligation.

4.4 Perceptions and Acceptance among UN Staff (Pilot Study)

4.4.1 Approach

A pilot study was carried out between March and June 2002 to compile information on the perceptions and acceptance of staff and managers after five years of ongoing HR management reforms. Unfortunately, time-constraints and limited resources required that the survey was restricted to a small number of staff and managers. As a result, those surveyed were selected based on their key positions within the management structure of the UN Secretariat and their functions as staff representatives to obtain a characteristic sample of views and experiences of managers and staff.

Expert interviews were conducted with these staff members ranking from the level of Assistant Secretary-General to the levels of the General Service category at the three UN Secretariat main offices in New York (headquarters), Geneva (UNOG) and Vienna (UNOV). Details of the design and an outline of the pilot study, including a description of the method used to collect and analyse data are provided in Annex VI. Characteristics of the sample group are provided in table 9, which is part of Annex VI.
In preparation for this pilot study and to design the structure of this study, I conducted informal talks with UN staff members at various levels at UN offices at New York, Geneva, Nairobi and Vienna, including a field duty station (UNTSO) between 1998 and 2001, and again between 2002 and up to early 2003. The results of these informal talks provided additional guidance to my research on specific areas of the new UN HR management reform. By systematically analysing the issues discussed by individuals during these informal meetings, I could for instance identify a number of reform issues that require particular attention in the reform process. These findings added some key questions to my research as well as pointers for the reform of the UN management.

By testing the grade of agreement and disagreement with the selection and implementation of reform measures, the pilot study was to identify what respondents believed at the time was lacking and needed to be changed in order to improve the UN HR management system. The data compiled in this pilot study are reflections of the perceptions and experience of individual staff members at the various levels of the UN Secretariat hierarchy. The aim of this pilot study was to capture through a variety of survey methods the perceptions and experience of those staff members with respect to the ongoing reform process and to collect data on the importance of the problems respondents have experienced in implementing the reforms in their area of responsibility (see Questionnaire form, which is part of Annex VI). The data collected was analysed using a variety of methodologies to subtract the essential information and to verify the validity of the results.

4.4.2 Analysis of the Interview Data

The semi-structured interviews went from the more general questions about the perceived need for UN HR management reform and the most important issues of the reform programme to more specific questions, such as the opinion of respondents about the most successful steps taken and the reasons for non-implementation of reform measures. Respondents were also asked about their opinion about the role and influence the UN Staff Union has played in the reform development and reform implementation. The catalogue of questions included further questions related to the general acceptance of the reform programme (e.g. in their work unit or department) and concluded by asking respondents to
describe their expectations for the future of this reform programme, e.g. if they believed in the success of the reforms (for the full range of questions see Annex VI).

Respondents were asked after the interview to complete a Questionnaire in order to collect data on possible implementation problems perceived with respect to the reform implementation by rating these problems with respect to their personal experience and in their area of responsibility.\textsuperscript{265} After the data collected through the Questionnaire were cleaned and missing values were identified and properly coded, so they would not confound the analysis, the statistical analysis was performed. This analysis included frequencies, bivariate significance testing, correlation, and robust regression analysis. The results of this analysis put into perspective respondents’ reports of their evaluation of the implementation of UN HR reforms.

In addition to the statistical analysis of the questionnaire, a text analysis of the recorded interviews was performed. First transcripts of each interview were prepared. These transcripts were scanned to capture the specific responses to the questions asked during the course of each interview. In a second review of the transcripts, significant statements on issues not directly asked during the course of the semi-structure interview were extracted. Such statements were grouped into various categories, e.g. statements about the management and organizational culture, the qualification of staff and the system of justice.

These statements were ranked on the basis each respondent had stressed such issues and as such analysed. The scale used by the two independent raters ranged from zero (0) to 100 as specified below. The text analysis and the excerpts of significant statements made during the course of the interviews were tested for reliability and significance and provided an additional source of data for the assessment.

\textsuperscript{264} As can be seen from the Pilot Study Form – Evaluation Form displayed in Annex VI, the interview consisted of closed-ended and open-ended answer categories.

\textsuperscript{265} The data collected were statistically analysed with the assistance of Dr. Robert Yaffee of the New York University. For further details on the method used in this analysis see Annex VI.
4.4.3 Findings of the Pilot Study

Is reform needed and is there wide support among staff members of the UN Secretariat?

The entrance question of the interview was: “The Secretary-General has developed a comprehensive reform programme of the United Nations, which includes the reform of the management of human resources of the UN Secretariat. Do you in general agree that the UN HR management needs to be reformed?”

As shown in figure 4 below, 97 per cent of respondents consented at various degrees that the UN HR management needs to be reformed, with 64 per cent stating their complete agreement with the need for HR management reform. Consequently, this pilot study
confirmed earlier polls by which UN civil servants had equally agreed or wished for management reforms.\textsuperscript{266}

Figure 4

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Do you in general agree that the UN HR management needs to be reformed?}
\end{figure}

With respect to the views of Member States whether reforms are agreed, the re-election of SG Kofi Annan for a second term (2002-2006) may be sufficient proof that the majority of Member States (shareholders of the UN) was at the time in agreement with the progress and the overall approach of this reform. Member States certainly assured the continuity of this reform programme up to the end of 2006 by offering SG Annan a further term as Chief Administrator.

\textit{Has reform overall met all its targets in the opinion of the UN civil servants?}

54 per cent of respondents agreed more or less strongly that reform measures had met the targets as of 2002, while 28 per cent disagree and 18 did not voice any opinion either way. Many of the respondents stated that this reform was a long-term effort to change the organizational culture and to introduce the desired improvements. They talked about the importance of the political and financial support of Member States and the need to gain the wider trust and agreement among the UN Secretariat staff.

\textsuperscript{266} See for instance the 1985 poll of 900 staff members in UNOG with a 80\% agreement (Beigbeder 1987: 22); see also the 1995 and 2005 worldwide survey ‘Picture of UN Staff’ (UNOG Staff 1995, 2005); and the 1997 survey of 940 UN Secretariat staff in UNNY and
Even though a majority of 63 per cent agreed more or less strongly that the UN HR management reform was going well, the implementation of this reform programme had failed to convince a quarter of the respondents that this reform programme is on the right track. Our further analysis of the data collected showed that even those, who believed that reforms were on the ‘right track’, were not fully convinced that reform measures could guarantee the desired changes and improvements, but remained sceptical towards the final success of these reforms. The interview design did not allow further inquiry into the reasons for such scepticism or to differentiate whether such critical statements were purely personal opinions or if respondents had some more specific knowledge of the internal reform process that let to a certain disbelief. Further research would be necessary to detect the reasons for such reluctance to believe in a final, positive outcome of these reforms, in particular since the sample was not sufficient to establish strong indicators that could be representative for the Secretariat as a whole.

In the word of one respondent: “The most important issue will be to bring the majority of staff ‘on board’. Unfortunately, so far we have failed with many and to do so will be a
very difficult and time-consuming process.” A few respondents pointed out that numerous staff members might be reluctant to believe in the success of this reform programme due to their experiences with former reforms. Unless individual statements about the beliefs of other staff are proven by a Secretariat survey, they cannot be seriously counted, but may be pointers for future research of possible pertinent suspicions and resistance among the staff towards current reform efforts.

When further asked about the reasons of their disagreement with the way this reform was going, an equal number of respondents answered that there was no clear guidance and strategy (39%) as there were respondents stating they felt it was not for the lack of clear guidance that reform was not necessarily going ahead at the speed it could be (39%). Almost one quarter of respondents (22%) had no opinion on the reasons.

A robust regression analysis was performed to analyse the summated index of scores on evaluation items, from lack of direction through negative attitudes, in subsequent questionnaire in Annex 6. Three variables were found to significantly account for the level of criticism indicated by the critical count dependent variable. In order of their magnitude, these variables were conflicting objectives, lack of technical support at my level, and lack of supporting staff. The extent to which each variable contributed to the critical count index is shown in Equation 1 below:

\[
\text{Critical count} = 227.59 + 5.93 \text{conflicting \_ objectives} + 5.65 \text{lack \_ of \_ technical \_ support \_ at \_ my \_ level} + 3.88 \text{lack \_ of \_ supporting \_ staff} \tag{1}
\]

The significance tests for each of the variables in this equation are found in Table 8 below, where critical count is represented by Critcnt2, conflicting objectives by conobj, lack of technical support at my level by techsupt, and lack of supporting staff by suptgstf.
Table 8: Robust Regression Analysis explaining the criticism of the HR Reform

| Criticnt2 | Coef.    | Robust Std. Err. | t     | P>|t|   | [95% Conf. Interval]   | Interval       |
|-----------|----------|------------------|-------|-------|------------------------|----------------|
| conobj    | 0.05525028 | 0.04921542       | 12.04 | 0.000 | 0.04659906              | 0.007190151    |
| techsupt  | 0.05653066 | 0.01446985       | 3.91  | 0.011 | 0.001933472             | 0.00937266     |
| suptgstf  | 0.03881093 | 0.0116835        | 3.32  | 0.021 | 0.0008777544            | 0.006884432    |
| _cons     | 227.5942  | 31.88278         | 7.14  | 0.001 | 145.6369                | 309.5515       |

*What is the most important issue of the current reform programme?*

Asked about the most important issue of the current reform programme, the most frequently mentioned issues were those relating to accountability and changes of attitudes of managers. New technologies were mentioned by 95 per cent of respondents to be an equally important factor for the reform of the UN HR management system.

*Did reform and training improve manager’s attitudes?*

65 per cent of respondents stated they observed some improvements since the initiation of reform in 1997. To the contrary, 25 per cent of respondents disagreed and 10 per cent remained undecided or did not comment on this issue. As has already mentioned in the context of the above discussion of training, only a systematic analysis by independent researchers could identify the full benefits and the actual changes of attitudes of managers and the improvements of the overall management through training. As training activities are ongoing while at the same time other improvements are introduced, such as changes of work processes, a conclusive assessment of the contribution of training activities versus other reform measures contributing to detected improvements may be problematic.

It would also be interesting to further explore the reasons for a certain degree of reluctance of staff to believe in the ability of reform and training to change managers’ attitudes and behaviours towards their staff. All this pilot study could provide are responses that
indicated a wide spread conviction that only a generation change or extreme efforts could create a noticeable difference over time.

Interestingly enough, only 16 per cent of respondents mentioned that they believe the UN must recruit (more) new people to renew itself. Keeping in mind that of the 16 respondents providing information on their entry date into the international civil service of the UN, 50 per cent were less and 50 per cent were more than five years in the service of the organization, and of those with more than 5 years in the service of the UN 62 per cent had been in the UN international civil service for nine or more years, it is not overly surprising that a fairly large number of respondents was not too concerned about the need of the organization to recruit ‘new blood’.

*Has the UN HR management reform improved the chances to be promoted?*

35 per cent of respondents were in agreement and 24 per cent of respondents disagreed that the UN HR management reform had created by 2002 any noticeable improvements in terms of the career development. The overwhelming majority of respondents (41%) did not voice any opinion or was undecided on this issue.

Figure 6

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*Did the reform noticeably shorten the recruitment period?*
Official statements of the UN administration had announced in 2000 that recruitment lead times had been drastically improved to an average of 275 days or nine months through reform efforts (GA/AB/3398: 3; A/55/253: 8; see also chapter 3.3.3). While 61 per cent of respondents agreed more or less strongly that recruitment periods were improved through reforms and refer at the same time to the (still) lengthy recruitment processes of the UN, 39 per cent of respondents remained neutral providing neither a positive nor negative assessment. It must be noted, however, that only 60 per cent of the sample group voiced any opinion on this issue, which further diminishes the value of this aspect of the study.

*Is the new SSS possibly contributing to increased mobility rates?*

60 per cent of respondents stated their more or less strong agreement, while 11 per cent tend to disagree. The remaining 29 per cent were undecided or neutral on this issue. Many respondents stated that they see a need to establish a more systematic if not managed re-assignment programme in order to ensure a fair system of rotation and mobility throughout the organization. Such a more rigid mobility scheme is about to be effective as of 2007 for all Professional staff and the most senior level of General Service staff members.

*Does the majority of staff accept the decentralization of UN HR management functions?*

SSS introduces for the first time in the UN a decentralized HR management system and delegates all HR management functions to the heads of departments and offices. The majority of respondents (57%) agreed more or less that the decentralization of the HR management is very good. 33 per cent of respondents disagreed and the remaining 10 had no opinion whether decentralization would bring improvements.
Several respondents in higher management positions talked about their reluctance to take on the responsibilities offered to them through a fully decentralized HR management system. They stated that they would rather not have these authorities, if their decisions were to be scrutinized under the new system and they would be held accountable for each and every action they took, but would prefer to leave the HR management execution (and accountability) to a central office. In other words, these respondents felt uneasy about being exposed to strict controls and constant oversight while being given a pro-forma full authority to manage their financial and staff resources. The possibility of their HR management decisions being challenged or of being held accountable, having to justify and rectify their own HR management decisions is apparently not acceptable to those managers. Since 2000, the new UN HR management includes aspects of the ability and competency of those managers to perform HR management functions in performance appraisals of UN managers and supervisors throughout the Secretariat administration. It would be interesting to review those records of senior managers’ performance appraisals as well as to conduct a Secretariat-wide survey that could provide sufficient data on the
acceptance of the new HR management responsibilities among managers five years after the decentralization was introduced.

**How do staff members feel about the future of this reform programme?**

Opinions on this issue were greatly divided and considering the small sample of this pilot study, it is not possible to produce a clear answer to this question, other than that all – even the least optimistic respondents – hoped that this reform would succeed.

**Do staff members believe this reform will improve the organizational climate and culture of the UN Secretariat?**

Respondents were hopeful, but felt it was too early to say whether the ongoing reform would accomplish real, lasting changes of the organizational culture.

**How much do staff members talk among themselves and with their supervisors about the ongoing reform? Are managers aware of the general mood among their staff in view of these reforms?**

The majority of respondents in supervisory positions (52%) stated they were more or less aware of the opinion of their staff about the ongoing HR management reform. When asked to be more specific and describe the mood among their staff, the majority of those with supervisory responsibilities answered in general and vague terms as if they were no able to describe more clearly the attitudes towards reforms among their staff.

43 per cent of respondents believed that most staff members of the UN Secretariat were enthusiastic and optimistic about the reform efforts made so far. 33 per cent disagreed with this assessment and the remaining 24 per cent had either not built their own opinion or did not make any statement about the mood among the staff in their units, sections or departments. All respondents believed, nevertheless, that a large group of staff members do not follow regularly or may not be interested in the reform progress.

Despite the general impression that many staff members of the UN Secretariat were critical and reluctant at the time to believe in the long-term success of the HR management reform, this pilot study provides some valuable indicators of the deep hopes among the staff that this UN HR management approach will improve the conditions for their career development and the fairness of the HR management system within the Secretariat.
Many of the long-term employees among the respondents spoke about their hope that this time reforms will succeed and referred to their experience of previous reforms when conditions had degenerated and process had become even less flexible rather than simplified and more transparent. Respondents with longer employment records in the UN or the UN system further confirmed that many of the measures presented in this reform programme were not new, but were a revival of formerly discussed measures that had simply not been successfully implemented or had been abandoned in past year’s reform discussions.

It became apparent during this pilot study and during the informal talks between 1998 and 2003, that positive assessments of the reform were more frequently found among those staff members who were directly involved in the reform design and implementation. This might have been due to those individuals’ intimate knowledge of specific successes of specific reform programmes in their areas. Respondents with no or limited direct involvement in HR management decisions had no strong opinions about the fundamental opinions and expectations of their immediate colleagues. This was in particular true for the respondents in supervisory positions.

None of the staff representatives were overly optimistic and enthusiastic about the ongoing reforms, but none disputed the need for reforms either. They agreed with most respondents in their hope that this reform would make a difference, but could not refer to any specific examples of accomplished improvements for the staff.

The Staff Union’s inability and lack of representation of the interests of all staff members of the UN Secretariat referred to by many respondents may be best summarized by quoting one response as follows: “All they do is voicing their criticism without having any constructive things to contribute.” My observations during the interviews and informal meeting with staff representatives at the four offices, Geneva, Nairobi, New York and Vienna were, nevertheless, that they all were extremely concerned about the conditions of the staff. The criticism of the staff representatives I spoke with was articulate and on many topics staff representatives did indeed offer alternative solutions; often they also proposed to modify or fully apply existing mechanisms rather than to introduce new policies for the sake of reform.
4.5 Summary of the Assessment

Since the implementation of this UN HR management reform is still in progress and many more areas of the HR management system are in need of further development, this assessment is a snapshot of an ongoing effort to improve the HR management of the UN Secretariat.

Of the 113 results corresponding to the key actions, selected and presented in Annex V, 51 per cent have been implemented, while 46 per cent are still pending or in the process of implemented (for 3% no conclusive assessment could be made). Such figures do, however, say little about the qualitative impact of reforms.

A number of very important steps have been taken during the first five years of reforms (1997 – 2002) in order to prepare the ground for comprehensive reforms and to introduce some milestones leading to an eventual new management culture that will also positively influence the UN HR management. Written policies and instructions have been revised, a series of new technological tools (e.g. Galaxy and e-PAS) have been introduced and a new system for the selection and recruitment/appointment of staff (SSS) that presents a more decentralized HR management approach has been implemented. As the pilot study indicated, the staff (including managers) in 2002 remained reluctant to believe in the full success of these reforms and was at that time not completely in agreement with all proposed reform measures. They were nevertheless optimistic and hopeful that this time reforms would be successfully implemented, while accepting that this would be long-term effort.

The following three years (2003 – 2005) have brought about a somewhat slower progress of HR management reforms, while reform efforts and measures were further refined as the implementation continued. The areas that will require special attention are the creation of a functioning staff development system that would be embedded in the new mobility scheme, and the whole area of performance evaluation (or staff assessment) in connection with the overhaul of the system of justice.

After almost 10 years of continuous management reforms and ongoing discussions about the need to reform the organization, an atmosphere of reform apathy starts to grow among staff and managers. According to a survey conducted by UNOG staff in 2005, 48 per cent
of respondents thought that reforms are positive, 43 per cent responded they would not know or that reform had no impact, and less than 10 per cent believed that reforms would be negative (UNOG Staff 2005). The larger group of UN staff members observe the progress and impact of ongoing HR management reforms. The latest reform proposal of the SG issued in March 2006 has revived the interest (and anxiety) of staff. Staff members are attending the more frequently scheduled town hall meetings and are invited to submit their comments and suggestions on the further development of reforms to senior management.

As for the Member States, the celebrations at the 60th Anniversary of the UN have seemingly re-invigorated their attention to the progress and continued need for management reforms. The debates have, however, also revealed again the different interests among the less developed and developed Member States in UN reforms. These differences have created increasing tensions that have thrown the organization in a new financial crisis by mid 2006.

The reform process will have to be continued and some of the unfinished reform plans will have to be completed, otherwise reforms, which have been stalled, will turn out to be much talk, but little practical results. The conditions set out by Member States during the consultations and approval of the budget for 2006/2007 require the UN administration to show what actual progress has been made to date and which advantages any further reforms will produce.

Despite the concerted efforts of various Working Groups and Committees on UN HR management reform, as well as advice obtained from independent specialists, the reform progress is slow and many measures could not be accomplished as originally anticipated in the mid-90s (see hereto also JIU/REP/96/6: para. 121). Since many aspects of the UN HR management reform have insufficiently progressed, it is not possible to come to a conclusive judgement on the overall success of SG Annan’s reform programme. Factual improvements will be noticeable once a number of further reform measures are implemented and more reform measures have been fully implemented. Moreover, as the latest reform report acknowledges, “these earlier efforts addressed the symptoms and not the causes of our underlying weaknesses” (A/60/692: 4).
It will be important to continuously monitor much more systematically the impact and real progress of reforms than was done hitherto. As SG Annan said from the initiation of these reforms, reform is a process. Changes to the HR management system, that has been modified, but never drastically altered since the creation of the organization, will require time. In particular, a change of the management culture expressed by certain behaviours and attitudes of the actors concerned will be a process that might not be possible before a new ‘generation’ of UN civil servants has taken over and the still somewhat old-fashioned bureaucracy style of many managers of the UN Secretariat has been changed through more training and coaching.

Like in many other organizational reform processes, ongoing reforms have at times removed rather than added transparency to many aspects of the UN HR management. There is still a significant level of uncertainty among staff members and managers about the current (new) procedures and the future reform development. The key to ongoing, successful reforms is the expeditious re-establishing of new procedures and policies in support of the desired changes to ensure that all members of the organization are gaining confidence in the change programme and accept the new approach. Any unnecessary delay in the process may cause some loss of trust in the process itself, but also in the leadership behind these changes.

When setting priorities, it will be important in the coming years to concentrate on the next steps in each and every area of HR management. For instance, new mechanisms of the justice system will have to be developed also in connection with the Office of the Ombudsman established in 2002. Further examples are the establishing of an effective HR planning scheme, necessary changes in the OHRM, the completion of the Skills Inventory (which requires a repetition of the data collection exercise Secretariat-wide) and a consistent career development programme.

Clear and fair procedures will also have to be further developed in view of the new and decentralized HR management system (SSS), which is still very much criticised by staff representatives, but also by some managers and staff members. It will be important to incorporate true trust-building mechanisms into the selection, recruitment and especially in connection with the internal appointment process.
In this connection, it must noted that the troubled staff-management relations are seriously hampering the reform process and yet staff-management relations were not sufficiently incorporated in these UN HR management reform programme, neither by the UN administration nor by the UN Staff Union or any of the other staff associations. Although progress has been made through the introduction of staff representatives in the staff selection process (e.g. through their participation in the joint reviews bodies), but no fundamental review of the union’s rights and role has taken place.

Unfortunately, staff-management relations are tense since the beginning of this reform initiative in 1997 and escalated in 2004 with the Staff Union refusing to further cooperate with the administration in view of the Union’s objections to the new recruitment and appointment policies and review procedures.

The UN Staff Union has taken the wrong, even though understandable decision when turning away from possible cooperation in view of further developments of reform measures. To address the internal problems more openly, if not publicly and to fight more rigorously for a modernization of the system of staff representation would have been the smarter way to go in the interest of all UN civil servants.

The new SSS does, for instance, not allow candidates to obtain full information on the reasons why they were not chosen over other competitors. In consideration of the confidentiality of the cases and the manager’s role as sole decision-maker, it may appear rational to withhold any information related to the decision-making process which will also serve as protective measure of the organization against any possible legal actions for discrimination or other possible claims. The incorporation of evaluation criteria in vacancy announcements would, on the other hand, provide more transparency to the overall process and would give candidates some feedback that could be useful when considering to apply for a similar vacancy and when preparing of their next career move.

The relationship between the UN administration and legislators experienced similar difficulties during the course of this reform. Member States blame the SG for some of the delays by not providing to them the necessary information and not submitting the requested reports on time. On the other hand, Member States have not fulfilled their obligations by paying their contributions on time and have postponed consultations and
reviews of reform proposals such as the decisions on the remuneration system that remains a pending matter for some time.

If reforms are meant to lead to a fairer UN HR management system, which will support the image of the UN as an interesting and attractive work place, a number of improvements have yet to be completed with respect to each of the 10 building blocks. The regular budget provides for many necessary activities only limited funding and the restrictions of posts does not allow the SG to recruit additional staff to assist in the implementation of many of the reform programmes. Both financial as well as staff restrictions remain on issue of concern in view of the overall reform implementation.

The discussion of withholding contributions to the regular budget or approving only part of the new budget 2006/2007 (as has been done by US representatives) is rather destructive also in view of diplomatic relations among Member States. Lack of funding will further delay and not speed up the implementation of further management reforms.267

Despite possible financial shortfalls in the next two years, OHRM is optimistic in accomplishing a number of further improvements. The UN administration expects to take further steps during the biennium 2006/2007, such as the development of functionalities with respect to HR planning, further simplifications of rules and development of tools to support users, the strengthening and monitoring of the SSS, the successful implementation of the new system of mobility, the implementation of new contractual agreements, the continuation of the integration of core and managerial competencies into all human resources systems, further enhancements of the e-PAS, progressive implementation of the comprehensive career development system, the development and implementation of work/life programmes. In addition, it is foreseen that progressive improvements of the system of justice can be accomplished in 2006 and 2007, including the reduction of the backlog of cases through significant improvement in the processing of disciplinary cases (A/60/6 (Sect. 28C): 28C.7).
OHRM is also hopeful that ICSC will conduct the long-awaited review of the pay and benefit system (ibid.). This review will be important as adjustments of salaries in particular for the Professional and higher categories are considered by the Senior Management Group insufficient to be competitive. As a result, senior management has repeatedly raised the issue that the UN increasingly fails to attract the calibre of highly qualified staff it would require in order to be effective (CEB/2005/HLCM/27).

In the final year of SG Annan’s term the implementation of already approved reforms and the endorsement of new, additional proposals will determine the direction for reforms from 2007 onwards.

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267 Although some respondents to my pilot study considered the financial issues as the lesser problem in the overall reform implementation, respondents in senior positions made a strong point that not enough financial resources and consequently funding of additional posts in connection with the reform programme were available to allow an efficient and opportune realization of some reform measures. In particular respondents who have immediate access to detailed information of the implementation process agreed, that the organizations had not enough personnel assigned to this reform programme.
5 Conclusions

5.1 Synopsis of Findings and Outlook

In September 2002, the SG announced in his letter to the staff: “The last round of reform focused on improving the way the Organization recruits and manages its human resources. This time we need to strengthen our ability to act as a good employer” (SG’s letter to the staff 23 September 2002).

This last round of reform efforts has meanwhile reached into the last year of SG Annan’s term. It will not be possible to complete all those pending HR management reform tasks by the end of 2006, although SG Annan may have hoped to achieve most of his targets within his term and when he initiated his comprehensive management reforms in 1997. This means the continuation of this ongoing reform programme and the implementation of any additional management reforms that are demanded by Member States following the 60th anniversary Summit will be left for the next SG to accomplish.268

During the first year of the reform programme, efforts were concentrated on the building of consensus among actors. Structural changes were introduced to support the programme, including the creation of a number of new bodies serving consultations and the monitoring of reform measures in particular at the most senior management levels. Reforms also produced reductions of the expenditures and operational changes, including those involving field offices. In addition to staff reductions, reforms addressed the restructuring of departments and offices that indirectly also had an impact on the conditions of the staff of the UN Secretariat.

Major changes have taken place in view of technological innovations in the area of the overall management of the UN Secretariat, but in particular in the area of the HR management system. Through the increased use of media such as the UN Internet and Intranet, staff members as well as Member States could be kept informed on the progress

268 There are, for instance, indications for new standards of conduct, and the need of a number of additional management reforms as a reaction of Member States to SG Annan’s renewed reform proposal of March 2006 (A/60/692; also A/60/L.1).
of reforms and on upcoming changes, which helped to promote the reform programme throughout the organization.

It is obviously impossible to predict the direction and progress of HR management reforms under a new SG. The main areas, which will need to be addressed in the coming years of continuous reforms, and the issues that need to be more closely incorporated in this reform based on my assessment remain nonetheless the same.

The major challenge of the reform process remains the change of the organizational culture. Although the UN administration has used a variety of techniques ranging from promoting the new HR management to training and coaching of staff and managers on the aspects of the new, desired organizational culture in order to change their attitudes for almost 10 years, the organizational culture has changed little; from the very top, the leadership of Member States, to the lower levels of the UN Secretariat bureaucracy the organizational culture of the UN can be expressed by referring to sentiments of disappointment, mistrust, suspicion, fear and belligerence. At the same time, issues of ethics, accountability and transparency are vital concerns of UN staff members as much as of the legislators. If the UN is to become pro-active, more responsive in its management and more efficient and effective in its programme execution, all actors will have to change their attitudes and behaviours, and some will have to do so fundamentally, otherwise they will be left behind.

It is precisely these changes that will require a rethinking of the fundamental roles of UN civil servants. The change of the organizational culture to positive values, such as cooperation, client orientation, open communication and a supportive and innovative work environment, will be the corner stone of this management reform effort. The multicultural environment of the UN may contribute to the development and to the slowing of this process. Those who strive for a new UN that is flexible, little bureaucratic and can offer effective services at a good value will welcome the innovative approach of these reforms. Those who prefer continuity and stability to the system and fear that any change could diminish their own roles or functions and the overall ability of the UN to operate better worldwide will resist.
Both sets of those values, continuity and stability on one hand and flexibility and innovation, are vital for the UN to serve its many purposes as a forum and service organization and to serve its legislators (governments) and ultimate shareholders (the peoples).

Although the reduction of administrative expenditures is not the foremost goal of this reform programme, the aim of reforms have always been to operate more cost-effective since Member States pressed for changes whenever they felt that their contributions were not managed in their best interests. In many instances, interests of Member States vary, however, and the questions of what constitutes the best utilization of aid to fight hunger and poverty, of human rights issues and economic and social development conditions would need to be further explored as so many of these UN mandates have proven to be ineffective, if not in some instances counterproductive.

As for the management reform of the UN Secretariat, the implementation of internal reforms had to be realized within the regular budget provisions, which is based on a zero-growth policy. This gave little financial flexibility to the SG and his senior management team to develop, introduce and implement reforms. Staff reductions, temporary suspensions of the recruitment, appointment and promotion of staff, and cost reductions in general are, subsequently, a necessity during the course of this reform programme.

The revised reform proposal with the pioneering title “Investing in the United Nations for a stronger organization worldwide” (A/60/692) issued in March 2006 seems to signify the SG’s determination to send his message to Member States that continued reforms will require additional, not less funding and support by Member States. So far, many Member States acted like the many national reformers by demanding reforms as the means to reduce costs, while in fact organizational changes require an investment on the part of the shareholders, before higher returns can be achieved resulting from higher productivity and better management practices in an organization.

Unfortunately, recent debates about UN reforms in conjunction the approval of the budget for the biennium 2006/2007 demonstrate that Member States have not yet agreed on this

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269 For overall the development of the budget, see A/60/692: Figure 3, which illustrates the growth between 1996 and 2005.
basic prerequisite for successful reforms. To the contrary, as the reform process continues, the rift among Member States still exists exposing the deeper laying issues that divide the two major groups, the developed countries and the countries of the Group of 77. This division congeals the over twenty-year long ‘crisis’ of the organization and shows that the UN requires more than reforms of its structures and internal procedures. The UN needs to be repaired through a reformed Code of Conduct applicable to all its members.

As long as they cannot find consensus, reforms are at risk to fail or be further delayed. The ultimate responsibility for successful reforms is, therefore, with the Member States and the realization of reforms depends on their support by providing the necessary funding and political unity as well as strategic guidance.

Regrettably, Member States have shown no consistent support for UN HR management reform and have not pursued a further examination of the conditions of UN international civil servants, including a review of the remunerations and benefits to follow up on the findings of the 1992 salary review (see hereto chapter 2.7.3). That is not to ignore that conditions in some UN Member States’ civil services are substandard to the basic rights of UN international civil servants. Corruption in numerous Member States contributes to untenable conditions in those national civil services, including poor benefits and, in some instances, even deferred payments of salaries. Such examples demonstrate that UN reform has to go hand-in-hand with reforms of national civil services and changes of attitudes and behaviours in UN Member States.

In spite of the shortcomings of this reform programme, a number of important steps have been taken since the introduction of comprehensive reforms in 1997. The changes and reform projects accomplished by the end of 2005 have set the tone for the further development of UN reforms. As the reform of the UN HR management is part of a wider overall management reform of the organization, the progress of HR management reforms may have given some directions for reforms in other management areas.

This study of UN HR management reforms has not only exposed the still existing shortcomings of the current UN HR management system, but attempts to offer insights that may be useful to those who continue with the implementation of reforms. The main finding of this study is that UN reforms must be pursued under an inclusive reform
programme and must be carried out together with all actors. The final outcome of such reforms must be based on the agreement of legislators and of those who are most affected by the changes, the UN civil servants. The second important message, this study aims to convey is that there will be no effective UN reform without a fundamental organizational culture change.

Actions, such as the decentralizing of the UN HR management, the rewriting of rules and policies and the restructuring of the Secretariat (which may be extended to the UN system as a whole in future in order to increase the UN’s effectiveness) are the strategic, functional and structural components of this full change programme. The most important step of these reforms is the change of the ideological environment, the organizational culture, in which the shareholders from the lowest-ranking UN employee to the most eminent Member State Representative operate. This new culture of the UN cannot be prescribed or dictated from above, but must be ‘lived’ and realized by those who are responsible for the management of the organization, who are the legislators and managers of the organization.

Monitoring and controls as well as continuous evaluation of the evolution of the new management will be important to detect as early as possible whether things go right or wrong. It has been, however, already mentioned above that too much control can hamper the development of this new, positive culture of more innovation, greater flexibility and a sense of higher responsibility and self-governance. The today’s UN of rigid, bureaucratic rules, and duplications of controls and monitoring mechanisms (resulting in questionable consequences to its bureaucracy) provides almost no room to manage programmes, funds or personnel in accordance with modern management practices – indeed it is virtually a contradiction.

A renewal of the UN is only possible in the long term and by importing new ideas and a new generation of UN civil servants. In this respect, the UN is still on the same, old path that was already designed by UN reformers in the mid 1980s. If these new ideas will take roots to build the desired organizational culture, and if the new and young UN civil servants will remain devoted to the UN, will greatly depend on the way they will be
‘treated’, in better terms, on the job satisfaction, employment conditions and career opportunities offered by the UN.

Although the majority of staff members support reforms and hope that this reform programme will succeed, especially in the interest of better HR management practices and greater fairness, the analysis of the various, not necessarily directly to UN reform related surveys’ results, including the surveys of the Coordinating Committee in 2005, the Survey on Integrity in 2004 and my own pilot study of 2002, also show that a certain degree of reluctance to believe without any doubts in the success of this reform programme remains to exist among UN staff.

Such doubts are based on perceptions and distrust towards the leadership (Member States as well as the UN administration likewise), which is rooted deeper than UN reforms may wish to accept. It is irrelevant whether the multi-cultural environment of the UN is leading to more, less or equal nepotism, discrimination, harassment and other forms of misconduct of managers and staff in comparison with other organizations. Relevant in view of this reform is that such issues are correctly and consistently addressed and the climate of suspicion and uncertainty that necessarily developed over the last few years of ongoing reforms without clear and feasible improvements of the HR management is replaced by a climate that assures staff that they belong and are welcome as partners of legislators and senior managers in this organization.

The UN Secretariat has, unfortunately, not evolved as so many national administrations into an employer who applies at all times best HR management practices. Although the study of OIOS (issued as A/56/956) did not find sufficient evidence of systematic discrimination, the UN is not a place beyond unpleasant realities at the work place.

Gender balance and geographical distribution are as much issues as they have been in the past years, and it is not comprehensible why both principles are not equally applied to the total number of posts and rigidly throughout the Secretariat structures. The most serious oversight of all, in this connection, is the delay of the reform of the system of justice. A grave shortcoming of the current system of justice is that in too many instances recommendations of respective UN bodies, including those of the UNAT, have apparently been disregarded or rejected by the administration to the disadvantage of UN staff.
members as evidenced by research results established among others by the JIU (JIU/REP/2000/1) and Ameri (2003).

It is inexcusable that an organization with a Charter that contains guarantees for human rights and provisions for the equal opportunity of women and men does not stand by its own values and basic principles in the administration of its employees. The multi-cultural environment of the UN brings together staff and supervisors from a widely differing range of cultures and with diverse values and social attitudes; this naturally influences the management style and interpersonal behaviour of people working in the UN. As much as it makes for an interesting work environment, as much it can bring additional risks, such as the possibility of hidden discrimination of women by supervisors with a male-dominating background or conflicts that may arise from different social values expressed in conflicting attitudes and perceptions.

That harassment, including sexual harassment, mobbing and other issues of unethical behaviour have been recently dealt with in a much more meticulous and transparent way, could indicate that a new cultural shift has begun and managers are from now on held accountable to stricter standards. Nonetheless, organization-wide changes of the management culture will take time. The introduction of the Ethics Office and a comprehensive review of the existing auditing and oversight machinery of the UN Secretariat are expected to bring a number of improvements in this area (A/60/568). It can only be hoped that these new administrative units will be real improvements and not just another administrative element to justify a certain political aim.

The reform of the UN HR management – the first ever attempted on a full scale - may be still incomplete with many of the proposed activities not being on target, but the enormous accomplishments of getting the progress started cannot be underestimated. It is significant that the SG who has succeeded by putting this first comprehensive reform programme forward (which he revised and complemented several times during its course) is a UN civil servant himself promoted through the ranks of the organization, with a concrete insider knowledge. SG Annan has certainly made his mark in the history of the UN in this respect.
The following chapters provide a collection of thoughts to this reform and topics that have not or, in my opinion, not sufficiently been addressed in this reform programme and those that are perceived as the central future challenges of the new HR management.

5.2 Future Challenges

5.2.1 The new Generation of UN Managers

As the discussion of the decentralization and the new functions of the OHRM revealed, the reform of the UN Secretariat’s HR management system will also change the roles and functions of Personnel and Recruitment Officers in addition to those of line managers. This will require that the Secretariat assign greater emphasis to personnel management skills when recruiting professionals into management positions. Furthermore, junior professionals will have to be prepared through systematic training for their future HR management responsibilities.

The decentralization of the HR management system and the influx of managers from other organizations and private sector organizations with a more modern HR management style cannot be a sufficient guarantee that the UN HR management will change into a more efficient and fairer system. It will be necessary to introduce a number of additional supportive and controlling mechanisms to assure the continuous improvement and development of UN HR management practices. Training and the continuously educating of staff on the application of HR management techniques will have to remain central instruments in this connection.

Reforms will hopefully lead in the near future to concrete, material and functional improvements, such as competitive UN salaries, adequate entitlements, equal work conditions throughout the Secretariat and the UN system and a operative staff development and career development system. The application of such fundamental changes will depend, however, on the qualification of managers and the quality of assistance by the centrally managed OHRM.

Many UN managers have difficulties adjusting to the new HR management philosophy, because they were not forced in the past to practise good HR management. Their main responsibilities were the planning and management of programmes, and HR management
was left to a large degree to the respective Executive Officers or to OHRM. Good HR management requires, however, a different set of analytical and management skills and involve a manager’s ability to manage situations of emotional and psychological aspects.

The new UN management philosophy will demand of managers to accept themselves as partners of their teams rather than the remote boss who is almost invisible and unapproachable to their staff. In this respect, it will be useful for many senior managers to consider a return to a more person-oriented management style as was practised by some of the former UN managers.270

With the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the UN, the organization is meanwhile managed by the forth generation of international civil servants. Succeeding generations of staff and managers have brought about changes of the organizational culture as much as the organizational culture changed as a reaction to internal and external events.

Future generations of UN managers and staff will continue to bring changes into the UN’s internal environment. The major challenge of this reform is to stir the development of the organizational culture and to develop the kind of HR management philosophy that is supportive to the mandates of the UN. Both will have to agree with the values and competencies proclaimed by the reform programme.271

While new generations of staff and managers will continue to introduce changes to the UN’s internal system of values and believes, so will the existing organizational culture over time influence the mentality of the staff members. Which of these two forces will be more influential will depend on the organizational climate that will determine the degree of positive or negative resistance to the desired changes.

Experienced observers of the UN administration have already critically remarked on the shortcomings of the organization’s management with respect to past reform efforts. They have pointed out that today’s problems exist because the organization did neglect the many

270 Examples are in addition to SG Dag Hammarskjöld the many senior managers who joined the staff for lunch in the cafeteria and would casually visit work units and sections frequently to talk to their staff. Such characteristics are today unfortunately hard to find even within the middle management of the UN Secretariat.

271 According to the booklet ‘Competencies for the Future’, such values include integrity, professionalism and respect for diversity. For competencies see also chapter 3.3.5.
opportunities in the past to renew itself and to change the ways the UN is managed.\textsuperscript{272} The years of reforming the UN since 1985, but in particular since 1997, offer a chance to repair the one most central aspect of the imperfect UN HR management system, which is the qualification of managers in view of the leadership skills and partners of their staff.

With the arrival of larger numbers of younger professionals, the future managers of the UN, it is imperative to apply a more modern, flexible and open management philosophy if the UN Secretariat wants to retain those new generation of UN civil servants.

5.2.2 Building Trust and Acceptance

The lack or loss of trust in the UN appears repeatedly in official reports and is observed by nearly every scholar familiar with the organizational culture and climate of the UN. This phenomenon has also been acknowledged by UN senior managers and can be established for the various categories of staff throughout the organization. Representatives of the UN administration and staff representatives each claim that the other party does not offer the desired trusting cooperation and their hidden objectives must be considered carefully.

There is also a significant lack of trust on the part of UN civil servants towards Member States and on the part of Member States toward UN managers, often expressed in a strong tendency of those very Member States to micro-manage the organization through respective actions taken in the legislative bodies of the UN (see hereto also Stanley Foundation 1997).

Both the absence of trust of certain government into the competency or independence of UN administrations and the identified low levels of trust on the part of the civil servants towards the leadership (towards Member States good intentions as well as the competencies of the internal management of the UN Secretariat) creates a serious problem in this reform process. The absence of trust (and therefore consensus among the various groups of actors) is an obstacle in the successful implementation of reforms, including the

\textsuperscript{272} Among the most experienced critics of the UN are Maurice Bertrand (1988, 1990, 1995), who was between 1968 and 1985 a member of the JIU, Yves Beigbeder (1987, 1988, 1997) a long-experienced practitioner of the UN, and two former senior managers of the UN, Erskine Childers and Brian Urquhart (1994).
building of a new climate and new organizational culture (see hereto also UN Staff Report Vol. 24, No. 1 and UN Staff Report Vol. 24, No. 2).

The success of this reform relies heavily on the acceptance by the internal actors and this acceptance will be built on trust that reform measures are in the best interest of the staff concerned. This trust may or may not be confirmed through the practical implications and results of such reforms. In addition, trust and acceptance are particularly of importance when reform proposals presented to Member States for approval have financial implications.

As mentioned before, Member States appear to pursue the erroneous belief that reforms decrease expenditures, while in reality efficient reform implementations cause additional costs before changes amortise. In addition, a fundamentally trusting relationship between Member States and the senior management who is driving the course of this reform is vital for the beneficial realization of the required changes, without any obstructive interference of Member States.

Actions of Member States, which caused delays for the achievement of specific reform issues, have led at times to reservations about the true motives of legislators among the UN staff and managers. This is in particular the case, when reforms that would raise UN safety and work place standards to the levels of many national civil services cannot be implemented due to the lack of attention or funding by Member States. The reluctance of a number of Member States to take swift actions when it comes to the approval of reforms and to pay their contributions in full and on time has certainly raised doubts among the UN staff and diminished the staff’s confidence in the honest desire of these Member States real reform ambitions.

Change creates anxiety and resistance among a certain number of employees. Anxiety and resistance can increase as reforms do not show the suggested immediate improvements or
are implemented with great delays.\textsuperscript{273} Although reform is a process and not a brief event – as numerous times pointed out SG Annan, a process that takes in the eyes of the actors unnecessarily long is a serious threat to the successful completion of reforms.

If in addition, reforms are introduced into an environment of mistrust as in the case of the UN unwarranted delays could increase the resistance among the staff and managers and those Member States who may not be fully committed to a UN reform. A failed reform caused by such unfortunate circumstances as discussed above would certainly be a tough obstacle to any future reforms.\textsuperscript{274}

5.2.3 Representation of Women - a forgotten Reform Issue?

Women worldwide perform 51 per cent (in industrialized countries) to 53 per cent of all work, but are only remunerated for about one third of the work they do and have (on average) less power by office or professional status than men (Babbie 1998: 181-182; also United Nations Development Programme (Ed.) 1995).

How does this picture of the global inequality among the genders translate into the international civil service of the UN? As in the ‘real’ world, women in the UN Secretariat are equally in a much less advantageous situation than men. Although women represent almost 51 per cent of all civil servants of the UN Secretariat, they are noticeably less represented in the Professional Service category with a reported 41.3 per cent in June 2005 and 23.7 per cent among the most top management positions (source: A/60/310: paras. 47-48; see also A/57/414: para. 67; A/59/263/Add.2).

\textsuperscript{273} Schreyögg estimates that the probability of organizational changes to be met by ‘perceptional dismissal’ is rather high (Schreyögg 2000: 486). Furthermore, Schreyögg uses the term ‘pre-orientation’ to explain how in change management programmes the previous experience of long-term employees in view of former reform efforts and the effects of organizational changes in terms of personal improvements, for instance of individuals’ career developments or work conditions, can determine the attitude of employees towards later reform efforts.

\textsuperscript{274} This ‘pre-orientation’ is the result of negative experiences UN staff members made during former management reforms and may lead to selective observations and pre-judgement to confirm perceptions and earlier experiences. As research indicates, the first experience (\textit{Ersterfahrung}; Schreyögg 2000: 486) with unfulfilled previous reform promises of the administration, in particular, if such experiences are repeated throughout the employees’ service in this organization, often results in ignorance of information non-conform with these earlier (negative) experiences or is not perceived sincerely. For the full discussion of reform resistance and how change managers can overcome this resistance refer to Schreyögg 2000: 485-494.
Exceptions of low representation of women are such occupational groups that are traditionally associated with ‘female professions’, such as Language Teachers, Tour Guides, and clerical functions at the General Service level. Despite regulations to ensure equal treatment of women and men in the international service in terms of salaries and benefits, there is strong evidence of the inequitable treatment women experience during their career in the UN in terms of career opportunities and recognition.

Article 8 of the UN Charter ensures equal employment opportunities of women and men within the organization by stating: “The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.” In addition, reform documents frequently refer to the status of women in the UN Secretariat in accordance with the provision of geographical distribution outlined in Article 101. To merge the question of equal rights of women and men with the principle of equitable geographical distribution is, however, inadequate if the representation of women is to be improved on all levels of the organizational hierarchy of the UN. Gender issues are regulated in the practice of the UN management by the Personnel Manual, Administrative Instructions (e.g. ST/Al/379), and through Information Circulars (e.g. ST/IC/1992/67), and Bulletins issued by the SG (e.g. ST/SGB/237).

As is the case with some of the other HR management measures discussed in the context of this ongoing UN HR management reform programme, the improvement of the representation of women in the international civil service of the UN is another not-so-new issue in the history of the organization. A first initiative undertaken by the GA in the interest of “issues of special concern to women” was the establishing of the Commission on the Status of Women in 1946 (JIU/REP/94/3: 40; ST/Al/382; ST/Al/412). After numerous resolutions had been approved with respect to the improvement of the status of women in the organization during the 1970s and early 1980s, the issue of the inadequate representation of women in the UN Secretariat became a renewed and stronger focus during the 45th GA (A/55/427: para. 21; also JIU/REP/94/3).

Main efforts instituted over the past 60 years to increase the representation of women in the organization concentrate on policies related to the recruitment, promotion and mobility
of women (A/49/587: para. 38). ‘Mainstreaming’ gender perspectives into all policies and programme in the UN system became the slogan since the mid 1980s.275

In hindsight, the goal of achieving gender balance among the UN employees (the so-called 50/50-goal) by the end of 2000 was unrealistic from the beginning.276 Without lasting policies in place to support the consequent recruitment and promotion of women in this male-dominated organizational culture of the UN, appointments of women did not reach the desired levels to create a gender-balanced UN (JIU/REP/94/3: paras. 50-51, 53).

Progress continued to be slow, despite repeated requests by legislators and various new measures introduced by the SG, such as different seniority criteria to support the expeditious promotion of women, which were prescribed by the JIU as “discriminatory towards male candidates” and such drastic measures as the de-facto temporary suspension of the recruitment of men in January 1995 (JIU/REP/96/6: iv).

Historic evidence shows that none of the measures introduced after 1985 could establish rapid changes in the representation of women throughout the organization or to their career opportunities. The strategic plan of action for the improvement of the status of women in the Secretariat (1995 to 2000) was insufficient to tackle the problem of low recruitment and promotion records of female employees. As we know now, the prognoses of the Focal Point for Women in 1994 to reach the target of 35 per cent representation of women overall by 2000 and of 25 per cent at the senior levels by 1997 through these new strategies, were too optimistic.277 Only by the end of 2002 could such results be accomplished.278

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276 Equally unrealistic had been the former date for reaching gender-balance in the UN by 1980 (JIU/REP/94/3: 6).
278 The overall proportion of women in the professional and higher categories (P1-USG) reached in late 2002 the ratio of 35%, but remains at the senior management level (D1-USG) at a ratio of 25% (A/57/447: paras. 4-5 and Table 1 attached hereto as Annex VII). See hereto also Network, Vol. 7, No. 3 which refers to the report of the status of women in the UN system (A/58/374) that states that women “account for 35.6 per cent of Professional and higher-level staff with appointments of one year and more in the Secretariat.”
One of the obstacles to faster progress is the relatively low significance the ongoing reform programme of 1997 assigns to gender equality. While other actions are emphasized as central reform goals, the issue of representation of women is addressed as a general aim with the promise to reach gender balance in the UN Secretariat (A/51/950: para. 230; A/53/376). Moreover, after the strategic plan of action (1995 to 2000) failed to produce a gender-balanced bureaucracy by the year 2000, the UN administration continues to employ the same measures. The hidden reasons of the problem, caused by the (still) male-dominated culture of the UN Secretariat are not sufficiently tackled in a sound and systematic way. The SG is, nevertheless, required to provide progress reports on the implementation of the system-wide medium-term plan for the advancement of women (see for instance E/CN.6/1998/8; E/CN.6/1999/5 and E/CN.6/2001/5).

Special measures (re-)introduced during the reform programme 1997 to improve the representation of women comprise (A/RES/54/139; A/57/447; ST/AI/1999/9):

a. The inclusion of the objective of improving gender balance in action plans on human resources management for individual departments and offices;

b. Policies to ensure that appointments and promotions of suitably qualified women will be no less than 50 per cent of all appointments and promotions until the goal of 50/50 gender distribution is met;

c. Specific mandates of the Steering Committee for the Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat to monitor the implementation of the special measures for the achievement of gender balance, of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women to monitor and facilitate progress in the implementation of the strategic plan to be given to, and of the Central Review Bodies (CRBs) to ensure adherence to the prescribed procedures and the substance of progress related to the appointment and promotion of women;

d. Training programmes tailored to the gender issues (so-called gender mainstreaming training);
e. The creation of a gender-sensitive work environment (with flexible working hours, child-care and elder-care programmes, and better spouse-employment opportunities) within existing resources.

Although all those measures were put in place, the representation of women was not improved at the expected levels throughout the Secretariat. Especially, the number of women in leading positions increased at a slower pace than expected within the organization. Despite the introduction of numerous new internal instructions and the creation of new institutions concerned with women issues, changes did not take place more rapidly. As a result, the SG announced that a special roster in support of the accelerated promotion programme for women in the UN Secretariat be established (A/59/263/Add.2: para. 14). The usefulness of such newer mechanisms is, however, doubtful based on official statistics presented in Annex VII.

HR management reforms could not obliterate that women are less likely promoted than men in the UN Secretariat, even though women accept frequently new assignments and move more often between different departments and duty stations and are, consequently, twice as mobile as their male colleagues (A/57/447: 1). In other words, even those measures that are designed under the current reform programme to improve the qualifications and, as proclaimed, the chances to be promoted, such as flexibility and mobility, do not appear to play a favourable role in the career advancement of female UN civil servants compared with their male colleagues.

It is further disappointing, that none of the bodies involved in the area of gender improvement have the expressed authority to investigate and effectively object to actions suspected to be in breach of the overall policy to improve the representation of women. There is no central authority given to any of these institutions to take corrective actions
against alleged cases of violations. The three bodies, the Special Adviser, the Steering Committee and the CRB, were given solely advisory and/or monitory powers.\textsuperscript{279}

In September 2002 (and five years into reforms), SG Annan acknowledged that there is still “a long way to go” (A/57/387: para. 172) until the organization could achieve an acceptable gender balance, in particular at the senior levels. Unfortunately, the finding of the JIU proved during the ongoing reform process as valid as it had been then, which is that “the major obstacles to women’s advancement – in recruitment, career development, training and work-family-related issues, and grievance redress systems – have been much talked about, but scarcely reduced” (JIU/REP/94/3: iii). Insufficient actions since 1985, but also in connection with the 1997 reform programme made the improvement of women representation within the UN Secretariat over the past years a plan without effective strategies (A/RES/52/96; A/RES/55/69).

In an attempt to speed up the process, specific measures have been introduced since 1999 to alter the employment and promotion procedures in favour of the recruitment, appointment and promotion of women in the UN Secretariat. So are, for instance, since late 1999 the provisions of eligibility under the UN Staff Rules waived for female candidates, which allows women at the P-4 level to apply for internal vacancies at the higher (P-5) level after only one year of service (cumulated over two years preceding the application), regardless of their contractual status (ST/AI/1999/9: para. 1.4).

By relaxing the eligibility provision and using the principle of ‘cumulative seniority’ (calculating the years a woman has served in the system in her present and previous position), as well as the principle of accelerated promotion for female candidates, more women are to be appointed and promoted (ST/AI/1999/9: paras. 1.6-1.8). In order for departments and offices to fulfil their goal to recruit and promote women through a

\textsuperscript{279} The terms of reference of the Steering Committee demonstrate the weak position of these bodies in terms of their real authority to introduce or to press for changes. These terms include tasks such as “to review and evaluate the Strategic Plan for the Improvement of the Status of Women in the Secretariat”, “to initiate and review proposals for policies and concrete measures for the achievement of the goal of gender balance in the Secretariat”, and “to review the impact of proposed reforms in human resources management policies and practices” (ST/SGB/1999/9: Section 2.1). They do, however, not establish any effective instruments or even clear relations with other institutions that could ensure the legal enforcement of their proposals.
vacancy-planning scheme, OHRM is supposedly assisting managers by identifying qualified women (ST/AI/1999/9: para. 1.5).

Contrary to this approach, the decentralized HR management system (SSS) introduced as of May 2002 permits complete disregard of the principle of seniority in the appointment of men and women. As a result, all applicants must have served a minimum of two years at the P-4 level, before they will be considered for the next higher P-5 position. This poses a conflict insofar that recruitment decisions of managers are no longer bound to respect the policy of accelerated promotions and one-year ‘cumulative seniority’ of women over men.

Though it may be too early to evaluate the practical impact of SSS with respect to the representation of women, it would be advisable to monitor developments and to evaluate recruitment and appointment practices to detect early any disadvantages for the promotion of women. Such an evaluation could determine whether or not SSS and the decentralized HR management had a negative impact on the representation of women in the Secretariat. It would further provide necessary indicators for determining if corrective actions were required to ensure long-term improvements of the gender balance.

In addition to improving gender balance in numbers, it would further be important to explore the issue of hidden discrimination in the organization as recent cases of sexual harassment and abuse involving senior UN managers and their staff came to light. The improvement of gender balance and the management of hidden gender discrimination in the Secretariat, which must be presumed to be a main obstacle to improved gender balance, would both repair the UN’s damaged image as a (still) mainly male-dominated organization.

5.2.4 The Aging Secretariat

How the UN can attract and retain future generations of young international civil servants and the keep the right mix of experienced and younger employees will be important questions as increasing numbers of its staff reach the retirement age. The average age of UN civil servants in the active service of the UN Secretariat could be successfully decreased in the course of this reform programme from 49 years (in 1997) to a constant 46 years (since 2002) (Re-Reform No. 3; A/57/414; A/60/310).
Taking into account that the average age at the entry level is 37 years for the Professional category and 44.5 years in the General Service category, the average age of the UN Secretariat work force will, however, not fall significantly below the 43-year margin unless drastic changes in the practice of the UN recruitment will occur (A/60/310: para. 54). An option for the rejuvenating would be to restrict employment by introducing a maximum age limit.

By lowering the retirement age from 62 to 60, additional vacancies would be freed for the recruitment of younger staff. When considering the worldwide trend of an aging work force and the necessity of securing long-term financing of the UN pension fund system, a return to the 60-year mandatory retirement ceiling is most unlikely.

Reforms have uncovered the UN’s past failure to manage its staff succession planning and to retain young professionals. On the other hand, there is no scientific evidence that organizations with larger number of older employees would be less competitive or less productive. That older UN international civil servants are often less productive, less flexible and less prone to change, but more reluctant or resistant to learn about or utilize new technologies is rather based on myths and assumptions than on scientifically established facts.

To the contrary, research in the USA has supported a “number of counterassertions about older workers” (Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 98). Older employees are, according to such findings, less absent from work, “have fewer accidents, less alcoholism and drug addiction”, “show few or no differences in adaptability and productivity” and “often cost their employers less” (ibid.). They also tend to be more often on time than their younger colleagues and “receive higher ratings on job skills, loyalty, reliability, maturity, interpersonal relations” and demonstrate often “a strong work ethic” (ibid.).

The observed numbers of resignations of younger staff combined with the average age of new recruits must, nonetheless be accepted as a critical aspect in this HR management

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280 It must be noted in this connection that in 2002 the mandatory age of separation for all UN employees has been amended from 60 years to 62 as a precautionary measure to support the building of sufficient financial reserves by the UN Pension Fund (Highlights No. 24, Oct.-Dec. 2001; A/56/846). This decision applies to all staff recruited after January 1990 (A/57/413: para. 3).
reform programme and must be taken into account in the implementation of further changes of the recruitment system, the staff development, career development and succession planning of the UN. As larger numbers of UN civil servants retire now then in earlier years of the UN, and the mechanisms to deal with future, increasing vacancies are insufficient, it will be vital to introduce quickly effective succession planning instruments.\textsuperscript{282}

Retirements over the coming years will require that the UN recruit larger numbers of younger individuals in order to build and maintain a diverse work force in view of age and talents. As mandates of the UN may further change, it will be important to train a pool of younger managers from which the organization can select its future leadership through (still to be established) progressive career development programmes.

Until such a new generation of younger UN managers is trained, any preferential treatment in the appointment and promotion of younger staff over staff members with seniority and advanced UN experience could, however, affect the staff morale and prove detrimental to the performance of UN programmes. In order to support the advanced rejuvenation of the UN Secretariat, the SG proposed a one-time buy-out programme for approval by the GA in 2006.

These additional vacancies together with vacancies resulting from expected retirements will create a potential for the UN Secretariat to recruit younger and highly trained professionals who will better fit the new job descriptions. In this connection, it must also be taken into account that for the majority of the most qualified (and therefore older) individuals who will join the UN as a second or even third career opportunity, the decision to join the UN civil service may be their last and final career decision. These individuals with long-term professional and management experience will be less tolerable to inadequate management practices for different reasons than those applicable to younger or long-term staff.

\textsuperscript{281} For trends on population ageing see United Nations (Ed.) 2002

\textsuperscript{282} Latest statistics show that between July 2003 and June 2004 almost 39\% staff members retired and 22\% resigned (A/60/310: para. 66).
Any changes of HR recruitment, appointment and promotion policies, in particular those giving certain preferences to new or younger recruits, will have to be considered carefully for not violating basic human rights or discriminating applicants e.g. due to their age which will further diminish staff morale. The UN will be well advised to follow examples, such as the US national civil service, with specific legislation of anti-discriminatory regulations.

5.2.5 The Issue of Time and Money

The timely realization of the reform programme is important in order to bring about the desired changes of the UN HR management system in addition to other required changes of the internal management. As reforms are implemented within the limitations of the regular budget, it is imperative that additional financial sources become available, since the regular budget proves insufficient to pay for all expenditures incurred by reform activities.

Many reform activities rely on the expertise of outside consultants and depend on the implementation of technological instruments and other changes, which will increase the expenditures of the organization if these activities are to be introduced quickly and effectively. Certain delays may be necessary in order to build consensus among the various groups of actors within the UN Secretariat. Significant delays in the implementation of reforms can, however, lead to the loss of confidence into the reform process, destabilize the reform process and, consequently, diminish the success of these reforms.

Nonetheless, the transformation of the UN Secretariat into the desired modern organization is a long-term and complex venture. Many changes require careful planning and coordination and must take into consideration the worldwide, different operations of the organization, its multi-cultural nature and its obligation to deliver successfully programme

283 As we know, the suspensions of promotions as a result of the financial restrictions of the UN had significant consequences for the moral of UN civil servants in the past (SCB/1467: 2). Therefore, it is important that this reform establishes trust-building mechanisms. Suspensions of permanent appointments, such as the one introduced on 1 November 1995, and other policies that may affect the job security and contractual status of longer-term UN civil servants could further undermine the staff moral in the UN Secretariat.
results while the implementation of reforms is ongoing. Since many of the proposed changes cannot be introduced without the agreement among and approval of Member States, in addition to the approval of additional reform expenditures, the timetable of reforms is to a large extend determined not by the UN administration, but by the Member States.

Time is an issue, however, not only in view of the effective implementation of reforms, but also in terms of the continuity of reforms. After SG Annan’s term expires at the end of 2006, many reform measures will be incompletely implemented. The new SG and his senior management team will possibly add new aspects to the reform process based on their views and experience. This may lead to further changes of this ongoing reform programme.

Such changes could prove both constructive and disruptive to the continuous implementation of reforms. In addition, requests of additional reforms or changes thereof by the GA could create delays or a disruption of the implementation of ongoing reforms. So could, for instance, the various demands on the SG to report on detailed questions with respect to the implementation of reforms in connection with as well as in addition to the already existing reporting system derail the programme by causing unnecessary delays in the introduction of changes. As many of the proposed UN HR management reforms are interrelated, a delay of one component may cause delays in a number of other areas of this reform programme.

Chances are that the repetitive demand for more detailed information on reform issues is further delaying the implementation of reforms and may even cause this long-term reform effort to fail by preventing that immediate, necessary decisions and actions are taken to introduce those much desired management improvements. Unless the implementation has, however, advanced to a reasonable stage, it will be impossible to determine with certainty whether or not those changes have produced the desired results.

5.3 Reforming Staff Representation

The ongoing reform of internal management processes and structures of the UN Secretariat does not include changes of the existing system of staff representation. This study
contains several references to the role and status of the UN Staff Union in connection with various HR management reform aspects and pointed to the difficult staff-management relations, which led to the total breakdown of staff-management consultations in 2004.

Since late 2005 relations between the UN Staff Union and management have returned to a more cooperative atmosphere, but the differences between the Staff Union’s reform expectations and the reform approach taken by the UN administration persist (SCB/42/3). Overall, the Staff Union could influence HR management decisions only marginally, despite its strong objections and although it could at times successfully mobilize staff to demonstrate against administrative decisions during the course of this ongoing reform programme.

On one hand, the administration displayed the attitude that the Staff Union is not to co-manage this reform (or the Secretariat in general), on the other hand, the participation of staff representatives in reform working groups and in staff-management consultations may not have been sufficiently planned and coordinated to be successful.

Such issues highlight the problematical state of the UN Staff Union and its relatively weak position compared with most national labour unions. In fact, the UN Staff Union was not given the same rights to effectively defend the interests of the UN civil servants as were established in many public services of UN Member States and is, therefore, not equipped to fight against decisions of the shareholders (Member States) and the UN management.284

So does Article 2(b) of the Statute of the Staff Union determine that the Staff Union is to “promote and safeguard the rights and interests and welfare of all members of the staff of the United Nations” (UN Staff Union 1993). According to the provisions of the UN Charter, the UN Staff Regulations 8.1 and 8.2 and the UN Staff Rules 108.1 and 108.2, the Staff Union is, however, not given the right of formal negotiations and equal participation

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284 While in many Member States of the UN labour unions are major player in the private and public sector, some with a history of successfully negotiating significant improvements of the work conditions and rights of employees, the UN Staff Union has neither equivalent rights of participation nor the financial resources as many of those national public service unions. Examples of strong unions in industrialized countries representing employees in the private or public sector are the CFDT in France, the ÖTV (VERDI) and IG Metall in Germany, the GMB in the UK and the Teamsters in the US. For the different role of labour unions in the private versus the public sector see Condrey (Ed.) 1998: 249.
in HR management decisions, but simply invited to consultations with the UN administration (Beigbeder 1987: 127).

The roles of the two coordinating entities, the Coordinating Committee of International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations (CCISUA) and the Federation of International Civil Servants’ Associations (FICSA), are equally toothless as their mandates and objectives are purely instrumental in the coordination and consultation process between the member unions and the UN administration.\

The current HR management reform offers now an opportunity to strengthen the role of the Staff Union by improving the consultative staff-management mechanisms and by introducing real participatory instruments. This will be especially important since it appears that the Staff Union’s reputation as an effective instrument of staff representation has weakened.

Although the majority of staff still perceive the Staff Union as an important institution that defends the rights of UN civil servants, observations in the course of this study also show that many staff members (and about 90% of those interviewed in connection with UN HR management reforms) doubt that the Staff Union is able (or willing to) effectively represent the staff. This low opinion among staff of the effectiveness of their staff representatives and the Staff Union in general, does meanwhile not lead to more interest and engagement of staff members in the work of the Staff Union.

To the contrary, the less staff members are convinced that the Staff Union may be able to make a difference, the more they seem to ignore the efforts and successes of their staff representatives.

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285 CCISUA includes staff unions and associations of the Secretariat and UNESCO and UNICEF. FICSA includes staff unions and associations of all the common-system organizations (for details see http://www.ccisua.org and http://www.ficsa.org). According to Beigbeder, until 1973, there was only one staff association in each organization, until in April 1973 the UNOG Staff Coordinating Association was established (Beigbeder 1987: 81 and 127).

286 During interviews and informal talks with staff at the various duty stations, many respondents spoke of the lack of ability of the UN Staff Union to strongly defend the interests of the staff. Some respondents also questioned the integrity of staff representatives. So did, for instance, some respondents speak of their beliefs that staff representatives and the Staff Council represent an opinion that is at times not shared by the majority of the staff. Others mentioned that they believed that the Staff Council was not honestly trying to cooperate in a constructive manner with management in order to improve the situation of the staff.
By increasing the number of active members, the UN Staff Union would be able to participate in or contribute to the many committees and working groups more effectively. It would be in a position to build a larger pool of experienced staff representatives, and by attracting more staff members to become paying union members, the Staff Union would further gain financially.

Unfortunately, the UN Staff Union is, like the UN Secretariat, facing increasingly similar problems of attracting sufficient numbers of new (and younger) individuals who would be willing to actively participate in the work of the Staff Union. Eventually, this will make succession planning in the UN Staff Union (including its Staff Associations at duty stations away from headquarters) more and more difficult. It will be, therefore, important for the Staff Union to examine how it can attract new (active, paying) members and what can be done involve more staff directly into the work of the Staff Union’s various working groups and other activities, outside its established, elected bodies.\(^\text{287}\)

In addition, the Staff Union could in connection with a Staff Union reform consider alternative ways of raising additional funds, in addition to its current way of funding its activities and look into an union-tailored training programme for staff representatives and those appointed into key positions within the Staff Council to expand their knowledge and improve their skills.

The most important issue, however, would be the lobbying for the establishing of a Staff Union modelled after unions representing national civil servants. True reform of the UN HR management system naturally also requires a modernization of the UN Staff Union system, including its network of Staff Associations, its internal management, its legislative structures, most of all, however, it requires the establishment of true participatory mechanisms in internal management decisions.

It is astonishing in a way that the Staff Union itself has not considered – at least not publicly – a thorough review of its own role and procedures to adapt to the new UN HR management system.

\(^{287}\) Although the Statute of the Staff Union determines that every staff member regardless of contractual status is automatically a member, the number of staff members who pay their membership dues and of those who are permanently, actively involved in the work of the Staff Union is very small and basically equivalent to the number of staff representatives throughout the UN Secretariat.
management system. It is, on the other hand, also astounding that neither legislators nor UN administrators have seemingly considered a reform of the staff representation system necessary in connection with HR management reforms.

It is hoped that this oversight in the reform process is not a sign of lacking confidence on one hand or of the low significance the Staff Union may be given by legislators and administrators, on the other hand.

5.4 Directions for Future Research

This study referred to a large number of publications ranging from issues of reforms of public service organizations to organization theories and studies of the internal management of the UN and other international organizations issued by researchers and practitioners. Unfortunately, research concerning the UN management is not very systematic and theory building of international management is non-existent.

Most authors have researched the internal management of international organizations, including the UN, on selective issues or as comparative study of various international organizations. None of these approaches provides sufficient findings from which conclusions could lead to a common analysis of the management of international organizations. Management requirements of international organizations are in many aspects distinct from those of national public administrations or organizations of the private sector.

General organization theories and management theories proved to be useful for this study of the UN HR management reform, but could not be directly applied to the specific management features of the UN. The UN exists in a unique political environment with legislative structures of a Member States assembly and Councils of elected representatives of those Member States, each with specifically defined legislative authorities.

The different funding modalities consisting of a regular budget and a variety of extra-budgetary funds for the many mandates of the UN and the complex, world-wide operating system of the UN also require a different approach in the UN management of financial and human resources. The ‘simplistic’ approach of organization theories in the analysis of
national public sector and private sector organizations does not capture these different characteristics and management aspects of international organizations.

The ongoing UN management reform has utilized practical experience of national public sector reforms in many Member States and has employed a number of experts and consultants to explore the specific shortcomings of the UN management. It has also used experience gained from its own past reform history, mainly the experience that reforms cannot be introduced without the involvement of the staff and managers, even if not always applied throughout this reform process as has been claimed convincingly by the UN Staff Union.

As has been already mentioned in chapter 1.3, there is a large potential for more systematic research into the internal management of international organizations to gain further theoretical and empirical knowledge of the many specific management requirements. This reform offers a new opportunity to evaluate the implementation process and the final implications of reform measures, in particular those of the UN HR management.

Such research findings could serve a number of other international and regional organizations, which are under equal pressures to introduce management reforms. More comparative studies would be useful to learn from the successes and failures of the reforms of others.\textsuperscript{288}

We know especially not enough about the impact of the various cultural influences on the overall organizational culture of international organizations and how these different cultural values and beliefs relate to a possible reform-resistance (or could be used constructively to enhance the reform process). Such analytical knowledge could prove very useful for the change of the existing organizational culture.

The pilot study conducted in connection with this study provided some valuable indicators on the perception and attitudes of UN staff members towards reforms. Surveys on issues such as staff mobility, job satisfaction and integrity did provide useful information on the ‘mood’ among the staff.

\textsuperscript{288} The Studies of Maguire (Ed.) (1996) and Kaul (1996) referenced in this study are among such comparative reform analyses.
To further explore on a much larger platform the reservations (or enthusiasm) of staff and managers of the UN Secretariat towards reform, the already implemented changes of the UN HR management system and those still in progress, a worldwide survey specifically designed to inquire into HR management reform issues would be extremely informative to administrators and legislators.

Cultural influences are also an issue when analysing gender equality in international organizations. Gender issues are extensively researched in the context of social, historical and cultural studies and as issues of national labour laws and political developments in societies on a national or multi-national, comparative level. Questions of gender equality in international organizations, including the UN, have unfortunately not been examined as scientific topics, neither in connection with studies of the international management, nor in view of the employment conditions in international organizations.

As a result, we have many different assumptions about the impact of different cultural values and beliefs on the organizational culture of international organizations and, therefore, on the careers, employment and work conditions of women in those organizations, but have no knowledge that would be founded on scientific research. Furthermore, we have little systematic knowledge of the external influences by an environment that can prove to be extremely hostile to women rights, as is the case in so many UN field duty stations, and how these influences can affect the work, health and career development of women.

Since the UN stands for defending human rights and for the development of equal rights for women under the headlines of its many mandates and programmes, it is unacceptable that no systematic analysis of its very own (male-dominated) organizational culture and management practices has been conducted, while so many scholars have researched the effectiveness of its programmes in less developed countries.

That neither Member States with strict legislation to assure gender equality in their national public administrations and political systems nor UN administrators ignored the need for further research to detect the hidden issues that slow the equal representation of women in the UN, while for other management issues experts have been appointed and
commissions have been established, may be an indication of the low significance assigned to gender issues in the UN.

There are also other aspects of the UN leadership and internal management that would need to be researched in order to either confirm or refute assumptions and incomplete knowledge on the issues. For instance, although there is much talk about the behaviour and political influence of particular members and groups of Member States of the UN, there is no systematic analysis of the impact of such factors on the success or failure of past or current reforms.

Furthermore, as legislators demand reforms that might have been successfully implemented in their own national public sector, it would be useful to evaluate the long-term practical impact of such national reforms before designing similar UN reform measures. The example of the Assessment Centre Approach, which was discontinued in some Member States and has not presented any advantages as discussed in chapter 3.3.3 is an indication that such research could prove to be useful in the further development of reforms.

Then, there are a number of issues of this ongoing UN management reform that would deserve additional systematic analysis, such as the question of the effectiveness of the new recruitment, placement and promotion system, the value of the PAS, and the incorporation of staff training into a UN career development system. Even though the UN administration might have conducted its own studies, independent research could validate the UN’s findings and, consequently, support the reform progress in the coming years.

5.5 The UN of the Future and its HR Management

Latest developments in many Member States of the UN have shown a trend of increased outsourcing of services from the public sector to private enterprises, which specialized in services previously delivered by public sector agencies. Another phenomena that can be observed is the trend of joint ventures between governmental and private sector organizations to utilize the most specialized or best-performing agency for the delivery of common public services, instead of duplicating or competing in the service delivery.
As these tendencies become more apparent at national levels, and public sector organizations shift as a result of those developments, from being mainly service providers themselves to becoming coordinating agencies, similar changes could be possible in the future in international organizations. Following this trend on the national level, it is possible that in a few years a new generation of international organizations evolve; some of which may become coordinators of services, others the providers of specialized services to other international organization clients.

It is difficult to predict if and when such developments may become also realities on a wider basis for the UN, but the discussion about the effectiveness of the UN versus non-governmental organizations and the increase of international assistance through smaller, more flexible non-governmental organizations shows that new alternatives for future international aid and assistance have opened up (A/59/354). According to this scenario, the UN could develop in future from a service organization to a coordinator of international assistance by outsourcing many of the functions it is at present performing in the field.

So far, the UN has taken the approach to utilize common services as much as possible within its own system (in-sourcing) and to establish, especially in the field, joint offices to facilitate the delivery and coordination of services and programmes. In accordance with the 2005 World Summit Outcome resolution (A/60/1), the UN is to utilize to a greater extent the combined experience of its various organizations, agencies, funds and programmes in the pursuit of its goals and to expand its cooperation with regional and national organizations and private enterprises.

Should such developments continue and be further extended, the UN HR management as a central common service would change considerably. Coordination and outsourcing requires a different management approach and different skills of staff and managers. In particular the outsourcing of services would create an increased demand for contract managers with the specialized knowledge of the respective service industry.

If the UN would increasingly slip into the role of a coordination agent instead of directly delivering the services as mandated by Member States, the Secretariat would require less people with higher-specialized knowledge and could most possibly reduce its large
administrative bureaucracy to concentrate on its functions as forum organization and major coordinator of international assistance and aid.

Whether or not such developments eventuate, the UN must continue to re-construct its management and to modernize the ways financial and human resources are managed. While it may be easier to establish a new entity than to change and streamline an existing, complex system, in particular when these changes have to be undertaken while the system continues to operate, examples of national public sector reforms have demonstrated that drastic steps such as the privatisation of former national services (e.g. national transportation and postal services) are not impossible to manage and could even improve customer services.

Under any scenario, if it is more coordination and in-sourcing or more cooperation and outsourcing of UN services, the UN will have to respond to such changes by establishing a functioning, central HR management planning system which will allow the organization to manage its present and future staff requirements, including the building of a cadre of staff with the necessary skills and professional expertise. In this context, the maintenance of a proper skills and talents bank (an staff inventory) is as important as the establishing of a functioning staff development system that is clearly linked to career development.

Proper HR management planning will also include that the recruitment and appointment system is revised and employment conditions are comparable throughout the UN system, in order to facilitate transfers of staff between the various, cooperating UN entities without disadvantages to their career development and contractual status. That the selection and recruitment process needs to be further improved goes without question and has been recently acknowledged by the SG himself.

Once a staff development structure is in place, which will capture current talents and experience of individuals and the knowledge developments of staff (through training and further external education programmes), the question of PM will almost automatically fall into place. There is no proper staff development without adequate placement. Logically, placement decisions of supervisors would have to be screened not only to ensure that formalities were met, but also that the placement decision is in the interest of the individual’s knowledge development and coherent with the organizational HR planning.
Unfortunately, inappropriate placement decisions of managers have, in some instances, hampered or further deteriorated a staff member’s chances of career development by isolating the staff member from central work processes and, therefore, from the opportunity to gain further professional knowledge. Placement and mobility in the UN have to be more readily recognized as important contributors to the individual learning process and, therefore, career development.

As some of the placement and appointment decisions that turned out less advantageous to individual staff members demonstrate, it will be advisable to link the UN HR management planning with a system of frequent reviews of the PM of managers to closely monitor and evaluate managers’ performance with respect to the PM of their staff. This will ensure that staff members are not sidelined and excluded from their chance of skills and knowledge development regardless of their personal relationship with the boss, their contractual status, gender, seniority and level.

In order to synchronize the above mentioned elements, staff planning and staff development which should be linked to a fair career development and a smart placement and appointment strategy, it is inevitable to return to a more centrally administered UN HR management system for the purpose of managing these key functions.

In fact, as the UN may be steering towards more cooperation, the sharing of common services and efficient coordination, my vision of the new UN HR management is that a system-wide Office of Personnel Management would be responsible for the key functions, while leaving the day-to-day HR management in the hands of managers and supervisors under the control of the heads of the main offices, Regional Commissions and field duty stations.

Although many improvements have been accomplished between 1997 and the end of 2005, and further reform steps have been taken in early 2006, the new HR management system is still at its infant stage and has not brought about revolutionizing transformations of the existing system. Accomplishments, such as more flexible working arrangements
and an electronic vacancy/application system (Galaxy), are common features in many organizations worldwide and will required further development and improvements.\textsuperscript{289}

Nonetheless, the year 2006 will signify a second major step towards the new HR management (after the implementation of the SSS in 2002) with the introduction of the new mobility scheme.

The main achievement of these reforms is the introduction of a reform programme that has touched more areas of the internal management and structures of the UN and has initiated more changes than any other former reform efforts could do. As the analysis of the ongoing reform implementations showed, the completion of reforms is even in early 2006, after 10 years of intensive HR management reform activities, a long way from being completed.\textsuperscript{290} In the years ahead, the UN Secretariat and the system as a whole will continue to go through many more changes until Member States will be satisfied with the modifications.

Hopefully, the reform of the internal management of the UN and its HR management will successfully continue to catch up with modern management practices. At the end, true UN reform goes beyond formal changes of an existing system and its policies. It is a development process of an organization in which all actors must actively participate as equal partners and, most of all, by re-examining their own views, attitudes and behaviours in light of the reformed organization they desire.

\textsuperscript{289} The UN Secretariat has, for instance, not yet explored the possibility to introduce job-sharing, a wider use of part-time and tele-working. With respect to the Galaxy system, plans are discussed to replace this system by a new software more adequate for the purpose of planning and management performance.

\textsuperscript{290} This is also acknowledged in the latest reform report of the SG (A/60/692), which is published at the time the final editing of this study is concluded.
Annexes

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Annex I: The Departments of the United Nations Secretariat and Offices away from headquarters, including Regional Commissions (as at June 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departments</th>
<th>Regional Commissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Office of the Secretary-General (OSG)</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Addis Ababa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Ethics Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS)</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Office of Legal Affairs (OLA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Department of Management (DM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Department of Political Affairs (DPA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) Department for General Assembly and Conference Management (DGACM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) Department of Public Information (DPI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Department of Safety and Security (DSS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15) Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offices Away from Headquarters</th>
<th>Regional Commissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG), includes: the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON), includes: the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (Habitat) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV), includes: the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Beirut</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annex II: Oath of Office

**Staff Regulation 1.1(b)**

Staff members shall make the following written declaration witnessed by the SG or his authorized representative:

> “I solemnly declare and promise to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the United Nations, to discharge these functions and regulate my conduct with the interest of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any Government or other sources external to the Organization. I also solemnly declare and promise to respect the obligations incumbent upon me as set out in the Staff Regulations and Rules.”

Annex III: Categories of UN International Civil Servants of the United Nations Secretariat

## Professional Service and higher categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under-Secretary-General</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary-General</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director D-2</td>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Officer D-1</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officer P-5</td>
<td>XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Officer P-4</td>
<td>XV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Officer P-3</td>
<td>XV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate Officer P-2</td>
<td>XII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Officer P-1</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
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</table>

## General Service and related categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GS-7</td>
<td>XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-6</td>
<td>XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-5</td>
<td>XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-4</td>
<td>XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-3</td>
<td>XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-2</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS-1</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There are 12 steps at UNOG, while offices in Rome offer from the equivalent G-1 to the G-6 level 15 steps and at the G-7 level 12 steps.

## Trades and Crafts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Steps</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TC-8</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-7</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-6</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-5</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-4</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-3</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-2</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-1</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Security Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-7</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-6</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-5</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>IX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Field Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FS-7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS-6</td>
<td>XII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS-5</td>
<td>XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS-4</td>
<td>XV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS-3</td>
<td>XV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS-2</td>
<td>XII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS-1</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Public Information Assistant and Tour Coordinator/Supervisor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tour Coordinator/Supervisor and Briefing Assistant</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information Assistant II</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information Assistant I</td>
<td>II</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Language Teacher

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language Teacher</td>
<td>XII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* UNOG offers for this category 13 steps

(data compiled from various UN sources)
Annex IV: Composition of the UN Task Force on Human Resources Management Reform (GA Resolution 51/226)

Mrs. Rafiah Salim (Malaysia),
Mr. Sidi Mohammed Cheiguer (Mauritania),
Mr. Gerardo de la Garza (Mexico),
Mr. Robert Dodoo (Ghana),
Mr. Mohan Kaul (India),

Mr. CJ (Clive) Parry (UK),
Ms. Benita Plesch (Netherlands),
Mr. Reyer (Rick) A. Swaak (USA),
Mr. Akira Takahashi (Japan),
Ms. Rosalie Tung (Canada),

ASG for Human Resources Management, UN
President, BSA Group
Executive Manager for Human Resources, CEMEX
Head, Ghana Civil Service
Director, Management and Training Services Division, Commonwealth Secretariat
Head, International Public Service Unit, Cabinet Office, Office of Public Service
Director-General for the Senior Public Service
Principal of O.S.S., Inc.
Special Assistant to the President, Japan International Cooperation Agency
Chaired Professor of International Business at Simon Fraser University

Coordinator of the Task Force: Mr. Roger Eggleston, Secretary of the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (PER)
Secretary of the Task Force: Ms. Rachel Mayanja, Chief, Common System and Compensation Service

(The Task Force was constituted in January 1998.)

(Source: Secretariat News, March 1998, page 5)
Annex V: Reform goals, actions and measurable results related to the UN HR Management Reform 1997 – 2005

### IDEOLOGICAL CHANGES – A NEW, POSITIVE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFORM GOAL:</th>
<th>A HR management culture that is responsive and results-oriented, that rewards creativity and innovation and promotes continuous learning, high performance and managerial excellence (A/53/414).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Measurable Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulate vision of the new HR management culture as part of the overall culture change</td>
<td>Directions for the development of specific reform measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date of Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote the new culture in the context of management reforms, which includes the building of a culture of continuous learning</td>
<td>Publication of new standards and values through various media (reports, e-mail, video conferences and town hall meetings) and through various training programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance assessment against core values, core competencies and managerial competencies (see Compact &amp; PAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff morale improved (assessed by public statements of staff union representatives and administrators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial reduction of rebuttals and cases filed against administrative decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction Programmes for new staff and managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure consultations and continuous dialogue with MS on management reform issues</td>
<td>A high ratio of consensus and support of HR management reforms by MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date of Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct access to information placed on UN Website for all Permanent Missions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prior to 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expeditious approval of reform proposals and budgetary provisions related to HR management reforms by MS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely payments of contributions by MS as indicator of their general support of reforms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure active staff participation in the development of reforms</td>
<td>Joint staff-management working groups to define HR management reform measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date of Initiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# IDEOLOGICAL CHANGES – A NEW, POSITIVE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

**REFORM GOAL:** A HR management culture that is responsive and results-oriented, that rewards creativity and innovation and promotes continuous learning, high performance and managerial excellence (A/53/414).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Measurable Results</th>
<th>Date of Initiation (a)</th>
<th>Status of Implementation (b)</th>
<th>Completed (Y / N)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High degree of successful staff-management cooperation on reform issues</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Repetitive activity throughout the UN process</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements of staff-management relations are publicly confirmed by both sites</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of new bodies for staff-management consultations complementing or replacing existing joint bodies such as the Staff-Management Coordination Committee (SMCC)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No concrete steps taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break down rigid, hierarchical structures and provide legislative framework for change that will also have an impact on the management of human resources</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>From 1998 onwards</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New mechanisms for better cooperation among UN entities (&quot;one roof&quot;) also in HR management matters and in view of staff mobility</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2001 and further revisions planned</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New nomenclature by addressing all UN employees as International Civil Servants</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce new guidelines and establish policies to encourage behaviour coherent with the new organizational/HR management culture</td>
<td>Revision of the Standards of Conduct</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2001 and further revisions planned</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Code of Conduct (with further revisions after 2002)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whistleblower protection</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader harassment policy</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Antifraud policy</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy and measures in support of ethical conduct</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy on financial disclosure for senior officials</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote the UN's image as an attractive work place</td>
<td>- with a flexible and responsive management system</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- which attracts and retains successfully more highly qualified professionals</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- with job profiles that reflect core competencies and desired managerial functions</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 26
### STRATEGIC CHANGES – A DYNAMIC AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT REFORM STRATEGY

#### REFORM GOAL:
A long-term management strategy to strengthen the UN civil service and to modernize the UN HR management through decentralization by assigning full authority and responsibility to managers (A/51/950).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Measurable Results</th>
<th>Date of Initiation (a)</th>
<th>Status of Implementation (b)</th>
<th>Completed (Y / N)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen the leadership capacities by changing administrative authorities to the SG as Chief Administrator</td>
<td>SG has the authority to redeploy posts and utilize savings without the prior approval of MS.</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No more micro-management/interference by MS in recruitment and appointment decisions of the SG</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No concrete steps taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a long-term strategy for reform that includes a comprehensive HR management reform programme</td>
<td>Appointment of a Task Force on HR management reform</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submission of specific HR management reforms for endorsement by the GA followed by further proposals in 2000, 2002 and various progress reports</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expeditious implementation of reform measures as scheduled</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ independent experts and expertise of the ICSC, Board of Auditors, JIU and OIOS to design reform proposals</td>
<td>Proposed reform measures are based on a broad basis of knowledge and expertise</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design specific measures in HR management key areas which are based on the wide agreement of management and staff</td>
<td>Establishing of Working Groups to define jointly (staff &amp; management) reform measures and of Strategic Units in each department to assist in and oversee the implementation</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralize management</td>
<td>Delegation of authority to UN agencies and Offices away from HQs to manage their own funds and human resources without prior approval by HQs</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some 15 HR management functions are delegated to heads of departments</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full responsibility for HR management is delegated to heads of departments</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clear guidelines in view of the delegation of HR management responsibilities are in place</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A flexible and responsive HR management</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**STRATEGIC CHANGES – A DYNAMIC AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT REFORM STRATEGY**

**REFORM GOAL:** A long-term management strategy to strengthen the UN civil service and to modernize the UN HR management through decentralization by assigning full authority and responsibility to managers (A/51/950).

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change the role of OHRM to a central office for HR planning and policy management</td>
<td>See functional and structural changes as a result of the decentralization of HR management and respective new policies</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce a long-term productivity strategy</td>
<td>Results-based budget planning and annual performance reporting requires the justification of posts</td>
<td>prior to 1997</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental programme management plans and work plans (for sections and units) establish individual performance goals</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease administrative spending by 1/3</td>
<td>No budgetary growth between 1998 and 2001 and again in the 2002/03 budget proposal that would result from the establishing of new posts and functions within the Secretariat</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abolishing of 1,000 posts (before budget period 1998/99) - NOTE: more staff post reductions are in progress and planned, e.g. the abolishing of 90 posts in 2006/2007</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>From 1998 onwards</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of possible areas of savings</td>
<td>Repetitive activity throughout the UN process</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Repetitive activity throughout the UN process</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FUNCTIONAL CHANGES - NEW OR REVISED MECHANISMS AND POLICIES

REFORM GOAL: A modern, flexible and efficient HR Management that includes effective accountability mechanisms and improved internal controls (A/55/253).

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<th>Actions</th>
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<th>Completed (Y / N)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish a thorough UN HR planning system</td>
<td>Introduction of a medium- and long-term integrated human resources planning system, including succession planning</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HR Action Plans are established throughout the Secretariat (with 26 departments/offices participating in the 2003/2004 cycle)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>From 1999/2000 onwards</td>
<td>Could not be confirmed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skills Inventory to establish a functional database on skills, qualifications and talents of UN staff</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simplify and streamline processes, rules and procedures</td>
<td>Revisions of the UN Staff Rules and Regulations and personnel-related Administrative Instructions, handbooks and guidelines</td>
<td>prior to 1997</td>
<td>Repetitive activity throughout the UN process</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elimination of over 290 obsolete Administrative Instructions (including not only the HR management)</td>
<td>prior to 1997</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve the recruitment, placement and promotion system</td>
<td>Staff Selection System</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection System for senior officials</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GALAXY introduces globally vacancy announcements (the first electronic UN recruitment and tracking system)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information on existing vacancies is directly sent to Permanent Missions</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recruitment process is reduced by 40% (in time required) within two years (2000 to 2002)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Could not be confirmed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction of the Assessment Centre Approach in the UN Secretariat</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>No concrete steps taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive accountability and monitoring mechanisms in conjunction with these delegated HR management authorities</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special training to prepare managers and members of the Central Review Bodies for their functions under the decentralized system</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No concrete training publicized</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve geographical distribution of posts</td>
<td>Reduced numbers of unrepresented and underrepresented countries (no further specifics could be established)</td>
<td>since foundation of the UN</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FUNCTIONAL CHANGES - NEW OR REVISED MECHANISMS AND POLICIES

REFORM GOAL: A modern, flexible and efficient HR Management that includes effective accountability mechanisms and improved internal controls (A/55/253).

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<tr>
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<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve representation of women</td>
<td>A 50% representation of women throughout the Secretariat</td>
<td>since 1946</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase mobility</td>
<td>Managed mobility programme for Professional and Senior General Service staff (initially on a voluntary basis; as of 2007 mandatory)</td>
<td>prior to 1997</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managed mobility programme for junior professional staff at the P-2 level</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase of overall mobility rate from currently 1.5% (July 1999 - June 2000) - not further specified in terms of ratio or time table</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentives for mobility</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No concrete steps taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce a model of competencies and continuous learning</td>
<td>Specifically designed training, partially mandatory, for staff at all levels throughout the UN Secretariats to build awareness of the desired changed culture and management skills (e.g. People Management since 1996, Supervisory Skills Training for senior GS and Professionals since 1998; Communication Workshop for senior staff in Oct. 2000)</td>
<td>prior to 1997</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure re-training of staff effected by reform measures</td>
<td>US$ 15 million programme for training and re-appointment activities</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No concrete training publicized</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a performance management system</td>
<td>PAS is introduced throughout the Secretariat</td>
<td>prior to 1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revised and electronic version (e-PAS) applies to all staff with appointments under 100 Rules, except at levels of ASG and above</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance compact for senior managers (ASG and above)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsibility and accountability aspects are fully considered in the performance appraisal process</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance award system is established</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No concrete steps taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FUNCTIONAL CHANGES - NEW OR REVISED MECHANISMS AND POLICIES

**REFORM GOAL:** A modern, flexible and efficient HR Management that includes effective accountability mechanisms and improved internal controls (A/55/253).

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish career development as a management tool</td>
<td>Annual Staff Development Programmes to build new skills and assist staff in their career development “planning”</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint advertising of vacancies of UN, UN AIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP &amp; WHO to increase mobility rate within the Secretariat and the UN system</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve the conditions of service</td>
<td>Competitive salaries and fair(er) conditions of employment based on the recommendations of the ICSC and CEB</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No concrete steps taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New measures in view of the spouse employment; flexi-place work; childcare and elder care; domestic partnerships; and dependency benefits</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction of flexi-time work arrangements</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular workshops on security issues, personal safety and victim assistance</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analyse existing conditions to propose suitable measures (e.g. through survey on Sexual Harassment in 1997; on Work/Life Issues in 2002; and on Integrity in 2004)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Repetitive activity throughout the UN process</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change contractual arrangements</td>
<td>New contractual arrangements (fixed-term, short-term and continuing contracts) and proposed discontinuation of permanent contracts</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No concrete steps taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a new system of justice</td>
<td>Introduction of the Case and Jurisprudence Digest of UNAT judgements in Nov. 2001</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definition of clearly defined measures</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appointment of a Redesign Panel to propose a new model</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Exceeds review period</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review the composition, mandate and conditions of the ICSC</td>
<td>Changes of the statute and mandate of the ICSC</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Was clearly rejected by MS in 1999</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### FUNCTIONAL CHANGES - NEW OR REVISED MECHANISMS AND POLICIES

**REFORM GOAL:** A modern, flexible and efficient HR Management that includes effective accountability mechanisms and improved internal controls (A/55/253).

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utilize UN training and research entities and independent expertise in the management reform process</td>
<td>Frequent use of the facilities of the UNSSC and UNU for learning and training purposes of staff and managers</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce new technologies to improve HR management</td>
<td>Implementation of all IMIS HR management components, incl. automated time and attendance recording procedures</td>
<td>prior to 1997</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HRMIS (as sub-system to IMIS) that includes rosters</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Appears to be abandoned in the process</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic HR Handbook</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worldwide access to relevant information (including HR management reform issues) through the UN Intranet and Internet made available through the ODS, i-seek and other platforms</td>
<td>prior to 1997</td>
<td>Ongoing reform effort</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galaxy (see also functional changes - improvement of the recruitment, placement and promotion system)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish the KIMRS as management/monitoring tool</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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 STRUCTURAL CHANGES - NEW AND STREAMLINED ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-organize the Secretariat to a smaller and more cost-efficient administration</td>
<td>A leaner administration with simplified structures and a less hierarchical management</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a senior management structure that reflects and supports the new organizational culture, re-enforces changes of managerial functions and serves as a consultative forum with respect to HR management reform</td>
<td>Approval and establishing of the post of DSG and appointment</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Management Group</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations System Chief Executive Board (CEB) (replaces the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC)) to further coordination and cooperation on the whole range of substantive and management issues</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLCM (advisory sub-committee of the CEB, which is subdivided into working groups on specific management issues)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Committee</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Committee</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure implementation of specific recommendations with respect to accountability issues and monitoring of performance of senior managers</td>
<td>Steering Committee on Reform and Management (chaired by the DSG)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a Strategic Planning Unit - Announcement of the appointments of the members of this Strategic Unit</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability Panel / as of 2005 Management Performance Board</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce joint staff-management bodies to ensure and improve the monitoring of managerial decisions</td>
<td>Joint Monitoring Committees in each department and office</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Joint Monitoring Committee (subsidiary to the SMCC) to make recommendations on PAS implementation and policy issues</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish mechanisms to review and monitor the correct execution of HR management authorities delegated to managers</td>
<td>- at the departmental level: Central Review Bodies (Boards, Committees and Panels)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- for senior staff (D-2 and above: Senior Review Group</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## STRUCTURAL CHANGES - NEW AND STREAMLINED ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES

### REFORM GOAL:
A new organizational structure in response to the administrative changes to reflect the new roles of departments and the Office of Human Resources Management and to carry out the new and enhanced functions of the central management (A/59/263).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Measurable Results</th>
<th>Date of Initiation (a)</th>
<th>Status of Implementation (b)</th>
<th>Completed (Y / N)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase effectiveness of the oversight function and that appropriate management action is taken to implement the recommendations of OIOS, the Board of Auditors and JIU</td>
<td>Oversight Committee to provide independent advice to the SG on all Secretariat activities relating to internal and external oversight and investigations</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructure the DM to ensure the most efficient oversight of the implementation of reforms</td>
<td>Principal Office to assist the Under-Secretary-General for Management in the implementation of management reforms, related policies and the development of strategies</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office for Oversight and Internal Justice to establish administrative policies, procedures and machinery for the efficient functioning of the internal system of justice and to provide legal advice on the disposition of appeals, staff grievances, disciplinary matters and the implementation of judgements of the UNAT</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish new entities to improve the system of justice</td>
<td>Office of the Ombudsman within the Office of the SG</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishing of new bodies and revision of terms of reference of existing bodies concerned with rebuttals, claims and the review of cases submitted</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>No concrete steps taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create various oversight and monitoring mechanisms within OHRM and within departments in support the new HR management</td>
<td>Establishing of advisory bodies and specific units at the departmental level to monitor the execution of authorities assigned to managers with respect to HR management functions</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct &amp; Discipline Units</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethics Office</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-structure the Secretariat to reflect the redefined role of OHRM and Executive Offices (EOs)</td>
<td>Re-organize OHRM and EOs to institute special units as required to administer the new functions of OHRM and those delegated to departments and offices away from headquarters</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Date of Initiation: Year when this action and related results were announced as being initiated or in progress.
(b) Status of Implementation: If not otherwise indicated, the specific year refers to the year results were officially proposed/announced as fully implemented.
NOTE: The ratings on the completion (Y/N) are based on the accomplishment of the measurable results by the date they were announced as implemented in official records compared with information of second sources that confirmed or refuted the completion. If results had not been fully reached by the announced date - even though such results may have been attained after the formally announced date - the rating N was given for not completed. In cases where no specific date for the planned or completed implementation could be established, but results had been accomplished by a given date (completely implemented), the status as at December 2005 (closing of this review period) is recorded, accordingly.
Annex VI: Pilot Study Documentary

**Expert Interview Outline**

**Approach**

The goal of this pilot study was to detect the mood among staff members of the UN Secretariat with respect to the proposed reforms and implementation of UN HR management measures in connection with the ongoing reform process. The date chosen for collecting relevant data was the fifth year after the introduction of HR management reforms. In preparation of this study, informal meetings had taken place with various key players in the UN Secretariat and representatives of Permanent Missions to identify the priorities these parties would give internal management reforms.

To collect data on the perception of staff, personal interviews were conducted with 22 staff members of the UN Secretariat in three duty stations, New York, Geneva and Vienna during the course of 2002. Of the total number of persons originally invited, eight were not available at the time the interview was to take place due to unscheduled events or official travel requirements on short notice. With the exception of one, all invitees responded in a very courteous and cooperative manner by offering a later interview date or arranging for a member of their office to accept the invitation on their behalf or by delegating the task to a more reform-experienced colleague.

In two instances, the delegated persons felt insufficiently qualified to respond to the questions and felt uncomfortable to undergo a formal interview. As a result, an agreement was reached to hold an unstructured, informal talk in place of the interview. The questions asked followed the outline of the semi-structured interviews with formally invited respondents. These observational data were, obviously, not included in the analysis of data collected through the actual interview process.

The response of a 22nd respondent could be included only in part into the conclusive analysis of the interview due the fact that the statistical analysis of the Questionnaire was almost completed at the time this respondent was available for questioning. As a result, the data recorded during the interview session with the 22nd respondent was included in the text.
analysis of the interviews, but was not included in the statistical analysis of the Questionnaire. As a result, the statistical analysis consists of 21 respondents, while the analysis of the recorded interviews is based on a sample of 22 respondents.

**Structure of the study**

Interview data were compiled using a two-step approach. In a first step, data were collected through semi-structured interviews. The majority of respondents agreed that this interview was voice-recorded. In a few cases, respondents refused that their responses were recorded on tape. Responses were in addition recorded in an Interview Evaluation Form (see below). The second step involved the respondents’ active cooperation by completing the Questionnaire (displayed below) rating single problems in the reform implementation on a scale of 100 for the most important to zero (0) for the least important problem experienced in the implementation of reforms. A rating of 50 represents the respondents’ neutral opinion with respect to the importance experienced.

The Questionnaire addressed 23 problem areas of the reform implementation and respondents were offered to rate any of those problem areas on a scale of 100 (most important) to zero (least important). For two problem fields (conflicting goals and others), respondents were given the possibility to specify and assign single ratings.

Statistical data, such as position, year of birth, years of service in the UN and number of duty stations served at, were collected from each respondent to record the characteristics of this sample group and were entered into a Code Record (see below). This Code Record was kept separate from the actual reform data to guarantee the anonymity of the participants in the process of the data analysis.

All respondents were invited two months in advance of the scheduled interview date. The invitation contained a brief outline of the purpose of the interview and a summary of this research study of the UN HR management reform. Correspondence was submitted by e-mail with a follow-up letter faxed to each individual. In order to confirm the dates and exact time of the interviews, over 50 per cent of invitations required a personal phone call to the respondent.
The allocated time for each interview session was 60 minutes. The session consisted of four parts, an introduction, the semi-structured interview, the completion of the Code Record and the completion of the Questionnaire.

The purpose of the introduction was to outline to each respondent the general purpose of this research project, the content of the interview, and the use of the empirical data. Each respondent was issued a Statement of Confidentiality and assured that no information exposing the respondent’s identity would be used without the individual’s prior expressed permission. Respondents were encouraged to discuss any issues of their personal concern related to the UN HR management reform not necessarily addressed by the questions guiding through the various stages of the semi-structured interview and to ask for clarification on any of the interview questions.

**Catalogue of Questions:**

The interview covered two groups of questions. The first group of questions was directed at the ongoing reform process including the staff representation; the second group of questions related to the future of the reform. The questions of this semi-structured interview are listed in the Evaluation Form below. To offer respondents an opportunity to relate further thoughts after the interview session, respondents were given a contact phone number and e-mail address in case they wanted to forward additional comments. Of all respondents four submitted additional information after the interview.

**Size and Characteristics of Sample Group**

Respondents were selected on the basis of their function and professional involvement, knowledge and experience of the UN reform process. To obtain a valid view and opinion, UN servants were invited to participate in this pilot study that would build a representative sample of UN civil servants of the UN Secretariat, including managers at different management levels, members of OHRM and its subsidiary offices in Geneva and Vienna and representatives of the Staff Union.

The sample consisted of 22 respondents. This sample is, nevertheless, considered representative since it consisted of participants ranking from most senior UN officials at the Assistant Secretary-General level who were at the time of the interviews in key positions with respect to UN HR management reforms to lower levels in the UN Secretariat.
Respondents included also staff representatives of central administrative units. As a result, the sample consisted of individuals who either represented as senior managers the overall management strategy of the administrative units under their authorities or who as staff representatives could be considered representing the opinion and mood of the staff at large.

Table 9 below shows the distribution of respondents by administrative bodies (departments and offices and independent entities of the UN), which included top managers of the UN Secretariat, staff representatives and representatives of OIOS, ICSC and the JIU. In the interest of ensuring the anonymity of the respondents, no further details on the ranks and positions of respondents are provided. Respondents ranked from the level of Assistant Secretary-General to the levels of the General Service category.

Table 9: Respondents by Department and UN Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>PER CENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHRM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest ranking UN Official approached was the Under-Secretary-General for Management at the time who delegated this task to his Special Assistant.

Unfortunately, not all Staff Representatives were available to participate. It was, therefore, agreed with the Staff Committee that representatives of units that could be considered key to the UN Secretariat operation would participate in this pilot study.
The distribution by gender was balanced with 11 male (plus one male respondent interviewed after the data analysis was completed) and 10 female respondents. The age of the respondents was between 30 (youngest respondent) and 78 (oldest respondent).

Of the 17 respondents who provided their entry date into the service of the UN system, nine individuals (53%) had joined the international civil service of the UN before 1980 and eight (47%) after 1980. The shortest period of continuous service among respondents was a period of four years. The longest period was given 34 years of continuous service in the UN system.

The most recently re-assigned candidate was about three months in the new position, while the least mobile respondent had been for 34 years in the present position and duty station. With the exception of one respondent, who had left the UN civil service and had rejoined the UN international civil service after some years, all respondents had continuously worked within the UN Secretariat or the UN system after their initial recruitment by the UN.

**Response Rate**

The collection of data through the semi-structured interview was accomplished at a rate of 100 per cent (22 respondents). Due to the late scheduled interview of the 22nd respondent, the sample group for the statistical analysis of the Code Record and Questionnaire accounts however for 21 respondents (see table 9). Returns of the Code Records were 76 per cent. Returns of the Questionnaire amounted to 71 per cent. The small sample represents a pilot study to identify the main problem areas in the current reform implementation and to test the hypotheses of this study introduced in the introduction of this study. The statistical analysis of the empirical data collected through these expert interviews provides information on trends, individual opinions and perceptions, but also offers valuable answers with respect to the existing reluctance of staff members and managers towards and their awareness of the reform of the HR management of the UN Secretariat.

All but two of the respondents were extremely accommodating and shared their views, experiences and insights in a very open and genial manner. The average interview was scheduled to take one-hour time, however in a few cases the respondents volunteered to exceed the allocated time by more than 30 minutes; in two cases the respondents continued their discussion of UN management reform issues during my follow-up visits. Such follow-
up visits were required in order to collect the questionnaire each candidate was asked to complete after the interview. With the exception of two individuals, all respondents talked frankly about their personal expectations, offering personal observations and sharing their perceptions. Some also referred to the feedback they had received from colleagues and other staff members on the current UN HR management reform. Only two individuals were reluctant to answer all questions or asked that their reply to specific topics be removed from the records.

**Analytical Methodology**

The data collected through the close-ended questionnaire were analysed with the assistance of Dr. Robert Yaffee of the New York University. Data were directly entered into SPSS v.11.5, SAS v 8.2, and STATA 7 and later STATA7SE. After an initial frequencies analysis of the data, Dr. Yaffee applied a variety of bivariate significance tests to assess hypothesized relationships between aspects of the reform and other factors.

An overall index of the criticism (critical count) of the HR reform was constructed by summing the scores on evaluation items (from lack of direction through negative attitude). The critical count on a number of assessments was regressed by applying a White estimator to determine what factors significantly contributed to a critical assessment of the HR reform.

To confirm the validity of the model, Dr. Yaffee tested the residuals for normality with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, for heteroskedasticity with a Cook-Weisberg test, and for collinearity with a correlation matrix among the independent variables. The statistical packages used to analyse these data included SAS, SPSS, and STATA.

Data recorded during the semi-structured interviews were transcribed, transferred from the transcripts to spreadsheets, coded and categorized and tested for variance, reliability and significance before further analysed.
Form used to collect data for this Pilot Study

THE NEW UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Code Record

I. Personal Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME:</th>
<th>TITLE/FUNCTION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOINED THE UN: 19</td>
<td>LEVEL/GRADE:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIRTH DATE (year only):</td>
<td>DUTY STATION:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTACT (Ph/Fax):</td>
<td>DEPT/Office/Unit/Section:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail:</td>
<td>ROOM #</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Years with the Organization:

ENTRY DATE

CONTRACTUAL STATUS

(please enter the number of years/months you have been …)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in the UN System:</th>
<th>Short Term (less than one year):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fixed Term:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the Secretariat:</td>
<td>Indicate the present contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at this Duty Station:</td>
<td>term as shown on the P11(mm/yy):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in this Position:</td>
<td>Permanent:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at this Level:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HAVE YOU BEEN AT OTHER DUTY STATIONS?

YES ☐ NO ☐

If this is not your first duty station, since you entered into the service of the United Nations, where were you posted before?

(up to 3 entries) __________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

How long were you at your last duty station/s? (yy/mm) ____________
EVALUATION FORM
(used as a record sheet in addition to the recordings of the interviews)

III. The Ongoing Reform Process

a. The SG has developed a comprehensive reform programme of the United Nations, which includes the reform of the management of human resources of the UN Secretariat. Do you in general agree that the UN HR management needs to be reformed?

Yes □ No □ No opinion □

b. What would you say is the most important issue of the current reform programme? Changing attitudes of managers and staff, changing the rules and methods how human resources are managed or what do you believe is most relevant in the context of the HR management reform?

c. SG Kofi Annan initiated the current HR management reform programme in 1997. Since then a number of changes have been made and reform goals were accomplished. What, in your opinion, are the most successful steps taken so far?

d. From UN official records and public announcements I got the impression that a number of reform plans could not be implemented as originally planned.* Some had to be delayed, because the GA postponed consultations, others were not carried out, because – I believe - there may have been not enough funding and manpower. Would you like to comment on these shortcomings of the reform implementation, starting with the delays in the reform implementation as observed by you?

d.1 Delays

d.2 Non-implementations

e. Do you think that such delays/non-implementations will cause possible problems for the overall reform implementation?

f. **TO STAFF REPRESENTATION.** The Staff Union (Staff Committee) has repeatedly claimed that their views are not sufficiently respected in the context of the current HR management reform and Staff Representatives are not always invited or allowed to participate in the development of HR management reform strategies. Do you think these accusations are justified?
g. Did you receive any feedback from the staff and managers in your department in terms of how well the current reform programme and single reform measures are perceived?

☐ I am fully aware/informed.
☐ I am aware of the most relevant concerns of my staff and managers.
☐ I am not fully aware of what is going on and how my staff/managers feel about the reform.
☐ I do not know enough about their perceptions and the mood in my area.
☐ I have no/very little knowledge.

h. How do staff members and managers in your department perceive the reforms? (with enthusiasm, with mixed feelings or are they afraid and anxious?)


i. Do you feel that your regular work leaves you sufficient time to actually be able to see the practical results of these reforms or are you too occupied by routine work or urgent deadlines to observe the changes/impact the HR management reform has created?


j. Do you believe that UN staff members are today better off and are less frustrated than they were in 1985 and before 1997?

Yes ☐ No ☐ No opinion ☐

IV. The Future of the Reform

k. Given the knowledge/information you have at this point of time, what do you think will be the outcome of the current reform process? Will it succeed and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN?

better ☐ the same ☐ worse ☐ other ☐

l. Will it make Member States more agreeable with the UN management style of the UN Secretariat?

Better ☐ the same ☐ worse ☐ other ☐
m. Where do you expect the biggest future challenges of the reform programme? Will it be in the area of financial resources or do you think there may be some reform frustration if this programme is not implemented as quickly as possible?

n. Would you like to make any final comments and talk about issues we have not covered in this interview?
Please order the importance of the problems you have experienced in implementing the reforms in your area of responsibility on a scale of 100 to 0 (100 being the most important, 0 being the least important).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Problems in Reform Implementation</th>
<th>Rating (100-0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lack of managerial direction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lack of time frame integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lack of supporting staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lack of funds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lack of supplies at my level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Lack of technological support at my level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Conflicting objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Lack of training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lack of interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Lack of oversight</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lack of checks and balances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Lack of periodic review of progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Lack of reporting of the progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Lack of sanctions for non-compliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Conflicting goals (if so please specify below)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Inconsistent direction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lack of specification of objectives at my level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Lack of agreement on division of labour at my level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Cultural resistance to change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Lack of communication between management and staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Lack of ombudsman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Other (please comment below)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To 16 (Conflicting goals): ____________________________________________________________
To 23 (Other): ________________________________________________________________

Kindly treat this questionnaire confidentially. The design and content of this questionnaire is the proprietary of Ms. Anna Edighoffer and its sole purpose is to be used in connection with this study.
You are asked to complete this brief questionnaire after the interview and return it directly to Ms. Edighoffer. In exceptional cases, it may be agreed that you return the completed questionnaire by fax to Anna Edighoffer (Fax +44-xxxxxxxx) or via e-mail to xxxxxxxxxx@xxx.com
Statement of Confidentiality

Interview

The New Human Resources Management of the United Nations

The content of this interview will remain confidential, and any related documentation and evaluation will be coded to ensure anonymity. No comments attributed to you will be included in my thesis without your previous personal approval and permission.

Signature of interviewer/researcher

Date: ________________
Annex VII: Gender distribution of all staff in the Professional and higher categories with appointments of one year or more in the United Nations Secretariat, by department or office and by grade, as at 30 June 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department/Office</th>
<th>USG</th>
<th>ASG</th>
<th>D-2</th>
<th>D-1</th>
<th>P-5</th>
<th>P-4</th>
<th>P-3</th>
<th>P-2</th>
<th>P-1</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Grand total</th>
<th>Percentage of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGCOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFIP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSRSGCAC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
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(Source: A/57/447: Table 1 [IMIS])

Note: A similar break-down of the distribution by department and level is presented in table A.8(e) of A/57/414 for the total group of Professional Service staff (regardless of the type of appointment), which differs slightly from the data presented above.
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